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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Vol. I of this study looks at the law of Prohibitions through numerous 
procedural lenses. Apart from such interest as they have merely for a re- 
alistic picture of what administering that branch of the law involved, the 
cases on procedure bear on one important general issue: Without dis- 
agreement, Prohibitions were considered in principle to be sought "for the 
King" -- in order to protect a public interest in correct lines of jurisdic- 
tion. They could accordingly be sought by an "informer" who was not 
himself a party in interest, and -- again in principle -- the "informer's" 
procedural errors should not be held against "the King." I.e., when it was 
clear enough to the judges that a non-common law court was out of line, 
that court and the person suing there should be prohibited, even though 
the person responsible for making it clear -- plaintiff-in-Prohibition -- had 
made a procedural misstep that might be fatal to a merely private com- 
plaint. (Even defendant-in-Prohibition falls within the idea, though few 
cases turn on his procedural errors and neglects. His role, in theory, was 
to inform "the King" that there was no offense against jurisdictional or- 
der, and if that was substantially true Prohibition should be denied, 
though defendant performed his role imperfectly.) 
In practice, on the other hand, the parties to Prohibition cases were vir- 
tually always parties in interest. Ordinarily someone being sued in a non- 
common law court was seeking for his own advantage to stop the suit 
against him. (Occasionally the non-common law plaintiff sought to have 
his own suit prohibited, in order to secure common law determination of 
an issue that had arisen in it -- equally for calculated private advantage.) 
The "public theory" of Prohibitions was therefore in constant tension with 
the imperatives of fairness to essentially private parties and the courts' 
duty as a general rule to enforce procedural propriety. The cases in Vol. I 
tend to ask how clearly the "public theory" was grasped and how consis- 
tently it was applied. They ask also how important to the judges jurisdic- 
tional order ultimately was, worth how great a sacrifice of procedural 
nicety. Behind the latter question is a more abstract, but historically real, 
one: how important the ideal jurisdictional order ought to be in modern -- 
post-Reformation -- circumstances, when all courts, including the ecclesi- 
astical, were the King's agencies, all presumptively dedicated to seeing 
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something like one "law of the land", as well as natural justice, faithfully 
applied. 
In the upshot, the cases in Vol. I better illustrate the existence of the 
tension than any decisive resolution of it. Results are mixed, varying over 
a multiplicity of contexts. Perhaps, however, the point most to be empha- 
sized is that the "public theory" did have an impact. Neither that theory 
nor a preference for common sense over nicety was drowned out by com- 
peting inclinations, including relative indifference as to whether cases and 
issues were decided where, by the ideal jurisdictional schema, they 
should be. From the ecclesiastical and royal point of view, such relative 
indifference -- and corresponding insistence that seekers of Prohibitions 
have clean hands and observe the normal rules of private litigation -- had 
more to recommend it than the common law judges would concede. 
Vols. II and III of the study together deal with another large matter: the 
substantive scope of the Prohibition (substantive as contrasted with some 
"scope" questions treated under procedure in Vol. I -- e.g., whether the 
writ can be extended to somewhat more flexible functions than simply 
stopping a non-common law court from continuing with a suit before it.) 
"What is the Prohibition really for?" is another formulation of the ques- 
tion. This issue is naturally implicit in the subject-matter categories to 
which the study beyond Vol. III is devoted. Vols. II and III collect the 
cases on miscellaneous subjects in which it tends to be explicit and cen- 
tral. 
The Prohibition was manifestly for one thing -- "paradigmatically" so, 
I shall say: to stop non-common law courts from entertaining suits which 
could and should be brought at common law. A section of Vol. III deals 
with miscellaneous cases involving these "paradigmatic" Prohibitions. Its 
burden is to show that even the simplest and most easily justified form of 
Prohibition was not entirely simple. Head-on encroachment on the sphere 
of business assigned to the common law courts was not always obvious to 
perceive. (Extremely blatant encroachment of course tends not to occur, 
or at any rate to produce cases worth controverting and reporting. Inter- 
esting instances in some way raise the question whether a situation actu- 
ally does conform to the "paradigm" that would be represented, say, by an 
ecclesiastical suit to recover real property.) 
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Four recurrent kinds of cases shade away from the "paradigm", or ar- 
guably, perhaps, carry the Prohibition beyond its proper scope, employ it 
for purposes wider than "what it is really for." Two of these -- relatively 
rare classes as far as miscellaneous cases are concerned, though the types 
are prominent in some subject-matter categories reserved until later in the 
study -- are treated in Vol. III. These are: (1) Cases in which an attempt is 
made to stop proceedings in one non-common law court on the ground 
that the suit belongs in another non-common law court. (2) Attempts to 
stop non-common law suits merely because, as I shall put it, the com- 
plainant is trying to extend "the ambit of remediable wrong" unduly. I.e., 
the non-common law plaintiff is in no position to recover at common law 
if only he would turn to the proper place; he is not even pressing a bad 
claim so related to established causes of action at common law that only a 
common law court should pronounce it bad; plaintiff-in-Prohibition sim- 
ply thinks that his opponent is trying to make him liable for something no 
court should be permitted to hold a person liable for, even if the general 
flavor of the complaint is not especially alien to the normal responsibili- 
ties of, say, an ecclesiastical court. 
Cases of both these types raise a fundamental puzzle, about which 
there is express controversy in the cases: Does the power of the common 
law courts transcend the self-protective function of preventing encroach- 
ment on their own territory? Do they have, besides that "paradigmatic" 
power, a general "superintendency" (as it was sometimes spoken of) over 
the English legal system as a whole, such that they may both police the 
internal lines of non-common law jurisdiction and be the arbiters of "the 
ambit of remediable wrong"? 
That jurisdictional issue overlaps considerably the ones that arise in the 
present section of the study, Vol. II. Cases in the forms collected in Vol. II 
represent a much larger part of Prohibition practice than the lines-of-non- 
common-law-jurisdiction and "ambit" cases. That is one reason why they 
are treated first. The other reason is that in a sense they strain the "para- 
digm" more, exemplifying in at least some dimensions the boldest use of 
the Prohibition. 
The two remaining basic questions -- those involved in Vol. II -- are: 
(1) Does the scope of Prohibitions extend beyond stopping suits improp- 
erly brought in non-common law courts ab initio? May it be used to stop 
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a suit which to begin with was quite properly brought there, in order to al- 
low an issue that has arisen in such suit to be determined at common law? 
(2) Granting, realistically, that the answer to that question is "Yes", but 
even if it is not: May prohibitions be issued on complaint that a non-com- 
mon law court, in an initially proper suit, has actually made an unaccept- 
able ruling or insisted on an unacceptable rule? Two general responses 
to the latter question are possible: (a) it may well be that issues arising in 
initially proper non-common law suits can be recognized as appropriate 
for common law determination (jury trial or legal determination by com- 
mon law judges.) Prohibitions may perhaps be issued on surmise that 
such an issue has arisen; the non-common law suit may be arrested unless 
and until the issue is resolved in such a way as would warrant Consult- 
ation. If, however, no attempt has been made to prohibit the suit merely 
because a given issue has arisen, Prohibition does not lie. No action of the 
non-common law court will warrant a writ; if the suit initially belongs to 
it, and no issue-arising is pointed to as inherently requiring common law 
determination, the non-common law court is free to handle the case as it 
sees fit -- to make such rulings or apply such rules as it likes (subject, of 
course, to internal appeal when available, as it always was in the ecclesi- 
astical system up to the Delegates.) (b) Suits may perhaps be stopped 
when certain recognizable "common law issues" have arisen, but if that is 
true, they may also sometimes be stopped because of the way the non- 
common law court has handled the suit before it -- because, in effect, it 
has made an intolerable or erroneous ruling or proposes to apply a rule 
which cannot be countenanced. In addition to their power to regulate ju- 
risdiction -- jurisdiction over certain kinds of issues, perhaps, as well as 
over certain kinds of suits -- the common law courts have, again, a kind 
of "superintendency" over the entire legal system. They are sometimes 
entitled to concern themselves with what goes on in other jurisdictions. 
The first of the fundamental questions was not very controversial in 
general terms, nor is it the heart of Vol. II. "Common law issues" were in 
fact recognized; readers of Vol. I will have seen many Prohibition cases 
occasioned by them. There remained a penumbra of doubt. Beyond a few 
acknowledged "common law issues", some judges were skeptical of the 
category. They were inclined to say that once a suit was properly in a 
non-common law court's possession that court should be left alone to dis- 
pose of nearly any issue that arose; as they usually put it, the "incidents" 
should follow the "principal." Other judges were readier to see "common 
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law issues" beyond the accepted few, less ready to trust the non-common 
law courts with matters they thought they themselves were more compe- 
tent to decide. Although one Section of Vol. II ("Problems of the Disal- 
lowance Surmise") deals with some of the more difficult aspects of 
"common law issues" -- aspects which overlap the central concerns of 
Vol. II -- the residue of the subject is left until later in the study. (The 
General Introduction, at the beginning of Vol. I, explains this arrange- 
ment.) The heart of Vol. II is the second fundamental question -- the com- 
mon law's title to intervene because of some action taken by a 
non-common law court and, granted its title in some sense, how the 
power was to be used in practice. 
That title so to intervene was assumed to be part of the law cannot, in 
the light of the cases, be doubted. Non-common law courts were often 
prohibited on complaint about moves they had allegedly made, or were 
about to, in suits rightly before them, and such complaints were still more 
often considered, whether or not a writ was ultimately granted. Probably 
no judge could be found who would simply disclaim power to control the 
conduct of non-common law courts once their jurisdiction over a suit or 
issue as such was conceded. By contrast, power to police jurisdiction out- 
side the common law system and to fix the boundaries of remediable 
wrong in situations of no direct concern to the common law was more 
cleanly debated. There was no agreement, but judges could be found to 
deny the power flatly. With respect to "conduct control", debate was 
about whether to intervene in this or that situation or type of situation and 
about the rationale of a power assumed to exist. 
It is unsurprising that such debate should have been confused and divi- 
sive. One might almost be surprised that no judges, apparently, were 
ready to reject "conduct control" as a legitimate function of the Prohibi- 
tion altogether, for it is problematic in the abstract, and in practice it was 
hard to find an agreed-on rationale and to intervene on consistent princi- 
ple. The cases will illustrate, however, why a complete disclaimer would 
have been very difficult. Judicial division -- never satisfactorily general- 
ized -- almost inevitably settled around the difference between an expan- 
sive approach to "conduct control" and a minimalist one, with shades in 
between. At the minimalist pole, intervention to prevent non-common law 
courts from making certain rulings or applying certain rules could be de- 
fended as an extended form of the self-protective function served by 
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"paradigmatic" Prohibitions -- a way of preventing incidental damage to 
interests protected by common law jurisdiction, though the jurisdiction it- 
self was not infringed. That is perhaps a more modest adaptation of the 
writ than, say, regulating jurisdiction within and among non-common law 
systems. The most expansive theory to justify such intervention tends to 
erect some standards and rules of the common law into something like 
constitutional law, binding on all tribunals. There are arguments for that 
theory, but they are tricky, and granting it entails a perplexing search for 
which common law standards to insist on as "national law", when, it was 
agreed, the non-common law systems were in general independent and 
entitled to be different from the common law in procedure and substance. 
Save for those on self-incrimination in Section V (whose presence here 
I shall explain), the cases in Vol. II arise by way of what I shall call the 
"disallowance surmise": Plaintiff-in-Prohibition, implicitly admitting that 
he has no complaint about being sued in the non-common law court in- 
itially, surmises that he has made a move in that court which has been 
'disallowed", wherefore the suit should be prohibited pending common 
law determination of the matter to which the disallowed move relates. I 
divide disallowance surmises into two species: (a) substantive (b) eviden- 
tiary. 
A substantive surmise of disallowance says that the non-common law 
court has made a ruling which is unacceptable as a matter of substantive 
law and which the common law court should prevent from being given 
effect. Almost always the ruling consists in ruling out a defense. For a 
semi-realistic example: Suppose A sues B for ecclesiastical defamation -- 
properly in the sense that the words are perfectly actionable in an ecclesi- 
astical court. B admits he spoke the defamatory words but claims they 
were true. The ecclesiastical court disallows the defense, thereby imply- 
ing the legal position that defamatory speech cannot always be justified 
by proving that what was said was true. B seeks a Prohibition on the the- 
ory that ecclesiastical courts should not be permitted to adopt that legal 
position. 
Evidentiary disallowance surmises were occasioned by a formalistic 
proof requirement in ecclesiastical law. By a "formalistic proof require- 
ment" I mean a rule that prima facie evidence of a certain type or quantity 
must be produced to back up a claim if that claim is to be listened to at 
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all. Evidentiary formalism contrasts to the practice of letting litigants pre- 
sent whatever evidence they can to the judge of fact, the judge being free 
to draw his conclusions from such admissible evidence as is put before 
him, or from the lack of it (also, in the case of the English jury under the 
ancient theory, from any knowledge of his own that falsifies or supple- 
ments presented evidence.) The actual embodiment of ecclesiastical for- 
malism was a two-witness rule -- i.e., a rule that required certain claims to 
be supported by the oral testimony of two competent witnesses if those 
claims were to be considered. For a realistic example of an evidentiary 
disallowance surmise: Suppose A sues an executor in an ecclesiastical 
court for a legacy. The executor claims that A released the legacy and of- 
fers to prove the release by one witness. The executor seeks a Prohibition 
on surmise that proof by one witness was disallowed. He does not main- 
tain that the ecclesiastical court has taken an unacceptable position of 
substantive law (such as that a legacy may not be released), but that the 
two-witness rule ought not to be enforced against him. 
In both types of case -- substantive and evidentiary -- the effect of a 
Prohibition would be to let the excluded plea, or the evidence which 
ecclesiastical standards regarded as defective, be used for plaintiff-in- 
Prohibition’s benefit at common law. In the defamation case, that means 
that the ecclesiastical suit must not continue if the words were true. Their 
truth would accordingly be tried by jury. If they were found true, the Pro: 
hibition would stand; if false, the ecclesiastical suit would be revived by 
Consultation. So in the release case: If the legatee wanted to deny that he 
had made a release, he must do so pursuant to the Prohibition. A jury 
would decide. The testimony of the executor’s one witness could of 
course be presented to the jury, which might or might not believe him, 
might be influenced by other evidence or by the lack of more evidence 
than the single witness, and might use its own knowledge. If the verdict 
went for the executor the Prohibition would stand; if for the legatee, Con- 
sultation would lie. 
In other words, the Prohibition operated to cause any factual dispute 
between the parties to be tried at common law. Similarly, any legal ques- 
tions arising by the way would be decided by the common law court (pre- 
sumably using common law standards, though a nicer question than is 
directly raised in any of the cases below can perhaps be asked about 
that.) E.g., with reference to the examples: There can sometimes be ambi- 
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guities about classifying utterances as "true" or "false", and whether a 
transaction constitutes a valid release can be controvertible. (The "nicer 
question" would be, e.g., whether the criteria for a valid release of an in- 
terest or expectation in the common law sphere need be the same as those 
for valid release of a legacy, or whether construction of language for pur- 
poses of determining its "truth" need follow the same rules in both 
spheres.) 
This is to say that ecclesiastical courts were not normally ordered to 
treat defenses as legally good or to accept proof by less than two wit- 
nesses. I know of no attempts to order them to do such things directly--by 
Mandamus -- and doing so indirectly -- by Prohibition quatenus a certain 
defense or certain evidence is ruled out -- was not normal. Once a com- 
mon law court decided to prohibit on a disallowance surmise, it almost al- 
ways took over. It should be noted, however, that to surmise disallowance 
of a plea or proffered evidence was to allege a fact; defendant-in-Prohibi- 
tion was in general free to deny that any disallowance had occurred. As 
against that point of general principle, we shall encounter a judicial incli- 
nation sometimes to presume that a type of claim always would be disal- 
lowed by ecclesiastical courts. Moreover, it would be risky as a rule for 
defendant-in-Prohibition to evade taking issue on the merits of his case 
and go to a jury on a question of what happened in an ecclesiastical court. 
That is the sort of situation in which jurors are likely to go to the merits 
on their own accord, or to suspect that a party who resorts to quibbling 
over jurisdiction has no case on the merits. 
Both types of disallowance surmise raise the large question: Do com- 
mon law courts have any business intervening because of something an 
ecclesiastical court has done in a case wholly within its jurisdiction? With 
reference to the examples: What title has the common law to care whether 
truth is a defense to acts of defamation solely remediable in ecclesiastical 
courts by spiritual sanctions? What title has it to insist that the proof re- 
quirements of a sister branch of the legal system may not be enforced in 
cases, such as litigation over legacies, solely within that branch's sphere? 
Does the power to control jurisdiction even in the more extended senses - 
- to assume jurisdiction over issues arising in proper non-common law 
cases, to regulate the "ambit of remediable wrong" and to keep non-com- 
mon law courts out of each other's territory -- entail this further power? 
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In the rest of this Introduction, I shall try to adumbrate at a few steps' 
remove from the cases some of the considerations to keep in mind when 
looking at them. Let us first ask whether there is a difference of principle 
between substantive and evidentiary disallowance surmises. Is there any 
reason why an ecclesiastical court should be entitled to its procedure, in- 
cluding its evidentiary formalism, but not always to its legal positions? Or 
is the opposite discrimination more defensible? It seems to me that there 
are basically three possible stands on these questions: (a) Ecclesiastical 
courts have a pretty clear right to their evidentiary standards -- at least to 
the kind of proof requirements they actually have. The two-witness rule is 
not irrational, even if it is undesirably rigid. It is meant to insure reliable 
truth-finding, an end nobody quarrels with; the ecclesiastical method of 
trial, where a single judge decides the truth on the basis of testimony, re- 
quires such insurance (as the perhaps superior common law method of 
jury trial does not, but since there is no way of converting the ecclesiasti- 
cal system to common law procedure altogether, it must be permitted 
safeguards appropriate to its way of doing things); formalistic proof re- 
quirements do not ordinarily work real hardship on people, but only re- 
quire them to take a little more trouble to have transactions witnessed and 
penalize the imprudent. Insisting that facts be proved in a certain way, 
when that method is not irrational and the facts bear on a question that 
only concerns ecclesiastical courts, can hardly be called wrong. It is at 
least more plausible to become disturbed over a legal ruling -- e.g., that 
truth is no defense to defamation -- which, if nothing worse, goes against 
expectations formed by common law practice. 
(b) Rigid evidentiary requirements prevent rights or immunities of 
whose legal validity no one has any doubt from being established. They 
prevent such rights from being established when "by accident" a man 
finds himself in an ecclesiastical court. The immediate cousin of an eccle- 
siastical right -- e.g., a release of debt -- would have an excellent chance 
at common law although only one witness supported it; just because the 
thing released "happens' to be a legacy instead of a debt, the release with- 
out two witnesses will be out of luck. Is that not a strange and unfair dis- 
crepancy? Perhaps a strong case can be made for letting ecclesiastical 
courts recognize such substantive rights and duties in their sphere as they 
see fit, at least within reason -- e.g., to enforce in their defamation cases 
the widely-subscribed "higher morality" that says a man should abstain 
from making cruel and gratuitous remarks about people even when they 
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are true. The case for letting ecclesiastical courts block rights which they 
themselves acknowledge and would have no conceivable justification for 
not acknowledging -- for letting them close themselves off from even 
considering in particular cases whether there is any basis for doubting that 
an act not supported by two witnesses took place -- is much weaker. 
(c) There is no basis for saying that evidentiary holdings are generally 
more or less deserving of control by Prohibition than substantive hold- 
ings. Comparing evidentiary and substantive disallowance-surmises is 
"the wrong way to slice it." The right way is to focus on the claim being 
made in an ecclesiastical court, not on why that claim is obstructed. Thus: 
An executor wants to allege a legacy-release. The common law court 
knows that he is being prevented from using that defense, and that is all it 
needs to know. It only muddies the issue to worry about whether the ex- 
ecutor's claim is blocked because of the two-witness rule or because the 
ecclesiastical courts do not regard legacies as releasable, for it makes no 
difference which is the reason. The issue is whether common law courts 
have any title to interfere in the handling of legacy suits, or the handling 
of legacy-release claims. Maybe they do, maybe they don't. It all depends 
on the theory that justifies action on some disallowance surmises but not 
on others -- if indeed there is such a theory, if action on such surmises is 
ever justified, and if it is not justified whenever the common law court 
disapproves of the ecclesiastical result -- the result, not how the ecclesias- 
tical court got to it. For example, if we adopt the theory that ecclesiastical 
practice should conform as closely as possible to the analogy of common 
law practice, then perhaps releasees of legacies ought to get the same 
treatment as releasees of debts; an ecclesiastical court should be pre- 
vented from standing in the way of anyone who can convince a common 
law court that he has a release, for whatever reason it stands in his way. 
By the same theory, ecclesiastical courts should be prevented from stand- 
ing in the way of a defamatory speaker who was telling the truth. 
A different theory might discriminate the two exemplary cases. E.g.: 
The common law should not concern itself with legacy suits or any inci- 
dents thereof because a legacy is an interest of which the common law 
simply takes no account; as it were, when a man comes crying that he has 
not been allowed the advantage of a legacy-release, common lawyers 
ought not to understand what he is talking about; if ecclesiastical courts 
wanted to say that testators may not leave legacies, or that legacies may 
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never be released, or that legacy-releases must be proved by the oaths of 
twelve bishops, it would be entirely their privilege to do so. Defamation, 
on the other hand, is something that the common law does take account 
of; some types of defamation it does not remedy itself, but permits the ec- 
clesiastical court to; the fact that a defamation suit is, as it were, delegated 
to the ecclesiastical courts does not mean that the common law has no in- 
terest in it; therefore common law courts are entitled to insist that ecclesi- 
astical courts handle their defamation suits by approximately the same 
standards, substantive and evidentiary, as analogous common law suits 
would be governed by. 
Conversely: Legacies and legacy-releases may involve serious prop- 
erty interests and be mixed up with common law affairs. E.g.: An execu- 
tor to whom a large legacy has been released may suffer consequential 
loss if he cannot establish the release and has to pay the legacy; his capac- 
ity to satisfy the debts of the estate, even out of his own pocket, may be 
diminished. Also, many releases are general -- comprising all claims, or 
debts and legacies. An executor who could not establish such a release in 
a legacy suit might conceivably be hurt in a subsequent common law ac- 
tion -- as if the jurors had heard that he paid the legacy referred to in a 
comprehensive release and therefore concluded that the release was a 
fake. Prohibition is justified by the common law's responsibility for pro- 
tecting the subject's property and his interest in potential secular litiga- 
tion. Ecclesiastical defamation, by contrast, was petty stuff. The common 
law remedied slanders likely to bring pecuniary loss or other serious dam- 
age on people, leaving the ecclesiastical courts with "spiritual" power to 
make casters of moral aspersions apologize. It is reasonable to say that 
the common law had washed its hands of such defamatory conduct as it 
did not remedy itself, that ecclesiastical defamation by definition had no 
material consequences, and that the field was a specialty appropriate to 
churchmen in their pastoral capacity -- for all which reasons, ecclesiasti- 
cal courts should be free to have any rules or evidentiary standards they 
like in the area of defamation. In sum, there are various ways of discrimi- 
nating cases in which common law intervention is and is not justified, but 
they ought not to depend on the distinction between substantive and evi- 
dentiary surmises. 
In reflecting on the relationship between substantive and evidentiary 
disallowance surmises, we have touched on some of the possible theories 
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for distinguishing justifiable and unjustifiable instances of common law 
control over non-common law conduct. Let us now look away from the 
substantive-evidentiary distinction and ask directly what alternative theo- 
ries seem possible for that purpose. Our hypothesis -- only an hypothesis - 
- is that common law intervention is not justifiable whenever "foreign" 
courts fail to meet preferred standards; that common law control over the 
system is less than all-inclusive; that the non-common law courts were 
sometimes entitled to be let alone, whatever Westminster Hall thought of 
their way of doing things. The hypothesis demands a criterion and a con- 
ception of the common law's supervisory role to back it up -- a test to 
identify the situations in which the judges ought to sit back and let eccle- 
siastical courts do as they will. It seems to me that three criteria and cor- 
responding theories should be put on the map. The degree to which traces 
of them, rivalry between them, or the prevalence of any one can be seen 
in the cases will be the underlying question throughout Vol. II. 
(a) In some ways, the most attractive theory a priori is the "rule of rea- 
son." Might the simplest approach not be for the common law courts to 
ask only whether the complained-of conduct of a "foreign" court failed to 
meet elementary standards of fairness and accountability? Of course ap- 
plication of a "basic reasonableness" test is an intuitive affair. One cannot 
expect criteria of reasonableness to remain altogether steady over a multi- 
plicity of situations, nor will "positive" standards and habits, such as the 
rules of the common law, fail to influence what those accustomed to them 
take for reasonable, The great advantage of the "rule of reason," however, 
is that it implies the right to be different. It is suited to a mixed system un- 
der central control because it recognizes the legitimacy of mixture. The 
common law courts would not be put in the position of telling other 
courts that they must dance to the common law's tune -- that they operate 
within their sphere at the common law's mere sufferance -- but only that 
the common law courts have a trust to protect the subject against abuse. 
One-sided rules (it is important that ecclesiastical courts were presump- 
tively apt to favor clerical interests), rules which imposed ridiculous bur- 
dens on the everyday conduct of business or which took insufficient 
account of their own implications, must be denied enforcement; other- 
wise, non-common law courts are entitled to apply their own rules to suits 
and issues admittedly within their jurisdiction. The basic function of the 
supervising agencies is to control jurisdiction; "foreign" courts do operate 
at the common law's sufferance in the sense that they may only touch 
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what it says they may. Beyond that basic function, all the common law 
courts need is a loose power to insure that what is suffered is not misused. 
If the common law needed to ride closer herd on the "foreign" courts than 
that, it ought probably to restrict their jurisdiction more narrowly. Better, 
in other words, to say that issues of given types must be determined at 
common law than to leave them to ecclesiastical courts and then interfere 
when they are handled in a way that offends common law standards. Such 
interference, after conceding jurisdiction, should be confined to the ex- 
ceptional case, where an issue is grievously mishandled, by standards so 
fundamental that one could not have anticipated their violation. 
(b) We may call the second approach the "conflict-avoidance" theory. 
The presupposition of this theory would be that "foreign" courts must 
look to the common law's lead when it is meaningful to do so; that such 
courts must imitate the common law at those points where it supplied 
relevant analogies. The imperative implicit in the threat of Prohibition 
should not say simply "Be reasonable," but "Take the common law for 
your guide whenever it makes sense to do so; treat your litigants as they 
would be treated at common law in analogous situations." The question 
for the supervising agencies to keep in mind would be whether a mean- 
ingful common law analogy existed. There is no mechanical way of an- 
swering that question--no more than there is an easily-arrived-at set of 
criteria into which the "rule of reason" can be translated. But which ques- 
tion is asked -- "Is this rule basically unreasonable?" or "Is there a fruitful 
common law analogy to which the ecclesiastical court could be made to 
conform?" -- might considerably affect the disposition of a case. Refer- 
ring back to our examples above: "Truth is not always a defense to defa- 
mation" might of course fail a reasonableness test, depending on the 
length of the judge's foot. It would have a hard time not failing a conflict- 
avoidance test, since defamation was shared between the common-law 
and ecclesiastical systems. A meaningful common law analogy existed, 
for the very suit would be at common law if the opprobrious words had 
been a little different. Per contra, one might question whether the com- 
mon law provided any analogies for legacy cases, since it had no such 
category. On the other hand, it handled release cases. Whether a case of a 
legacy-release should be considered a legacy case or a release case is a 
problem under the conflict-avoidance theory, but not under the reason- 
ableness theory. One might question whether the two-witness rule could 
conflict with the common law, since it was geared to a different -- and ac- 
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cepted-as-different -- procedural system. Using the reasonableness test, 
one would no doubt have to say that the two-witness rule was reasonable 
enough in general (the alternative, at any rate, would be to hold it alto- 
gether unreasonable and block it in every instance); yet one would be 
quite free to differentiate reasonable and unreasonable applications of it -- 
e.g., reasonable to apply it to some transactions but not to others; reason- 
able to insist on two witnesses in the absence of any documentary or cir- 
cumstantial evidence, unreasonable not to allow other evidence to be 
substituted for one witness. 
The conflict-avoidance test rests on the conception of the common law 
as the lex terrae in a broader sense than "the law of the pre-eminent 
courts, including the rules by which they control the jurisdiction of other 
courts." It involves saying that the rules applied by those pre-eminent 
courts within their own jurisdiction represented more than the law of one 
part of the legal system. They also represented the norms of the commu- 
nity at large, embodied its values and defined its expectations. They did 
so because of their prescriptive warrant: more than the sum of a tribunal's 
precedents, they were the sum of a community's experience through infi- 
nite ages. This way of thinking about the law was commonplace; its 
brass-tacks significance is indeterminate. One possible application to real 
legal problems is our present one: If the common law were only the law 
of Westminster Hall, there would be little point in asking that "foreign" 
courts in some sense and degree conform to it. Within the limited sphere 
the law of the land allows them, and subject to Westminster Hall's resid- 
ual power to insure that what is allowed is not perverted to injustice, they 
would seem entitled to their own law. The "grant" of a delimited sphere to 
judges whose art and tradition was not the common lawyer's would seem 
to imply the intent that "foreign" law should prevail infra libertatem. But 
the common law is not only the law of Westminster Hall. It contains the 
standards by which Englishmen are to be treated wherever authority is ex- 
ercised over them, and by which they are to design their conduct. There is 
accordingly a condition implied in the "grant" of non-common law juris- 
diction -- a proviso that "foreign" judges conform to the common law 
when it furnishes an imitable model, that they have regard to the values 
and expectations which all Englishmen share, which they have a moral 
right to, and which they enjoy the benefit of in that major part of their le- 
gal relationships governed by the common law. Of course the proviso has 
only a limited application. Obviously the "foreign" courts cannot simply 
14 
Introduction 
follow the common law; they are permitted and intended to do things the 
common law does not do, to enforce duties which it does not recognize 
except by conceding the power of other tribunals to enforce them; inevita- 
bly, given the acceptance of "foreign" jurisdictions within the system, 
there will be senses in which the common law fails to "meet" the law of 
other jurisdictions, to be comparable, to supply meaningful analogies. But 
quatenus comparability does exist, to that extent Prohibitions should be 
used to assure the subject this birthright of common law standards. 
The "rule of reason" (the argument goes on) is appropriate where Eng- 
lish jurisprudence clearly employed it: judicial scrutiny of local customs. 
Local law is as much the subject's birthright as the common custom of 
the realm; that which is as old as the common law -- as much grounded in 
immemorial native usage -- has every right to vary from it. There, the 
subject is only entitled to protection against customs which a jury might 
find (perhaps because the evidence indeed showed long continuance and 
no sign of commencement), but which a mythical "reasonable man" could 
hardly believe had really stood the test of infinite time. The rule that 
every special custom must be reasonable in the judges's eyes was the 
means to that order of protection -- protection against extremely one- 
sided customs; customs which those affected by them could have had no 
interest in consenting to; customs which, if indeed infinitely old, must 
have originated in the tyrannous imposition of one man's will on others 
and survived through lack of occasion to test, or lack of imagination to 
perceive, their vicious implications. If other facets of jurisprudence are 
considered, it will be apparent that the "rule of reason" and the minimal 
standard of control it implies do not describe the check on exceptions to, 
and qualifications of, the common law in England. Equity, for example, 
ought to "follow the law." That means in essence that it should not criti- 
cize the common law head-on, should not frustrate the operation of the 
law merely because some of its rules are less than ideal, or because a man 
is standing on his legal rights with something less than an unspotted con- 
science. It should positively respect the values and expectations embod- 
ied in the common law; it should block only those unconscionable 
activities which the law is not structured to prevent or punish, but to 
which it gives no sort of countenance. "Foreign" law proper -- ecclesiasti- 
cal and civil law -- is on the far end of the spectrum of institutions permit- 
ted to encroach on the common law's simple, universal hegemony. At one 
end is custom and the tribunals, such as manorial and borough courts, 
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largely devoted to administering local law; in the middle "natural equity," 
which in its place -- as the power to make exceptions in hard cases, to ful- 
fill the policy of the law while occasionally infringing the letter -- no le- 
gal system can do without, and which ancient English practice has 
institutionalized in the Chancery and other conciliar organs; at the other 
end, courts and laws admitted to occupy precisely delimited spheres, to 
perform specialized functions, to supplement the common law in ways 
which it would have every right to do without or to make its own provi- 
sion for. At one end, the "rule of reason," designed only to check abuse 
of an inherently just privilege, was the single appropriate control; in the 
middle, a tradition of restraint, largely enforced by the courts of equity 
themselves, insured that the power to mitigate the common law was not 
used to subvert it; at the far end, at least ecclesiastical law was positively 
bound to refrain from contradicting the common law -- bound not to do 
what, within reason, custom was fully entitled to do and what, so long as 
it was under the species of "mitigation" or "directing the conscience of the 
party," equity was needed to do. 
The restraint on ecclesiastical law was recorded in the statute book (25 
Hen.8, c. 19, sect. vii), though Protestant-Anglican-Erastian orthodoxy in- 
sisted that the statute only declared what had always been law: canon law 
has force in England only insofar as it does not conflict with the statutory 
and common-customary law of the realm. Admittedly, it may not be tech- 
nically necessary to deduce our "conflict-avoidance" theory from that re- 
quirement. I.e.: It would be possible to say that jurisdiction-control proper 
is a sufficient means to guarantee that "foreign" law at odds with the com- 
mon law is not suffered; that the rule expressed in the statute is best im- 
plemented by prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from entertaining suits and 
issues which they cannot be expected to handle without depriving the 
subject of rights assured to him by native law; that the decision to allow a 
suit or issue to ecclesiastical courts ought to imply the judgment that 
nothing the ecclesiastical court can do (short of abuses controllable by the 
"rule of reason") will conflict with the law of England. On the other hand, 
there is at least harmony of spirit between the positive legal restraint on 
the freedom of canon law and the "conflict-avoidance" approach to disal- 
lowance cases. Inasmuch as the law of ecclesiastical courts must not con- 
tradict the common law, it makes sense to argue, it ought to have regard 
for the values, standards, and expectations embodied in the common law. 
Ecclesiastical courts ought not to proceed on the assumption that canon 
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law is licensed (i.e., guaranteed to be sufficiently consonant with the com- 
mon law) to the extent that suits and issues as such are left to their dispo- 
sition. They ought rather to use their jurisdiction with an eye to 
minimizing conflict with the common law in those contexts where the law 
whose direct imperatives they may not resist provides applicable analogi- 
cal guidance. Prohibitions should be used to insure such practice. 
(c) The third possible approach to disallowance cases may be called 
the "common law interest" theory. What I have in mind here amounts to a 
modification of the "conflict-avoidance" theory. It says that that theory is 
correct in principle, but only applicable in certain cases, where the com- 
mon law has a specifiable interest in the way an ecclesiastical issue is 
handled. In other words, there are some cases in which, admitting ecclesi- 
astical jurisdiction, the common law courts should not concern them- 
selves with whether common law analogies, values, and expectations are 
respected. Such cases, if not the majority, are perhaps at least the norm, in 
the sense that the common law should be presumed to have no concern 
with the disposition of ecclesiastical suits unless an interest can be made 
out specially. But if such an interest can be specified, then maximum fea- 
sible approximation to common law standards should be demanded. 
Like the other two theories, this one has no determinate application. 
Like those theories, it only points to a criterion -- "Does the common law 
system have sufficient interest in this ecclesiastical matter to insist on 
closer observation of common law standards than would ordinarily be ex- 
pected?" "Interest" has no pre-defined meaning. One might, for example, 
argue that the common law is "interested" in defamation suits because it 
entertains a large share of them itself. The most obvious kind of "inter- 
est," however, arises where a single transaction has effects within both 
the common law and ecclesiastical systems and might come in question in 
common law litigation. E.g.: A parishioner being sued for tithes pleads a 
lease of the rectory to himself. The common law is interested in the lease 
because more depends on it than the parishioner's discharge from the ec- 
clesiastical duty to pay tithes; common law litigation depending princi- 
pally on the lease could happen any day -- say an action of Trespass or 
Ejectment over the right to the physical property of the rectory, an action 
of Debt for the rent. 
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By the "common law interest'' theory, the ecclesiastical court should 
clearly be prohibited if it will not handle the lease case by common law 
standards. But here an important question arises: Should the ecclesiastical 
court not be prohibited from determining the validity of a lease at all? Is a 
lease (or, more generally, any transaction in which the common law has 
the clearest kind of "interest") not a "common law issue," which the ec- 
clesiastical court should not touch, whether or not it is willing to observe 
common law standards? As I point out above, there is reason to doubt 
whether the "common law issue" was a universally and simply acceptable 
category. The "common law interest" approach to disallowance surmises 
affords a way to have something like that category in effect without rec- 
ognizing it straightforwardly. I.e.: The courts could endorse the rule that 
the "incidents" follow the "principal," and then modify it by prohibiting 
on surmise of disallowance in accord with the "common law interest" the- 
ory. In other words, they could hold that ecclesiastical courts are always 
entitled in principle to determine all questions that must be determined in 
order to dispose of suits properly before them -- provided that questions 
in which the common law has a specifiable interest are determined by 
common law standards. By this approach, a party may never have a Pro- 
hibition by surmising that an issue of a certain type is before an ecclesias- 
tical court; he must surmise that an issue of a certain type (one in which 
the common law is interested) is before an ecclesiastica1 court, and that 
the ecclesiastical court has wrongfully refused to handle that issue in a 
common law way. Whether the courts did take such an approach -- avoid- 
ing the "common law issue" as a category of untouchable questions, but 
creating a class of issues which ecclesiastical courts could handle so long 
as they conformed to common law standards -- is one of the inquiries to 
be addressed to the cases. (Of course the courts would not be presented 
with a stark choice. It would be possible to have some "untouchable" is- 
sues, other issues that must be determined by common law standards, and 
still others which were entirely the ecclesiastical courts' business, subject 
at most to "rule of reason" control. The cases will bring out another possi- 
bility, that some "untouchable" common law issues were created by fic- 
tionalization of the disallowance surmise -- i.e., by holding that 
ecclesiastical courts' alleged failure to handle issues in a manner accept- 
able to the common law could not be denied.) 
Leaving aside its intersection with the problematic category of intrinsic 
"common law issues," the ''common law interest" theory would seem to 
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have firmer implications than the rival theories for two-witness-rule cases 
in particular. The two-witness rule can hardly be considered unreasonable 
across the board; there are problems about seeing conflict with the com- 
mon law in evidentiary rules adapted to an alien system of procedure. If, 
however, one focuses on the common law's "interest" in what happens in 
an ecclesiastical suit, it is difficult to give free run to ecclesiastical proce- 
dure. For the focus is shifted to results and their impact in the common 
law sphere. For example, if a lease of a rectory is unestablishable is a 
tithe suit, knowledge of that result, or of the consequent payment of 
tithes, might dispose jurors to be skeptical of the lease when it came in 
question by way of an action of Trespass for breaking into the glebe. 
Therefore it becomes strongly arguable that the ecclesiastical court must 
not insist on the two-witness rule with the effect of making it impossible 
to establish a lease -- a lease which might be establishable under common 
law procedure and which ought not to be prejudiced at common law by 
ecclesiastical events. (Per contra, it is possible to argue that the common 
law has no interest in legacies since they can never be the subject of tem- 
poral litigation and the transaction on which they depend -- the making of 
a will disposing of personalty -- has no status at common law. Ergo, noth- 
ing about a legacy, such as whether one has been released, is of interest to 
the common law. Ergo, however unreasonable one considers the two-wit- 
ness rule, or however ready one is to see a "conflict" where a release of a 
£100 debt is easier to establish than a release of £l legacy, one should 
swallow one's scruples and let the two-witness rule have its head. In the 
lease case, however reasonable and unconflicting one considers the two- 
witness rule, the common law has an interest in blocking it. Given com- 
parable assumptions as to reasonableness and conflictingness, the same 
distinctions apply to substantive rules on what makes a lease or release 
valid.) 
The three theories outlined -- "rule of reason," "conflict-avoidance," 
and "common law interest" -- perhaps ought to be thought of as alterna- 
tives, but there is no logical necessity that they be so considered. In other 
words, it might have been good judicial policy to think out the theory that 
justifies intervention to control the conduct of non-common law courts 
and to apply consistently the criterion appropriate to that theory. But 
there is nothing logically wrong with saying that all the theories are true - 
- i.e., that "foreign" courts may be prohibited if they propose to apply 
rules which the supervising court finds unreasonable; that they may also 
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be prohibited from enforcing rules that conflict meaningfully with the 
common law, whether or not such rules would be held unreasonable by 
the standards applied, say, to local customary law; that they may in any 
case be prohibited if they refuse to determine issues in which the common 
law is specially interested by common law standards. Among other ques- 
tions to be addressed to the cases is whether the courts approached any- 
thing like a choice among theories, or whether signs of all three appear in 
such ways as to suggest that all were embraced and choice among them 
avoided. 
The cases will of course reveal many complexities which I have made 
no attempt to anticipate. Except for one component, however, I have per- 
haps said enough at a general, a priori level to introduce the contents of 
Vol. II. The arrangement of the material is in a sense implicit in the analy- 
sis above, though practical considerations have influenced the exact order 
in which I shall discuss the cases. I shall first take up cases arising on 
substantive disallowance surmises in which such surmise was probably 
the only hope for Prohibition. That is to say, I shall exclude from Section 
II those cases in which the disallowance surmise occurs, but in which it 
may not have been necessary because the ecclesiastical suit may have 
been prohibitable on the ground that a "common law issue" had arisen. 
The latter class will be treated in Section III, "Problems of the Disallow- 
ance-Surmise." There I shall consider the cases in which the disallowance 
surmise may have been used unnecessarily, but may, on the other hand, 
have served to render the category of "common law issues" superfluous 
or suspect. With that class of cases, a couple of other groups are con- 
nected -- cases in which the fictionalization of the disallowance surmise 
was considered; cases in which parties failed to get Prohibitions by main- 
taining that a "common law issue" had arisen, but were told that Prohibi- 
tion would lie if wrongful disallowance was attributed to the ecclesiastical 
court. Section IV deals with the numerous cases arising on evidentiary 
disallowance surmises. In the final Section V, I shall deal with cases on 
self-incrimination, the appropriateness of which to this chapter I must 
briefly explain. 
Evidentiary disallowance surmises bring in question the ecclesiastical 
courts' right to their procedure -- arguably, at least, a more (or less) de- 
fensible right than the right to dispose of their own suits by their own sub- 
stantive rules. Cases on the power of ecclesiastical courts to demand 
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sworn testimony put the same right in question. Despite numerous con- 
textual differences, title to insist that claims be supported by two wit- 
nesses and title to compel men to supply evidence under oath are both 
titles to go about ecclesiastical business by methods well-warranted in ec- 
clesiastical law. Moral responses are readier-to-hand to condemn inquisi- 
torial procedure; they were available to the judges and lawyers we are 
concerned with, as, through the medium of the history of the "privilege 
against self-incrimination," they are available to us. But those responses 
themselves want scrutiny. Inquisitorial procedure admitted of abuse; so, 
in the form of extremely inflexible application, did the two-witness rule. 
At the margin of downright unfairness and stupidity, both ecclesiastical 
practices -- especially the former, of course -- admitted of "rule of reason" 
control. Short of that margin, it may be questioned -- and often has been - 
- whether there is anything intrinsically wrong about asking reasonably 
suspected or charged persons to tell the truth under oath about their activi- 
ties, insofar as the information they can supply is relevant for the disposi- 
tion of a legitimate case. Such investigation can be unfavorably compared 
to the common law way of doing things -- whereby (under the old system, 
before the power to compel testimony of any sort was introduced) cases 
had to be disposed of on the basis of voluntarily presented evidence and 
the jurors' own knowledge. By very much the same token, one might 
consider ecclesiastical "evidentiary formalism" pretty silly. It was none- 
theless the ecclesiastical way. Assuming that there is a prominent gap be- 
tween "pretty silly" and "utterly unreasonable and unacceptable," it would 
not do to block the two-witness rule in every case. Distinctions and ra- 
tionale were called for, criteria for singling out those ecclesiastical cases 
in which the common law courts had grounds for insisting that ecclesias- 
tical evidentiary canons be waived. Likewise, disapproving of a system 
which countenances, and perhaps needs, the power to exact potentially 
self-incriminating testimony does not lead straight to the conclusion that 
the exercise of such power must be totally banned. It does lead to the 
kinds of questions we have been reflecting on abstractly and which per- 
vade the disallowance cases. E.g.: However strongly one disapproves of 
a system that countenances and needs inquisitorial procedure, can one ad- 
mit ecclesiastical law into a limited sphere and then turn around and sim- 
ply forbid the operation of one integral aspect of ecclesiastical procedure? 
Is the "rule of reason" a drastic control on inquisitorial procedure? a suffi- 
cient one? (I.e.: Is it flatly contrary to the law of nature to ask a man to 
convict himself of a crime, so that all inquisition in criminal matters 
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should be banned, leaving the power only in civil cases? If so, the "rule of 
reason" would be a drastic control. Or can reason only object to ex- 
tremely offensive forms of inquisition -- such as "fishing expeditions" not 
preceded by any specification of charges, or questioning designed to en- 
trap in especially unfair ways? If so, are further controls necessary?) Is 
there any sense in which the common law has a "privilege against self-in- 
crimination," and hence any foothold for demanding that ecclesiastical 
courts avoid contradicting the common law, at least in some cases? (Cf.: 
Is there any sense in which the common law has standards which conflict 
with the two-witness rule, as opposed to a wholly different system inca- 
pable of conflicting in respect of particular rules?) Are there "common 
law interests" in whose name inquisitorial investigation may sometimes 
be blocked and sometimes not? E.g.: May an ecclesiastical court be pro- 
hibited from exacting testimony that might put a man in danger of secular 
liability -- either criminal prosecution or civil loss -- whereas forcing a 
man to accuse or convict himself of a purely ecclesiastical crime must be 
tolerated (short, at least, of extreme unfairness)? 
In sum, self-incrimination as a topic of inter-jurisdictional law -- a 
much better-known topic than most of those studied here -- is "formally" 
of a parcel with disallowance cases, part of our present concern with com- 
mon law control over the conduct of "foreign" courts in suits within their 
spheres. The "material" senses in which self-incrimination cases are dis- 
tinct, such as their involvement with the statutory powers of the High 
Commission, will be specified when we come to those cases. In the sepa- 
rate Introduction to Section V, general considerations bearing on self-in- 
crimination and its relation to the wider concerns of Vol. II are discussed 
in greater depth. 
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SUBSTANTIVE SURMISES OF DISALLOWANCE 
Summary: In the very broadest terms, perhaps judicial restraint, rather 
than great readiness to interfere in the handling of “foreign” suits, is the 
predominant impression left by the cases, Something of a trend toward 
greater restraint can be seen in the 17th century. No single theory, clearly 
and exclusively specifying when and why common law intervention is 
justified, emerges. The cases, in their several groupings, tend to caution 
against general theories capable of cutting though many classes. Although 
some results may be construed as reactions to ecclesiastical conduct 
thought merely unreasonable, the weight of careful thinking about disal- 
lowance cases went rather against conceiving the common law as enforc- 
ing a “rule of reason.’’ Because there was an ecclesiastical appellate 
system capable of correcting errors by ecclesiastical standards and par- 
ticular decisions so foolish by any standard that it could hardly be pre- 
sumed that they would survive appeal, there was a strong argument for 
assigning a different function to the conduct-controlling Prohibition. The 
cases do not say with much precision what that different function was. 
Some decisions encourage the view that the common law should be made 
to prevail by Prohibition in the event of head-on rule-conflict. However, 
very few cases present even relatively unambiguous instances of such 
conflict. Some results can be seen as instances of directing non-common 
law conduct in order to protect interests in the common law sphere, but 
sometimes the courts refused to intervene even when a plausible case 
could be made that secular interests might be harmed. In the upshot, the 
most practically useful generalizations are lower-level ones, referring to 
particular kinds of cases -- e.g., that the chance of getting the common 
law courts to interfere with ecclesiastical assessment of the capacity of es- 
tates to bear legacies diminished as the 17th century went on; that Prohi- 
bitions would be pretty freely used to prevent complaints of defamation 
from being treated more tenderly in ecclesiastical courts than at common 
law; that the judges could very likely be persuaded to intervene if an ec- 
clesiastical court took a more indulgent view of the legal capacity of mar- 
ried women than the common law; that tithe-payers had a fair chance of 
securing help by the disallowance surmise in the relatively rare circum- 
stances in which that was their only route to common law assistance. On 
the whole, a man with an unusual case would be well-advised to try hard 
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in the ecclesiastical court and take appeals if he was not initially success- 
ful. A man tempted not to try very hard, even hoping that the ecclesiasti- 
cal court would do something wrong enough to justify removing the suit 
to the common law by Prohibition, should be dissuaded from putting 
great stock in such calculations. 
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A few relatively early cases, different from each other, will serve to in- 
troduce the topic. They go to show that ca. 1590 the courts felt free to in- 
tervene when pleas were in their judgment improperly disallowed. 
Whatever the conditions and limitations of such intervention, there are no 
signs of its having been challenged in general. That is to say, there is no 
evidence of a theory to the effect that power to control jurisdiction by its 
very nature entails indifference to the manner in which a court with ad- 
mitted jurisdiction disposes of the case before it. 
In Somers v. Sir Richard Buckley (1590), 1 a Prohibition was granted 
to the Admiralty on surmise that that court would not allow plaintiff-in- 
Prohibition to plead an agreement to divide a prize. Two ships had col- 
laborated in taking the prize in such a manner that by Admiralty law their 
masters were entitled to split it. One master, plaintiff-in-Prohibition, was 
sued in the Admiralty by the master of the other ship for retaining more 
than his share. He claimed that they had agreed to split 4-1 in his favor, 
instead of 50-50. Allegedly, he was not allowed to assert the agreement. 
On its face, the disallowance seems outrageous, for surely a considerate 
agreement to share in a given way should prevail over the disposition that 
Admiralty law would make in the absence of a bargain. Subsequently, 
defendant-in-Prohibition's counsel moved for Consultation, claiming that 
the Admiralty would in fact allow the plea. A Consultation was granted 
on condition that it do so. The outcome suggests that plaintiff-in-Prohibi- 
tion was either confused or disingenuous, more likely the latter. I.e.: He 
may have alleged the disallowance fictitiously, hoping that the defendant 
would leave it unchallenged and take issue on the fact of the bargain. The 
Court's willingness to grant a conditional Consultation on motion (as op- 
posed to insisting on a formal traverse of the disallowance) might indicate 
a certain disinclination to prohibit by reason of a disallowed plea when 
there was an alternative course and the surmise looked improbable. The 
1    32 Eliz. C.P. (No term) 2 Leonard, 182. 
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case does, however, make the point that the Admiralty's jurisdiction over 
prizes taken at sea does not entitle it to handle litigation over them in any 
way it chooses. 
In Bennet v. Shortwright (1590), 2 a man was sued for tithes and 
claimed that he had duly set them out in the field, but that the parson had 
not taken them away. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the ec- 
clesiastical court had refused to let him plead his defense. Again, the dis- 
allowance seems so absurd as to be incredible, for the plea amounted to 
saying that the parishioner had performed his legal duty as normally un- 
derstood. Was the ecclesiastical court really prepared to hold that a pa- 
rishioner who had set out tithes would be liable for non-payment if (as 
remarks in the reports suggest was the case) the tithes were carried off by 
a stranger or eaten by beasts before the parson collected them? The 
Queen's Bench spoke on the assumption that the ecclesiastical court was 
prepared so to hold. In support of not letting it get away with it, the Court 
relied on the maxim that by setting out decima transeunt in cattalla. I.e.: 
By the common law, once tithes are set out the parson has property in 
them and can maintain an action of Trespass against a stranger who takes 
them. 
An ecclesiastical rule holding the parishioner liable for loss of the 
tithes during the interval between setting out and collection would cer- 
tainly jar with the common law rule, though perhaps the two rules are not 
strictly repugnant. According to one report (Leonard), the Court said by 
way of dictum that a man who sets tithes out and then, before the parson 
collects them, takes them back himself may be sued in the ecclesiastical 
court for non-payment. The effect of the dictum to say that tithes turned 
into chattels by the common law are not ipso facto taken out of ecclesias- 
tical cognizance. That being admitted, an ecclesiastical rule that setting 
out does not discharge the parishioner from liability once and for all 
would be consistent with the common law rule that setting out constitutes 
payment in the sense of "a transfer of property from one owing a duty to 
the person to whom it is owed." The implied ecclesiastical rule in this 
case is only an instance of "a rule that setting out does not discharge the 
2 M. 32/33 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 206; 2 Leonard, 101 (dated, presumably erroneously, T. 30); 
Harl. 1633, f.l19; Add. 25,196, f.253b. 
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parishioner from liability once and for all." Therefore it is not strictly re- 
pugnant to the common law maxim. However, it would be odd to legis- 
late that the parson may sue a stranger for taking the set-out tithes and at 
the same time may sue the parishioner as if he had not set them out. The 
oddness would be eliminated if the parishioner, having been forced to pay 
twice, could recover over against a trespasser. Indeed, the supposed rule 
amounts to treating the parishioner as an insurer pending collection. But 
because the common law rule transfers the property to the parson, the pa- 
rishioner could not maintain an action (unless in equity) against a tres- 
passer. He would therefore be an absolute insurer, which is an 
unreasonably hard position to put him in. 
In looser terms, perhaps the implied ecclesiastical rule is not contrary 
to "natural reason." Still, it seems very hard to attach liability to the pa- 
rishioner for an indefinite time after setting out, during which the tithes 
might spoil, and the risk of their being taken or destroyed by a trespasser 
would be perpetuated by the parson's own negligence. The hardness of 
such a rule, and its disharmony with the common law maxim, were quite 
enough to justify a Prohibition in the judges' eyes. The subsequent events 
of the case suggest, however, that the ecclesiastical court probably did not 
in fact propose to enforce so unlikely a rule. For defendant-in-Prohibition 
took issue on the disallowance. That he dared do so suggests that the 
plaintiff was mistaken about what the ecclesiastical court had actually 
done; or that he alleged the disallowance fictitiously, in the hope that is- 
sue would be taken on another element in his surmise (the fact of setting 
out or an exiguous customary variation from the de jure manner of tith- 
ing, which was also involved); or that the disallowance was really for evi- 
dentiary reasons, which the plaintiff concealed because he doubted that 
the King's Bench would block ecclesiastical enforcement of the two-wit- 
ness rule. 
In Pendleton v. Green (1591), 3 a parishioner being sued for tithes 
wanted to claim that one Taylor, rather than his adversary, Pendleton, was 
the lawful parson entitled to the tithes. A Prohibition was granted on sur- 
mise that the ecclesiastical court would not let the parishioner plead that 
3 3 Leonard. 266 (dated M. 33 Eliz. -- either 32/33 or 33/34); Croke Eliz., 228 (dated P. 33, sub. 
nom. Green v. Penilden). 
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defense. The implied ecclesiastical rule would seem to be that a parish- 
ioner does not have standing to challenge the right to the parsonage. He 
must either pay the parson de facto or excuse himself by a modus, bar- 
gain, or the like. He may not plead that someone else is parson de jure. So 
I would state the implied rule to give it color of reason. (The reports are 
scanty.) Surely no ecclesiastical court would prevent a parishioner from 
claiming that his adversary had no pretense whatever to sue as parson. 
The parishioner here must have confessed Pendleton’s de facto incum- 
bency and sought to show a defect in his title. The Queen’s Bench held 
that the rule was unreasonable because the parishioner might have to pay 
twice: If he cannot dispute Pendleton’s title, he will have to pay him, after 
which Taylor, as rightful parson, might sue for the same tithes. 
Is the decision in this case as clearly justifiable as those in the two 
cases above? Surely the prospect of an unjust double payment depends on 
how the ecclesiastical court would handle a future suit by Taylor. In the 
event of such a suit, justice would obviously require that Green be ex- 
cused and Taylor be driven to recover against Pendleton. Why should the 
Queen’s Bench assume the worst before it happened? In the two cases 
above, the vetoed rules attributed to the ecclesiastical courts had a strong 
flavor of unreasonableness. Here, a rule was vetoed because it might lead 
to injustice if not supplemented by other rules. The earlier cases would 
stand with the principle that “foreign” courts are entitled to their own 
rules so long as they do not offend against reason in a fundamental way. 
This case implies that the common law may impose its standards more 
freely, if not indiscriminately. There was, in this case, a prospect of injus- 
tice. It could be avoided now by imposing the judges’ preference on the 
ecclesiastical court. Their preference was not arbitrary. It is probably 
more sensible to let the right of the parsonage be disputed and settled now 
than to restrict the rightful parson to recovery against the usurper. On the 
other hand, the implied ecclesiastical rule is reasonable in the sense that 
respectable reasons can be give for it. There is an advantage in not letting 
Green and Pendleton dispute about Taylor’s interest in his absence. There 
is perhaps a public advantage, from the point of view of the Church’s cor- 
porate interests and morale, in encouraging parishioners to pay the repre- 
sentative of the Church in possession promptly, leaving clergymen and 
their patrons to quarrel at their leisure about who ought to represent the 
Church. The question of title to a parsonage is likely to involve the right 
to the patronage -- an issue outside ecclesiastical competence. Because 
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the ecclesiastical rule can be defended by these reasons, Pendleton v. 
Green argues for a strong version of the common law’s right to regulate 
ecclesiastical handling of ecclesiastical cases. 
In Pett v. Baseden (1592), 4 a man bequeathed £100 to his wife pro et 
in exoneratione of her dower in certain land, the sum to be paid within a 
year of the testator’s death. The widow promptly married Baseden, who 
exchanged mutual promises with the executor, Pett: The executor to pay 
Baseden £100 within the said year of the testator’s death; Baseden to 
make the executor a discharge of the legacy and dower. Baseden then 
sued for the legacy in an ecclesiastical court. Pett pleaded: (a) that he had 
offered to pay the promised £100, but Baseden, hoping to recover both 
the legacy and the dower, would not make him a discharge, so that the 
agreement remained unexecuted; (b) that he was now ready to pay the 
£100, provided Baseden would make the discharge. The executor ob- 
tained a Prohibition because the ecclesiastical court would not accept his 
plea and proffer. On demurrer, the Prohibition was upheld. 
I would reconstruct the ecclesiastical court’s overruled position on the 
case as follows: (a) The legacy is not conditional on the dower’s being 
discharged. Under the terms of this will, the executor must pay the legacy 
and leave it to those interested in the land to help themselves as best they 
can to avoid the dower. (The land was devised to the testator’s son when 
he should reach twenty-one, the executor meanwhile to take the profits 
for payment of debts and legacies. Would equity not be the only resort for 
the executor or son to avoid the dower?) (b) The agreement is a temporal 
thing, of no consequence from the ecclesiastical point of view, whatever 
legal or equitable rights it may engender. Therefore it is not appropriate 
for the ecclesiastical court to force Baseden, in effect, to execute the 
agreement. 
The Queen’s Bench expressly rejected the first point, holding that the 
legacy was conditional. The ecclesiastical court ought not to have held the 
executor liable to pay the legacy until the dower was discharged and 
therefore ought to have accepted the executor’s offer. If Baseden refused 
it, it ought to have dismissed his suit for the legacy. This being held, the 
4 P. 34 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 274. 
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agreement hardly matters except as reinforcement: It shows that Baseden 
had himself acknowledged that he ought to release the dower in order to 
have the £100. The executor's promise and attempt to perform it tend to 
excuse him of any negligence. But if the legacy must be taken as condi- 
tional, the case would be the same without these additional circumstances. 
(Baseden's counsel argued that the executor had not pleaded sufficient 
circumstances in his favor. They contended that his case would be better 
if he had shown expressly that Baseden had refused payment -- as op- 
posed to merely declining to make the release -- and if he had shown ex- 
actly when he had offered to perform -- i.e., that he had done so within 
the year specified in the will. The Court was not moved by this argument. 
On my analysis, the reason would be that the conditional character of the 
legacy was the only really material point.) 
Was the Queen's Bench justified in interfering with the ecclesiastical 
court's construction of the legacy? On the one hand, the interference 
seems dubious, inasmuch as legacies were purely ecclesiastical interests. 
The judges themselves said that the agreement would support a common 
law action. If the executor, having been compelled to pay the legacy, 
could sue Baseden for breach of contract if he failed to make the release, 
was the executor not pretty well protected? On the other hand, a damage 
suit is no substitute for specific fulfillment of the testator's intentions. It 
seems to me that the ecclesiastical court construed the legacy foolishly, in 
such a way as to defeat the plain meaning of the will. Whatever objec- 
tions can be made against interfering in the construction of legacies -- at 
least when there is no utter violation of common justice -- the Queen's 
Bench saved trouble and possible hardship by deciding the case as it did. 
With Lord Rich's Case (1594), 5 we pass to a line of connected reports 
which as a group provide the most coherent focus on disallowed pleas as 
a basis for Prohibition. Lord Rich the elder left £1500 to his daughter, 
provided she marry with the consent of his heir and another. Lord Rich 
the younger was sued as his father's executor for that legacy. He pleaded 
that the estate was utterly insufficient to satisfy the legacy (worth only 
£1500 and £5000 in debt.) Upon surmise that the plea of "No assets" was 
disallowed, he obtained a Prohibition. If there was nothing more to the 
5 M. 36/37 Eliz. Q.B. Harg. 26, f.42; Harl. 4817, f.152. 
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case, the decision seems overwhelmingly justified. Disallowing "No as- 
sets" in unambiguous circumstances could only imply the unreasonable 
rule that legacies should be satisfied before debts. Even if legacy law as 
such should be considered beyond common law control, the interests of 
creditors must obviously be protected. One report of Lord Rich's Case 
(Harl. 4817) adds that the daughter-legatee had in fact married without 
the consent specified in the will. There is no apparent connection be- 
tween this circumstance and the main point of the case. The reporter ap- 
pends a note, however, which flatly contradicts Pett v. Baseden above: 
"...If she marries without assent, though by the common law the legacy is 
not payable, yet the spiritual court will award that she will have [it], and 
no Prohibition lies on that since it is [a matter of] testament and lega- 
cies." If correct, the suggestion is that ecclesiastical courts would either 
simply not recognize conditional legacies -- surely an incredible rule -- or 
that they would disregard some conditions, such as the attempt to limit 
freedom of marriage in this case. Whereas in Pett v. Baseden the common 
law intervened to prevent construing conditional language away (and per- 
haps "pro et in exoneratione" is not perfect conditional language), the re- 
porter here would have the common law powerless to insist that a plain 
condition be respected. Quaere. 
Norton and Sharp v. Gennet et al. 6 presents a variation on the theme of 
Lord Rich's Case. The basic situation was the same: Executors were sued 
for a £200 legacy. The estate amounted to £350. The testator was bound 
in £1000 and, according to the executors, the condition had been broken 
so that the £1000 were forfeit. The ecclesiastical court would not allow 
the executors to plead this matter, which amounted to a claim that the es- 
tate was insufficient to satisfy legacies. The problem of the case arose 
from the fact that it was disputable whether the bond had actually been 
forfeited. The principle that the common law may intervene to prevent 
enforcement of legacies against an insufficient estate or to the detriment 
of creditors was not controverted. There was some discussion of the ef- 
fect of outstanding bonds on the ecclesiastical court's power to go ahead 
and award recovery of legacies. Coke, for the legatee, argued that lega- 
cies may not be recovered if bonds to pay money or the like are outstand- 
6 T. 37 Eliz. Q.B. Owen, 72; Moore, 413; Harg. 12, f.41b: Harl. 1631, f.45b; Lansd. 1059, f.232b. 
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ing, but that they may be recovered if outstanding bonds are such that the 
condition may never be broken. Here the bond was of the second type -- a 
jailer's obligation to save the Sheriffs of London harmless if prisoners 
should escape. Save for Justice Fenner, who was in some doubt, the Court 
accepted Coke's distinction. The serious contention in our case -- whether 
the bond was forfeited or not -- need not detain us. The Court was finally 
convinced that it was not forfeited. A Consultation was granted on condi- 
tion that the legatee enter into an obligation to the executors to make res- 
titution if the bond should be forfeited in the future. For our purposes, the 
significance of the case is that the common law may intervene, not only to 
prevent recovery of legacies against an estate plainly insufficient to sat- 
isfy more than debts, but also to resolve doubts as to the estate's suffi- 
ciency to support legacies in view of the particular claims against it. (The 
alternative rule would be to trust the ecclesiastical court to work out a fair 
solution in ambiguous circumstances. Although that course might have 
something to recommend it in some cases, the present case points to the 
danger: Considerable common law technical competence could be re- 
quired to evaluate claims against an estate.) 
A number of later cases retest the principle that the common law may 
protect the plea of "No assets" against legacy claims. In a Common Pleas 
case of 1597 7 the executor pleaded that he had paid out all the testator's 
assets to satisfy debts, showing how and to whom. It is not clear that the 
plea was actually disallowed. The report gives the Court's opinion that if 
the plea is disallowed Prohibition will be granted. The opinion empha- 
sizes that there will be no Prohibition unless it is disallowed. That is to 
say, the executor has no right to have such facts as may be disputed -- the 
size of the estate, the truth about its indebtedness, etc. -- tried at common 
law. The common law will only guarantee that the ecclesiastical court ac- 
cept the priority of debts over legacies as a matter of law. 
The debate in Agarde v. Porter (1602) 8 reached a much higher pitch of 
jurisprudential interest than that in earlier related cases. In this case, the 
executor did not seek common law assistance until he had been sentenced 
to pay a legacy and the sentence had been upheld on appeal to the Dele- 
7 39 Eliz. (No term) Add. 25,199, f.3. 
8 P. 44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.467 (the strong report); Add. 25,213, f.31 (brief). 
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gates. But apparently no attempt was made to hold his delay against him. 
When he got around to seeking a Prohibition, he surmised: (a) that he had 
pleaded that the estate was extensively indebted and that various debts 
due to the testator were desperate. (The report does not say that he alleged 
the estate's absolute insufficiency to pay legacies. The plea should be 
taken as a claim that no legacy should be paid pending collection of debts 
to the testator and payment of debts owed by him.) (b) He had offered to 
prove these facts by "reasonable testimony." (c) The plea had been re- 
fused. This surmise leaves it ambiguous whether the plea was refused be- 
cause the circumstances were regarded, if true, as insufficient to excuse 
the executor from paying the legacy, or because the testimony offered 
was not regarded as "reasonable." Arguing for a Consultation, Tanfield 
claimed that the plea had not actually been disallowed, and that the eccle- 
siastical court was not seeking to enforce evidentiary requirements stricter 
than the common law would insist on. Tanfield also argued, however, that 
there should be no Prohibition even if the plea had been disallowed. The 
present interest of the case lies in this further argument. 
Tanfield maintained in effect that common law intervention is justified 
only when the ecclesiastical court's "error" is not an error in the terms of 
ecclesiastical law. That is to say, the common law may intervene when 
the ecclesiastical court has correctly (in its own terms) applied a rule that 
conflicts with the common law. It may not intervene when the ecclesiasti- 
cal court has made an "unjust" decision capable of being corrected by ap- 
peal within the ecclesiastical system. This position implies that the 
common law judges should take judicial notice of the rules of "foreign" 
law outside the context of the immediate case. They should try to estimate 
whether a given decision reflects an inexorable conflict of laws, or 
whether it is simply a particular judge's misguided attempt to apply rules 
which the common law would regard as tolerable in themselves. The 
common law court should not act whenever the rule implied in a particu- 
lar decision seems unreasonable or at odds with the common law. 
In a sense, Tanfield's distinction has axiomatic truth -- or speciousness. 
Plainly the Prohibition did not exist to do the same job as ecclesiastical 
appeals. Yet applying the distinction presents difficulties. Suppose an ec- 
clesiastical court disallows a plea and a Prohibition is sought. Suppose the 
common law court calls in civil lawyers and, being persuaded that the dis- 
allowance was bad ecclesiastical law, refuses the Prohibition and tells the 
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party he must help himself by appeal. Then suppose the party exhausts all 
appeals, but the original disallowance is upheld at all levels. Is he entitled 
to a Prohibition now? Common sense might say "yes," since it is now his 
only remedy against injustice. But it is not clear that Tanfield's principle 
leads to that answer. (In the instant case, he plainly did not want it to, for 
his adversary had already lost in the Delegates, the highest normal court 
of appeal in the ecclesiastical system.) It is just as possible for successive 
ecclesiastical courts to apply their own law mistakenly as it is for the 
original court to do so. Appeals are only designed to reduce the practical 
likelihood of injustice and error. If the common law ought not to jump to 
the "positivistic" conclusion that the ecclesiastical law is what the original 
ecclesiastical court by implication says it is, should it indulge in "positiv- 
ism" on second thought, holding that after all the ecclesiastical law must 
be what the highest appellate court says it is? Surely the common law 
should stick to its original determination -- that the disallowance does not 
reflect an intrinsic conflict of law. The losing party is no doubt pitiable, 
but he is no worse off than a man who loses in a Writ of Error. In the eyes 
of a critic of the judges in error, the loser there is pitiable too. Legal sys- 
tems have to assign the last word. They can only do so at some risk of in- 
justice. It is not a defect in the English legal system that it does not assign 
the last word to the common law in all circumstances. Subjecting every 
decision to a finite series of appeals is the most that can be done to recon- 
cile justice and finality. 
But to carry out the logic of Tanfield's position, it seems to me, is to 
ask too much of the common law courts. On the first round it is easy 
enough to say, "This is mere error or injustice. Take your appeal." It is a 
great deal harder when the error proves perdurable. To hold that a deci- 
sion is merely foolish, and so remediable by appeal, is one thing. To re- 
fuse to intervene when there is no other way to prevent a decision one has 
already branded as foolish from taking effect is a harder thing. Moreover, 
it is anomalous to leap in when the ecclesiastical court is bound to apply a 
perfectly reasonable rule which happens to differ from the common law 
and to stand back when the ecclesiastical system has failed to reverse an 
unreasonable decision which can legitimately be regarded as bad in eccle- 
siastical law. I therefore conclude that Tanfield's principle is unworkable 
in the long run. Therefore I can see little point in invoking it in the first 
instance. Every economic advantage is on the side of intervening at once 
if intervention might ultimately be necessary. In addition, it is much sim- 
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pler to take the ecclesiastical law to be accurately reflected in what the ec- 
clesiastical court has actually done than to engage in a constructive proc- 
ess to decide whether Prohibition or appeal is the right remedy. To reject 
Tanfield's principle is not to rob the ecclesiastical appellate courts of their 
function, or to make the Prohibition a mere equivalent of appellate con- 
trol. For a distinction can be made between unreasonable decisions, 
which justify Prohibitions even though they might be reversable by ap- 
peal, and decisions only correctable by appeal because they are no worse 
than questionable by ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless, we shall encounter 
"Tanfield's principle" (as I shall continue to refer to it) at various points. 
It gives strong expression to the "conflict-avoidance" theory of the com- 
mon law's title to intervene on disallowance surmises. 
In Agarde v. Porter, Tanfield would appear to be applying his principle 
in two ways: (a) To say that ecclesiastical law does not "really" hold that 
legacies should be paid before it is clear that the estate can sustain them 
over and above debts -- whatever these particular ecclesiastical courts 
may have done. (b) To say that ecclesiastical law does not "really" insist 
on unreasonable evidentiary rules, or rules at odds with the common law - 
- whatever the particular courts may have done. The latter point we may 
leave aside until we turn to evidentiary rules. The former appears to con- 
tradict the preceding cases. In those cases as reported, there is no discus- 
sion about the "real" ecclesiastical law. The Prohibitions were issued as if 
the ecclesiastical law would prefer legacies to debts. The probability that 
a decision unambiguously charging an insufficient estate with legacies 
would be reversed within the ecclesiastical system was not discussed as a 
reason for denying Prohibition. (Tanfield cited Lord Rich's Case in favor 
of his general distinction. I can only say that on the basis of my slight re- 
ports there is no evidence that the Court acted on it in that case with re- 
spect to the plea of "No assets." It is conceivable that it was applied to the 
other issue -- the conditional legacy.) 
Unfortunately, the Court did not produce a decisive resolution of the 
issue of principle raised by Tanfield in Agarde v. Porter. The judges did 
refuse the Consultation which Tanfield was seeking by motion. He was 
invited to plead formally if he wanted a Consultation. That means he 
could demur and use the arguments we have reviewed in support of the 
demurrer, or deny the disallowance as a matter of fact, or plead the eccle- 
siastical law as he understood it and challenge the other side to contradict 
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him or demur. There is no report of what he decided to so. In turning 
down the motion, the judges at least did not deny Tanfield’s general argu- 
ment as it relates to the plea of “No assets.“ They did not say that the 
Prohibition was good if it was true that the ecclesiastical courts had de 
facto refused to let the condition of the estate be pleaded, regardless of 
whether that act was in principle remediable by appeal. Leaving that 
question open, the judges denied the motion because they thought it at 
least probable that ecclesiastical evidentiary requirements would prevent 
the executor from establishing his defense. That was probable enough to 
require that the truth be investigated upon formal pleading. In effect, the 
Court ducked the legal problem and adopted a procedural solution, per- 
haps wisely. 
In a case of 1605, 9 the plea of “No assets” was disallowed in more 
complicated circumstances. In effect: A. devised a legacy to B., making 
C. executor; B. sued C. for the legacy and had sentence to recover; before 
paying, C. made D. his executor and died; B. sued D. to perform the sen- 
tence; D. pleaded that he had no assets from A.’s estate and sought a Pro- 
hibition when that plea was disallowed. Three judges -- Gawdy, 
Yelverton, and Fenner -- favored the Prohibition, while Justice Williams 
opposed it. 
Since the line taken by Tanfield in the preceding case does not reap- 
pear in this one, we are free to consider the ecclesiastical decision with 
respect simply to its reasonableness and congruity with the common law. 
In those terms, it will perhaps seem offhand that little can be said for it: 
D. cannot reasonably be charged with C.’s duties as A.’s executor unless 
he is in possession of goods which C. held qua executor. It is equally 
clear, however, that D. should be charged as C.’s representative to the ex- 
tent that C. was responsible for the absence of A.’s goods in D.’s hands. 
If C. once had possession of A.’s goods in sufficient amount to satisfy 
A.’s debts and legacies but inexcusably let them out of his hands and died 
before satisfying his executorial duties, C.’s estate should be liable (sub- 
ject to any priorities the law might assign to claims against C personally - 
- surely ahead of C.’s legacies.) If D. were sued at common law for A.’s 
9 H. 2 and P. 3 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f.39b. (Second hearing dated P.1, but that must be an error 
for P.3.) 
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debts and pleaded that he had no assets from A.’s estate, the creditor 
could reply that C. had wasted A.’s goods and so should answer for the 
debt out of his own. A fortiori, one would suppose, when the debt is a 
judgment debt against C. as executor. No one, I take it, would deny that 
the ecclesiastical court would be entitled to behave analogously with re- 
spect to a legacy. The ecclesiastical court might well hold D. responsible 
for A.’s legacies out of C.’s goods if it appeared that C. had wasted A.’s 
estate. A fortiori when, as here, C. had been sentenced to pay the legacy. 
The issue then becomes whether, in disallowing D.’s plea that he had no 
assets from A., the ecclesiastical court was adopting a legitimate means to 
hold D. liable to the extent that he may justly be so held. 
Justice Williams based his dissent on the possibility that C. had wasted 
A.’s goods. I think his position may be expanded as follows: The ecclesi- 
astical court is entitled to hold D. liable as C.’s executor for C.’s unper- 
formed executorial duties -- especially those confirmed by sentence -- 
unless an excuse is shown. It is entitled to say that the bare plea “No as- 
sets from A.’s estate” is an insufficient excuse. It may insist on a plea that 
the lack of assets is not C.’s fault, or presume that it is his fault in the ab- 
sence of a contrary showing. In other words, the ecclesiastical court is en- 
titled to subject C.’s own estate to C.’s duties as A.’s executor if D. 
cannot account for A.’s estate as C. would be obliged to do if he were 
alive. It is entitled to say to D., as it would to C., “Either show that A.’s 
estate was insufficient from the start to support legacies, or else pay.” D.’s 
plea that de facto he has no assets from A does not necessarily show that. 
Such handling of the case would not be strictly analogous to common 
law handling of the most nearly comparable case, for at common law the 
plea of “No assets” in response to a debt claim would be good in itself, 
subject to being answered by a plea alleging that the goods had been 
wasted. But why should ecclesiastical behavior be as analogous to com- 
mon law behavior as possible? Moreover, Williams' position is espe- 
cially reasonable in view of the fact that B. had already successfully sued 
C. If B. were suing D. for the legacy without having sued C. before, it 
might be argued that to presume a fault in C. unless D. can rebut it is un- 
fair, hard on D., or contrary to the probabilities. One might argue that in 
fairness D. should be allowed to rely on the one fact of which he has 
manifest notice -- that none of A.’s goods are in his hands -- pending alle- 
gation and proof of a fault in his testator. The most likely explanation, af- 
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ter all, would be that C. had paid out all of A.’s goods for debts. But here 
B.’s recovery against C. surely raises the presumption that A.’s estate was 
originally sufficient to bear legacies. It does not prove the estate’s suffi- 
ciency, because C. might have defended B.’s suit on other grounds. How- 
ever, C. did have an opportunity to plead want of assets. Since he did not 
do so, at least not successfully, it is fair to presume that A.’s estate was 
sufficient, and therefore that the absence of A.’s goods in D.’s hands is 
owing to some fault in C.’s administration. 
Williams’s brethren, however, did not agree with the above position. In 
effect, the other three judges preferred offhand to insist that the ecclesias- 
tical court conform more strictly to common law standards. A Prohibition 
was accordingly granted. The case was reopened the next term when Ser- 
jeant Heale moved for a Consultation. Heale’s argument adds some facts 
and hence somewhat changes the perspective in which the case appears. 
According to Heale, C. had pleaded non devisavit when B. sued him for 
the legacy. C. claimed that his testator made no such bequest. C. lost on 
that plea and costs were awarded to B. Subsequently, C. brought two ap- 
peals and also sued (presumably in vain, or without full prosecution) 
three Prohibitions to the three ecclesiastical courts that heard the case suc- 
cessively. On the basis of these facts, Heale thought B. should have a 
Consultation at least for the costs which the ecclesiastical court had 
awarded against C. The justice of this demand seems very strong. It 
would seem that C.’s own estate should be liable for the loss which C. 
caused B. by contesting his legacy on a false plea. 
The report does not make it entirely clear what Heale was asking for 
beyond such a Consultation. I take his position to be that at least a Con- 
sultation quoad costs should be granted, but that a full Consultation 
would be appropriate even on motion. Heale excepted to the sufficiency 
of D.’s surmise, but the report does not make his grounds clear. I am in- 
clined to assume that his basic contention was what I project from Wil- 
liam’s opinion above: that D. should have claimed that C. was not 
responsible for the want of assets in D.’s hands, or at least that the eccle- 
siastical court was entitled to insist that he so claim if he wanted to avoid 
the legacy. The putative ecclesiastical position amounts to a rebuttable 
presumption of C.’s responsibility. The facts in a sense reinforce the rea- 
sonableness of the presumption, for it appears that C. went to great 
lengths to avoid paying the legacy, while at no time suggesting that the 
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estate could not support it. He also consumed assets of the estate in litiga- 
tion. (Significantly, all the trouble was over a £10 legacy.) 
The last point is related to the one clear additional argument contrib- 
uted by Serjeant Heale. According to Heale, "by the ecclesiastical law if 
an executor appeals and the sentence is affirmed ... he will be charged de 
bonis propriis." If that rule is enforceable, our case should be settled in 
B.'s favor, at least quoad costs, even though the other arguments for B. 
fail. The rule seems reasonable, being designed to prevent executors from 
consuming the estate by undue litigation. Yelverton (Henry, as opposed 
to the judge, Sir Christopher), arguing against the Consultation, said: "It 
is against a ground of law that he will be charged for the accessory who is 
discharged of the principal." To the extent that D. is not liable to pay the 
legacy (the "principal"), he is not liable to carry out the sentence against 
C. (the "accessory"), whether for the substance or the costs. Yelverton 
goes on to make the basic argument for D.: D. is liable for C.'s executo- 
rial duties only if he holds assets from A. or if C. wasted A.'s estate. D. 
denies the former and has not been contradicted. B. has not alleged the 
latter. Yelverton takes "C.'s executorial duties," generally -- i.e., to com- 
prise both payment of legacies and execution of sentences to pay legacies. 
His "principal and accessory" argument comes to saying that the ecclesi- 
astical rule stated by Heale is unenforceable: The common law ought not 
to tolerate a rule which shifts liability from the testator's estate to the ex- 
ecutor's estate in the absence of actual waste -- ultimately, I suspect, be- 
cause the common law would not do so itself in analogous circumstances. 
The report ends with the Court telling Heale he may demur to the sur- 
mise if he wants to. All that can be inferred is that the Court by now was 
not convinced that the position taken by Heale and Justice Williams was 
utterly without merit. As in the last case, the judges avoided a difficult le- 
gal problem for the moment by sensibly refusing to face it on mere mo- 
tion. 
With Herdy v. Herdy, 10 a Common Pleas case of 1605, we return to 
the simple case: disallowance of an executor's plea that he lacks assets to 
pay legacies. Herdy v. Herdy is significant in three ways: (a) It reveals a 
10 M. 3 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,205, f.40. 
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shift in Common Pleas opinion. According to the brief report from 1597 
above, the Court agreed that such disallowance warrants a Prohibition. In 
Herdy v. Herdy, the Court was divided. (b) The argument made by Tan- 
field in Agarde v. Porter reappears in simpler circumstances and is pretty 
clearly embraced by two judges. (c) New arguments the other way -- i.e., 
in favor of granting a Prohibition -- are introduced. 
Chief Justice Gawdy and Justice Daniel favored a Prohibition in Herdy 
v. Herdy. They were willing to take notice of ecclesiastical law and con- 
cede that the disallowance was erroneous by ecclesiastical standards. 
Therefore the party seeking a Prohibition could equally well have helped 
himself by appeal. But that did not seem a sufficient reason to refuse a 
Prohibition. The two judges seem to accept duplication of remedies with- 
out apology. It is worth noting, however, that they did not adopt what I 
call above the "positivistic" approach -- inferring the ecclesiastical law 
solely from what a single ecclesiastical court had done. They were willing 
to consider what the ecclesiastical law "really" was, and hence to recog- 
nize that there is a problem as to whether the Prohibition should be used 
when it is not strictly necessary. Just by recognizing the problem, they left 
the possibility open that duplication of remedies is not always unobjec- 
tionable. Their reasons for thinking it unobjectionable in this case there- 
fore have the greater importance. Two such reasons are given. 
(a) The factual issue -- whether the estate is really insufficient to pay 
legacies in addition to debts -- is "a temporal thing triable by our law" 
This statement is momentarily disturbing. One might suppose that if the 
issue is "temporal" Prohibition should lie whether or not the ecclesiastical 
court disallowed the plea. The truth of a modus or validity of a deed 
should be tried at common law; therefore an ecclesiastical court will be 
prohibited even though it is perfectly willing to let the party plead his mo- 
dus or deed. If Gawdy and Daniel thought the condition of the estate tri- 
able at common law, should they not have considered the disallowance -- 
and hence the problem of duplication of remedies -- irrelevant? The an- 
swer, I think, is that they were using the "temporal" character of the issue 
as a reason for permitting duplication of remedies here, not as a reason 
for prohibiting even if there had been no disallowance. Their position 
may be stated as follows: Granting a Prohibition in a legacy suit, over 
which the ecclesiastical court has clear jurisdiction, is only warrantable if 
an error has been committed. Granting a Prohibition to correct an error is 
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problematic when the error could be corrected by appeal. It is justified, 
however, when the effect of granting a Prohibition will be to try a ques- 
tion at common law which (negatively) will not take the common law 
court out of its depth, or (positively) which in itself is more suitable to the 
common law than to an ecclesiastical court. 
(b) Gawdy and Daniel also argued that there is a relevant, though not 
immediate, conflict between ecclesiastical and common law. According 
to Gawdy and Daniel, although the two laws agree that debts have prior- 
ity over legacies, they disagree about the executor's obligations with re- 
spect to the estate remaining after debts are paid. The ecclesiastical law 
requires the executor to do his best by all legatees, while the common law 
permits him to satisfy one ahead of the others. (I.e.: A leaves £10 to B 
and £10 to C, and the estate after debts amounts to £10. By ecclesiastical 
law the executor must pay £5 to each. By the common law, he may pay B 
his full legacy and nothing to C. If he does pay £10 to B -- Gawdy and 
Daniel would presumably say -- C's legacy suit should be prohibited.) 
But granting that such a conflict exists -- What was the judges' purpose in 
pointing it out? The plea disallowed here was that the estate would only 
satisfy debts. The executor was not trying to excuse himself on the 
ground that he had used up the estate paying other legacies, as by com- 
mon law standards he might. Once again, the relevance of the argument is 
to justify a Prohibition here notwithstanding the availability of appeals. 
The argument must come to saying that in such a case as this it is not un- 
likely that a dispute over the priority of legacies will arise later, and 
therefore that it makes sense to seize the moment -- to make sure now that 
the matter is settled in a manner acceptable to the common law and avoid 
the risk of another Prohibition's being sued. One might add that it would 
also avoid the risk of another Prohibition's being foreclosed. To see the 
force of this argument, imagine that plaintiff-in-Prohibition is told that his 
remedy is by appeal. He appeals, and the appellate court does the right 
thing: remands the suit with instructions to allow the plea of "No assets to 
pay legacies." The plea is allowed and contradicted by the other party. 
Upon trial it is found false, so that the executor is sentenced to pay this 
legacy. The fact is, however, that the executor has used up the estate pay- 
ing debts plus one of several legacies. According to Gawdy and Daniel, 
he should now be entitled to a Prohibition to stay execution of the sen- 
tence. Since this sequence of events is not wildly improbable, it surely 
makes better sense to economize by granting a Prohibition now. More- 
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over, if a Consultation were issued at the present stage, 50 Edw. 3 might 
stand in the way of a new Prohibition when, in the imagined sequence of 
events, the executor became entitled to one. 
Justices Walmesley and Warburton vehemently opposed Gawdy and 
Daniel, on the ground that their opinion tends to dispossess the ecclesias- 
tical courts of their rightful appellate role. For Walmesley and Warburton, 
jurisdiction over a suit in principle gives the ecclesiastical court power to 
try any issues arising in that suit. The generally valid response to a man 
who dislikes the way an issue is tried is "Take your appeal." At what 
point this ceases to be the valid response -- so that a Prohibition becomes 
appropriate -- Walmesley and Warburton did not try to say. They would 
presumably have said what Tanfield did in Agarde v. Porter: when it is 
evident by judicial notice of the ecclesiastical law that an appeal could not 
possibly produce a result acceptable by common law standards. (Tanfield 
himself argued in Herdy v. Herdy, but nothing is reported of his argument 
except that he cited Lord Rich's case -- to what intent does not appear.) 
The alternative to adopting that position (which the language and exam- 
ples used by Walmesley and Warburton do not exclude) is to say "Never" 
-- i.e., that once the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction there is no way 
of making it conform to common law standards, only the ecclesiastical 
appellate system to insure that unreasonable rules will not prevail. To take 
this latter position is to reduce the Prohibition to its paradigmatic role -- 
regulating jurisdiction. I doubt that Walmesley and Warburton were ready 
to go that far. 
A conclusion is not reported in Herdy v. Herdy. Civilians were called 
in so that the judges could be sure they understood the ecclesiastical law 
correctly. The civilians agreed that the disallowance was erroneous and 
that appeal would lie. Then, the Court being deadlocked, there was noth- 
ing to do but put off decision. The Chief Justice said the Court would stay 
until other judges could be consulted. I have found no further traces of the 
case. 
In Angell's Case (1607), 11 an executor was not allowed to excuse him- 
self from paying a legacy by pleading that he had spent the estate paying 
11 T. 5 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f.77b. 
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debts on simple contracts. The King's Bench refused a Prohibition be- 
cause the creditors whom the executor had satisfied could not have recov- 
ered by common law action. Duties to pay money founded on oral 
agreements (as opposed to specialty debts) could not be enforced at com- 
mon law against an executor, though they could be against the contractor 
during his life. The decision in Angell's Case need not imply approval of 
the ecclesiastical holding, or of a putative rule that legacies should be pre- 
ferred over debts on simple contracts. (In reason and equity they surely 
should not be.) What the decision does imply is that common law inter- 
vention is justified only to protect common law interests: If an ecclesiasti- 
cal holding is merely unreasonable, the remedy should be by appeal (or 
conceivably, in a case such as this one, in a court of equity.) If enforce- 
ment of the legacy would make it less easy for creditors entitled to com- 
mon law actions to recover against the executor, or if it is likely to result 
in an unfair charge on the executor's own resources, a Prohibition is ap- 
propriate. 
Carried far enough, this distinction would permit one to say that the 
common law has no interest in either the reasonableness of "foreign" law 
or its conformity, by analogy or directly, with the common law. The com- 
mon law's interest, aside from regulating jurisdiction in the strict sense, is 
confined to protecting potential common law litigants who might be hurt 
by "foreign" decisions. In the context of "No assets" pleas, the distinction 
makes sense. In other contexts, it was not carried to its logical conclusion, 
for the Prohibition was frequently, if tacitly, used to enforce a "rule of 
reason," as well as reasonable congruity with common law standards. If 
the Prohibition was bound to be so used, might it not have been used here 
to save an executor who had done the right thing by his testator's honor? 
If the executor could save himself by appeal or by resort to equity, a Pro- 
hibition would save him more expeditiously. It would save him from 
"temporal" loss and permit disputed "temporal" facts to be tried at com- 
mon law. His interests seem closer to the common law's concerns and 
competence than, say, those of a man sued in the ecclesiastical court to 
make him apologize for a defamatory remark. Yet, as we shall see, the 
common law would intervene to prevent ecclesiastical courts from apply- 
ing their own standards in defamation cases. 
We have seen signs of retreat from the courts' original confidence that 
Prohibition lies when ecclesiastical courts will not allow executors to 
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plead "No assets." Our next case, from 1624, 12 goes all the way. Accord- 
ing to the brief report, the executor alleged that his assets were less than 
sufficient to pay debts. The plea having been disallowed, the Common 
Pleas refused a Prohibition. Two reasons are given: (a) "... Legacies are 
things merely determinable in that court and no other court can have cog- 
nizance thereof." (2) "... This is a thing that consists upon the judge's dis- 
cretion." Unqualified, the first reason implies that the Prohibition may 
never be used to control the conduct of a court having jurisdiction, how- 
ever indefensible its decisions are, even however detrimental to common 
law interests. The second reason operates as a qualification by specifying 
why control by Prohibition is inappropriate in this case. 
The second reason points to a significant peculiarity of legacy suits. It 
is quite true that judging the sufficiency of an estate is likely to call for 
considerable discretion. Even if we assume that the court has a perfect in- 
ventory of the testator's goods before it, the real value of the estate is 
likely to be uncertain. There will be claims against it and debts owing to 
it. The realizability of claims of both sorts must be in some degree doubt- 
ful. Any number of legal doubts may surround the claims, and if all of 
those were resolved the solvency and attachability of debtors would re- 
main uncertain. The legacy in question may be one of several large ones, 
a single trivial one, or anything in between. In the absence of rigid rules 
requiring claims for and against an estate to be realized within a certain 
time or fail, the decision whether to require payment of a legacy now is 
necessarily discretionary. It must be based on an estimate of the prob- 
ability that the estate can support the particular legacy in question. 
The issue, of course, is "Whose discretion?" There are certainly re- 
spects in which the common law courts seem to be the best judge. They 
are particularly competent to judge the one thing that is most likely to be 
problematic -- the validity of creditors' claims against the estate and of 
the executor's claims against debtors. (Cf. Norton and Sharp v. Gennet, 
above.) On the other hand, ecclesiastical courts could pretend to expertise 
in the law of wills and executors' duties. If the common law could better 
judge the strength of an unrealized estate, the ecclesiastical law was per- 
haps the better judge of an executor's conduct. Legatees must often have 
12 P. 22 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.11. 
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had long waits and painful struggles before collecting their sometimes 
modest due from over-cautious or unfriendly executors. The ecclesiastical 
courts had a legitimate claim to know best how to balance fairness to the 
executor against respect for the testator's intentions and the legatee's ex- 
pectations. Refusing a Prohibition does not, after all, mean condoning a 
particular ecclesiastical court's disallowance of what on its face was an 
undoubtedly good plea. It means trusting the ecclesiastical system as a 
whole to work out a fair solution. In some cases, I suspect, disallowing 
the plea of "No assets" was a response to proffered evidence, not anything 
so absurd as a rejection of the legal theory that debts come ahead of lega- 
cies. To the extent that such responses depended on over-strict standards 
for establishing facts, there was a genuine conflict-of-laws problem. But 
if the reason for the disallowance was evidentiary, plaintiff-in-Prohibition 
should say so, raising the genuine problem. Otherwise, disallowance of 
"No assets" must almost always have been a function of discretion -- a 
matter of whether or not to count debits and credits of the estate in assess- 
ing its sufficiency to bear a particular legacy in the light of others. The ec- 
clesiastical appellate system was equipped to control the exercise of such 
discretion by the original court, and, if necessary, to correct true errors of 
law and failures to respect the principle that debts have priority. 
In sum, good arguments can be made for the Court's resolution of the 
case of 1624. That resolution breaks with earlier cases, but carries out a 
trend already perceptible ca. 1600. It may be symptomatic of a more in- 
dulgent attitude toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction as the 17th century went 
on. On the other hand, it may only be the result of cumulative rethinking 
of a real problem. It may have implications beyond "No assets" cases, but 
such implications are not clear, since the decision was predicated on the 
peculiarities of legacy suits. 
A couple of Caroline cases tend to confirm the 1624 decision. In the 
briefly reported Tomlinson's Case, 13 an executor sued for a legacy 
pleaded Plene administravit -- virtually the same thing as "No assets," 
that the estate had already been used up in satisfying legitimate claims 
against it. A Prohibition was sought because the plea was not allowed, but 
the Court denied it, saying simply that the ecclesiastical court was compe- 
13 T. 7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 168. 
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tent to judge whether the estate had been fully administered. In another 
late case, 14 an executor was sued, not for a legacy, but for his testator's 
dilapidations. The testator was a clergyman, who had allegedly failed to 
keep up the property of the benefice, to the damage of his successor. The 
claim against the estate amounted to a tort claim on behalf of the corpo- 
rate living and its present holder. Such suits were entirely appropriate to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In our case, the executor pleaded that he had 
used up the estate to satisfy debts, and his defense was disallowed. The 
report only says that the Common Pleas was in doubt as to whether to 
grant a Prohibition, inasmuch as the subject matter of the claim -- dilapi- 
dations -- was of purely ecclesiastical cognizance. Like the first reason in 
the case of 1624, this doubt seems to imply the extreme rule that the com- 
mon law has no way of regulating an ecclesiastical court's conduct, once 
its jurisdiction is clear. Fuller discussion might have added a qualification 
analogous to that in the 1624 case: To recognize its jurisdiction is not al- 
ways to give the ecclesiastical court a carte blanche, but in testamentary 
matters it is practically advisable to give it a very free hand. Jurisdiction 
does not entail unlimited power to behave unreasonably. To deny that an 
executor's primary obligation is to satisfy debts would be unreasonable, 
but it is a safe assumption that ecclesiastical courts will not do so and 
have not actually done so when they have disallowed the plea of "No as- 
sets." The best assumption is that they are only using the discretion 
which they need to deal with estates, and to concede discretion is to deny 
oneself the privilege of scrutinizing its exercise. It is arguable that dilapi- 
dations fall more clearly within a legitimate discretion than legacies. It is 
easy to see that debts have a higher claim on a dead man's assets than 
legacies. "Natural reason" (as distinct from the common law) might not 
necessarily rate even debts above reparations for the dead man's wrongful 
neglect of property in his trust. Giving ecclesiastical courts scope in leg- 
acy cases carries some risk of injustice to creditors as against legatees. In 
the dilapidations case, perhaps justice has less to choose, as between 
creditors and the Church, or creditors and a successor whose property has 
been damaged. 
In addition to the "No assets" cases, there are a few other significant 
ways of grouping cases on disallowed pleas. Let us look now at three 
14 T. 17 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.78b. 
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defamation cases. The first of the cases, Ambler v. Metcalfe, 15 is appro- 
priate to consider immediately after the "No assets" group, for it presents 
a contrast. In Agarde v. Porter, Tanfield suggested that ecclesiastical 
courts might legitimately be prohibited when they disallowed pleas owing 
to head-on conflict with the common law. His concern was to show that 
"No assets" cases were not of that sort. Disallowing that plea, he main- 
tained, was not the result of a difference between ecclesiastical and com- 
mon law -- rather, of the exercise of a discretion appropriate to the 
ecclesiastical court, controllable by appeal if misexercised. In effect, 
Tanfield's view prevailed in the long run, though not at once, with spe- 
cific reference to the "No assets" plea in legacy suits. Ambler v. Metcalfe, 
by contrast, presents head-on rule-conflict between ecclesiastical and 
common law. 
A case was as follows: A man was sued for defamation in an ecclesias- 
tical court. The alleged defamatory words were, "Thou art a lyer and a 
bastard and begotten without the feare of God." The ecclesiastical defen- 
dant sought to justify the words as true. (Quoad bastard. Nothing was said 
about "liar" in the discussion of the case. We may take it as if "bastard" 
were the only aspersion.) To that end, he pleaded that his opponent was 
born after his parents had contracted to marry, but before they actually 
married. By the common law, one born in those circumstances was a bas- 
tard. By the ecclesiastical law, he was not. I.e.: We have here a straight 
and well-known rule-conflict. By ecclesiastical law, marriage legitimated 
retrospectively any children born between contract and actual marriage. 
By the common law, only those born after actual marriage' were legiti- 
mate (and. hence entitled as heirs.) The defense (that the words were true 
because by common law standards the adversary party was a bastard) was 
disallowed, and sentence was given against the ecclesiastical defendant. 
He then appealed to the Delegates, who affirmed the sentence. Then he 
sought a Prohibition on the ground that the defense had been improperly 
disallowed. The puisne Justices of the Queen's Bench, Chief Justice Po- 
pham being absent, granted the Prohibition. (No issue was made over the 
delay until after sentence and appellate sentence.) The next term, the case 
15 M. 38/39, H. 39, and P. 39 Eliz., Q.B. Lansd. 1099, f.38b (the good report, which alone gives the 
full facts and the discussion on Cokc's motion); Add. 25,198, f.210 (relating to H. 39); Harl. 
1631, f.155 (relating to M. 38/39.) 
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was reconsidered and the decision to grant a Prohibition confirmed. The 
term after that, Attorney General Coke moved for a Consultation. Three 
judges (Popham, Clench, and Fenner) remained convinced that the Prohi- 
bition was properly granted (Justice Gawdy saying nothing), but they ad- 
journed the case without definitive decision on Coke's motion. 
Coke's argument came to a contention that since the ecclesiastical 
court had jurisdiction its conduct was beyond control. The Court's re- 
sponse, as expressed by Chief Justice Popham, requires somewhat com- 
plex statement. (a) Coke said that "bastard" will not support a common 
law action for slander unless spoken in such a context that someone's in- 
terest as an heir to land might be damaged. Since a common law action 
would not lie, Coke argued, there was simply no basis for prohibiting. In 
other words, he proceeded on the theory (dubious, as we shall later see) 
that ecclesiastical courts may be prohibited from entertaining defamation 
suits only when the plaintiff there could have sued at common law. That 
being the only basis for prohibiting, Coke maintained, it followed that the 
ecclesiastical court's manner of handling a defamation suit within its ju- 
risdiction was no basis. Popham, Fenner, and Clench quarrelled with 
Coke on the common law actionability of "bastard." They thought (also 
dubiously) that "bastard" will support a common law action in whatever 
circumstances it is spoken, because there is always a chance that the im- 
putation will affect interests in land. Two possible consequences follow 
from the judges' position on this question. (i) If words were actionable at 
common law, they were usually for that reason not actionable in ecclesi- 
astical courts. I.e.: If "bastard" would always support a common law ac- 
tion, the usual reasoning would conclude that every ecclesiastical suit for 
"bastard" should be prohibited. If the judges meant to follow that usual 
line, they had a basis for Prohibition in the instant case without regard to 
the disallowance. (ii) It was not always held that when the common law 
had jurisdiction over particular words the ecclesiastical courts lacked it. 
I.e.: Concurrent jurisdiction over defamation was occasionally admitted. 
Suppose the judges would have conceded that "bastard" may be sued on 
either at common law or in the ecclesiastical court. Would they not then 
have a special reason for insisting that the ecclesiastical court observe 
common law standards -- I.e., that a defense which would be good at 
common law be accepted by the ecclesiastical court? It is surely arguable 
that uniformity is especially important where jurisdiction is fully concur- 
rent. One could reasonably say that ecclesiastical courts are free to apply 
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their own rules and standards in suits that can only be brought there, but 
that they are not free to do so when the party has a choice of courts. It is 
not socially healthy for people to be able to pick the court whose rules 
suit them better. 
(b) However, Popham expressly waived his disagreement with Coke 
on the common law actionability of "bastard." "Though the words will 
not support an action at common law," he said, "yet because by the com- 
mon law he can justify and it is not punishable, therefore the Prohibition 
lies." Popham's rule seems clear: Any justification for defamatory words 
which the common law regards as valid must be accepted by ecclesiasti- 
cal courts, even in cases plainly and exclusively within their jurisdiction. 
As Ambler v. Metcalfe actually stood, the principle has two applications: 
(i) In fact, the ecclesiastical court was careful not to insist on the defini- 
tion of "bastard" implicit in its rule on legitimacy. Instead, it did some- 
thing more portentous -- refused to accept truth as a defense. (This is 
clear from the sentence, the words of which are reported in order to con- 
vey this point. For retraction and denial of the defamatory remarks were 
not required. What was required is not reported specifically -- no doubt 
some nominal penance plus costs. The ecclesiastical court did not hold 
that untrue words -- by its standard -- had been spoken and therefore 
should be retracted. It held instead that "pro temeritate sua et quia nixose 
dixit" he should be punished. He was regarded as guilty of gratuitous 
malice and uncharitableness, regardless of whether he spoke truly or 
falsely.) Popham's principle obviously requires that truth be accepted as a 
defense to alleged slander. 
(ii) However, the ecclesiastical court should presumably not be prohib- 
ited merely for intending to reject truth as a defense. If it appeared from 
the record that the alleged slanderer had in fact spoken untruly, there 
should be no Prohibition. It would so appear if the ecclesiastical defini- 
tion of "bastard" applied. Since the judges were inclined to uphold the 
Prohibition, they must have been ready to insist on the common law defi- 
nition. Popham did not only mean that certain general principles of defa- 
mation law, such as "Truth is a defense," are binding on ecclesiastical 
courts. An ecclesiastical court which accepts those general principles can 
still expose itself to Prohibition by failing in more particular ways to be 
guided by the common law. 
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Ambler v. Metcalfe was complicated. Despite their inclinations, the 
judges were in sufficient doubt to put off decision. (Reluctance to grant a 
Consultation on motion in a doubtful case may have entered into their 
hesitation.) Going on their inclinations, several observations should be 
made. On the surface, the case seems to point to a strong form of com- 
mon law control, and to the sort Tanfield in Agarde v. Porter said was 
justifiable: The ecclesiastical law has a definition of "bastard" different 
from the common law's. It seems hard to say that one is more reasonable 
than the other. The ecclesiastical definition is more humane. (Though it 
should be noted here that the common law rule on legitimacy was some- 
times pointed to with pride as "more moral," more dissuasive to adultery, 
than the Church's rule -- even the Church's.) Nevertheless -- just be- 
cause the legal definitions clash -- the ecclesiastical court is not free to 
use its own standards in its own cases. Likewise, the ecclesiastical law 
holds that truth does not always justify defamatory speech. (The report of 
Ambler v. Metcalfe states that as a rule as straightforward as the legiti- 
macy rule. I am not sure it was, but at any rate it was the rule implied in 
the actions of the ecclesiastical courts in our case, including the highest 
court of appeal.) There is an obvious case in "natural reason" and Chris- 
tian morality that saying uncharitable things about one's neighbor is not 
necessarily excusable by truth. Nevertheless --just because the common 
law holds truth a defense -- ecclesiastical courts must do so too. Truth 
was a defense in common law actions for defamation causing material 
loss and punishable by damages; therefore it must be a defense in ecclesi- 
astical suits, the nature and consequences of which were quite different -- 
rather psychological satisfaction to the offended than economic restora- 
tion. 
Below the surface, however, having regard to the peculiarities of defa- 
mation law, the Court's inclinations in Ambler v. Metcalfe seem to me 
less stark than the above picture suggests, and basically sensible. First, 
one must take account of overlaps in the field of defamation, even short 
of the special problem of strictly concurrent jurisdiction noted above: A. 
calls B. a bastard in a context such that the defamation is only actionable 
in an ecclesiastical court. C. calls D. a bastard, and because D. happens 
to be heir-apparent of an estate a common law action will lie. To let the 
legal definition of words and rules on justifiability produce different re- 
sults in circumstances identical except for the slight difference of context 
that drives B. to one court and D. to another is to admit a pretty jarring 
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anomaly into the legal system. Even in less close cases, it was often prob- 
lematic whether a suit belonged in one court or the other. In sum, the field 
of defamation was an exceptionally shared field, and hence an especially 
apt one for uniformity. 
Secondly, "Truth is a defense to slander" is one of those rules of law 
that expresses a pretty fundamental moral choice -- choice, not axiom. 
The opposite rule can also be defended by reason, but precisely because 
both rules are defensible a society has to make up its mind which it pre- 
fers. As it were: Shall we be the kind of society that encourages and pro- 
tects truth-speaking, even when that means immunity for certain kinds of 
anti-social conduct? Or shall we be the kind of society that favors charity 
and considerateness even though that entails some compromise of the 
generally valid principle that people may and should speak the truth? This 
kind of choice is not quite like the choice among mere rules of law be- 
cause it is so close to the choices individuals make among "life-styles." 
Visceral expectations are influenced by legal choices of this character as 
they are not by choices as to what shall constitute a valid conveyance or 
the like. A man who says something malicious and insulting but true may 
feel justified in a genuinely moral sense if the legal institutions surround- 
ing him suggest that truth is always a defense against a charge of slander. 
It may be damaging to social morale for such a man to find himself in a 
court where his understanding of the law and the morality behind it turn 
out to be wrong. In short, within a national system, conflicting attitudes 
toward truth as a defense are more dangerous than routine conflicts of 
law, and uniformity dictated by the senior member of the system has 
much to recommend it. Insisting on the common law on that kind of ques- 
tion is in a way closer to insisting on "reasonableness" than to upholding 
the common law when and insofar as ecclesiastical law conflicts with it 
directly. 
Once one considers the realities of defamation law, the same can be 
said of the common law definition of "bastard." A man who calls an- 
other a bastard is hardly thinking of the legal meanings of the word. The 
common law meaning was the same as the everyday -- simply "born out 
of wedlock." That is what a speaker would ordinarily mean. It would be 
hard to let a man be punished for saying truly what he meant to say (as- 
suming truth to be a defense.) An ecclesiastical court which followed the 
ecclesiastical meaning (as the court in Ambler v. Metcalfe did not) would 
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in reality do something worse than contradicting a common law rule. It 
would in effect make use of a legalism to stick a man with liability for 
defamation. That would be more significant as a violation of a common 
law policy than as a violation of a common law rule. For the common law 
typically resorted to legalism for just the opposite purpose -- to avoid at- 
taching liability for words. The common law courts tried to find a "favor- 
able sense" of allegedly defamatory words (often a sense much more 
favorable than what the speaker obviously meant.) The pedantry that ef- 
fort engendered served a valuable end -- to discourage defamation-happy 
people from quarrelling in the courts. It would make sense to insist that 
ecclesiastical courts follow the general bent of judicial policy as the com- 
mon law set it in an area shared between the two systems. Again, to insist 
on that is more like insisting on vague "reasonableness" than like deny- 
ing the ecclesiastical courts their own rules in their own cases. 
Two late-Jacobean cases may be considered alongside Ambler v. Met- 
calfe, since they also involve disallowance of attempts to justify defama- 
tory words. In Webb v. Cook, 16 the ecclesiastical suit was for saying the 
plaintiff had a bastard. The defendant confessed speaking the words and 
justified by pleading that two Justices of the Peace had adjudged the 
plaintiff reputed father of a bastard under the statute of 18 Eliz., c.3. (The 
act authorized J. P.s to make such findings and to charge reputed fathers 
with support of their offspring.) A Prohibition was granted (nisi, accord- 
ing to Lansd. 1080, but there is no report of any reconsideration or change 
of mind) because the justification was not allowed. Apparently the Court 
was in agreement, though Lansd. 1080 gives a hint of doubt on the part of 
Chief Justice Montagu. The defamatory words in a case two years later 17 
were that the plaintiff had a bastard and that a named parish was charged 
with his maintenance. Again the justification that the plaintiff had been 
adjudged reputed father was disallowed; again a Prohibition was granted 
without dissent. I shall discuss the two cases together since the issue was 
the same: Were the ecclesiastical courts bound to accept administrative 
findings of reputed parentage as conclusive proof that the words were 
true? 
16 P. 17 Jac. K.B. Croke Jac., 535 (dated T. 17); 2 Rolle 82 (sub. nom. Cooke's Case); Lansd. 1080, 
17 M. 19 Jac. K.B. Harg. 30, f.114b. 
f.74b: Add. 25,213. f.232. 
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There was no discussion in these cases as to whether the ecclesiastical 
courts had to accept truth as a justification and no inclination to assume 
that they would not. Indeed, a remark in one report of Webb v. Cook 
(Rolle) shows that the judges took it for granted that truth was as good a 
defense in the ecclesiastical court as at common law. Justice Houghton 
said that a Prohibition would not be granted if the ecclesiastical court had 
disallowed a general justification on grounds of truth -- i.e., if the defen- 
dant had simply pleaded that the words were true. For then, Houghton 
said, the remedy for the improper disallowance would be by ecclesiastical 
appeal. In other words: Truth being a good ecclesiastical defense, disal- 
lowing the justification amounts to an error by ecclesiastical standards, 
not correctable by Prohibition -- in accord with "Tanfield's principle." 
The error in the instant case, however -- unwillingness to take the Jus- 
tices' finding as conclusive -- was not to be considered a violation of ec- 
clesiastical standards. (Why not? Could one be sure that an ecclesiastical 
court of appeal would back up the original court on what amounted to a 
factual presumption? The answer, I assume, is that one could not be con- 
fident that an appellate court would reverse, even though it might, just be- 
cause there was no notorious rules or familiar experience on which to 
base a prediction.) 
In Webb v. Cook (according to Lansd. 1080), Justice Houghton put the 
following case by way of dictum: A sues B for the defamatory word "bas- 
tard." B. pleads a common law verdict (as in a property suit) finding A. a 
bastard. If the plea is disallowed, Prohibition lies. Houghton presumably 
thought the instant case close enough to that model to justify the same re- 
sult. Chief Justice Montagu seems to have doubted the model case. ("It 
seems otherwise, per Montagu, where the slander is merely spiritual.") It 
is from his doubt about the model, which seems the stronger case, that I 
infer Montagu's possible doubt in Webb v. Cook itself. His doubt may 
have gone to the essential point: Whatever control the common law may 
exercise over the rules of law applied in ecclesiastical courts, does it fol- 
low that mere results or established facts outside the ecclesiastical system 
have to be given any particular weight? Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
defamation is "merely spiritual," a matter of correcting un-Christian con- 
duct, a purpose too far removed from those for which verdicts or Justices' 
findings are made to require carrying established facts over from one 
sphere to the other. It is more likely, I think that by "merely spiritual" 
Montagu meant to distinguish a defamatory expression such as "bastard," 
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which, if believed, could affect secular interests even though punishable 
in the ecclesiastical court. He agreed with Houghton's case, but warned 
against extending it so far as to say that any truth established by verdict 
must be taken as true by ecclesiastical courts for the purpose of justifying 
defamation. 
The important problem raised by Houghton's model is how close it is 
to Webb v, Cook. Verdicts were a singularly solemn and conclusive 
method of establishing the truth. The anachronistic term "administrative" 
may be applied to Justices' findings because they were statute-based, did 
not involve juries, and were designed to alleviate a contingent social 
problem in a fair and expeditious way. That is not to say they were unju- 
dicial in form, procedurally unfair, or less likely to be true than other 
kinds of fact-finding. (There was a right of appeal to Quarter Sessions, for 
example.) Still, they were "administrative" in that they did not serve the 
ultimate purpose of law -- to put men at peace, to conclude by "art" the 
differences that "nature" would leave festering -- but the shorter-run ends 
of welfare and regulation. The specialness of the verdict comes not so 
much from its putative reliability as from its association with the need for 
finality, for feigned certainty in the absence of knowledge. Is there any 
need -- is it more a gain than a loss -- to extend the special aura of con- 
clusiveness to other proceedings which the legislature invents from time 
to time? That is an issue worth reflection. Whether the judges in our 
cases were worried by it does not appear. In both cases, they went the 
way of common sense, stopping the reinvestigation of matters already in- 
vestigated, foreclosing men adjudged bastard-makers from vindicating 
themselves and casting aspersions on the local authorities. They favored 
the credit and authority of statutory proceedings, for which special claims 
could always be made because the putatively unanimous will of the com- 
munity lay behind them and all courts owed them respect. 
In the second of our cases (not, so far as appears, in Webb v. Cook), 
much was made of the fact that the Justices of the Peace had only found, 
as they were required to, that the ecclesiastical plaintiffs were reputed fa- 
thers of bastards. The defamatory words would be true, and so justified, 
only if the plaintiffs were really fathers of bastards. Why should the ec- 
clesiastical court not be free to regard the reality as an open question, 
however bound it was as to the reputation? Why should it not be free to 
regard men's bad reputation as rebuttable by any evidence of the truth 
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that might be forthcoming -- conceivably evidence not available when the 
J.P.s made their determination? Should the ecclesiastical court be forced 
in effect to lower its standard of what is defamatory -- i.e., to hold that it 
is not defamatory to say that one who is certainly reputed to have sired a 
bastard actually did so? In our case, the judges rejected such worries as 
"not material, for there is no way to know a father but by reputation. The 
mother may be certainly known." That seems to me a sound answer. The 
J.P.s were strictly speaking only charged with establishing reputed father- 
hood and could presumably infer it from reputation in the literal sense. 
But they were surely willing and obliged to listen to evidence bearing on 
actual fatherhood -- i.e., to anything that would rebut reputation. Practi- 
cally, an ecclesiastical court investigating real fatherhood would be going 
over travelled ground. At the same time, if the ecclesiastical court chose 
to be strict and exclude evidence of reputation it might run a high risk of 
contradicting the J.P.s and weakening their authority. In the end, the con- 
siderations which I suspect were important in Ambler v. Metcalfe prob- 
ably influenced the outcome of the later cases too: An inclination to check 
defamation suits wherever they occurred, an inclination both to indulge 
and restrain legalism to that end. Not falling into the gap between real and 
reputed fatherhood is an instance of restraining it. 
The reports of Webb v. Cook suggest one further angle. They empha- 
size that the ecclesiastical court accepted the defendant's confession (that 
he spoke the words), while rejecting his justifying plea. That emphasis 
perhaps reflects an attempt in the surmise to make out that the ecclesiasti- 
cal court was unfair. If it was going to refuse the plea, should it not have 
ruled out the confession, putting the burden of proof that the words were 
spoken on the plaintiff? There is no discussion of this point. If it was ac- 
tually made, there is a sense in which it seems odd. At common law, a 
man could confess and avoid. His plea in avoidance was subject to de- 
murrer. If his justification was held legally bad on demurrer he was not 
allowed to retract what he had confessed and go to trial. What had the ec- 
clesiastical court done in our case but rule a justification insufficient in 
law and stick the pleader with what he admitted to be true by the act of 
claiming it was justified? If an objection can be made to the ecclesiastical 
court's conduct on this score, it must be based on the premise that in one 
respect ecclesiastical courts were not free to imitate the common law. 
Realistically, such a contention might have merit. Would the defendant 
have had an opportunity to argue for his plea at all comparable to that 
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which was available upon demurrer at common law? Would he have 
known that the confession would be held against him if the plea was dis- 
allowed with anything like the certainty with which men could be ex- 
pected to know about the rules of common law pleading? (For that matter, 
was the ecclesiastical court right by ecclesiastical standards?) Nothing 
having been said about these ticklish questions, one may suspect that the 
judges were pleased to settle the case without getting into them. 
An incidental point in the second of our cases adds a final dimension. 
When the Prohibition was being discussed in that case, it was said that the 
ecclesiastical plaintiff had in fact appealed to Quarter Sessions before the 
words were spoken, where the original finding by the J.P.s was reversed. 
The Court said that a Consultation would lie on those facts, but that they 
must be pleaded. The judges would not consider a Consultation on mo- 
tion, or denying the Prohibition, on the basis of informally ascertained 
facts outside the record. Perhaps the bias against quarrelsome defamation 
suits is reflected in their unwillingness to cut procedural corners. The 
other point to note is that Consultation would be granted, upon due plead- 
ing, if the words were spoken after the reversal at Quarter Sessions -- not, 
presumably, if they had been spoken before. (The importance of dates 
may have been one reason why full pleading was insisted on.) May 1 , A. 
is found reputed father. June 1, B. calls him bastard-maker. July 1, Quar- 
ter Sessions reverses the earlier finding. A. now sues B. in the ecclesiasti- 
cal court and B’s plea is disallowed. The Prohibition will stand. Fair 
enough, in a sense: When he committed the slander, B. had a good excuse. 
But that result is a little hard on A. By the higher record -- Quarter Ses- 
sions -- the truth is that he is not so much as the reputed father of a bas- 
tard. Yet there is no way he can vindicate his honor. The ecclesiastical 
court is bound to look to B.’s excusability when he spoke. It is not free to 
take the position that slanderers speak at their own risk -- justifiably if 
they speak the truth, but only if it appears to have been the real truth by 
the most conclusive evidence now available (granting that official records 
are conclusive.) If a case of this sort had arisen, what was said by the way 
in our report could possibly be questioned. 
Prohibitions were granted because of disallowed pleas in two other 
defamation cases. In both, it seems to me, pretty good arguments can be 
made against prohibiting. (The reports are too brief to show arguments 
pro and con.) I am inclined to see in both, as in the preceding cases, a 
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policy of favoring when possible those who were hauled into court for 
words. In Philips v. Piper et al., 18 a man and wife sued the churchwar- 
dens and sidemen of their parish for saying that the plaintiffs kept a 
bawdy house. The defendants admitted so saying, but pleaded that they 
did so in the line of duty -- viz. by way of presentment under oath at the 
time of visitation. (When bishops and their officials visited parishes un- 
der their authority, it was customary to swear in the churchwardens to 
give information about moral offenses, in the manner of a presentment 
jury.) A Prohibition was granted on the surmise that the justification was 
disallowed. A motion for Consultation was denied per Curiam the next 
term. It seems to me that two doubts can be raised about this Prohibition: 
(a) The ecclesiastical decision does not seem flagrantly unreasonable, tak- 
ing it to be that a false presentment is defamatory. (b) Granting that it 
would be more reasonable to regard presentments as immune from defa- 
mation-liability (deliberately untrue ones being under pain of perjury), the 
presentment was a purely ecclesiastical act. Granting (as in the above 
cases) that ecclesiastical courts are concluded by statutory paternity-find- 
ings, should they not be free to make their own rule as to whether defa- 
mation can be committed by making a false accusation in an official 
ecclesiastical capacity? Surely their liberty to do so can be defended, 
even if it is true that a common law action for defamation would fail in 
analogous circumstances (as if grand jurors present for a felony and the 
presentee is acquitted and sues members of the grand jury for slander.) 
However, assuming the common law rule to be clear in that case, there is 
an advantage in uniformity. It would be confusing for men called on to 
perform apparently similar public duties to be subject to the risk of defa- 
mation in one case and not in the other. A grand juror might be over-cau- 
tious because of an unfortunate experience as a churchwarden. Finally, 
the decision in Philips v. Piper may have been influenced by the nature of 
the defamatory words. “Bawdy house keeper” was arguably actionable at 
common law (because keeping a brothel, unlike fornication per se, was a 
secular misdemeanor) with the consequence that the expression was 
either not actionable in ecclesiastical courts or concurrently actionable in 
both jurisdictions. The brief report suggests that the occasion on which 
the words were spoken, rather than the words themselves, was the ratio 
18 T. 44 Eliz. K.B. Add. 25,203, f.556b. 
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decidendi. But if there was doubt about the ecclesiastical actionability of 
the words, or if jurisdiction was concurrent, common law scrutiny over 
the justifying plea is perhaps more defensible. Certainly it is more under- 
standable. 
In Howell v. Come, 19 two men with a quarrel arising from, or resulting 
in, defamatory words agreed to arbitration. The report does not say 
whether they so agreed after one had commenced a suit against the other 
or before any litigation. In any event, the arbitrator made an award. One 
party began, or persisted in, an ecclesiastical suit. The other party pleaded 
the arbitrator's award and sought a Prohibition on surmise that the plea 
was disallowed. The two judges whose opinions are reported, Winch and 
Chief Justice Hobart, favored a Prohibition. There is no report of the rea- 
soning. The disallowance does not seem to make sense off-hand, but, as 
usual when that is true, one may wonder whether it would survive appeal. 
Going a step deeper, should ecclesiastical courts not perhaps be free to 
hold that ecclesiastical defamation is not by nature arbitrable? So holding 
would seem colorable because of the criminal character often attributed to 
ecclesiastical charges of defamation: May an offended individual give 
away the Church's right to punish a slanderer? Perhaps he should be held 
to have given away any right to litigative costs by his agreement to abide 
by arbitration, but so far as appears our case was about the substance of 
the suit, not costs. On the other hand, the considerations brought out 
above strongly argue for the Prohibition: Defamation was a shared field, 
where uniformity was desirable in itself. (Presumably an action for words 
at common law would be barred by a plea of arbitrament.) Moreover, ju- 
dicial policy was dissuasive toward vexatious suits for hot words. Surely 
the last way to serve that policy is to allow second thoughts to people who 
have patched up their feud to the extent of agreeing not to afflict the 
courts with it. 
The defamation cases just discussed do not in reality present hard-and- 
fast rule-conflicts between ecclesiastical and common law. In Ambler v. 
Metcalfe, the ecclesiastical court did not actually insist on its definition of 
"bastard," though its right to do so had to enter into discussion of the case; 
some ecclesiastical courts may have held that truth was no defense to the 
19 M. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.245. 
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charge of defamation, but we have seen positive reason to doubt that was 
a generally understood and consistently applied rule; in a couple of cases, 
ecclesiastical courts refused to accept findings of reputed fatherhood as 
concluding them in defamation cases, but such decisions can hardly be 
taken as reflecting ecclesiastical rules (as opposed to ad hoc rulings on a 
rather ambiguous question of logic and policy.) Our next group of cases, 
involving the legal capacity of women, provides the strongest example of 
true rule-conflict. 
In Glanvyle v. Newport (1600), 20 the Common Pleas was divided 
over whether the ecclesiastical court should be permitted to apply a rule 
straightforwardly at odds with the common law. In this case, a woman 
sued for defamation, viz. calling her "whore." The defendant pleaded her 
husband's release of all actions. A Prohibition was sought because that 
defensive plea was disallowed. The effect of a Prohibition would be to 
enforce the common law rule that the husband's release binds the wife. 
Two Justices opposed the Prohibition and one favored it, Chief Justice 
Anderson remaining silent. The final decision was to invite a demurrer -- 
i.e., to grant the Prohibition only in order that the issue might have full- 
dress debate. Since there is no report of further proceedings, there is no 
way of knowing whether the parties accepted the invitation, or whether 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition preferred to drop his suit rather than try to per- 
suade a divided court. 
Justice Glanville thought that the husband's release must bind the wife 
even in an ecclesiastical suit for defamation. ("... for against the hus- 
band's release it is not reason that the wife should proceed in the suit 
there.") Moreover, he said, "such a case was so ruled in 14 Eliz. in the 
King's Bench when I was a reporter there, as other students are now here, 
for it was said there that we are all subjects and are held in both laws to 
take notice of such discharges." 
Justice Kingsmill opposed the Prohibition, "for the suit is for the defa- 
mation of the wife's good name, for which there will be no pecuniary rec- 
ompense, but restitution of credit." The rule that the husband's release 
binds the wife, that is to suggest, is a function of the husband's property 
20 H. 42 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f.42b. 
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in his wife's goods. His release would block the wife's action for dam- 
ages because releasing the possibility of damages is tantamount to con- 
veying property which he has in her right. The wife has no interest in 
damages or specific property apart from her husband's, because he has le- 
gal authority to dispose of her goods. But, because the wife lacks full le- 
gal personality qua property-holder, it does not follow that she is a 
non-person otherwise. It does not follow that she has no separate interest 
in her good name. There is no reason to foreclose her from vindicating it 
by the non-pecuniary sanctions of retraction or penance, whether or not 
the husband's business concerns have accidently led him to release ac- 
tions to his wife's slanderer, and whether or not he values her good name 
as much as she does. (It is of course not hard to imagine domestic situ- 
ations in which a husband would be content to see his wife's whoredom 
uncontradicted.) 
Justice Walmesley opposed the Prohibition more vehemently and for 
different reasons; "See the statute, that in the case where the suit is in the 
Court Christian for cause of defamation, Prohibition will not be granted, 
and that is a mortal offense, which no one may release except only God." 
The statute that Walmesley refers to is Circumspecte agatis (13 Edw. 1). 
While it is true that the statute affirms ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
defamation, it is difficult, though not utterly implausible, in the light of 
numerous cases, to argue that defamation suits are simply unprohibitable 
(save -- to make an exception which Walmesley would perhaps not have 
disputed -- when the same defamatory words are actionable at common 
law.) The difficulty of so arguing, even in cases where there was no com- 
mon law remedy for the words, was pointed out by Glanville in reply to 
Walmesley: "...the statute of Circumspecte agatis gives to the Court 
Christian as great authority to hold plea in case of tithes as in case of 
defamation, and yet there if the defendant pleads a lease and it is proved 
by the testimony of only one and the judge of the spiritual court disallows 
the proof because it is not by two, there is no doubt but that Prohibition 
lies." Walmesley's other point seems to be that the ecclesiastical court 
might, even ought to, disallow the wife's own release-- a fortiori the hus- 
band's. Again, Walmesley's point is plausible, though probably not gen- 
erally acceptable. It comes to saying that a private ecclesiastical suit for 
defamation (like, one might note, a Prohibition) is not strictly a private 
suit, but a criminal charge -- in ecclesiastical terms an "information" of a 
sin, which, for the slanderer's own good and that of the Christian commu- 
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nity, ought to be punished even though the offended party does not insist. 
Here too, Glanville expressly contradicted Walmesley: "That is true [that 
the offense may only, in strictness, be released by God], but yet if an of- 
fense is committed against me I may remit it as to me." On this point, 
Kingsmill would probably have agreed with Glanville, for his position, in 
contrast to Walmesley's, was only that the rationale of the common law 
rule rendered it irrelevant in this case -- whether or not ecclesiastical 
claims for defamation were generally prohibitable or releasable. 
In Stevens v. Totty (1602) 21 the Queen's Bench was confronted with 
a similar case. Here again, the ecclesiastical court's alleged fault was dis- 
allowing a husband's release in a wife's suit. Two circumstances distin- 
guish this case from Glanvyle v. Newport: (a) The wife was suing for a 
legacy rather than for defamation. (b) The husband and wife were "di- 
vorced." No mention was made of Glanvyle v. Newport. It was assumed 
in Stevens v. Totty that apart from the divorce the ecclesiastical court 
would be obliged to let the husband's release bind the wife. That assump- 
tion repudiates any theory to the effect that ecclesiastical courts may ap- 
ply whatever rules they like in cases within their jurisdiction. It does not 
in any way repudiate Justice Kingsmill's position in the earlier case, for 
there is a clear difference between legacy and defamation. In releasing a 
legacy left to his wife, a husband in effect conveys property which is his 
during the marriage. Such a release falls within the rationale of the com- 
mon law rule as Justice Kingsmill understood it. Even Justice Wal- 
mesley's stronger position in Glanvyle v. Newport was confined to 
defamation in its terms and is therefore consistent with the opinion of the 
Queen's Bench in Stevens v. Totty. 
Consequently, the argument in Stevens v. Totty turned entirely on the 
"divorce." There were both factual and legal uncertainties. When the case 
was first argued, it was assumed that the husband and wife had been di- 
vorced a mensa et thoro by ecclesiastical process because of the hus- 
band's adultery. I.e.: Although the marriage had not been adjudged void 
21 T. 44 and M. 44/45 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.548b and 609b (the best report); Croke Eliz., 905 
(sub. nom. Stephens v. Frances Totty, M. 44/45); Add. 25,213, f.35 (brief, but the only report to 
show there was a demurrer, T. 44); Noy, 45 (P. 44, misdated, since the report relates to the final 
disposition.) 
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ab initio (annulled, as we would say), the partners had been fully released 
from all conjugal duties and forbidden to cohabit without license from the 
ecclesiastical court. Later, however, the judges inspected the record and 
found that the ecclesiastical sentence was weaker than that: The award 
was only that the partners be separated from bed and board until they 
were reconciled and agreed to cohabit again, and it did not appear of re- 
cord what the reason for the award was. The difference between the 
stronger and weaker kind of "divorce" was probably not decisive for the 
outcome of the case, but reinforcing. Upon the first argument, when they 
were assuming the stronger kind, all the judges were somewhat uncertain, 
but two of them (Gawdy and Fenner) leaned clearly in favor of the Prohi- 
bition. In the end, the whole Court favored the Prohibition, probably even 
on the assumption that the divorce was as strong as it could be, short of 
annulment. 
The problem concerning the "divorce" may be analyzed into the fol- 
lowing questions: (a) What is the exact meaning in ecclesiastical law of a 
"strong" divorce a mensa et thoro? (b) Apart from its exact meaning in 
ecclesiastical law, does the common law in its own sphere (with respect 
to the wife's capacity to maintain common law actions and hold property 
separately) attach any consequences to cessation of the full, normal mari- 
tal relationship? (c) Exactly how are these questions relevant for the case 
at hand? 
To help answer the first question, civil lawyers were called in. Initially, 
the common lawyer Dodderidge argued against the Prohibition (upon de- 
murrer, but there is no report of the arguments by counsel contra.) Al- 
though unpersuaded by Dodderidge, Gawdy and Fenner did not resist 
Justice Yelverton's express request that civilians be heard. (The Chief 
Justice was silent if he was present.) According to the best report, two ci- 
vilians argued on each side. On the basis of their argument, the Court was 
persuaded that even a "strong" divorce does not dissolve the matrimonial 
bond itself -- i.e., so that the parties may remarry. If they had been per- 
suaded the other way, even Gawdy and Fenner would no doubt have 
agreed that the husband's release would not affect the wife. It is surpris- 
ing that it was thought worth discussing whether the divorce was full 
enough to permit remarriage, for we tend to assume that divorce in the 
modern sense was simply not recognized by the Church of England. Dod- 
deridge, however, argued that the prohibition on remarriage after a 
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"strong" divorce, at any rate, was a comparatively recent innovation. The 
arguments of the civilians are not reported at large, but it would appear 
that Dodderidge found two civilians to back him up. 22 
On the second question, Dodderidge argued that the common law for 
its own purposes distinguished the matrimonial bond as such from the 
"society" of marriage. When the "society" is dissolved, whether by a sen- 
tence of divorce (perhaps even a "weak" one) or by such accidents as the 
husband's exile, the wife is given separate legal capacities which she 
would otherwise lack. The Court was not impressed by this argument. 
The judges thought that divorce can only restore separate legal capacity to 
the wife if it is an absolute dissolution of the bond of matrimony by ec- 
clesiastical law, though they had to concede, on the basis of authority 
cited, that other circumstances, such as the husband's exile, might restore 
her separate legal capacity. To the extent that instances could be cited in 
which a once-married woman had been restored to single status after di- 
vorce, the judges preferred to assume that the divorce was a true annul- 
ment. 
That Dodderidge made a separate argument on the third of the ques- 
tions above is less manifest, but I think it is visible in one sentence. ("And 
[the opinion of] those in the spiritual court, who best know the effect and 
force of this divorce, is that the release is not allowable.") If that sentence 
contains an argument, it must be the following quite sensible one: 
Whether or not the partners could remarry, the ecclesiastical court is enti- 
22 The passage on this point goes as follows: "And it has been used that after such a divorce the 
parties have married others, which Waterhous, Clerk of the Crown Office, and he said that it was 
in question in a Yorkshire case whether after such a divorce the woman may be endowed or not, 
and it was held that she may, but he said that of late time after such divorce the parties have been 
forbidden to marry any other." There is obviously an omission in the MS. (not appearing as a 
hiatus or illegible word.) Perhaps Waterhous was consulted and is the speaker, instead of 
Dodderidge, for the rest of the passage; perhaps the clause should say "which Waterhous ... 
confirmed (agreed to, or the like)" after which Dodderidge continues. Conceivably there was 
only a reference to a case involving Waterhous. The substance is in any event clear. If a woman 
could recover her dower after a divorce (as if her ex-husband were dead) there would be an 
excellent argument against letting his release affect her, even if the partners could not remarry. 
(Such, in the context, would seem to be the significance of the Yorkshire case. A more 
predictable issue about divorce and dower would be whether land acquired by the husband after 
the divorce is subject to dower. A holding that it is -- i.e., that the woman "may be endowed" -- 
would argue for the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond.) 
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tled to hold that for other ecclesiastical purposes, such as this legacy suit, 
the divorce (even, perhaps, in the "weak" sense) makes the wife a sepa- 
rate legal person again. In other words, the very act of disallowing the re- 
lease construed the meaning of the divorce to one intent, however it 
should be construed to others. To that intent, it is irrelevant what further 
consequences ecclesiastical law would attach to the divorce, what the 
general theory of such divorces is, or, on the premise that the ecclesiasti- 
cal construction is decisive, how the common law treats divorces for its 
own purposes. Without answering this argument, the court rejected it. The 
judges' implied position was that uniformity should prevail -- that the 
wife should not escape her husband's release in a legacy suit if she ought 
not to be treated as a separate person in analogous common law situ- 
ations. In order to decide how a divorce should be treated in all situations, 
it was thought necessary to know how the ecclesiastical law construed the 
divorce in general, with particular regard to the remarriage test. Seeing 
that by the better ecclesiastical opinion there was no dissolution of the 
vinculum matrimonii, the judges held that the ecclesiastical courts had no 
power to determine the effect of their divorces to miscellaneous ecclesias- 
tical intents. 
The Court's opinion in Stevens v. Totty was less humane than its final 
action. The holding obviously invites abuse: A husband who had made 
life intolerable for his wife and in consequence legally forfeited the right 
to have anything to do with her could nevertheless defeat her interests 
from motives all-too likely to be spite. Realizing the danger, the Court ex- 
amined the executor who brought the Prohibition. The examination re- 
vealed that the legacy was large and the release made for little or no 
consideration. Having every reason to suspect mischievous collusion, the 
Justices told the parties that a Consultation would be awarded unless they 
would compound. A clerk of the Court was assigned to work out a settle- 
ment with the parties, which he did. The flexibility characteristic of Pro- 
hibition proceedings served a good purpose in this case. 23 
23 One report (Noy) has Popham saying that unless the parties would compound a partial 
Consultation would be granted -- ita quod the plea of the release be allowed. One of the civilians 
who argued, Dr. Crompton, then said that the wife would certainly recover if such a Consultation 
were issued. I take it that the Queen's Bench judges intended that effect, since their purpose at 
this point was to protect the wife against the husband's fraudulent deal with the executor. The 
point is of technical interest, though moot (because the parties in fact settled.) The partial 
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Glanvyle v. Newport and Stevens v. Totty meet in the later case of 
Motam v. Motam. 24 There, a wife sued for defamation after a divorce 
similar to that in Stevens v. Totty. (Counsel made contradictory state- 
ments about the exact terms of the divorce. One side said it was a mensa 
et thoro et mutua cohabitatione, while the other side said the decree con- 
tained the additional words de omnibus matrimoniis obsequiis. Nothing in 
the arguments depends on the difference. In any event, the divorce was 
stronger than the actual divorce in Stevens v. Totty.) Sentence was given 
for the wife and costs awarded to her. The ecclesiastical defendant then 
appealed. Only at that point did the divorced husband release, The defen- 
dant pleaded the release before the appellate court, which disallowed it, 
remitting the case to the lower court for execution of the sentence (pen- 
ance) and costs. According to Rolle and the virtually identical MS., the 
judges were plainly inclined to deny the Prohibition but withheld decision 
in order to advise further. According to Bulstrode, they did deny it. 
Stevens v. Totty was cited and distinguished 25 on essentially the grounds 
taken by Justice Kingsmill in Glanvyle v. Newport (though not so as to 
exclude Justice Walmesley's still stronger position in that case): A legacy 
is a material interest, with respect to which husband and wife are insepa- 
rable, while the wife's interest in her good name is intrinsically individ- 
ual. The costs gave the award a property aspect, but the Court discounted 
that feature because the costs were only an appurtenance to the principal 
matter, covering only the expenses of litigation -- i.e., were not damages. 
An additional argument by the wife's counsel was not mentioned by the 
24 
25 
Consultation would "save face." I.e.: The judges would not decide that the plea should be 
allowed but still, on grounds of equity, flatly overrule the Prohibition. At the same time, 
apparently, sentence could be given for the wife without violating the condition in the ita quod 
Consultation. I take that to mean that the ecclesiastical court could fulfill the condition by 
allowing the plea, then proceed to consider whether the release was obtained by fraud. The other 
reports do not intimate that the threatened Consultation was partial. 
M. 14 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 426; Harl. 4561, f.266; 3 Bulstrode, 264 (sub. nom. Motteram v. 
Motteram.) 
The fallibility to which the use of judicial precedents was subject in the 17th century is nicely 
illustrated here. Counsel arguing for the Prohibition (Coventry) cited Stevens v. Totty, describing 
it correctly. The "precedent" (record) was physically shown to the Court, but something was 
missing, for "the precedent did not comprehend the divorce." Justice Dodderidge came to the 
rescue: He "said that he well remembered the case when it was argued, that there was talk of a 
divorce (que parlance donque fuit del divorce)." Fifteen years earlier, Dodderidge himself had 
argued at length on the significance of the divorce. Memories dim, and authority often depended 
on memory. (Rolle/MS. Bulstrode has Dodderidge remembering Stevens v. Totty more 
precisely.) 
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judges -- that the ecclesiastical court of appeal in any case had no power 
to take the release into account, since such appellate tribunals are con- 
fined to reviewing the lower court's actions, and the release did not exist 
at the time of the original sentence. 
Motam v. Motam is formally distinguishable from Glanvyle v. New- 
port because there was a divorce in the former but not in the latter. The 
divorce was not decisive in the resolution of Motam v. Motam, however. 
The case should be taken as deciding that the husband's release will not 
bar the wife's suit for defamation. As such, it follows an earlier Jacobean 
case in the King's Bench, Fenton v. Edwards. 26 There, a woman sued 
separately for defamation, and the plea of her husband's release was dis- 
allowed. From the Bar, Yelverton said that he had been of counsel in such 
a case where a Prohibition was granted, and Richardson urged that the 
prospect of costs' being awarded gave the husband a releasable pecuniary 
interest. But counsel got nowhere. Justice Williams, noting that the 
woman's very capacity to sue without joining her husband was a peculiar- 
ity of ecclesiastical law, took the position that the ecclesiastical court was 
entitled to decide what effect the release should be given. ("Since the ac- 
tion originally belongs to their court, and you plead your release there, 
you must be adjudged by their law.") Williams added that when he was a 
Serjeant the Common Pleas would not grant a Prohibition in such a case. 
Nor would the Common Pleas do so now, Chief Justice Fleming added. 
The Prohibition was accordingly denied in the instant case. 
A year later, however, Coke's Common Pleas made a flatly contradic- 
tory decision in the identical case of Vincent v. Genis. 27 If Williams and 
Fleming in Fenton v. Edwards were right about former Common Pleas 
practice, then that court reversed itself. The position taken by Glanville in 
Glanvyle v. Newport prevailed. In Vincent v. Genis, the wife's suit was 
for "whore." The husband's release having been disallowed, a Prohibition 
was unanimously granted. Coke, speaking for the Court, cited what he 
called the "like case" of Bosome v. Sletter from the time of Chief Justice 
Wray (1574- 1592) in the Queen's Bench, taking no note of more recent 
precedents in that court precisely in point. In Bosome v. Sletter as Coke 
26 M. 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.73. 
27 M. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.227. 
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describes it, a conveyance of a parsonage came in question collaterally in 
an ecclesiastical suit. A Prohibition was granted to prevent the ecclesiasti- 
cal court from holding that the parsonage passed by deed, without livery 
of seisin. In other words, the common law intervened in that case to en- 
force a fundamental and notorious rule of real property. Coke made no 
distinction between that form of intervention and enforcement of a hus- 
band’s release against a wife’s suit for “spiritual” defamation. 
Finally, the King’s Bench took one more turn. In Motam v. Motam, 
that court held expressly that a husband may no more release the costs re- 
covered by his wife in a separate suit for defamation than the action it- 
self. That position was reversed in a Caroline case, 28 without any 
reported reference to Motam v. Motam or other earlier cases. In this case, 
the husband’s release was only pleaded upon appeal from a sentence, plus 
costs, in the wife’s favor. (Whether the release was made before sentence 
does not appear.) The Court held that the release ought to have been al- 
lowed quoad the costs, though not quoad any penance or other punish- 
ment imposed on the slanderer. A Prohibition nisi was granted to that 
end. 
The reasonable rule that a husband may not release his wife’s ecclesi- 
astical suit for defamation had its best moments in the Jacobean King’s 
Bench. A few cases on other subjects tend to confirm that that court was 
less ready than others to impose a rather mechanical conformity with the 
common law on other jurisdictions. One case, Wise v. Wapthorp, 29 in- 
volved the legal capacities of married women. In this case, a man made 
his wife executrix, left legacies, and died. After the wife had remarried, a 
legatee sued her without joining her new husband. She pleaded that as a 
married woman she ought not to have been sued alone, and a Prohibition 
was sought when the ecclesiastical court disallowed the plea. The Prohi- 
bition was denied, 3-1, the aged Chief Justice Popham not participating. 
Justice Williams doubted whether the ecclesiastical law had been cor- 
rectly applied, but held that if it had not been the remedy was by appeal. 
The matter being within ecclesiastical cognizance, there was no warrant 
for insisting on common law standards. Justices Yelverton and Tanfield 
28 T. 7 Car. K.B. Croke Car., 222. 
29 P. 4 Jac. K.B. Harl. 1631, f.302. 
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agreed. Justice Fenner dissented, holding that intervention is appropriate 
“if they proceed contrary to the law and reason” (law and reason, for Fen- 
ner, being defined by common law standards as to women’s separate ca- 
pacity.) The decision seems strong, inasmuch as the husband could be 
held responsible for his wife’s executorial duties at common law (i.e., for 
debts of the estate.) His liabilities could be affected, say, by the wife’s 
failure to assert the estate’s incapacity to support legacies. Even on Wil- 
liams’s assumption that the ecclesiastical decision was correctable by ap- 
peal, non-intervention in such circumstances was generous. 
A case from the next year is similar. 30 Here, a man made his wife and 
son executors and left a legacy to his grandchild. The grandchild, “to 
spare his father and put all the charge on the wife,” sued her alone for 
the legacy. She was not allowed to plead that there was a co-executor, 
who had joined her in proving the will and ought to have been joined in 
the legacy suit. However unreasonable or bad in ecclesiastical law the 
disallowance may have been, the King’s Bench refused to grant a Prohi- 
bition. The reported reason was simply that legacies are of exclusively ec- 
clesiastical cognizance. 
The non-interfering spirit of the Jacobean King’s Bench is again ex- 
emplified in a case of 1608. 31 A man made his wife executrix and left 
£60 to his daughter. The testator further willed that the executrix might 
retain the £60 so long as she and the daughter agreed, and that if they 
agreed the money should be delivered to the local Overseers of the Poor 
for safekeeping. The money was accordingly delivered to the Overseers, 
who made a signed and sealed receipt. The daughter subsequently sued 
the executrix for the legacy. The executrix tried to plead the above facts 
and the Overseers’ acquittance, but was not allowed to. A Prohibition was 
denied by Justices Yelverton, Williams, and Croke, alone in court. They 
did not in this case rely on the generality that legacies were the ecclesias- 
tical courts’ business. Three circumstances making the ecclesiastical 
court’s conduct reasonable were mentioned: (a) If the executrix could ex- 
cuse herself, the daughter would have no means 
in the ecclesiastical court, since no suit against 
of recovering her legacy 
the Overseers would lie 
30 M. 5 Jac. K.B Add. 25,213, f.78b. 
31 M. 6 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f.48. 
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there. (Presumably a court of equity would be her only way to get at 
them.) (b) The daughter was within age when she agreed to let the money 
be delivered to the Overseers. (c) If the executrix loses anything, it is her 
own fault, since she could have been taken a bond from the Overseers to 
save her harmless. In short, the ecclesiastical court had made an equitable 
decision. That is especially true in view of the daughter's nonage (which 
would be relevant for her contractual liability at common law as well.) If 
we waive that consideration, it is perhaps questionable whether the eccle- 
siastical decision (right or wrong) implies any clash with the common law 
comparable to the rule-conflicts on husband-and-wife and co-liability in 
the cases above. The strongest construction of the circumstances against 
the daughter would be that she released the legacy in consideration of the 
benefit to her of having the money kept (and perhaps increased by invest- 
ment) by the Overseers, assuming the risk of recovering it from them on 
demand. Whether an ecclesiastical court that refused a legatee's unambi- 
guous, considerate release (as distinct from one that refused a husband's 
release of his wife's legacy) should be prohibited makes a question. 
Could such conduct be taken as anything but downright irrational, hence 
correctable by appeal? On the other hand, a Prohibition could perhaps be 
justified where the transaction was ambiguous (as here) on the theory that 
releases even of "spiritual" legacies are "temporal" by nature, hence con- 
struable at common law. If disallowing the plea implied a misconstruction 
of the transaction, Prohibition should lie. In the instant case, the Court 
could have reached the same result by saying that the transaction did not 
amount to a release of the legacy or agreement not to sue the executrix -- 
i.e., that the ecclesiastical court had passed correctly on a common law is- 
sue. Judging by the report, however, the Court did not go through such 
steps, but simply chose to stay out of a legacy matter which gave every 
appearance of having been fairly handled by the court with jurisdiction. 
A further case, Starkey v. Berton, 32 bears a superficial and misleading 
resemblance to the cases above on the husband's power to bind his wife. 
Here, two churchwardens sued a parishioner for a rate levied to repair the 
church. The parishioner pleaded the release of one churchwarden and 
sought a Prohibition when it was disallowed. The King's Bench turned 
32 H. 7 Jac, K.B. Croke Jac., 234. 
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him down unanimously, but the reason was not that the subject belonged 
to the ecclesiastical courts. Rather, the judges considered the nature of 
churchwardens and held that the ecclesiastical court had acted correctly. 
(Churchwardens were a corporation in effect. The corporation, rather than 
the churchwardens as individuals, held the property and claims of the 
church to the use of the parish. One lacked capacity to convey property or 
release claims without the other. These must be regarded as points of 
common law, correctly understood by the ecclesiastical court in this case. 
Presumably the ecclesiastical court would have been prohibitable in prin- 
ciple if it had allowed the release, or even for no further reason than that 
the effect of a release by a single churchwarden had come in question.) 
Counsel in Motam v. Motam urged Starkey v. Berton in support of the 
proposition that the ecclesiastical court was entitled to disallow the hus- 
band’s release. The irrelevance of so using it was pointed out. 
One undated case closely resembling Starkey v. Berton 33 seems to 
contradict it. Churchwardens jointly sued a parishioner for a repair tax. 
The parishioner pleaded that he had offered to pay, and sentence was 
given in his favor. That sentence was reversed on appeal, and £15 costs 
awarded to the churchwardens by the appellate court. They then sued in 
an ecclesiastical court to recover the costs. The parishioner pleaded that 
one of the churchwardens had released the costs. The report says that it 
seemed to the judges (of whichever court) that Prohibition would lie if the 
plea was disallowed (suggesting that disallowance had not been alleged - 
- either that the Court was not sure whether it had, or else that the Prohibi- 
tion was sought merely because the effect of the release was in question.) 
The report contains a note on the seemingly contradictory Starkey v. Ber- 
ton, and a note (whether or not relating to that case) that costs recovered 
by churchwardens are to the use of the parish. It is not clear whether this 
contrary authority was cited or only recorded by the reporter in his note- 
book alongside the judges’ opinion. The case seems distinguishable from 
Starkey v. Berton only on the theory that while rates are due to the 
churchwardens as a corporation and therefore are not releasable by one, 
litigative costs recovered in suing for rates belong jointly to the church- 
wardens as individuals and are accordingly releasable by either one. As- 
suming such a distinction, the reported case implies that it amounts to a 
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rule of the common law binding on the ecclesiastical court -- i.e., that ec- 
clesiastical courts are not free to construe the nature of their own costs 
awards. 
It was relatively rare for Prohibitions to be sought because of disal- 
lowed pleas in tithe cases. Suits for tithes were as a rule either prohibi- 
table because the defense was triable at common law, whether or not the 
ecclesiastical court would allow it, or not prohibitable because the de- 
fense was perfectly valid by ecclesiastical law and triable as to fact by 
the ecclesiastical court. By what we have called "Tanfield's principle," an 
ecclesiastical court which unaccountably refused a valid ecclesiastical de- 
fense ought not to be prohibited because such an error should be appeal- 
able. A few tithe cases test "Tanfield's principle," however. One case 
from the Elizabethan Queen's Bench contradicts it. In Moore v. Buttoll, 34 
the parishioner pleaded simply that he had performed his legal duty, viz. 
severed the tithe from the rest of the crop and set it out in the field. He 
obtained a Prohibition on surmise that the plea had been disallowed. A 
Consultation was sought on motion, on the ground that the defense was 
triable in the ecclesiastical court (unlike, e.g., a modus.) As far as the brief 
report shows, counsel did not elaborate, to the effect that the disallowance 
was correctable by appeal. The judges (without Chief Justice Popham, 
who was absent) were in any event unwilling to grant the Consultation on 
motion. They took the disallowance "positivistically," as implying the un- 
acceptable rule that the parishioner is bound to deliver the tithes. ("For the 
parishioner has done his duty, and it is not reason that he should be com- 
pelled to carry the tithes to the parson's house.") It is of course possible 
that the Court could have been persuaded upon demurrer that ecclesiasti- 
cal law "really" had no such rule. 
Two other cases from the same court tend the same way, a little less 
decisively. In Green v. Hun, 35 a prescriptive variant from the de jure 
rules of tithing was pleaded -- viz. that wool was payable at Lammas 
whenever during the preceding year it was sheared (at the time of shear- 
ing being the de jure rule.) The parishioner claimed to have duly set out 
the wool at Lammas. Upon demurrer, counsel opposing the Prohibition 
34 M. 43/44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.425. 
35 M. 41/42 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 702. 
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argued that a custom merely governing the time at which such a product 
as wool should pay tithes, unlike a customary commutation, is triable in 
the ecclesiastical court. Whether or not correctly, the Court apparently ac- 
cepted this point. It sustained the Prohibition, however, because it was al- 
leged (and admitted by the demurrer) that the defense had been 
disallowed. In effect, the judges took the ecclesiastical decision as imply- 
ing that custom may not vary the de jure time of payment. There was no 
discussion as to whether such a decision would be likely to survive eccle- 
siastical appeal. Possibly the question did not arise because the custom, if 
not a modus, was still modus -like. Even if it was in theory triable in the 
ecclesiastical court, the judges may have thought it just as well for it to be 
tried by jury. They might not have gone along with the distinction be- 
tween a timing-custom and a commutation if the disallowance had not 
given them an alternative way to uphold the Prohibition. Moreover, the 
custom affecting wool tithes was only part of a lengthy prescriptive sur- 
mise addressed to a conglomerate tithe suit. Although a Consultation 
quoad the wool could have been granted, there was a practical advantage 
in such cases in upholding or overruling the Prohibition as a whole. On all 
the additional controverted points in this case, the Court thought the Pro- 
hibition should stand. 
In Gusling v. Hincke, 36 a parson sued a parishioner’s executor for 
tithes due in the testator’s lifetime. The executor pleaded that his testator 
had agreed to pay 10/ in lieu of the tithes in question and had paid that 
sum. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the executor’s defense 
was disallowed. Justice Williams warned plaintiff-in-Prohibition that the 
alleged disallowance had better be true. I.e.: In Williams’s opinion, there 
was no basis for Prohibition merely because the testator’s bargain with 
the parson was in question. (We shall deal with the fictitious or immate- 
rial allegation of disallowance below. The effect of insisting that the dis- 
allowance was material was to make it a traversable fact.) As in the last 
two cases, it would seem arguable that the disallowance was so unreason- 
able as to be correctable by appeal. Williams’s insistence that the alleged 
disallowance be true suggests that he did not believe the ecclesiastical 
court had really rejected the defense as such (as opposed, perhaps, to re- 
jecting proffered proof of the bargain.) But nothing about appealable er- 
36 P. 9 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1172, f.180b. 
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ror was said. It is possible that the Court was in doubt as to whether ec- 
clesiastical law would "really" recognize an oral agreement by a dead 
man in defense to a tithe claim against an estate. The case was not a com- 
mon one. 
A couple of later tithe cases go the other way. In Allen v.  Mady, 37 a 
parishioner claimed that his plea of mere payment was disallowed. A 
Common Pleas Prohibition was granted, but Chief Justice Hobart (no one 
contradicting him) was ready to undo it by Consultation on motion. In an- 
other case where the same claim was made, 38 the Prohibition was simply 
denied. 
A final case of late vintage, 39 however, leaves the standing of "Tan- 
field's principle" in doubt. A parishioner being sued for tithe-lambs 
pleaded a custom of a type that was common in the case of young ani- 
mals. Since lambs, calves, etc., are not normally born in multiples of ten, 
it was necessary to have some way of dealing with irregular numbers. The 
custom pleaded in this case was a typical formula: 1/2d. per lamb if the 
number born in a given year is less than seven; if there are seven, the par- 
son to have the seventh and refund 3d., etc. According to the parishioner 
in this case, the parson would not accept what was due to him according 
to the customary formula, but insisted on waiting until a tenth lamb was 
born and claiming that. The ecclesiastical court refused to let the parish- 
ioner allege this matter in his defense. The King's Bench was divided as 
to whether Prohibition would lie. Justices Berkeley and Jones opposed 
prohibiting. They were on solid ground because the parson here was not 
standing on his de jure right against the custom in a simple sense. If the 
ecclesiastical law had simply given the parson the tenth animal when it 
was born (e.g., nothing in 1600 though nine lambs were born, one lamb in 
1601 though only one was born that year), three solutions would be possi- 
ble: (a) Prohibition whether or not the plea was disallowed, modi being 
triable at common law; (b) Prohibition if the plea was disallowed (on the 
theory that this special type of modus -- like the wool-at-Lammas custom 
above -- could be tried in the ecclesiastical court but must be accepted as 
37 H. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.280b. 
38 H. 9 Car. K.B. Harg,. 378, f.25. 
39 P. 11 Car. K.B. Croke Car., 403. 
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a defense under pain of Prohibition); (c) No Prohibition (on the theory 
that the defense is triable in the ecclesiastical court and that exclusion of 
the plea is correctable by appeal.) But in fact, as was well-recognized, 
ecclesiastical law did not simply give the parson the tenth animal when- 
ever it was born. Rather, it had a de jure formula at least similar to the 
one claimed as customary here. I am not sure whether the values were 
exactly the same, or indeed whether there was one consistently applied 
and notorious formula as to values. In the report, Berkeley and Jones 
seem to say that what the parishioner claimed was exactly the same as 
what the ecclesiastical law gave him. But perhaps their position does not 
depend on the truth of that proposition. If the ecclesiastical law only rec- 
ognized the principle that liability for young animals in a given year was 
limited by a formula covering irregular numbers, there would be a good 
argument for denying Prohibition. I.e.: Assume that the ecclesiastical law 
as it "really" is says negatively that parishioners are not liable for the 
tenth animal in succession whenever it is born, and positively that a given 
formula or any reasonable variant warranted by custom will be applied 
instead. Then the disallowance of the defense in this case would seem, 
however inexcusable, to be an appealable error. A fortiori if indeed the 
standard formula was exactly the same as the formula pleaded. 
Chief Justice Brampston and Justice Croke disagreed. As I read the re- 
port, they did not altogether dispute the theory that Berkeley and Jones 
were going on. If the parishioner had expressly stood on a standard eccle- 
siastical formula, or if it had been unmistakable that the "custom" relied 
on was only the standard formula, they too would have opposed prohibit- 
ing. As it was, they were ready to give the parishioner the benefit of any 
doubt because he had stood on a custom. The ecclesiastical court had at 
last acted as if it regarded the parson as entitled to the tenth animal when- 
ever born, and as if a custom could not prevail against that rule. Bramp- 
ston and Croke preferred to look no further. In effect, they adopted 
position (b) of the three outlined above. The Court being thus divided, 
Berkeley and Jones agreed to a Prohibition in order to draw a demurrer 
and permit fuller debate. There is no report as to whether the parson 
thought it worthwhile to demur. 
The remaining, miscellaneous cases on disallowance are best classified 
as between those in which the Prohibition was granted and those in which 
it was denied. Let us take the latter group, which is larger, first. In one 
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late-Elizabethan case, 40 a parson leased his tithes. Subsequently, the 
whole living was sequestered for dilapidations. I.e.: Because the parson 
was permitting the property of the living to run down, to the detriment of 
future holders, it was made over by due ecclesiastical proceedings to the 
equivalent of a guardian or trustee. The property of the living generally -- 
right to tithes, glebe, parsonage-house, etc. -- was so "sequestered." The 
trustee then sued certain parishioners for tithes. They pleaded the lease of 
the tithes and alleged that they had paid the lessee. A Prohibition was 
sought because the plea was disallowed, but apparently denied. ("Appar- 
ently": The report does not state the outcome sharply, but gives a clear 
opinion against prohibiting. It appears to come from a judge and is uncon- 
tradicted.) 
" ... We do not know the quality of their sequestrations," the opinion 
says. In other words, sequestering a living is a lawful ecclesiastical proc- 
ess, the incidents of which are defined by ecclesiastical law. If by ecclesi- 
astical law the sequestration extends to the whole living, including tithes, 
and if prior leases are postponed to the sequestration (i.e., the sequestered 
parson's lessee loses what the parson-lessor would lose) -- so be it. The 
ecclesiastical law is entitled so to hold (even though a lease of tithes qua 
transaction was an ordinary secular conveyance, and in that sense the les- 
see had an interest recognized and protectable by the common law.) "The 
lessee," says the opinion, "at his peril must provide with the parson when 
he accepts the lease that no such forfeiture will be committed." (It is 
worth noting that the ecclesiastical rule here hardly clashes with the com- 
mon law applicable to analogous situations. A lessee of forfeitable prop- 
erty was normally subject to the risk of forfeiture -- e.g., lessee of a 
life-tenant where the life-estate is forfeited by the life-tenant's making a 
conveyance in fee.) No more pity was spared for the parishioners, who 
had paid the wrong man and would have to pay twice, than for the lessee 
himself. (No doubt they could get restitution if they could catch the les- 
see, but the "peril" of not knowing about the sequestration rested on 
them.) One final remark in the opinion is interesting: " ... We will not pre- 
sume that this is covin in the parson or the Bishop or corruption in the 
spiritual judges in their courts, no more than they will presume it of us." 
40 39 Eliz. (No term) C.P. Add. 25,199, f.2. 
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The implication there is that an actual showing of "practice" might 
change the case, that despite the legal reasons for non-interference a Pro- 
hibition might be employed to control abuse of ecclesiastical process. 
(The possible "covin," I suppose, would be for the parson to connive at 
the sequestration in order to defeat his own lease, or else for the ecclesias- 
tical authorities to sequester on fabricated grounds in order to "get" an un- 
favored parson and/or lessee.) But the Court would not see foul play by 
presumption. 
In Quarles and Cawllye v. Fairechilde, 41 the Queen's Bench was urged 
to intervene in an ecclesiastical suit for a different reason than usual: not 
because a defendant's plea was disallowed, but because the ecclesiastical 
court would not let a stranger come in to protect his interest. The underly- 
ing dispute in this case was over whether a living was "donative" or "pre- 
sentative." (The patron of a living, or advowson-owner, normally had the 
right to present a clergyman to the bishop. If the presentee was accept- 
able, he was installed in the benefice by the three legal ceremonies of in- 
stitution, admission, and induction. Some advowsons, however, were 
"donative." That meant that the patron could convey the living directly to 
a clergyman, without going through the bishop and without installation 
ceremonies.) In our case, one J. -- claiming to be the owner of a presenta- 
tive advowson -- presented Fairechilde. But the living was already in the 
possession of Forth. Forth got the living by the gift of Quarles and Cawl- 
lye, who claimed to own the advowson and that it was donative. Faire- 
childe sued in the ecclesiastical court to secure induction -- i.e., to force a 
legal decision as to whether the living was presentative, in which event he 
would be entitled to induction. As the Queen's Bench was to hold, Faire- 
childe's suit was essentially ex parte -- a claim addressed to the bishop 
asserting the right to be inducted. However, as was proper in such suits, 
he named Forth as "disturber" of his alleged right. Forth appeared, con- 
tested Fairechilde's claim, lost, and appealed to the Delegates. Pending 
the appeal, Forth died. Thereupon his patrons (Quarles and Cawllye) 
sought, in effect, to take his place. I.e.: They claimed that their interest 
was affected by the outcome of Fairechilde's suit and accordingly asked 
to be received by the Delegates to show that the living was donative. The 
ecclesiastical court refused to receive them, wherefore Quarles and Cawl- 
41 H. 41 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.43b. 
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lye sought and obtained a Prohibition. Our report gives the arguments and 
decision upon a motion for Consultation. 
The case was argued by great men -- Coke against the Consultation, 
Tanfield for it. The Court, per Chief Justice Popham, decided to grant the 
Consultation. Popham's opinion, however, contradicted Tanfield's argu- 
ment for the same result. (a) Tanfield argued that the Prohibition should 
never have been granted because there was nothing to prohibit. That was 
true, he said, because Forth's death killed Fairechilde's suit. (By, it would 
seem, universal-necessary, hence ecclesiastical, standards, not by a stand- 
ard peculiar to the common law: "For it is in the Court Christian as in 
other Courts, that to every suit there must be two parties ....") Therefore 
when Quarles and Cawllye asked to be received, they were asking for the 
impossible -- to be made quasi-parties to a suit that did not exist. There- 
fore the basis for their claim to a Prohibition -- improper refusal to re- 
ceive them -- was nugatory. Since a Prohibition which ought not to have 
been granted had been, it should be undone by Consultation. (It seems 
implied in Tanfield's argument that what the ecclesiastical court was ac- 
tually doing was irrelevant. If the ecclesiastical court regarded the suit as 
still alive and was carrying on with it, it was, so to speak, flapping its 
wings. I take it that two consequences might follow from this somewhat 
surrealistic perception of the situation: 1) If the ecclesiastical court was 
behaving in an absurd, unreasonable, or unlawful-by-any-standard man- 
ner, it should not be prohibited, for, by "Tanfield's principle," "foreign" 
courts should only be prohibited when they are correctly applying rules of 
their own which, by controlling common law standards, they ought not to 
apply. To that, one might, of course, make the "positivistic" reply that if 
the ecclesiastical court -- indeed, the Delegates -- regarded the suit as 
alive it was alive by ecclesiastical standards, which standards, by Tan- 
field's showing, are "wrong." The alternative to saying the ecclesiastical 
court was behaving absurdly is of course to say that its refusal to receive 
Quarles and Cawllye was a function of its "correct" recognition that there 
was no suit to receive them into. The report gives, and perhaps the record 
gave, no positive indication that proceedings in Fairechilde's suit were 
continuing, though it is obvious that they either were continuing or were 
likely to. Tanfield's client wanted a Consultation badly enough to hire an 
expensive lawyer, hardly a good investment unless there was in reality 
something to authorize the continuation of. Still, it was clever legalism to 
contend that refusal to admit Quarles and Cawllye was right, and hence 
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no basis for Prohibition, even though the ecclesiastical court did not de- 
duce that holding from the correct premise, viz. that the suit was dead. 2) 
Nothing the ecclesiastical court did as a result of entertaining a non-exis- 
tent suit could have any effect. If Fairechilde was inducted, that would be 
a manifest error. No weight could be given to it in any common law liti- 
gation over the status of the advowson. Therefore, one might argue, there 
is no common law interest to protect by prohibiting. Quarles's and Cawl- 
lye's common law interest in their donative advowson, if they had such 
an advowson, would be just as well off without a Prohibition as with one. 
And what basis for Prohibition could they have except that interest? They 
ought to go ahead and appoint a new clergyman, and if Fairechilde got in 
their way bring a Quare impedit. Fairechilde's having secured induction 
would not hurt their cause. Indeed, it would probably help it, by consti- 
tuting an actionable interference with their right of patronage.) 
Coke immediately jumped on Tanfield's general reasoning: If there 
was nothing to prohibit (at least in any sense "real" enough to worry 
about), then there was nothing to authorize the continuation of by Con- 
sultation. The Consultation Tanfield sought would be "in vain," for surely 
a flesh-and-blood Consultation operates to let the ecclesiastical court do 
what it lawfully can and actually will do once the arresting hand of the 
Prohibition is removed. Coke was on plausible ground here, for, as we 
have seen in Vol. I, there were situations in which a Prohibition that ut- 
terly misfired -- failed to shoot down an ecclesiastical suit actually in be- 
ing -- could be held void, but not be undone by Consultation. However, I 
doubt whether Coke's counter-stroke of logic-chopping was necessary to 
convince the Court that Tanfield's theory itself was pretty much "in vain." 
In any event, the Chief Justice rejected the notion that the ecclesiastical 
suit did not or should not exist. Because the suit was essentially ex parte, 
Popham said, there was no reason why the death of a quasi-party, or one 
"in for interest," should terminate it. Therefore the Prohibition stopped 
something about whose reality there was no doubt; therefore it must 
either stand or be reversed straightforwardly. 
(b) The Court then went on to hold that Consultation should be granted 
because (as above, without the tortuosities) Quarles and Cawllye would 
not be hurt if Fairechilde got his induction, while Fairechilde had a real 
interest in trying for it. In other words, if the Church was donative, Quar- 
les and Cawllye could not protect their interest at common law whether or 
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not Fairechilde was inducted. His induction on the premise that the 
church was presentative would simply have no effect on a common law 
test of the premise. If, on the other hand, the church was presentative, 
Fairechilde needed induction before he could take any profits from the 
living (challenging the adverse claimants to sue him) or himself bring any 
action at common law to test the nature of the advowson and hence his 
right. It seems to me that the Court did not hold that the Delegates were 
right to exclude Quarles and Cawllye (allowing them to come in would 
seem conducive to an intelligent decision on Fairechilde’s title to be in- 
ducted, as Forth’s participation had been), but that whether they were 
right or wrong did not matter for any common law purpose. Coke’s main 
argument against Consultation came to saying that the nature of the living 
was ultimately determinable at common law (as it unquestionably was), 
and therefore that the Queen’s Bench should keep the possession which 
the Prohibition gave it until the real issue was tried. Practically, that is a 
very sensible argument. If Fairechilde had been forced to deny that the 
church was donative to reverse the Prohibition, the problem could be set- 
tled here and now. As it turned out, the ecclesiastical Court was left to 
consume its time on a question ultimately beyond its competence, and 
further common law litigation was almost guaranteed. In rejecting a 
course with such clear practical advantages, the Court showed consider- 
able scrupulosity about prohibiting when the theoretical basis for doing so 
was shaky. In the abstract, the Prohibition was hard to justify (as Coke 
probably realized, for he made no very formidable case for it.) To say that 
an ecclesiastical court is not free to rule out intervention-for-interest by a 
non-party -- at that, a lay non-party whose interest in the right of patron- 
age is secular -- would be interfering indeed. A fortiori when, as here, such 
intervention was ruled out only at the appellate level, for it is surely de- 
fensible to hold that a suit should not be restructured by the addition of 
parties-in-interest when the judgment of a lower court, predicated on the 
old structure, is under review. Though Forth’s death pending appeal cre- 
ated an ambiguity in our case, it was surely the ecclesiastical court’s 
business to resolve it. 
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In Child v. Caninge 42 an occupier of land cut his hay and sold it with- 
out paying the tithe. Instead of suing the occupier, the parson sued the 
vendee. In principle, that was certainly an odd thing to do, for the duty to 
pay tithes belonged to the producer, not to persons into whose hands 
tithable produce might later come. Practically, it is not so hard to imagine 
what happened. The report says that the occupier put the hay (all of it, 
without severing the tithe) in a rick and sold it. Probably the property in 
the hay changed hands while physically it stood right there in the field. 
Probably the parson took on the vendee, pointing out that the tithe was 
unpaid and that it would be perfectly easy for him to pay it now in ap- 
proximately the normal way. But the vendee refused, making himself the 
"enemy" -- the obstinate one. (Perhaps the producer politely, or even 
truly, told the parson that he had reminded the vendee to take care of the 
tithe before he hauled off his hay, the vendee saying of course he would.) 
Some such story, at any rate, might explain why a parson believed it was 
appropriate or fair to sue the vendee (unless, of course, his motive was 
simply the hardboiled one -- to go after the person more likely to be able 
to pay, hoping to make a legal case for an unorthodox suit.) 
Whether the Prohibition that was sought in this case was based on an 
alleged disallowance is not clear. Claiming a Prohibition solely on the 
ground that the tithe suit was directed at someone other than the producer 
would have been entirely plausible, whether or not successful. Chief Jus- 
tice Hobart said, however, that "if they of the Court Christian will not al- 
low this plea, the defendant is without remedy." That suggests that the 
surmise "sounded in disallowance"; I.e.: The vendee was sued, for all that 
appeared from the libel, as if he were the normally-liable producer. In- 
stead of immediately seeking a Prohibition on the bare surmise that he 
was a non-liable vendee, he sought to plead that fact in the ecclesiastical 
court and brought a Prohibition when he failed. In any event, Hobart's 
opinion is strong: A vendee sued for tithes may not have a Prohibition, 
not even when it is clear that he cannot help himself, at least in the eccle- 
siastical court of first instance (much less if he has not tried.) The opin- 
ion is all the stronger because Hobart himself said that suing the vendee 
was improper ("Clearly the vendee cannot [ne poet, perhaps ne doet, 
42 T. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.209b. 
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ought not] pay them.") Nevertheless, Hobart took his stand on the propo- 
sition that the suit was "merely spiritual." Perhaps that comes to an appli- 
cation of "Tanfield's principle": There is no basis for saying that the 
common law rules out holding a vendee liable for tithes in certain circum- 
stances, as it rules out, for example, suits for tithes of exempt products. 
The very unorthodoxy of the attempt to nail the vendee makes it hard to 
say that the common law has any rules, pro or con, on the subject. On the 
other hand, insofar as the attempt looks novel and unreasonable, there is a 
basis for predicting that it would not survive ecclesiastical appeal. 
Justice Hutton disagreed. He did not think the case was open and shut 
("It seems a good question whether he will have a Prohibition or not"), 
but on balance he though prohibiting could be justified, apparently with- 
out reference to whether the vendee had tried to defend himself and been 
disallowed. Hutton was troubled by the unfairness of making a vendee 
answerable even in the kind of situation I sketch above (where he is in a 
sense morally responsible, has an opportunity to take care of the tithes.) 
For suppose the vendor falsely tells the vendee that the parson has been 
satisfied. Such a lie would not be false on its face even when the whole 
crop was lying in the field, plainly untithed, for the parson might have ac- 
cepted a substitute by agreement. Surely it is hard to put responsibility 
for knowing the truth on the vendee, hard even to make it his job to prove 
that he was deceived. At heart, perhaps, Hutton thought that letting eccle- 
siastical courts get a foot in the door to hold vendees liable spelt trouble, 
however sensibly ecclesiastical courts would try to behave; under the sur- 
face, perhaps Hobart did not think that attaching liability to vendees 
would be a disaster if it were done with great restraint, only in cases of 
fraud. (Fraud is imaginable: Sell your crop the moment you cut it or be- 
fore, give the vendee a piece of paper certifying the tithes satisfied -- 
known by him to be utterly fabricated -- and "skip town.") 
The report tells us that when the case was taken up again later it "ap- 
peared in another manner than is here put." How is not specified. In the 
event, the Prohibition was denied. However much that was a result of the 
reformulation, the report says that Hobart repeated his opinion on the 
question as formerly conceived. 
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In Browne's Case, 43 the King's Bench made a clear self-restraining 
decision. Browne was proceeded against in an ecclesiastical court for not 
attending services at his parish church. He sought a Prohibition because 
what he took to be his reasonable and lawful excuse was disallowed. (He 
said that he went to another church nearer home, could not reach the par- 
ish church at all in winter owing to impassable roads, but nevertheless 
went there three times a year and received the sacrament.) When the case 
was first taken up, no conclusion was reached. Only Justice Dodderidge's 
remarks are reported. Dodderidge said that this excuse was satisfactory 
for the purposes of 1 Eliz. (the Uniformity Act, making church attendance 
compulsory, subject to temporal penalties), but not by ecclesiastical law. 
I.e.: The statute required attending one's parish church as a general rule, 
but in respect of the temporal penalties accepted attendance elsewhere if 
one had a reasonable excuse; ecclesiastical law, as Dodderidge under- 
stood it, treated parish-church attendance as a categorical duty. On this 
occasion, Dodderidge expressed no conclusion. Subsequently, the Court 
agreed unanimously to deny Prohibition. The judges in effect refused to 
give the statute any "preemptive" operation -- i.e., to take it as bringing 
secular law into the field of church attendance, formerly occupied solely 
by ecclesiastical law, and thereby imposing secular standards on the ec- 
clesiastical courts in that field. Conflict between the spiritual and tempo- 
ral spheres was not in this instance considered disturbing. (It is a nice 
question whether conflict occasioned by statutory incursion of secular law 
into the ecclesiastical sphere is less bad than conflict between ecclesiasti- 
cal law and analogous common law. The Court in this case took on no 
such large, and perhaps fruitless, weighing-problem, but simply found no 
intent in the statute to interfere with ecclesiastical rules on church atten- 
dance. Its words were: "For notwithstanding this statute, they [this Court] 
have nothing to do with coming to churches, for this statute does not give 
authority to meddle with such things, but was made in corroboration of 
the canons." I take this as equivalent to saying that the statute "preemp- 
43 2 Rolle, 438 (dated T. 21 Jac. K.B.); Lansd. 1063, f.20b (dated T. 22.) From the party's name 
and the substantially identical facts it is clear that both reports relate to the same case. Rolle 
gives Dodderidge's tentative remarks and ends with an adjournment; the MS. gives the decision 
and Dodderidge's further concurring remarks. A full year is a large gap between first hearing and 
final disposition, but even if one of the reports is misdated, they plainly relate to two successive 
discussions. 
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ted" nothing. It cannot be considered as doing no more than reaffirming 
the canon law and leaving church attendance solely to ecclesiastical 
courts, for it undoubtedly did create a secular duty and penalty. The point 
must be that the statute was meant to add "teeth" to an ecclesiastical duty 
by superadding a secular liability, but for that very reason could not be 
meant to take away any existing ecclesiastical power or alter the way it 
was used. If the statute directed the secular authorities to enforce a some- 
what less stringent duty than ecclesiastical law insisted on -- i.e., did not 
demand parochial attendance so strictly -- that was a mere contingency; 
as it were, the added "teeth" were in one respect a little blunter, but there 
was no intent to make the existing one less sharp -- or voracious. This 
conclusion is good statutory construction, for the act is markedly affirma- 
tory of the ecclesiastical courts' power to enforce all its provisions.) 
On the second hearing, Justice Dodderidge made two further individ- 
ual observations: (a) A prescriptive title to attend a church other than that 
of one's parish will not avail unless there is a "spiritual composition." 
Judging by the reports, it would not appear that Browne set up a true pre- 
scriptive claim -- i.e., a claim that his right to go to a "foreign" church 
was based on immemorial usage, as opposed to a claim that it was his es- 
tablished and justified habit. (It would obviously make no sense for an in- 
dividual to claim a prescription, but one might do so as the occupier of a 
tenement or an inhabitant of an outlying sub-division of a parish.) I take 
Dodderidge's statement as a dictum leading to an a fortiori: A prescrip- 
tion like those enforced by Prohibition against some ecclesiastical duties 
will not prevail against the duty of parish-church attendance; the only 
way out of that duty is some sort of composition or dispensation sanc- 
tioned by the ecclesiastical authorities (and perhaps usage to the degree 
that ecclesiastical courts are themselves willing to count it as evidence of, 
or equivalent to, such a composition.) A fortiori, a common law court's 
mere opinion that an excuse is reasonable, or the fact that the excuse 
would be good vis-a-vis the additional statutory duty to attend church, 
cannot justify interference with ecclesiastical autonomy. 
(b) Secondly, Dodderidge said, "The temporal judges have no business 
reforming [nont riens a reformer] the injustice of the spiritual judge." 
That is to state the negative branch of "Tanfield's principle": whatever 
conflicts of law or overlaps of interest do justify Prohibitions on disallow- 
ance surmises, they are not justified when a common law court thinks an 
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ecclesiastical result unreasonable or unjust by universal standards, stand- 
ards which ought to be, and presumptively are, recognized by the ecclesi- 
astical system. In application to the present case (I take it): The most that 
can be said against the ecclesiastical court’s conduct is that it has fool- 
ishly and unfairly disallowed what sounds like a very good excuse, which 
is precisely not a basis for Prohibition. (To make any other charge 
against the ecclesiastical court would involve doing just what the judges 
were unwilling to: taking the statute as giving the common law an interest 
in church-attendance cases and creating an undesirable conflict between 
secular and ecclesiastical standards.) 
So much for miscellaneous disallowance cases in which the Prohibi- 
tion was denied. In those following it was granted, or at least may have 
been. In James v. James, 44 the Prohibition was considerably qualified, so 
that perhaps the case is mainly evidence of restraint in interfering in ec- 
clesiastical business. Mrs. James was called to account as administratrix 
for the goods of her husband’s estate. She pleaded a deed of gift to a 
daughter of some or all of the goods, made by the husband in his lifetime, 
and sought a Prohibition on surmise that the plea was rejected. I find it 
difficult to state the shape of the case quite crisply on the basis of the re- 
ports, but I think the gist was as follows: No one on the Court thought that 
the ecclesiastical suit should be prohibited merely because the inter vivos 
gift was pleaded. The disallowance was essential; the ecclesiastical court 
was entitled to consider whether certain of the husband’s goods had in 
fact been conveyed away in his lifetime and were therefore not part of the 
estate to be accounted for, provided that it applied common law legal 
standards in assessing whether such a gift had been effectually made and 
what it comprised. The question that caused trouble, provoking an ex- 
tended debate between Chief Justice Coke and Justice Dodderidge, was 
whether the bare surmised fact that the gift had been disallowed was suf- 
ficient basis for concluding that the ecclesiastical court had violated a 
binding common law standard. Coke’s position was the readily intelligi- 
ble one: A partial Prohibition should be granted because the gift was a 
perfectly good plea to account for as many of the husband’s goods as it 
did and legally could comprise; the disallowance implied rejection of that 
proposition; admittedly, only a partial Prohibition (quoad the goods in- 
44 H. 12 Jac., K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 315 (best report); 1 Rolle, 123; Add. 25,213, f.169 (brief.) 
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cluded in the gift) would lie, for the gift could not account for everything 
the administratrix was liable to account for (specifically, the estate's 
claims, which, as choses in action, were not conveyable to the daughter 
even if the intestate meant to give her everything he had.) Justice Dod- 
deridge seems to have been skeptical as to whether the disallowance re- 
ally did imply rejection of any "common law truth." He wanted to be 
surer than the record permitted him to see as to why the plea was rejected, 
suspecting that it may have been ruled out on grounds of form. He was 
worried by its manifest inadequacy as a full answer to the demand for an 
accounting. (I.e.: The record did not show that the administratrix had 
done anything more than plead the gift. Did that not show that she was 
proceeding on the indefensible premise that she could discharge her ac- 
countability merely by establishing the gift, which the ecclesiastical court 
was entirely right not to permit?) In short, I think the issue was between 
Coke's willingness to see error in a disallowance that made no immediate 
sense and Dodderidge's belief that the context should be more thoroughly 
scrutinized before an error worthy of Prohibition was seen -- an important 
issue of judicial policy. In the end, a compromise was arrived at. The rest 
of the Court went along with Coke, being somewhat moved by the fact 
that the administratrix sought her Prohibition before sentence. But to sat- 
isfy Dodderidge a nisi was appended to the partial Prohibition and ar- 
rangements were made for a civilian to appear before the Court to show 
why the plea was disallowed. The Prohibition would fail if the judges 
were persuaded that the disallowance was a reasonable act in context, im- 
plying no rejection of legal standards which the common law would insist 
on. 
Harrison v. Hearing 45 yields only a dictum on the present subject. It 
was decided in that case that probate of a mixed will (comprising land 
and goods) should be prohibited only quoad land even when the sanity of 
the testator is challenged. (This went against other holdings on the same 
question.) It was said by the way, however, that the ecclesiastical court 
would be prohibited in toto if it disallowed the plea that the testator was 
insane. In other words, the ecclesiastical court may settle the sanity ques- 
45 P. 14 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,211, f.155b. Two anonymous reports of the same case (1 Rolle, 358, and 
Harl. 4561, f.201b) do not contain the dictum. 
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tion by its own lights for its own purposes (taking the will as if it con- 
cerned only personal estate), but it must permit that question to be raised. 
Creedland's Case 46 is badly reported, but it may be another instance of 
a granted Prohibition. Creedland was made interim administrator of his 
brother's estate during the minority of the brother's son. (The son would 
have been entitled to administer by statute if he had not been a minor, for 
there was apparently no surviving wife or other children. By the same to- 
ken, the son would have been entitled to everything the father had after 
paying debts.) The son made Mrs. Hindman his executor and died. Hind- 
man sued Creedland to account for the father's estate. Creedland pleaded 
that he and Hindman had made an agreement to settle accounts, pursuant 
to which Creedland had paid Hindman £80 in full satisfaction. A Prohibi- 
tion was sought on surmise that the plea was disallowed. The two judges 
who speak in the report (Richardson and Croke) appear to agree on one 
point: if Creedland had pleaded only that he had paid £80 in satisfaction 
of the account, there would be no basis for Prohibition. That means (I 
take it) that the common law has no authority to scrutinize an ecclesiasti- 
cal accounting insofar as the pleading in the ecclesiastical court goes only 
to the state of the account. It would be presumed that the ecclesiastical 
court had its own reasons for disallowing a plea that went merely to say 
that Creedland had paid Hindman £80 and that there was nothing more to 
account for, whether or not the reasons were evident. If the disallowance 
was in any way improper, ecclesiastical appeal would have to take care of 
it, for it would amount to an error in the ecclesiastical business of evalu- 
ating the state of the account. On the other hand, both judges thought that 
the agreement between Creedland and Hindman altered the case. Croke 
appears to say that the agreement would justify a Prohibition (whether be- 
cause the plea was disallowed or because the agreement should be tried at 
common law, disallowed or not--which is not clear.) Richardson appears 
to say that Prohibition would lie if the agreement alone had been pleaded, 
but not when actual payment of the money was also pleaded. The report 
is inconclusive as well as unclear. It is mainly valuable for pointing to a 
case in which Prohibition by virtue of a disallowed plea would not be 
granted -- viz., when the plea claims mere payment on administrator's ac- 
count. (Cf. "mere payment" of tithes). 
46 3-7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 18. 
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III. 
PROBLEMS OF THE DISALLOWANCE SURMISE 
A. Introduction 
In the cases above, the issue was whether, by disallowing a defensive 
plea, the ecclesiastical court committed an error controllable by Prohibi- 
tion. In those cases, improper disallowance had to be surmised in order to 
argue plausibly for a Prohibition. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition had not made 
his plea in the ecclesiastical court, and if the plea had not been disal- 
lowed, there would have been no basis for a Prohibition. The plea having 
been made and disallowed, the question arose whether ecclesiastical con- 
duct needed to be, or appropriately could be, controlled by the common 
law courts. Since our present concern is primarily with the conditions un- 
der which common law control of conduct was held appropriate, it is the 
cases above that are important for our purpose. There are, however, some 
further problems connected with the surmise of improper disallowance. It 
will be convenient to treat them here, before resuming the main thread 
with cases on common law control of evidentiary and procedural prac- 
tices of ecclesiastical courts. 
Sometimes disallowance of a plea was surmised when it perhaps did 
not need to be. Whether it needed to be was occasionally an express issue. 
In other instances, the case could be disposed of without discussing 
whether the allegation of disallowance was really necessary. That is to 
say, we have some direct authority on when it is necessary to make a plea 
in the ecclesiastical court and wait for it to be disallowed before seeking a 
Prohibition, and when, per contra, a Prohibition is obtainable on another 
theory, without plea-and-disallowance. In addition, we have some am- 
biguous cases. The latter constitute factual or "practice" precedents -- i-e., 
instances in which a Prohibition was granted or considered upon surmise 
of disallowance, and in which nothing was said to rule out the possibility 
that the surmise was essential. It may, however, be extremely doubtful 
that surmising disallowance was in fact necessary. 
Unnecessary surmises of disallowance are not hard to account for. Let 
us take the most indisputable case to start with: One could prohibit a tithe 
suit by surmising that a modus existed. One did not need to surmise that 
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the ecclesiastical court had refused to let one plead the modus. We shall 
see below how and in what sense this was firmly held. What then does it 
mean if we find a plaintiff-in-Prohibition alleging that his plea of a modus 
was disallowed? Several possibilities may be distinguished: (a) At one 
time (before the point was settled), there may have been genuine doubt as 
to whether one needed to show that one had attempted to assert one’s mo- 
dus in the ecclesiastical court before one could be entitled to a Prohibi- 
tion. In case of doubt, a parishioner wanting to claim a modus would have 
good reason to make his plea and surmise disallowance. For if the com- 
mon law courts would not intervene unless an attempt were first made in 
the ecclesiastical court, it in all probability would intervene if an ecclesiastical 
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court failed to respect a modus. Now, in no other case was it ever so firmly 
settled that a Prohibition could be had without an allegation of an improper rul- 
ing on the part of the ecclesiastical judge. That is to say, no other response to an 
ecclesiastical suit was so clearly an ipso facto basis for Prohibition. (Of 
course no showing of disallowance was ever expected when plaintiff-in-
Prohibition was asserting the ecclesiastical court’s total and original lack of 
jurisdiction. For an extreme example: If a man was sued for breach of promise in 
an ecclesiastical court, he could have a Prohibition simply by pointing to 
the utterly improper suit against him. It was never suggested that one 
needed to except to the jurisdiction on legal grounds in the ecclesiastical 
court and wait to pursue a Prohibition until one could claim that the eccle- 
siastical judge had mistakenly upheld his own jurisdiction.) In conse- 
quence, especially in non- modus cases, it was often the part of prudence 
to surmise disallowance. If the common law court would not prohibit 
without a showing that the ecclesiastical court had done something 
wrong, perhaps it would prohibit with such a showing. One could rarely 
be sure; the chance for a Prohibition would usually be improved by 
claiming disallowance. But it does not follow that claiming it was necessary. 
Only in the case of the modus could it be confidently said it was not necessary,
but in fact several other responses to ecclesiastical claims were probably ipso
facto grounds for Prohibition too. The reason for saying that is that there are 
cases in which Prohibitions were granted or considered upon surmises 
which apparently merely asserted such responses, without reference to the 
ecclesiastical court’s conduct. There are two reasons for adding the 
"probably": (i) The case-lines supporting ipso facto grounds for Prohibi- 
tion other than modi are rarely unambiguous. To take a realistic example: 
May a parishioner prohibit a tithe suit by surmising that the parson made 
an agreement to accept money instead of tithes, without showing an un- 
successful effort to assert the agreement in the ecclesiastical court? It 
would have been hard for a lawyer to predict the answer to that at several 
times in our period. On the other hand, my guess would be that the 
chance of getting a Prohibition in that case would be about as good with- 
out a surmise of disallowance as with one, neither way being sure-fire. 
(ii) Reports do not always make it clear (as full records would) whether or 
not disallowance was surmised. If we find a court discussing whether to 
prohibit a tithe suit because the parson allegedly commuted the tithes by 
agreement, there is no guarantee that an unsuccessful attempt to plead the 
agreement had not been surmised. A judge who in a few brief words op- 
posed the Prohibition, say, might be holding that ecclesiastical courts do 
not have to respect commutations-by-agreement unless they choose to 
(disallowance having been alleged.) On the other hand, he might be hold- 
ing that a commutation-by-agreement is not an ipso facto basis for Prohi- 
bition, without prejudice to whether ecclesiastical courts are free to 
disallow such agreements as defenses. Both are probably plausible posi- 
tions. In the absence of positive indications in the report, all one can say 
is that where there is no apparent sign of alleged disallowance it was 
probably not alleged. 
(b) A party might plead in the ecclesiastical court with the genuine in- 
tention of accepting its jurisdiction. E.g.: I plead my modus (or whatever) 
in the hope that it will be allowed and that the contention can be settled 
without a Prohibition. I am driven to a Prohibition when my plea is disal- 
lowed (and perhaps when my prospects for defending the suit on some 
other ground have dimmed.) Since I actually have a complaint against the 
ecclesiastical court's conduct, I might as well reinforce my claim to a 
Prohibition by alleging it, even when I am confident that I could have had 
a Prohibition without reference to the ecclesiastical court's behavior. 
This situation contrasts with that in which a man makes a plea in the ec- 
clesiastical court, hoping or expecting it to be disallowed, because he 
fears that Prohibition will not lie except on a showing of disallowance. 
The latter runs the risk that the plea will not be disallowed, in which event 
he will have to give up his hope of prohibiting, or seek a Prohibition with- 
out surmising disallowance, or claim disallowance untruly. 
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(c) The last of those three choices leads to our final possibility: the fic- 
titious surmise of disallowance. Suppose one calculates that a surmise of 
disallowance would improve one's chance for a Prohibition. But suppose 
either that one's plea has in fact been allowed, or else that one is reluctant 
to make a plea for fear it might be accepted. So one alleges disallowance 
fictitiously. The stratagem may work in either of two ways: (i) The ad- 
versary may not dispute the disallowance. I say, for example, my modus 
(lease, agreement, or whatever) was disallowed. The other party knows 
that surmise is feigned and that he could in principle block the Prohibition 
by contradicting it. But if he does so he runs the risk that a jury will find 
against him. Even if the evidence is all on his side, suppose the jurors turn 
out to be biased against ecclesiastical courts. And might they not suspect 
that taking issue on the disallowance betrayed a weak case on the merits? 
Might they not he inclined to give a dishonest verdict for their tithe-pay- 
ing neighbor, say, perhaps assuming that rough justice was on his side 
whatever the technicalities? Then perhaps the evidence on the fact of dis- 
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allowance would not be entirely clear. Cases suggest that it was not always
clear whether an ecclesiastical court had actually disallowed a plea. Parties
and their lawyers seem sometimes, for example, to have been confused as to
whether pleas were disallowed for substantive or evidentiary reasons. Con-
fusion seems to have been possible as to whether an ecclesiastical court had 
said, "As a matter of our law, this is no defense even if it is true," or, "The  
evidence you offer will not support this defense by our standards, so you
must either waive the defense or offer further evidence." Imagine a jury trying 
to decide whether a plea had been disallowed in the face of conflicting 
expert testimony as to whether the plea was ruled out definitively or only 
provisionally, pending an offer of sufficient evidence. Even if the jury 
got the bare facts straight and returned a special verdict, it might create a 
risk-laden legal question as to whether the acts of the ecclesiastical court 
constituted disallowance in the proper sense, a question requiring dilatory 
argument and high-priced lawyers. More generally, it is risky to try to es- 
tablish in-court events before a jury which, however fair, will hardly un- 
derstand what it is expected to decide. 
If, therefore, defendant-in-Prohibition has reasonable hope of winning 
on the merits, he will be well-advised to take issue thereon. Instead of 
contradicting the claim that a modus, say, was disallowed, he had better 
dispute the modus itself. (There was never, I think, any doubt about de- 
fendant-in-Prohibition's power to take issue on the merits. A theoretical 
argument can be made against it: If the basis for claiming a Prohibition is 
improper disallowance, defendant-in-Prohibition ought logically either to 
deny the fact of disallowance, or else object to the Prohibition on the legal 
ground that the disallowance did not constitute controllable error. In prac- 
tice, however, I see no sign that such logic was ever insisted on. Defen- 
dant-in-Prohibition could admit the fact of disallowance, waive legal 
objection to the Prohibition, and contest the truth of the claim admitted to 
have been improperly disallowed. That, after all, was what plaintiff-in- 
Prohibition wanted him to do. If defendant was willing, it would be hard 
on the parties -- though tender toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- to pre- 
vent it.) If desperate, defendant-in-Prohibition might have to take issue 
on the disallowance; if at all hopeful, he should take issue on the merits 
(or, in quite a few cases, on the legal objectionability of the disallow- 
ance.) Even if he was not too hopeful, it might hardly be worth the time, 
risk, and trouble to avoid "getting down to it," letting the real quarrel be- 
tween the parties be settled at common law. If one's case was bad 
enough, one might lose in the ecclesiastical court even if one succeeded 
in keeping it there. The recurrent nature of tithes, the subject of the ma- 
jority of disputes, argues the same way. Only a determined litigative war- 
rior would as a rule have sufficient motive to go "all out" to win this tithe 
suit by any possible means. For if one succeeded in collecting tithes in 
kind in the face of a modus or agreement this year, the identical quarrel 
might have to be fought out next year -- perhaps to different results with 
different judges, lay or ecclesiastical, a different jury, and lawyers, civil 
or common, of greater or less skill. In the end, the only way for a seri- 
ously challenged parson to collect his tithes in kind was to break the mo- 
dus or other obstacle by verdict or judgment at common law. Better to 
try, even at some risk, than fool around with such maneuvers as travers- 
ing an alleged disallowance. 
(ii) One might get away with a feigned surmise of disallowance be- 
cause the other party would not dispute it. In addition, one might hope to 
persuade the judges to hold it indisputable. That is to say, one might sur- 
mise disallowance untruly on the theory that even if the defendant should 
try to take issue thereon, the Court might be convinced that he ought not 
to be permitted to. One might, in other words, talk the judges into creat- 
ing a legal fiction. As we shall see, a fiction was in effect created in the 
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case of the modus. That is, it was held in a leading case that defendant-in- 
Prohibition may not take factual issue on an allegation that a modus was 
pleaded and disallowed. It is not determinable whether plaintiff-in-Prohi- 
bition in that case or any other deliberately feigned the disallowance. Af- 
ter the decision, however, anyone who saw advantage in a fictitious 
allegation could make one (in modus cases -- not altogether confidently in 
any other kind.) Once the fiction was available, it must have been used. I 
do not think it became de rigueur form. The typical fate of a fiction is to 
be embalmed as a form: For a time, parties must allege and prove Fact X., 
inter alia, to have relief. One day, the judges decide that they should have 
relief whether or not Fact X. is true. The allegation of X. is accordingly 
held untraversable. But because X. has always been alleged in the past, it 
goes on being alleged despite its irrelevance, It is expected, the "done 
thing." If some bold Benthamite should come along and leave out the 
meaningless allegation, he might lose on a point of form, though fully en- 
titled to relief in substance. In the case of the disallowed modus, the story 
would seem to be different. I think it is apparent that Prohibitions were 
commonly granted on surmises of modi without pretense of disallowance 
before it was held that disallowance, if surmised, may not be traversed. 
Later on, I see no evidence that a fictitious claim of disallowance was in- 
sisted on as a matter of form. But once in a while reports show that disal- 
lowance of modi was alleged. When it was, I suspect, it was usually 
alleged fictitiously -- because a lawyer thought it safer, or merely better 
form, to lay disallowance. It may not have been appreciably safer, but one 
never knows -- an ecclesiastical court that disallowed a modus should 
clearly be prohibited, and the allegation of disallowance could clearly not 
be traversed; a common law court might take it into its head to doubt 
whether the mere alleged existence of a modus was sufficient grounds for 
prohibiting; it might be under ecclesiastical and political pressure to en- 
tertain such doubts, 
If we go back and imagine the traversability of a disallowed modus to 
be an unsettled question, it is possible to see why fictionalization would 
look like a good bet: I am not sure my client can win by surmising his 
modus without claiming disallowance. (I am not sure the other way either. 
There are precedents of Prohibitions granted on bare surmise of a modus. 
But I am nervous. The courts do not seem to have firmly decided -- on 
demurrer, say -- that Prohibition will lie on the bare surmise. My oppo- 
nent looks determined and has a good lawyer.) I figure that the chance of 
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a feigned surmise of disallowance being controverted is pretty slight (for 
the reasons above.) But, if an attempt is made to traverse, in the first 
place, the judges are not going to like making a jury issue out of the acts 
of an ecclesiastical court (for the same reasons that a sensible and non- 
desperate defendant will not welcome that prospect.) They are going to 
be impatient with a defendant who wants to maneuver by taking issue on 
the disallowance instead of disputing the modus and helping the conten- 
tion get resolved for good. If traversing a claim of disallowance (in a mo- 
dus case or any other) is next to unheard-of (as it seems to be), perhaps 
the judges will be disposed to look for reasons why it cannot be done. 
With judges so disposed, might I not argue, for example, that ecclesias- 
tical law does not "really" or reliably recognize the modus? That is, even 
if it is not true that the ecclesiastical court in our case has disallowed the 
plea, it is at least not clear that ecclesiastical law in general or across the 
board respects prescriptive exemptions from tithes in kind, at least not all 
exemptions which the common law would insist on. (By "Tanfield's prin- 
ciple," one should look to the "real" ecclesiastical law, not to the mere act 
of a particular ecclesiastical court. One should not prohibit a suit just be- 
cause one ecclesiastical court has made a seemingly unreasonable or un- 
intelligible decision. One should consider whether there are any genuine 
conflicts of law such as to render it unlikely that the error of a particular 
court can be remedied by appeal. Might not "Tanfield's principle" operate 
conversely as well? Is it not a matter of indifference whether a particular 
ecclesiastical court has allowed, or might allow, a plea, if one is con- 
vinced that ecclesiastical law does not "really" understand or respect a 
claim which by the common law is indisputably valid -- e.g., a modus? If 
the conduct of the particular ecclesiastical court is not the essential point, 
surely parties should not be allowed to dispute about it factually.) 
Failing that rather high-level argument, perhaps I could persuade the 
Court that the practical advantages of having modi tried by jury are over- 
whelming. I.e.: Granted that as a rule -- "Tanfield's principle" or no "Tan- 
field's principle" -- ecclesiastical courts should not be prohibited 
speculatively, without reference to whether they have actually done any- 
thing wrong, an exception should be made for the peculiar case of the mo- 
dus. For however willing ecclesiastical courts are to respect modi, to 
understand them just as the common law does, and to try them with scru- 
pulous fairness, they are still condemned to try them by testimony. But the 
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custom of a community can never be exhaustively tried by testimony.
A bargain, a lease, or any number of other defenses to tithe suits perhaps
can be, but not the custom of a community, which by its very nature
can be considered truly known only when the representatives of the 
community have given their verdict, drawing ultimately on their own 
knowledge. (The argument for the special virtue of jury trial in modus 
cases of course also goes to support Prohibitions on bare surmise of a mo- 
dus. For present purposes, one can go either way: If there is some formal 
merit in insisting on a surmise of disallowance, the advantage of jury trial 
is so great that it should be insured when possible. Here it is possible, 
just by refusing to permit a traverse which, as argued above, is practically 
awkward and probably frivolous in motive. We have a bird in the hand -- 
a way to insure jury trial by a small act of fictionalizing prestidigitation -- 
whether or not it could be insured with certainty in the unlikely event that 
someone were to demur to a Prohibition because it was founded on bare 
surmise of a modus. If, on the other hand, it is virtually certain that Prohi- 
bition lies on such a bare surmise, it would surely be wrong and unfair to 
let a modus escape trial by jury just because one parishioner has seen fit 
to surmise disallowance. If a man for reasons of his own tries to plead in 
the ecclesiastical court and, having done so, thinks it proper to allege dis- 
allowance, the modus should not be sent back for trial without a jury be- 
cause this possibly misguided man has exposed himself to a traverse of 
the disallowance and might not be able to prove that his plea was in fact 
disallowed. Among other things, strangers’ interests are usually involved 
with modi. Admittedly, validation or invalidation of a modus by ecclesias- 
tical trial would have no direct effect on future common law litigation in- 
volving the same modus and different people -- subsequent parsons and 
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other parishioners. Indirectly, however, a decision on a modus in a single 
case is likely to have an unsettling, litigation-promoting effect. If the parson 
wins, he will be emboldened to go after tithes in kind from other parishioners, 
who will be sure to resist and to try for a common law determination by any
means their lawyers can contrive. If this parishioner wins, others will be
emboldened to refuse tithes in kind, forcing this parson or his successor to 
make another attempt at litigation. Determination on the merits now by 
the only means that is ultimately going to be accepted throughout the 
community (i.e., by verdict) will save trouble and uncertainty for other 
people than the immediate parties.) 
Problems of the Disallowance Surmise 
The reasons for considering fictionalization a good bet reflect back, in 
turn, on the probable calculations of defendants. Traversing the disallow- 
ance is not a very wise stratagem in itself; it is rendered a little worse by 
the serious prospect that it will not be permitted. Even if I am otherwise 
inclined to traverse, I must consider that my attempt to may be opposed 
by strong arguments, whose rebuttal I must be prepared to undertake, and 
if I am unlucky I may lose my chance to contest the merits. (Bad luck 
would be to traverse without having been able to get any preliminary ad- 
vice from the Court on the acceptability of doing so, then to lose on a de- 
murrer to the traverse and be denied the opportunity to plead to the 
merits. How much procedural stringency to expect in a Prohibition case 
could be hard to judge.) The upshot of this analysis is as follows: While 
in the case of modi a fiction was created, in other cases the possibility of 
traversing the disallowance may have remained open. It surely must have 
(in theory, though factual issues on the disallowance are as rare as one 
would expect in any case) in cases of the sort discussed in the preceding 
section -- where there was no basis for Prohibition except the disallow- 
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ance. In other sorts of cases to be inspected in this section, surmises of disal- 
lowance may be largely feigned, though there is no way to be sure. It may 
be extremely likely that if the surmises had been contested as to fact their 
right to be feigned could have been successfully defended. The fictitious 
surmise of disallowance in non- modus cases of certain specific sorts may 
have had a de facto existence, by virtue of the excessive risk of contra- 
dicting the surmise, even though its untraversability was never upheld ju- 
dicially. 
The cases in this section are all interrelated, in that they all bear on 
whether disallowance need be alleged -- or need be alleged non-ficti- 
tiously -- to justify Prohibition. That is equivalent to saying that they all 
concern the status of the “common law issue” as a distinct ground for Pro- 
hibition, apart from any alleged mistake on the ecclesiastical court’s part. 
According to the different angles from which the cases bear on the com- 
mon questions, I shall treat them in three groups: (a) Cases on the trav- 
ersability of disallowance surmises; (b) Cases in which it was expressly 
held that disallowance must be surmised before a Prohibition could be 
considered; (c) Cases in which the disallowance surmise occurs, but in 
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which it is at least problematic whether it was necessary (or necessary ex- 
cept perhaps as a fictitious form.) 
B. The Traversability of Disallowance Surmises 
Summary: There are few cases directly on the traversability (factual 
disputability) of disallowance surmises. We have a firm holding that al- 
leged disallowance of a modus may not be traversed, and an authoritative 
opinion that disallowance of a plea going to the bounds of parishes is not 
traversable. The other cases discussed here touch on traversability but are 
too special to yield rules applicable to common situations. 
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A plaintiff-in-Prohibition who wanted to complain of an ecclesiastical 
court’s conduct ordinarily made a disallowance surmise. (The only alter- 
native way, aside from the Habeas Corpus proceedings sometimes em- 
ployed against the High Commission -- the one ecclesiastical court with 
color of power to imprison -- was to seek a Prohibition without disallow- 
ance surmise after the ecclesiastical court had given judgment. Occasion- 
ally the thrust of seeking a Prohibition after sentence was to ask for relief 
on the theory that the ecclesiastical court had committed a visible error.) 
As practice stood, when a man complained of ecclesiastical conduct via 
disallowance surmise, the proceedings of the ecclesiastical court were not 
certified before the common law court, enabling the latter to see for itself 
whether the complained-of act really took place. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition 
stated that his plea or evidence had been disallowed as he might state any 
other fact. There was no guarantee that he was telling the truth and no 
routine legal way (as opposed to informal investigation) for the common 
law court to check for itself. In this situation, three choices were open: (a) 
Always to regard the disallowance surmise as a controvertible statement 
of fact -- i.e., to let defendant-in-Prohibition traverse the disallowance if, 
subject to the risks and inconveniences of doing so, he chose that course. 
(b) Never to permit disallowance surmises to be traversed -- i.e., to re- 
move every suit complained of to the common law if, taking the disallow- 
ance surmise as true, there was any basis for Prohibition. (c) Sometimes 
not to permit such disallowance to be traversed -- i.e., to single out some 
issues as triable at common law regardless of whether the ecclesiastical 
court was willing to handle them by standards acceptable to the common 
law courts. 
Problems of the Disallowance Surmise 
The third of those possibilities is probably the "right answer." In a very 
few cases, it was expressly held that a disallowance surmise was not trav- 
ersable. The most important such case, Wright v. Wright, so holds with 
respect to the modus and equivalent prescriptions in discharge of tithes. 
Aside from those few cases, every award of a Prohibition because a 
"common law issue" had arisen in an ecclesiastical suit is suggestive on 
the question of traversability. For example, if a tithe suit is prohibited be- 
cause a lease had come in question incidentally -- prohibited on bare sur- 
mise of the lease, without disallowance surmise -- it is inferable that no 
disallowance surmise was necessary. If no disallowance surmise was nec- 
essary, then if such a surmise were to be made it should not be trav- 
ersable. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition said that he had a lease and had been 
disallowed from pleading it, defendant-in-Prohibition should not be al- 
lowed to take factual issue on the disallowance, but only on the reality of 
the lease. 
However, only an express holding that disallowance is not traversable 
in given circumstances would "sew up" its untraversability. A hundred 
precedents of Prohibitions granted on bare surmise that a lease was in 
question would be mighty persuasive, should A. come along and say that 
his lease was disallowed, and should B. traverse the disallowance. But 
one could argue that the precedents do not establish its untraversability. If 
in all hundred cases defendant-in-Prohibition had acquiesced in the legal 
sufficiency of the Prohibition (i.e., had not demurred so as to raise the 
question whether Prohibition lay in principle, but disputed the factual re- 
ality or legal validity of the lease itself), one could argue that such Prohi- 
bitions had never been tested in law; that by the law Prohibition ought not 
to lie unless the lease was disallowed; and that such disallowance must be 
"real" i.e., traversable. Similarly, and more obviously, a series of Prohibi- 
tions granted on disallowance surmise in a given type of case would say 
nothing conclusive about the disallowance's traversability if a traverse 
had never been attempted. In short, there is no substitute for express hold- 
ings on traversability, and of those we have very few. Disallowance of a 
modus, indeed, is the only allegation we can label untraversable with 
complete confidence. The firm and relatively early establishment of un- 
traversability in that most important of cases must, however, have made 
the risk of traversing seem all the greater in other standard cases. That is 
to say, the courts showed themselves ready to hold disallowance surmises 
incontrovertible in one case; a lawyer would be foolish to assume that 
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they would never do no in other cases, especially cases where there were 
precedents of Prohibitions on bare surmise that a given issue had come in 
question. 
On the other side, I have no express holdings that disallowance sur- 
mises may be traversed. That means there is no basis for drawing the 
boundary between traversable and untraversable surmises. The possibility 
cannot be excluded that no such thing as a traversable disallowance sur- 
mise would have been recognized if more traverses had been tried. That 
would of course not mean that any ecclesiastical suit would be prohibited 
if a party came and said that a plea had been disallowed. Some suits were 
in every sense the ecclesiastical courts' exclusive business; the common 
law court would have to perceive some justifying "interest" or reason be- 
fore it lifted an intervening hand. 
It is arguable, however, that the common law courts ought only to con- 
sider whether such a basis for intervention existed -- if so, prohibit with- 
out regard to what the ecclesiastical court had actually done; if not, 
"hands off." This position might be modified by judicial discretion with 
an eye to probability: issue cannot be taken on a disallowance, but even 
where there is a basis for intervention it should be withheld if the judges 
know, or have strong reason on grounds of probability to suspect, that the 
alleged disallowance never occurred. The desire to preserve such room 
for discretion would be a reason for insisting that disallowance be alleged 
in at least some cases. One might also so insist in order to keep a little 
pressure on parties to stick with the ecclesiastical courts. That is to say, 
one might see some purpose in demanding a disallowance surmise even 
though one were almost 100 per cent ready to believe any party who 
made one, and one's purpose might go a step beyond the desire to "make 
things look better" by way of a purely fictitious form. For if parties were 
told they must surmise disallowance in order to get Prohibitions, they 
might figure that to be on the safe side they ought actually to make a plea 
or offer evidence in the ecclesiastical court; having done so, they might 
decide to stick it out and win, or, losing, conclude that the evidence was 
so much against them that their chances at common law would be negli- 
gible; the incidence of Prohibitions and the political friction that accom- 
panied them would be cut down. One might consider that a bona fide 
attempt in the ecclesiastical court was "on the safe side" even if there had 
been strong reason to believe that disallowance surmises, though some- 
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times required, were never traversable (i.e., if there had been general 
statements to that effect, or many cases of great variety overruling at- 
tempts to traverse, for one can rarely be absolutely certain in the law, and 
insistence on the disallowance surmise would have figured as a reminder 
that judges at least pretended to take the conduct of the ecclesiastical 
courts seriously and might someday be persuaded actually to do so -- in- 
formally if not by permitting traverses. 
In short, a lawyer who predicted that any disallowance surmise he 
chose to make would be traverse-proof as a matter of law would not be 
out of his mind. There is not much practical difference between predict- 
ing that and guessing that the chance of the other party's trying a traverse 
was very slight. In strictness, however, I think the better prediction, and 
certainly the safer, would have been that there was a line between trav- 
ersable and untraversable disallowance surmises. It is not a line plainly 
visible in directly relevant cases; intelligent guesses can be made as to its 
location; conservative guessing would take note of the paucity of cases 
and steer clear of feigning disallowance surmises too freely. In other 
words, I think the courts would have permitted disallowance surmises to 
be traversed in many cases if their traversability had been firmly put in 
question. In the next section, we shall look at some cases in which the dis- 
allowance surmise was insisted on. In those cases and in general, the best 
assumption, surely, is that the judges "really meant it" -- i.e., that on the 
whole, subject to exceptions, they were concerned with what the ecclesi- 
astical courts had actually done and with whether they had really commit- 
ted the misdeeds ascribed to them. Both legal propriety and political 
convenience surely suggested that as a rule ecclesiastical courts deserved 
a crack at the issues arising in their cases. In general terms -- when not 
faced with a hard question of traversability -- the judges frequently said 
as much. They sometimes showed signs of concern lest the disallowance 
surmise be effectively fictionalized, probably realizing that de facto it 
could easily be. I think they would have resisted fictionalizing it de jure 
except in a narrow range of cases. 
Here we are concerned with that narrow range insofar as it was firmly 
defined. I shall first discuss Wright v. Wright, the leading case on modi, 
then two other cases directly on traversability. Finally, I shall discuss two 
cases which, although they do not involve attempts to traverse, are related 
99 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
to Wright v. Wright in that they involve both modi and the disallowance 
surmise. 
In Wright v. Wright, 1 the parishioner relied on a prescriptive discharge 
-- not a modus properly so-called, but a total exemption based on usage. 
For present purposes there is no difference. Such total prescriptive dis- 
charge was not lawful for laymen, but was for spiritual persons. The pa- 
rishioner here claimed through the Bishop of Winchester -- i.e., set up the ' 
title of discharge for the Bishop and his tenants and claimed to be a ten- 
ant. (Whether a tenant of a spiritual person might take advantage of such 
an exemption was debated in the case and resolved in the affirmative.) 
To obtain his Prohibition, the parishioner surmised that he had pleaded 
the above matter in the ecclesiastical court and been disallowed. The par- 
son formally denied that the plea had been disallowed. The parishioner 
demurred on the traverse, squarely raising the question whether the disal- 
lowance needed to be proved as a fact. Walter, of counsel for the parson, 
argued in general terms that once the ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction - 
- as it in a sense does in every tithe case -- it may not be prohibited until it 
does something wrong. In support of this proposition, however, he could 
do little more than cite cases in which Prohibitions had been granted on 
surmise of disallowance. It was easy enough for Coke, on the other side, 
to point to the non sequitur: Sometimes erroneous disallowance is the ba- 
sis for taking jurisdiction away from the court to which it belongs in the 
first instance, but it does not follow that that is the only basis. 
None of Walter's cases were modus cases, ergo they said nothing to 
this case. On his side, Coke cited no positive authority, at least so far as 
the report shows. He confined himself to asserting that modi are different 
-- that it should simply be presumed that a modus is not a good defense to 
a tithe claim in ecclesiastical courts, whether to not a particular ecclesias- 
tical court was willing to accept the plea. In the process of so arguing, 
Coke narrowed the application of his distinction by suggesting that all 
other defenses to ecclesiastical claims must actually be disallowed for 
Prohibitions to be justified. In the interest of persuading the court to make 
an exception for modi, he seemingly conceded that every other surmise of 
disallowance is traversable. Whether or not that is questionable, it may 
1 M .  38 /39  Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 511: Moore,  4 2 5  (dated H.  38.)  
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have been good strategy. In any event, Coke won. The Court held unani- 
mously that the allegation of disallowance was not material in this case 
and upheld the Prohibition. (Going by the formulation of the Court’s 
opinion in Croke’s report, the judges may have been a little more careful 
than Coke about narrowing the range of traversability. They said that the 
allegation of disallowance was not material here, especially since a modus 
was in question -- as if to say it might be immaterial in other circum- 
stances as well.) 
I know of no future challenges to the immediate rule of Wright v. 
Wright: If disallowance of a modus or equivalent prescription is alleged, 
it may not be traversed. That holding is a good basis for saying that disal- 
lowance need not be alleged if one wants to rely on a modus. It would be 
possible to insist on a fictitious allegation of disallowance purely as a 
matter of form, but there would be little point in so insisting, and I see no 
signs that the courts were inclined to. Walter’s losing argument in Wright 
v. Wright was broader than his purpose absolutely required. He could 
have said that disallowance of a modus must be proved as a fact if it is al- 
leged as a fact, irrespective of whether a modus must be pleaded in the ec- 
clesiastical court and disallowed before a Prohibition based thereon may 
be obtained. But that would have been a pretty pointless distinction, un- 
likely to persuade the Court. 
In advancing a general theory, Walter did the intelligent thing. His the- 
ory said that there are two and only two foundations for prohibiting: (a) 
The ecclesiastical court’s lack of jurisdiction ab initio; (b) Actual -- hence 
traversable -- disallowance of a defense which the common law courts are 
entitled to insist on the validity of. From that dichotomy, Walter wanted it 
to follow that merely alleging that a modus exists does not state a cause of 
Prohibition. But does it follow? On the answer to that depends the strict 
interpretation of the Court’s decision in Wright v. Wright. There are two 
possible readings: (a) Walter’s general theory is inadequate. In addition to 
the two foundations for prohibiting which it recognizes, there is (at least) 
a third. For sometimes ecclesiastical courts may be prohibited simply be- 
cause they ought not to determine certain sorts of issues arising in con- 
nection with litigation properly commenced in ecclesiastical courts, 
irrespective of their willingness. Whether modi constitute the only issue 
of that sort may be regarded as an open question; they certainly constitute 
one such issue. There may be various reasons why an ecclesiastical court 
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should not determine a modus -- or various alternative or overlapping cri- 
teria for identifying issues which ecclesiastical courts should not deter- 
mine. (E.g.: Because some issues can only be properly tried by jury as to 
fact; because some issues of law require common law technical expertise; 
because ecclesiastical courts across the board cannot be relied on to re- 
spect certain types of valid claim, even though particular courts show ap- 
parent willingness to respect them; because conflicting rules on a subject 
are so tangled that with the best will in the world an ecclesiastical court is 
likely to go astray and require correction at a later stage.) Be all that as it 
may, Walter's dichotomy is too exclusive. 
(b) Walter's theory is valid, but the consequence drawn from it -- that a 
modus by itself, without disallowance, is no cause of Prohibition -- is a 
false inference. To argue in this way requires showing that to assert a mo- 
dus is not to defend a properly launched ecclesiastical suit, but to dispute 
the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction ab initio. A defense may be con- 
ceived logically as saying, "Your claim against me is perfectly valid as 
you state it, but further facts which you do not state change the picture." 
("Your claim against me is perfectly valid" includes "You have made 
your claim in the correct court.") Pleading a modus may be conceived as 
saying, "Tithes in kind are not due in this parish by the law (i.e., by cus- 
tom entitled to the force of law), therefore your claim is without color in 
the first instance and does not demand a defense." (Which may be said to 
include, "There is no court in which such a totally uncolorable claim can 
be advanced, for courts have authority only to entertain such claims as are 
capable in principle of being either falsified as to fact or explained away. 
But to claim tithes in kind in a place where there is no legal duty to pay 
such tithes is to advance a claim which can be neither falsified nor ex- 
plained away. It is equivalent to suing on a contract in a country that rec- 
ognizes no power in promissory language to generate enforceable 
obligations, not to suing on a pretended -- or inconsiderate, or improperly 
exacted -- promise in a country which does, in general, recognize such 
power in promissory language.") 
Whatever the difficulties in such an analysis, it has some plausibility, 
especially in view of the legal force given to custom in common law ju- 
risprudence. It might, for example, be said that a contract to take money 
instead of tithes is a mere defense to a perfectly good tithe claim, whereas 
a modus is not, because the former is a countervailing fact while the latter 
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goes to the very law of the relevant local unit. It would follow that the 
contract must be pleaded and disallowed before Prohibition lies, unlike a 
modus. In other words, our second theory tends to make modi almost the 
only response to a tithe suit that would not have to be pleaded and disal- 
lowed before Prohibition (as Coke in Wright v. Wright seemed to suggest 
it might be, whether or not he had our theory in mind.) I say "almost" be- 
cause the same analysis might be applied in a few other circumstances. 
For example, a claim that a parson is seeking tithes from an intrinsically 
non-tithable product need not be advanced in the ecclesiastical court be- 
fore seeking a Prohibition because that claim, like a modus, goes to the 
suit's total lack of color. A composition-real (unlike a mere temporary 
bargain or lease) might be conceived as so solemn and final a waiver of 
all right to tithes in kind from the parish that to assert such a composition 
is not merely to "defend" a tithe suit. On the other hand, our first theory -- 
that there are simply issues beyond ecclesiastical competence, however 
unexceptionably particular ecclesiastical courts are ready to handle them- 
-is more expandable. The list of such issues would in principle be open, to 
be added to for sufficient practical reason. 
The Court in Wright v. Wright did not choose between these abstract 
theories. At least the reports give no sign that they were discussed as 
such. I suspect that the case was decided as it was basically because mo- 
dus -based Prohibitions, without allegation of disallowance, were familiar 
in practice. That would have been excellent practical reason for the deci- 
sion, for to hold disallowance of a modus traversable would have been to 
open questions about the familiar practice. I have elaborated the theories 
because having them in mind may give us a useful perspective on other 
cases. 
The second case producing a direct opinion on traversability is Pyper 
v. Barnably. 2 We have considered this case in Vol. I as it bears on self- 
prohibition. The facts were as follows: A. sued B. for tithes; B. pleaded 
that the land was not in A's parish; neither party sought a Prohibition; B. 
won; A. appealed; the appellate court affirmed the sentence below; A. 
then sought to prohibit his own suit on the ground that the bounds of par- 
ishes, constituting an intrinsic "common law issue," were in question. 
2 H. 41 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.47b. 
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Serjeant Heale, of counsel for B., first tried unsuccessfully to object to 
A's self-prohibition. Having failed on that front, he turned to the general 
proposition that ecclesiastical courts may determine any issue that arises 
in a suit over which they have jurisdiction in the first instance. Chief Jus- 
tice Popham replied, "... That is true if they will allow the same proofs as 
are allowable by temporal law, but sometimes they will not admit any 
proofs except by two witnesses at least, and then prohibition lies." Foster, 
A.'s counsel, then offered to prove that evidence tending to show that 
B.'s land was in A.'s parish had been improperly disallowed. (i.e., Foster 
made an oral offer, in effect saying, "Although our surmise is not founded 
on improper evidentiary rulings, but on the theory that parish bounds con- 
stitute a common law issue, we shall be glad to change the surmise, if, as 
the Chief Justice suggests, the ecclesiastical court must be shown to have 
made an erroneous holding before it can be prohibited.") Heale replied by 
offering to take issue on whether A's proofs were refused. To that, Po- 
pham said, "You may not traverse that, but you must take issue on 
whether the house is within the plaintiff's parish or not." 
No other judge speaks in the report. Popham's unmistakable statement 
to all intents wipes out his concession to Heale. His two remarks taken to- 
gether come out as follows: "It is true in general that ecclesiastical courts 
having jurisdiction of the 'principal' may deal with the 'incidents.' But 
that general truth must be qualified, for at least some 'incidents' may be 
tried in ecclesiastical courts only if those courts waive their evidentiary 
requirements. Then the qualified statement must be qualified some more, 
for in some cases -- at least the case of bounds of parishes -- whether the 
ecclesiastical court did waive its evidentiary requirements may not be dis- 
puted about. If plaintiff-in-Prohibition says it made improper evidentiary 
rulings, in contemplation of law it did make them." In application to 
bounds of parishes, the tendency of Popham's position accords with most 
opinion. 
By the way his position unfolds in the dialogue with counsel, he might 
be taken as demanding a pro forma disallowance surmise, but I doubt that 
he really was. We shall see in Section D below that the disallowance sur- 
mise sometimes occurs in bounds-of-parishes cases, and that its superflu- 
ity is not totally clear. On the whole, however, to surmise that the bounds 
of parishes were in question tout court was probably almost as reliable a 
way to get a Prohibition as surmising a modus in a tithe suit. Popham's 
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there is any comfort in such metaphysics, one may argue that a bounds is- 
sue goes to the "original color" of the ecclesiastical suit in the same way a 
modus does: A tithe suit by the Rector of Cornvale for crops produced in 
Barleyville has no more original "right to be" than a suit for tithes in kind 
where none are due; in either case, whether the suit has original colorabil- 
ity ought to be settled at common law. 
Our third straightforward case on the traversability of disallowance- 
surmises, Kelly v. Walker, 3 was as follows: Walker, a clergyman, sued 
Kelly before the Delegates for assault and battery. Although that offense 
was temporal as a general rule, the ancient statute of Articuli cleri (9 
Edw.2, sect. 3, confirming a similar clause in Circumspecte Agatis, 13 
Edw.1) gave ecclesiastical courts power to proceed against those who laid 
violent hands on a clergyman. Kelly pleaded in justification that Walker 
assaulted his servant: to help the servant and keep the peace, Kelly laid 
hands on Walker in a peaceful manner; thereupon Walker assaulted 
Kelly, whose further acts of pugnacity were in self-defense. A Prohibi- 
tion was granted on surmise that the Delegates disallowed the justification 
and proceeded to fine Kelly £10 and award damages to Walker. Walker 
traversed the disallowance in absque hoc form: The plea was not rejected; 
rather, it was committed to a Dr. Cotton for examination (in the nature of 
reference to a Master in Chancery proceedings); Cotton attempted to hold 
a hearing, at which Walker appeared, but Kelly refused to attend; because 
of his default, the court proceeded to sentence against him. Kelly de- 
murred to this traverse. 
The demurrer was entirely in point of substance. The reported argu- 
ment of Kelly's counsel is solely that the matter traversed was untrav- 
ersable. Godfrey, of counsel with Walker, warded off another possible 
argument -- that the award of a fine and damages was beyond the Dele- 
gates' power -- by contending that the Supremacy Act warranted it. For 
the rest, Godfrey tried to show that the disallowance was perfectly trav- 
3 H. 41 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 655; Moore, 915 (misdated M. 31); Add. 25,203, f.48. (Moore is 
slight; Croke and the MS. are both good reports. The only difference in the slightly fuller MS. 
report is that what Croke represents simply as a unanimous decision following Gawdy's opinion 
comes out as Popham substantially agreeing with Gawdy and the rest of the Court going along 
silently.) 
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ersable. (a) He argued that the only reason for taking jurisdiction away 
from the ecclesiastical court, seeing that it indisputably had jurisdiction 
by the statute, was its mishandling of the case, so that whether it had actu- 
ally been mishandled was of the essence. (b) He put forward the general 
rule that ecclesiastical courts may determine questions arising in suits 
properly commenced there, then expressly conceded Wright v. Wright as 
an exception (i.e., took the position that a modus was the only plea whose 
disallowance could not be traversed.) (c) Descending from general princi- 
ples, Godfrey cited the analogy of proceedings to remove pleas from ma- 
norial courts in ancient demesne; there the alleged reason for removal is 
traversable as matter of fact; the lord of the manor should not lose juris- 
diction unless he has actually done something to justify taking it away 
from him. 
Two judges, Gawdy and Chief Justice Popham, flatly rejected God- 
frey's argument. No one else on the Court contradicting them, the demur- 
rer was upheld and the Prohibition sustained. Both Gawdy and Popham 
said that the suit was outside the statute, whence they went on to hold that 
the disallowance was untraversable. In other words, they held that plain- 
tiff-in-Prohibition's surmise and declaration went to show that the eccle- 
siastical court should not be entertaining the case; ergo, what it did with 
the case was immaterial. (Cf. the theory that surmising a modus is claim- 
ing that the suit for tithes in kind was void ab initio.) The logic of this 
opinion is unexceptionable, but the premise is troubling. The statute un- 
doubtedly did give ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction "pro violenta injec- 
tione manun super clericum." What distinguishes this case from the 
general class of such offenses? What makes Kelly's plea anything but a 
commonplace defense to a prima facie valid ecclesiastical suit? Justice 
Gawdy's answer is singular: "For he had good cause to beat him." That 
can only be taken as an act of rather unusual statutory interpretation: viz., 
the statute gives ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction over assault and battery 
of clergymen, but does not give them authority to determine when such 
assault and battery is justifiable or to try the factual truth of justifications; 
ecclesiastical courts may determine the bare fact whether an assault took 
place, but any plea in justification, by the statute's intent, is a "common 
law issue," or ipso facto cause of Prohibition, regardless of the ecclesiasti- 
cal court's handling of it. That is perhaps an odd way to take a jurisdic- 
tion-conferring statute (and specifically one covering assault and battery, 
where justifications of self-defense and the like must be expected in many 
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cases. If the legislature gave A. pleas of assault and battery in Dale and 
said nothing to suggest that A. should not have power to try common de- 
fenses, it would be jealous construction to say that general language did 
not give him such power.) 
In the circumstances, however, it is not surprising that the judges took 
the narrowest possible view of the statute. As Chief Justice Popham said, 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over assaults on clergymen was purely statu- 
tory. In his view (ahistorical perhaps) there was no inherent ecclesiastical 
power to entertain such cases; the statute was not entitled to permissive 
interpretation on the ground that it declared the ancient law; it was priva- 
tory of a fraction of common law jurisdiction and "penal" in the sense of 
adding liability to ecclesiastical prosecution to the secular liability already 
on the subject's back. It was good doctrine to hold that such a statute 
should be construed as narrowly as possible. It is plain enough that the 
judges had no great use for an old piece of legislation creating a superflu- 
ous category of ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- superfluous in the sense that 
any assault remediable in ecclesiastical courts could also be remedied at 
common law, and must in any event be dealt with by common law stand- 
ards. The alternative to giving a narrow interpretation to a statute that de- 
served no great indulgence would have been to let the controversial 
disallowance go to trial (for clearly the judges would not embrace the 
most extreme position that can be advanced in Walker's favor -- the the- 
ory that, having been given jurisdiction over assaults on clergymen, ec- 
clesiastical courts were given full license to deal with them as they 
pleased, e.g., to hold that Kelly's justification was insufficient even if 
true.) Another cost of not restricting the statute would have been that the 
propriety of the fine and damages would have had to be debated. The 
judges are unlikely to have been happy about the use of those sanctions 
by a spiritual court; by simply deciding that the suit was outside the Dele- 
gates' jurisdiction, the problem of whether they had statutory authority to 
use them could be avoided. 
In sum, the Court's way of treating Kelly v. Walker is understandable, 
probably defensible. The case is too exceptional for the essential holding 
to imply very much as to the traversability of disallowance surmises in 
general, though it could be taken as authority for the abstract proposition 
that untraversable disallowance surmises are those -- perhaps only those - 
- which call attention to the ecclesiastical court's "original" want of juris- 
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diction (i.e., its lack of authority to deal at all with a contention superfi- 
cially appropriate to it, once the real nature of the contention is known). 
A further argument by Justice Gawdy is perhaps more significant, and 
more disturbing. After saying that the suit was outside the statute, Gawdy 
went on to speak more particularly to the traversability question. In other 
works, he did not quite confine himself to the argument that the disallow- 
ance was immaterial because it occurred in what the record showed to be 
an ultra vires suit. Rather, he proceeded to admit Godfrey's point about 
ancient demesne cases, but to resist generalizing it. True, he said, alleged 
mishandling of suits in ancient demesne may be traversed, "Otherwise the 
lord will lose his court. But in other cases it is not so, for if a plea is re- 
moved by Recordare out of the County, the cause is not traversable ...." If 
this remark is taken as a pure negation, there is nothing to be said against 
it. As such, it may be translated as follows: "It is true that complaints 
about ancient demesne courts may be disputed about factually. The law 
respects the lord's private interest in his jurisdiction and will not take it 
away unless it has actually been abused. But the rule about ancient de- 
mesne is only a rule about ancient demesne. Other situations we shall take 
as they come. That we do not have any general rule appears from the fact 
that the complaint about a county court that lies behind a Recordari facias 
cannot be traversed. Since there is no comprehensive rule, we may treat 
complaints about ecclesiastical courts as sui generis if we see fit, consid- 
ering whether in these circumstances or those they should be held trav- 
ersable. Therefore, in this case, we are free to take the position that the 
disallowance is untraversable for immateriality, the suit appearing to be 
ultra vires." 
I am inclined to give such a meaning to Gawdy's remark. There is a 
more radical possibility, however. He might be saying that the case of an- 
cient demesne is an exception, made out of respect for the lord's private 
interest, to the general rule that complaints about "inferior courts" includ- 
ing ecclesiastical courts may not be controverted factually. In other 
works, he may have been taking the Recordari facias as the typical case 
and embracing the rule, as to ecclesiastical courts, that the disallowance 
surmise is never traversable. Such a rule would mean that common law 
courts ought always to assume that a claim allegedly disallowed was actu- 
ally disallowed, considering only whether the alleged act of disallowance 
was an error of such sort as to justify Prohibition. That is an extreme posi- 
tion, both materially and symbolically. It opens the door to fictitious sur- 
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mises, hence to the party's automatic power to remove some suits (how 
many depending, in effect, on the principles by which a list of "common 
law issues" is compiled) to the common law, notwithstanding the ecclesi- 
astical court's original "rightful possession" and total willingness to pro- 
ceed by common law standards, substantive and evidentiary. 
Symbolically, it implies that "foreign" courts are "inferior" courts -- that 
the ecclesiastical courts are not so much an independent sub-system liable 
to control if they err in certain ways as lower members of a homogeneous 
system (as in relation to Westminster Hall county courts undoubtedly 
were), subject to having their cases removed to higher courts under cer- 
tain set conditions. By this theory, the mere owner of an ancient demesne 
manor is entitled to tenderness because jurisdiction is part of what he 
owns; no public court, whether the petty county courts or the judicial or- 
gans of the Church, has anything to complain about if the supervising 
common law courts see fit to designate certain suits as removable, regard- 
less of whether any error has been committed. 
Though this is an extreme theory, it is not fantastic to suppose that Jus- 
tice Gawdy held it. He was not generally friendly to ecclesiastical inter- 
ests. (Popham, who was less a "prohibiting judge" than Gawdy, is 
reported in general terms as agreeing, but the only remark of his own 
goes to the ecclesiastical court's want of jurisdiction over a justifiable as- 
sault. It is possible that Gawdy meant to say that disallowance surmises 
are never traversable, and that Popham meant to agree with him about the 
instant case but not to agree to that proposition. But the reports are too 
slight to show any such thing positively. Whatever Gawdy's intent, Kelly 
v. Walker itself was resolvable by construction of the statute.) 
Having looked at the cases directly on traversability, let us turn to two 
cases related to Wright v. Wright, in the sense that they involve both the 
modus and the disallowance surmise. In the early Sir Gilbert Gerard's 
case, 4 a modus was surmised without any allegation of disallowance. It is 
probably safe to assume that the Court would have prohibited the tithe 
4 Q.B. Harg. 11, f.28. The case presumably occurred between 1581, when Gerard became Master 
of the Rolls (he is designated as such in the report) and 1592, when Chief Justice Wray died. 
There is what appears to be a date on the report, but I find it illegible -- it may be 22/23 Eliz. 
(1580), which would put it slightly before Gerard's assumption of the Mastership. Of course the 
reporter or a transcriber might have added the plaintiff's title later. 
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suit if special circumstances had not made the case debatable. The eccle- 
siastical plaintiff (Gerard, the Master of the Rolls) was the farmer of an 
impropriate rectory belonging to the Queen. His counsel, Egerton, main- 
tained, in effect, that the Queen (hence her farmer derivatively) was Pro- 
hibition-proof -- privileged by prerogative to sue for tithes in the court of 
her election, ecclesiastical court, Chancery, or Exchequer. 
It would presumably follow from that position, not that the ecclesiasti- 
cal court could ignore the modus and get away with it, but that it ought to 
have its chance to determine the suit, including the truth of the modus -- 
i.e., that Prohibition would lie only on traversable surmise that the modus 
was disallowed. Counsel contra, Sherrington, denied that the Queen's 
farmer should enjoy the Queen's prerogative, without disputing Egerton's 
picture of the royal privilege in principle. He did, however, as his second 
argument, deny that the prerogative was applicable in this case. Here, the 
Queen stood in the position of the abbot from whom the rectory came to 
her, for the Statute of Monasteries provided that the monarch could hold 
as the abbot of the dissolved house held. The case should therefore be ap- 
proached as if the ecclesiastical plaintiff were the abbot. On that assump- 
tion, Sherrington maintained, Prohibition would undoubtedly lie, for it 
was notorious that ecclesiastical law would not recognize prescriptive dis- 
charges from tithes. (The prerogative, that is to say, would take effect 
when the right to tithes came to the monarch by other means than the dis- 
solution of the monasteries. The monarch was "capable of tithes" -- i.e., 
could be entitled to them by various means in addition to the ones avail- 
able to lay subjects: leases of rectories or vicarages or of the tithes at- 
tached to them.) 
Chief Justice Wray replied to Sherrington as follows: "... notwithstand- 
ing that at common law they, scil. the civilians, will not take notice of our 
law, yet he knew no reason why not, it being enacted by act of Parlia- 
ment, but that they should take notice of it and allow this prescription." 
The Court as a whole then adjourned the case until the next tern for fur- 
ther advisement, but at the same time said that if the modus was pleaded 
in the ecclesiastical court and disallowed it would grant a Prohibition. 
Nominally, the judges did nothing for the moment; actually, they gave 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition a broad hint -- that in this case his chance for a 
Prohibition on bare surmise of a modus was not good; that the ecclesiasti- 
cal court must probably be given an opportunity to entertain the modus; 
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that it would certainly be prohibited if it should refuse to do so. This reso- 
lution implements Wray’s opinion, which I construe as follows: Gener- 
ally speaking, it is notorious that ecclesiastical courts will not respect modi. 
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Therefore, as a rule, tithe suits will be prohibited on bare surmise of a 
modus (and, should disallowance of a modus be alleged, it would not be 
traversable.) But tithe suits brought by impropriators are a special case. 
For it is not notorious, expectable, or presumable that ecclesiastical courts 
will disallow modi alleged against impropriators. The Statute of Monas- 
teries in effect directs that the legal situation in existence at the time of 
the dissolution be perpetuated, thus that the successors of abbots have just 
such rights as the abbot had and no more, thus that where the abbot was 
entitled to 10/ in lieu of tithes in kind, so is his successor (as Sherrington 
said.) Statutes are addressed to all courts, whence it is presumable that 
ecclesiastical courts will consider themselves bound by the Statute of 
Monasteries to take note of the abbot’s legal (i.e., common law) situation, 
even though their ordinary habit is to ignore prescriptive tithe commuta- 
tions. Therefore there is no ground for prohibiting until it appears that the 
ecclesiastical court has actually failed to follow the statute. If it fails to, it 
will certainly be prohibited (and, since the conduct of the ecclesiastical 
court is of the essence, a surmise of disallowance will be traversable.) 
This opinion and the resolution based on it turn Sherrington on his 
head. Without granting Egerton’s argument from the prerogative -- in- 
deed, rejecting it, quoad ex-monastic tithes, in the process of accepting 
Sherrington’s premise -- but without “disputing” about the always-jealous 
prerogative, the Court gave Egerton and his high-placed client all they 
could reasonably ask for -- the privilege of proceeding in the court of their 
choice until it appeared that the court had violated the law. Wray’s opin- 
ion respects the principle that ecclesiastical courts should be presumed 
willing to obey statutes and capable of understanding them until the con- 
trary was manifest. The opinion also takes note of a practical reality: Is it 
not to be expected that ecclesiastical courts would be more receptive to 
modi when their effect was to reduce a lay impropriator’s haul than when 
it was to erode the value of an active clergyman’s living? Under the sur- 
face, Gerard’s Case supports Wright v. Wright, for no one in the earlier 
case was disposed to doubt that Prohibition will normally lie on bare sur- 
mise of a modus. Wray’s opinion does, on the other hand, except one type 
of case out of the rule of Wright v. Wright -- viz. by upholding the eccle- 
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siastical court's title to "first crack" at a modus plea when it is opposed to 
an impropriator's suit. However, Wray's opinion was not embodied in a 
proper decision, and it may have been contrived to meet the special deli- 
cacies of an important official's case touching on the prerogative. There 
is no sign of its doctrine later on. 
In the later case of Goslin v. Harden, 5 a parson sued on a modus, rather 
than for tithes in kind, and the parishioner alleged an alternative modus. 
(Specifically, the parson relied on a Yarmouth custom whereby he was 
entitled to five per cent of the total catch of deep-sea fish taken by his pa- 
rishioners. The parishioner maintained that the custom entitled the parson 
to five per cent of what was left over to the fisherman after he had paid 
the boat-owner's agreed share, that share going tithe free.) The parish- 
ioner sought a Prohibition on the ground that he had pleaded the alterna- 
tive modus and offered to prove it, but had been disallowed. There was no 
direct issue about the traversability of the surmise, but in discussing 
whether to grant the Prohibition the judges found themselves in some dis- 
agreement over the materiality of the disallowance. 
The Court agreed that a suit originally founded on a customary right to 
tithes, rather than the de jure right, is not prohibitable ipso facto -- i.e., 
merely because a custom is put before an ecclesiastical court by starting 
such a suit. Justice Houghton, however, thought that custom-based tithe 
suits should be prohibited at the request of an ecclesiastical defendant 
who claims that the custom is different, as in this case. If Parson sues for 
10d in lieu of tithes, Parishioner may have a Prohibition by surmising that 
6d is the customary sum; Parishioner need not say the ecclesiastical court 
prevented him from establishing his 6d custom; a contest between rival 
customs is a "common law issue." In support of this rule, Houghton gave 
the obvious practical reason: If ecclesiastical courts could try contests of 
customs, parsons would have a motive to sue for large sums as modi in- 
stead of suing for tithes in kind; parishioners would lose their chance to 
5 M. 14 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 419; Harl. 4561, f.259b; 3 Bulstrode, 241 (sub. nom. Harding et al. v. 
Goseling); Lansd. 1080 (sub. nom. Yarmouth's Case, misdated T. 16.) Rolle and Harl. 4561 are 
virtually identical. Lansd. 1080 is a brief, but correct, report of the result, noting that the case 
was only decided after long debate, as the major reports confirm. It is sufficiently clear from the 
text how I havc synthesized the major reports. They complement each other without conflicting 
significantly. 
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have their claims to modi worth less than the tithes in kind tried at com- 
mon law. (To this argument, it may be replied that there is a difference 
between allowing ecclesiastical courts to try contests between modi and 
allowing them "first crack." So long as the ecclesiastical court is not free 
to rule out the parishioner's modus -- or to make him prove it by stand- 
ards stricter than the common law would require -- it cannot by waving a 
wand award parsons, say, the full monetary value of tithes in kind plus 
ten per cent. The answer to that, surely, is that a corrupt ecclesiastical 
judge in his right mind would not disallow the parishioner's plea or insist 
on the two-witness rule; he would do everything "by the book" and use 
his almost uncontrollable fact-finding discretion to uphold the parson's 
modus.) 
Justice Dodderidge disagreed with Houghton. His doubts seem some- 
what tentative, but he was inclined to think that contests between modi 
belong as such to the ecclesiastical court -- subject to Prohibition only if 
the two-witness rule is insisted on. Quod nota -- only if the two-witness 
rule is insisted on. It was surmised in this case that the parishioner's mo- 
dus was disallowed. Houghton would have prohibited even without the 
disallowance surmise; Dodderidge hesitated to prohibit even with it. He 
expressly said that he wanted to know whether the two-witness rule was 
the reason for the disallowance (as to which the surmise was vague, stat- 
ing only that the parishioner had offered to prove his modus.) What was 
Dodderidge thinking about? Why was he not content to say, "I would not 
prohibit without a disallowance surmise, but here we have one. For some 
reason, substantive or evidentiary, the alternative modus was ruled out. 
Therefore let Prohibition be granted; if the disallowance surmise is 
feigned, let the parson traverse it?" Did Dodderidge really mean that the 
only basis for prohibiting in such a case would be the two-witness rule, 
that an ecclesiastical court which ruled out an alternative modus for no 
apparent reason, or some unacceptable legal reason of its own, was un- 
touchable? 
I find it hard to answer those questions satisfactorily in legal terms. I 
suspect Dodderidge was thinking practically and smelt a rat. That is, he 
could not think of any reason why the ecclesiastical court would be likely 
to disallow an alternative modus, unless because the evidence offered in 
its support did not meet ecclesiastical standards. But the surmise was 
vague enough to evoke suspicion that an evidentiary ruling was not the 
113 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
cause. So perhaps the surmise was dishonest. Had a parishioner without a 
substantive leg to stand on perhaps feigned a disallowance surmise in the 
hope that a jury of Yarmouth men would serve him well? In such circum- 
stances, telling the prohibitee he could traverse the disallowance surmise 
would be cold comfort. The possibilities of abuse are imaginable enough 
in the instant case. Fish taken at sea were in all probability not tithable in 
kind. The parsons of parishes heavily dependent on the fishing trade ordi- 
narily had customary rights to a share of the catch, without which their in- 
comes would be negligible. In our case, the rival customs were not 
trivially different. Five per cent of the gross catch would come to appre- 
ciably more than five per cent of the net catch after deduction of the boat 
owners’ share. Under a “share-cropping’’ system, the owners of the major 
piece of capital equipment must have contracted for a healthy portion. 
Either the parson or the parishioner, therefore, was seriously mistaken 
about the custom, if not lying shamelessly in the hope of prevailing with a 
friendly trier, ecclesiastical judge or common law jury as it might turn 
out. For as between two customs sharply different in principle and eco- 
nomic value, one would expect inhabitants of the parish to know the usual 
practice, however ready either side might be to gamble on overturning it 
by a lawsuit. In these circumstances, one might well think the public in- 
terest better served by leaning in the parson’s direction. If he won, even 
by the favor of an ecclesiastical court, the church would at least be sup- 
ported to the tune of five per cent of what was probably the larger part of 
the gross local product (compared to ten per cent of the gross local prod- 
uct in a parish wholly devoted to arable agriculture.) If the parishioner 
won by a jury’s favor, the church would suffer (For another angle, both 
versions of the Yarmouth custom assigned an additional 5% -- computed 
on whichever tax-base -- to the town. A verdict for the parishioner would 
put the municipality, as well as the church, out of a considerable amount 
of income.) As a practical matter, leaning in the parson’s direction 
meant, not holding the disallowance surmise technically traversable, but 
making sure informally that it was an honest surmise. If it was, then there 
was no avoiding a Prohibition and entrusting the parson’s fortunes to a 
jury. Justice Dodderidge wanted to know. 
The Court deferred to his wishes. On the first hearing of the case, only 
Justice Croke was present, in addition to Houghton and Dodderidge, and 
he had nothing to say at this time. The three judges adjourned the case, 
but referred it to clerk of the Court to investigate what really happened in 
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the ecclesiastical proceedings. Whether anything came of the clerk’s in- 
quiry, and indeed exactly how the Court at last lined up, is not clear from 
the reports. It is plain enough that a Prohibition was finally granted. Rolle 
and both MSS. say so. Rolle and Harl. 4561 represent the decision as u- 
nanimous in the end. Bulstrode gives a second, but not final, hearing, 
eventuating in a temporary stay to the ecclesiastical court. On that occa- 
sion, Croke put himself in Houghton’s camp clearly enough, but Dod- 
deridge seems still to be in a posture of dissent, perhaps a wavering one. 
He reiterated his dissenting opinion that the mere allegation of an alterna- 
tive modus is not grounds for Prohibition. He went on, however, to note 
that ecclesiastical rules on prescription were different from common law 
rules, and to conclude therefrom that Prohibition will lie if a parson sues 
on a purported modus where there is "really" none, but only a recent prac- 
tice or agreement. 
Putting this remark together with his others, a coherent position can be 
attributed to Dodderidge as follows: He was, it seems to me, working 
with “Tanfield’s principle.” He did not favor prohibiting unless a practi- 
cally meaningful rule-conflict between common and ecclesiastical law 
could be made out. Such a conflict would not appear from a bare surmise 
of an alternative modus, or from an unexplained surmise that an alterna- 
tive modus had been disallowed. If the disallowance was evidentiary (and 
it could be reliably assumed that such a disallowance had actually oc- 
curred), Dodderidge had already granted that he would prohibit -- for 
there was notorious conflict of evidentiary rules, and it was beyond dis- 
pute that the two-witness rule must not be applied to contests between 
customs. 
A second notorious conflict was in rules of prescription: continuous 
usage over relatively short periods begot rights by ecclesiastical law, 
whereas only immemorial usage had that effect at common law. Again, 
there was no disputing that a customary duty to pay tithes -- or something 
other than 1/10th of the product as a payment in the nature of tithes (five 
per cent, 6d per acre) -- must be a customary duty by common law stand- 
ards. If the common law court can see that the contest in the ecclesiastical 
court is between one party’s claim that a customary tithe or tithe-like pay- 
ment is due and the other party’s mere negation of that claim, the com- 
mon law court should take over. (Perhaps -- though this is to project -- 
“mere negation” should be construed to mean “denial that anything at all 
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is due," as when Parson makes a custom-based claim to a tithe, or quasi- 
tithe, of an intrinsically non-tithable product, such as coal or the sea-fish 
in our principal case, and Parishioner says there is no such custom, hence 
that he owes no share of his product, or monetary equivalent of a share. 
The contrasting situation is where Parson claims payment according to a 
modus instead of demanding tithes in kind of a tithable product -- as 
where he claims 6d per acre of hay-land instead of hay in kind. If Parish- 
ioner merely denies the modus -- i.e., does not advance an alternative mo- 
dus -- he inevitable admits that tithes in kind are due. Perhaps a contest 
between one party's claim to money and the other party's claim of the 
right to pay in kind -- like a contest between alternative modi in Dod- 
deridge's opinion -- belongs to the ecclesiastical court.) 6 
C. Fatal Failure to Surmise Disallowance 
Summary: No very firm rules emerge from cases in which it was held 
that Prohibition could not be granted without a disallowance surmise. It 
can be confidently said that defensive responses to ecclesiastical suits 
based on statutes must be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and disal- 
lowed before Prohibition would lie. Holdings and dicta on the need to al- 
lege common law transactions -- leases, releases, contracts and the like -- 
in the ecclesiastical court and claim disallowance present a confused pic- 
ture. The best advice to a party, on the whole, would be to take the eccle- 
siastical suit seriously -- i.e., to put in a plea; not to be too sanguine about 
getting a Prohibition without disallowance surmise. 
116 
*  *  *
The cases above say that alleged disallowance of Plea X may not be 
controverted. That is not equivalent to saying that X need not be pleaded 
in the ecclesiastical court (that the disallowance surmise may be dis- 
pensed with, that Prohibition lies on a bare surmise of X.) Holding X. 
untraversable is compatible with requiring a pro forma disallowance sur- 
mise; indeed, requiring it could be more than a bare form, were the judges 
to keeps a residue of discretion to look into the reality of alleged disal- 
lowances on their own motion. However, these qualifying points are more 
logical than practical. The only certain value of X. is the modus, though 
there are other strong candidates; Prohibitions could clearly enough be 
6 See "Endnote" at the end of this section. 
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had by surmising modi without alleging disallowance; in the case of other 
pleas, there is unlikely to be any greater discrepancy between their un- 
traversabiIity and their sufficiency as a basis for Prohibition without dis- 
allowance surmise. 
Now let us look at cases in which the absence of a disallowance sur- 
mise was held an obstacle to Prohibition -- i.e., in which the judges admit- 
ted they would prohibit if Plea X had been pleaded in the ecclesiastical 
court and disallowed, but in which the omission of a claim of disallow- 
ance was considered a compelling objection to prohibiting as the record 
stood. Insisting on a disallowance surmise is not equivalent to saying that 
the disallowance would be traversable. Whether to allow a traverse was a 
tough question in the rare instances when it occurred. Judges might well 
hold a disallowance surmise necessary in the case of Plea X. without 
committing themselves in advance to hold the surmise traversable, should 
someone attempt a feigned surmise and someone else bother to challenge 
it. However, the best assumption, in the absence of a positive holding to 
the contrary, is that when the judges insisted on a disallowance surmise 
they "meant it" -- i.e., intended that the party should make a serious at- 
tempt to obtain justice by appropriate standards in the ecclesiastical court. 
Before looking at cases in which Prohibitions were actually turned 
down for want of a disallowance surmise, let us note a few dicta and gen- 
eralizations in the reports. We have not yet seen, and will not encounter, 
any holdings which absolutely preclude the proposition that disallowance 
must always be surmised to prohibit a suit properly commenced in an ec- 
clesiastical court. Save for Wright v. Wright and the lesser holdings on 
traversability above, there is nothing that utterly stands in the way of say- 
ing that disallowance must always be truthfully surmised. A few dicta, 
concentrated in the late-Elizabethan Common Pleas, positively say that 
the disallowance surmise is an all-but universal necessity. In a case of 
1596 (noted in Section II above), 7 the Common Pleas held that Prohibi- 
tion would lie on the plea of "no assets" if and only if the executor had 
unsuccessfully tried to make the plea in the ecclesiastical court. From that 
position Chief Justice Anderson proceeded to generalize: "the same law, 
per Anderson, in every case [my italics]: one must first plead there, and 
7 39 Eliz. C.P. (no term) Add. 25,199, f.3. 
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on disallowance he will have Prohibition, and not contra." The nearly 
contemporary Somerset v. Marham 8 concerned the Admiralty and the 
right to seek a Prohibition after sentence. Somehow in the course of dis- 
cussing that case, the Court laid down the following rule: "It was agreed 
per Curiam that if one sued in the Spiritual Court for matter whereof they 
have jurisdiction, and therein a plea is pleaded which is triable at the com- 
mon law; yet if they will allow the plea, they shall have jurisdiction 
thereof, and try it: otherwise a prohibition lieth." 
In Blackwell's Case, 9 the question was whether the ecclesiastical court 
had jurisdiction over a claim to tithes based on the complaint that the pa- 
rishioner had nominally "paid" his tithes by severing them, but then de- 
nied the parson access to them by locking the gate. The Common Pleas 
held, 3 - 1, that the ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction, and incidentally 
that it had a right to insist on the two-witness rule in this case. The reason 
for the decision was that, in the majority's opinion, jurisdiction in such 
cases was conferred on the Church courts by statute. In the course of the 
discussion, Chief Justice Anderson said: "If a man begins a spiritual mat- 
ter in the spiritual court, as for a horse devised to him by the testator, if 
the defendant pleads a gift of the horse to him in the testator's life, they 
may determine the gift although it is a temporal thing, but if they will not 
allow his gift, Prohibition lies." The relation of this statement to the prin- 
cipal case is loose, but relevant. The disturbing thing about allowing the 
ecclesiastical court jurisdiction was that the tithes were severed, hence 
converted into the parson's chattels and protectable by action of Trespass. 
I take Anderson's dictum as a way of saying that sometimes, even with- 
out the help of a statute, spiritual courts may determine temporal matters. 
If the gift of a horse, why not what amounts to interference with the par- 
son's enjoyment of hay in which he has temporal property? Anderson 
may also have meant to raise the question whether ecclesiastical handling 
of the principal case would be subject to common law scrutiny -- as its 
handling of the inter vivos gift in a legacy suit would be -- owing to the 
temporal nature of the severed tithes (though later in the discussion he 
8 M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz., 595. 
9 T. 43 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.22b; Add. 25,202; Lansd. 1058, f.4b (dated H. 43, a brief report 
probably relating to an earlier hearing of the same case.) Lansd. 1058, f.22b., is the best report, 
from which the quotation is the text is taken; the plaintiff's name appears from Add. 25.292 only. 
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held that common law evidentiary standards did not need to be applied in 
the principal case -- probably unlike the gift case -- because of the stat- 
ute.) For our present purposes, it is the example in Anderson's dictum 
that is important: An ecclesiastical suit may not be prohibited merely be- 
cause an inter vivos gift comes in question, though making such a gift is 
plainly a temporal transaction, its efficacy resting on the common law and 
its construction within common law competence; but the ecclesiastical 
suit may be prohibited if it is shown by way of disallowance surmise that 
the gift was mishandled. 
Finally, in Robinson's Case, 10 the Common Pleas refused to prohibit a 
legacy suit on surmise that the legatee had accepted a lease in satisfaction 
of the legacy. The Prohibition was sought on the theory that the ecclesi- 
astical court simply ought not to handle the lease; there was no disallow- 
ance surmise. The Court refused the Prohibition without saying that it 
would prohibit if the lease were disallowed. For that reason, the case does 
not belong strictly in our present category, though there is probably no 
reason to doubt that a disallowance surmise would have fetched a Prohi- 
bition. (The lease case seems indistinguishable from Anderson's inter vi- 
vos gift above.) The principal interest of the report lies in the way in 
which the Court contrasted the case at hand to tithe cases: "[In the instant 
case Prohibition does not lie because] those of the Court Christian have 
power to determine the plea of a legacy, but in case of tithes it is true that 
we are accustomed to allowing Prohibitions on such suggestion, because 
we well know that they will not allow any plea in discharge of tithes, be- 
cause they hold that they are due iure divino, against which no plea is to 
be allowed there." 
Whereas the two general statements above suggest that the disallow- 
ance surmise is almost always necessary (with perhaps a tacit exception 
for the modus), and whereas Anderson's dictum in Blackwell's Case and, 
in all probability, the decision in Robinson's Case say that it is necessary 
when common law property transactions come in question in legacy suits, 
the Court's further language in Robinson's Case may swing the other way 
with respect to tithes. That language contains a possible ambiguity. It 
could be taken to apply to modus cases only, the example the Court must 
10 M. 44/45 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1058, f.55. 
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have had primarily in mind. In that event, it would come to saying, "True, 
we sometimes prohibit suits properly commenced in ecclesiastical court 
on the bare surmise of a plea, without demanding that improper disallow- 
ance be shown. To wit, we do so when we have reason to believe that the 
plea would be disallowed if it were advanced. For all practical purposes, 
that means we do so when the plea is a modus, for we do not believe that 
ecclesiastical courts will consistently give effect to prescriptive tithe-com- 
mutations in the face of their-doctrine that tithes in kind are due by the 
law of God." As it stands, however, that is not what the Court's statement 
says. It is cast more generally, and indeed gives the impression that the 
Court was thinking of the tithe case most analogous to the present legacy 
case ("on such suggestion," as if to say "on an analogous suggestion in a 
tithe suit".) 
The alternative translation would be: "From the ecclesiastical doctrine 
that the origin of tithes is jure divino, we infer that no plea claiming that a 
man sued for tithes has no duty to pay them will be properly handled in 
an ecclesiastical court. The claim that most obviously cannot be trusted to 
ecclesiastical courts is the modus, but it is not the only one. Take the case 
analogous to our legacy case, where one being sued for tithes claims that 
the tithes were leased to himself or to someone other than his opponent. 
Admittedly, the man so claiming is not disputing that tithes in kind are 
due jure divino, as a man claiming a modus is (in the sense that he is as- 
serting the power of custom to take away a duty decreed in terms by God; 
or, if even a divinely ordained duty need not be literally executed so long 
as an equivalent service is rendered, in the sense that he is asserting cus- 
tom's right to put any good 'consideration,' as secular law chooses to de- 
fine it, in place of his duty to God, whether or not it is a true equivalent 
under present conditions.) As a practical matter, the Church has no clear 
interest in awarding tithes to A. when they are leased to B., whereas it ob- 
viously does have an interest in preventing the erosion of ecclesiastical 
incomes by uneconomic modi. Nevertheless, ecclesiastical courts take so 
high and mighty a view of the duty to pay tithes that even such pleas as 
leases cannot be entrusted to them if the party objects. There is simply 
too much doubt as to what ecclesiastical judges will do with any attempt 
to escape liability for tithes, so wrongheaded and at odds with the com- 
mon law is their whole orientation toward the subject of tithes. 
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Will they, for example, hold that a man being sued by A. may not 
plead that the tithes were leased to B.? (A plausible theory, abetted by the 
jure divine doctrine, argues for that result: I am sued by A. for failure to 
perform my duty -- my divinely ordained duty -- A. claiming to be the 
lawful beneficiary of my performance: if I cannot say that I have done my 
duty -- set out the tithes, so that A. or anyone with better title than his 
could take them -- have I standing to excuse myself by the plea that B. is 
entitled?) Even if I claim that the tithes A is suing for were leased to me, 
can ecclesiastical courts be trusted? Will they perhaps adopt the theory 
that the duty to pay is so divine that as far as the Church is concerned one 
must pay one’s own lessor on demand, going to the secular law for any 
redress -- as for breach of contract or dispossession -- which the justice of 
this world thinks appropriate? Short of that will they perhaps take to look- 
ing over leases by standards of their own, upholding them only if the rent 
represents the fair value of the tithes? No doubt the answer to these ques- 
tions is uncertain. The point is only that the risk is sufficient, in view of 
the general ecclesiastical attitude toward tithes, to justify the short-cut of 
dispensing with disallowance surmises and simply taking over issues 
amenable to common law determination when they arise as claims to es- 
cape answering for tithes. As for Robinson’s Case itself, there is not the 
least reason to suspect the general ecclesiastical attitude toward legacies. 
Those are private interests. No one would pretend that the duty to pay 
them arises from any higher source than a branch of human law which the 
ecclesiastical courts are permitted to administer in England. Partly be- 
cause rights of legatees and the like are only a chapter of the ordinary law 
of the realm, the courts preeminently responsible for the law of the land 
have a duty to make sure that ecclesiastical courts do not mishandle the 
testamentary jurisdiction entrusted to them. But until it appears that they 
have mishandled it, there is no basis for suspecting that they will.” 
The second reading of the Court’s statement in Robinson’s Case prob- 
ably goes too far in one direction -- towards wiping out the disallowance 
surmise in most tithe cases. It is, however, a plausible position; one can- 
not easily assume that the Court did not mean to adopt it. The first read- 
ing, like the slightly earlier generalized dicta, probably goes too far in the 
other direction -- towards demanding disallowance surmises in all cases 
except those involving modi. That inter vivos gifts and leases taken in sat- 
isfaction of legacies should be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, and 
Prohibition granted only on disallowance surmise, is a pretty safe propo- 
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sition. Let us now turn to the cases directly holding that the disallowance 
surmise is required for Plea X. 
My first specific holding that disallowance must be surmised comes 
from 1588. 11 A parishioner being sued for tithes alleged simply that his 
opponent was not incumbent, because he was automatically deprived for 
failure to read the articles as required by 13 Eliz., c. 12 . The whole ques- 
tion was whether the surmise was good without a claim of disallowance. 
Coke, representing the parishioner, conceded that the surmise was not 
good in the sense of "ideal" or "artistic." It would have been better, he ad- 
mitted, to allege the failure to read the articles in the ecclesiastical court. 
But Coke tried to use the "public" theory of Prohibitions and the proce- 
dural liberalism implied by that theory to save his client. His words are: 
"Though it be not a good suggestion, yet inasmuch as it appears to the 
court a good cause of Prohibition here they ought not to grant Consult- 
ation." The first point to note is that it would appear from this remark that 
the issue was whether to grant a Consultation on motion. (From the rest 
of the report, one would not know that a Prohibition had been granted.) 
That being the precise issue, Coke could have been asking for either of 
two things: (a) Quash the Prohibition if you must, but do not remand by 
Consultation: (b) Uphold the Prohibition. I think the discussion makes it 
clear that Coke was shooting for (b). 
The other possibility might have been a useful second-best, because 
the parson would perhaps be discouraged from proceeding further in the 
ecclesiastical court without a Consultation. He would know that his suit 
would be prohibited if the ecclesiastical court did actually disallow the 
parishioner's pleas, for without a Consultation there would certainly be 
no 50 Edw. 3 problem -- see Vol. I. (A Consultation would probably bar a 
second Prohibition, though there are no cases on this rather interesting 
point -- Prohibition undone by Consultation because the plaintiff ought to 
have pleaded his matter in the ecclesiastical court; matter pleaded there 
and improperly disallowed; second Prohibition on the same libel sought. 
The respectable theory that Consultations on motion go only to give no- 
tice of the Prohibition's nullity ab initio and are therefore not within the 
intent of 50 Edw. 3 could be used to argue against a barring effect. Quaere 
11 T. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Harl. 1633, f.8b. 
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de hoc. If the ecclesiastical court dared proceed without a Consultation, it 
would be disinclined to reject the plea, even on evidentiary grounds, 
when it was sure to be prohibited as soon as it did. In short, quashing 
without Consultation might put the parishioner in an excellent position to 
bring a new Prohibition at once with a feigned surmise of disallowance. 
Any other course than taking issue on the fact -- reading the articles -- 
might seem futile or risky to the parson. 
Taking Coke’s argument as a straightforward one for granting or up- 
holding Prohibition: the Court had no trouble seeing through it. The 
judges simply said that the plea was in itself perfectly determinable in the 
ecclesiastical court and therefore must be pleaded there first. They distin- 
guished the present case from modus cases, using the theory that ecclesi- 
astical courts may be prohibited without the disallowance surmise in the 
latter because they notoriously refuse to recognize modi. Coke’s argu- 
ment amounted to reducing the absence of a disallowance surmise to a 
matter of form, or to saying that a claim of disallowance should be read in 
for the sake of getting the real question -- did the ecclesiastical plaintiff 
read the articles and therefore have standing to maintain a suit for tithes? - 
- to a jury as quickly as possible. For all the practical virtue in that, the 
judges were surely right in holding that legitimate interests of the ecclesi- 
astical courts were at stake -- the right to try issues which they were per- 
fectly willing and competent to try, and which concerned the 
qualifications of benefice-holders and Church discipline. 
With characteristic resourcefulness, however, Coke spotted the flaw in 
the Court’s language and counterattacked. The judges said that the plea 
was determinable in the ecclesiastical court -- unlike a modus -- and 
therefore that it must be pleaded there. Very well, said Coke, what about 
a plea going to the bounds of parishes? That is, a parishioner is sued by 
the Parson of A. and claims that the land which produced the tithes sued 
for is in the Parish of B. No one would maintain that this is not a perfectly 
good ecclesiastical plea; ecclesiastical courts might not recognize modi, 
but they obviously acknowledged that the Parson of A. is as a rule only 
entitled to tithes produced in A. Yet, according to Coke (and the great 
preponderance of authority), Prohibition will lie on the bare surmise that 
the bounds of parishes are in question, without showing disallowance. 
Ergo, the “determinability” of a plea in the ecclesiastical court -- meaning 
that the ecclesiastical court is willing to try it and has no legal rules on the 
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subject (as distinct from different trial methods) at odds with the common 
law--is no test for the necessity of the disallowance surmise. 
With this argument, Coke won a moral victory. The judges were 
forced to narrow their reason for opposing a Prohibition in this case: The 
fact that the parishioner's plea was statute-based was sufficient reason for 
insisting that it be pleaded in the ecclesiastical court. ("This is a good plea 
in Court Christian in respect of an Act of Parliament which makes him 
deprived ipso facto, which Act [is] general, as well in Court Christian as 
in any other Court.") The point was well-taken. It was awkward to say 
that "foreign" courts were incompetent to interpret and apply statutes, for 
by statutes Parliament gave instructions to them, as well as to the com- 
mon law courts. Therefore Prohibitions to enforce statutes should be de- 
layed until is appeared that a "foreign" court had actually disregarded or 
misunderstood a statute. The Court's riposte disposed of Coke's last hope 
for his client. (The report gives no result, but presumably a Consultation 
was granted if there was a definitive Prohibition in existence.) The case 
is authority for the general proposition that statute-based pleas must be 
pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, above and beyond the particular plea in 
question (not incumbent for failure to read the articles.) It would be dan- 
gerous to use it for any other general proposition. If anything, I would 
suspect that the judges were a little reluctant to be forced onto the high 
ground of statute-based claims. They acknowledged that disallowance 
did not need to be surmised in modus and parish-bounds cases, and that 
the principle involved in those two cases was not the same. They did not 
generalize about other non-statutory pleas. 
In Berry v. Whetstone, 12 a parishioner sought to challenge his oppo- 
nent's title to sue for tithes on different grounds. The ecclesiastical plain- 
tiff was purportedly lessee for years of the rectory. The parishioner 
claimed that his lease was invalid because the patron had not confirmed it 
in terms. (The situation would appear to have been tangled, for it was not 
alleged that the patron had not been consulted at all, as he needed to be if 
a lease of the living was to be valid beyond the life of the lessor-incum- 
bent. Rather, the patron had allegedly confirmed a lease pur auter vie, 
cestui que vie now being dead. Presumably the original, duly confirmed, 
12 M. 2 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,205, f.5b. 
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lease was for the life of A. -- someone other than the lessor -- upon 
whose death it was renegotiated as a straight term of years, but not recon- 
firmed. Conceivably, though I doubt it, there could be a legal issue as to 
whether confirmation was required the second time, since the patron had 
already consented to a lease that could run beyond the lessor's life, and 
what he had consented to -- an estate pur auter vie -- was "greater" in the 
hierarchy of estates than the term of years. I mention these details be- 
cause if there was a legal issue it was plainly one for the common law.) 
A Prohibition was sought by a surmise stating the parishioner's claim, 
without pretense that the defect in the lease had been unsuccessfully 
urged in the ecclesiastical court. Tanfield, representing the parishioner, 
claimed to have a Queen's Bench case from 29 Eliz. on his side, but it is 
not recited so as to show whether or not it was exactly in point. It prob- 
ably was, for Justice Walmesley conceded in general terms that the matter 
had been resolved in the Queen's Bench in favor of prohibiting. Never- 
theless, Walmesley refused to go along. Whatever the Queen's Bench po- 
sition, he said, he opposed Prohibition "because the principal is for tithes." 
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The other puisne Justices, Warburton and Daniel, agreed with Wal- 
mesley. As stated, their position was the broad one -- "incidents" of a 
tithe-suit simply belong to the ecclesiastical court -- rather than the nar- 
rower one -- the plea must be disallowed before Prohibition is justified. 
Chief Justice Anderson, however, intervened to insist on the narrower 
ground: As the case stood, Prohibition would not lie, but it would on sur- 
mise of disallowance. The issue -- validity of a lease of a rectory -- is in- 
trinsically appropriate to common law determination and governed by 
common law standards, and for that reason should not be simply left to 
the ecclesiastical court, but as an incident of a tithe suit it should go to the 
ecclesiastical court first. If the other judges had wanted to stand on the 
more sweeping position, they had the votes, but they seem to have acqui- 
esced in Anderson's view. 
As unusual way of implementing it, illustrative of the flexibility of 
Prohibition procedure, was adopted. Instead of denying the Prohibition, 
the judges sent a message to the ecclesiastical court to ask whether the 
plea would be allowed. The ecclesiastical court replied that it would not. 
(Presumably meaning that ecclesiastical law did not require confirmation 
of such a lease by the patron, at least in the somewhat complicated cir- 
cumstances of this case. One might perhaps wonder whether the ecclesi- 
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astical judges searched their hearts and books very deeply. They may 
have been perfectly willing for the common law to settle the validity of 
the lease, now that the opportunity was at hand and their "first refusal" 
had been respected. The lessee was probably a layman, not a repre- 
sentative of a true "ecclesiastical interest" about whose right to collect 
God's tenth the ecclesiastical authorities perhaps could not have cared 
less.) Being informed that the ecclesiastical courts would disallow the plea 
if it were made, the Common Pleas "awarded to stay suit until title tried." 
So says the report -- not that a Prohibition was granted. There is not much 
practical difference (for the suit could be remanded by Consultation if the 
lease were found valid), but my guess would be that the report means 
what it says -- i.e., that a stay, not a Prohibition, was granted, so that if the 
lease was found good a Consultation would not be required. As we have 
seen, stays were sometimes used in special circumstances, where a Prohi- 
bition would not have been appropriate but the effect of a Prohibition was 
desirable. In the instant case, there is no obvious reason for avoiding a 
Prohibition. 
I wonder whether the unusual procedure (if indeed the language of the 
report is significant) might not be a concession to the flat opposition to 
prohibiting expressed by Walmesley and, at least offhand, concurred in 
by Warburton and Daniel. As it were: In the face of that "flat opposition," 
Chief Justice Anderson says, "Wait a minute. We could prohibit if the 
objection to the lease had been pleaded and disallowed. Wouldn't it be 
more economical if, instead of just turning the Prohibition down, we took 
informal measures to see whether there is any serious chance of the plea's 
being allowed?" The other judges or some of them concede the point of 
law and accept the proposal for economizing. When it is discovered that 
the plea would be disallowed, so that there is no practical point in simply 
saying "No" to plaintiff-in-Prohibition, perhaps the obvious course is to 
prohibit. But then Justice Walmesley, say, protests, "On the record, things 
still stand where I said they did in the first place. No cause of Prohibition 
has been stated in the surmise. That being the case, it would be most un- 
suitable to grant a Prohibition. Maybe the writ would lie if the plea were 
actually to be disallowed -- about that I shall worry when it happens -- but 
I shall certainly not give my consent to a Prohibition now." The point be- 
ing, in strictness, unanswerable, the temporary stay is proposed; it com- 
mands a majority as a less questionable course, if not unanimity. That 
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may not be the exact scenario, but the conclusion it comes to makes sense 
in itself and sense of the report. 
The report of Berry v. Whetstone contains in addition a dictum by 
Anderson, Walmesley, and Warburton "that the bounds of parishes are 
triable in the spiritual court." The link between this remark and the dis- 
cussion of the case at hand does not appear specifically, but in the context 
it presumably goes to say that ecclesiastical courts should not be prohib- 
ited when bounds come in question without a surmise of disallowance, if 
then. (Contrary to Coke and the Court in the last case and most authority.) 
In Penn's Case, 13 a parishioner being sued for tithes wanted to chal- 
lenge his opponent's incumbency on the ground that he came in by sim- 
ony and was ipso facto deprived by force of the statute of 31 Eliz., c. 6. 
The parishioner's counsel said that the ecclesiastical court would not al- 
low that plea. The Court, however, "would not give credit to this sugges- 
tion" (Brownlow's report.) Counsel was told to offer his plea to the 
ecclesiastical court, and assured that a Prohibition would be granted if it 
was actually disallowed. I take it that counsel was asking the Court to pre- 
sume or hold by way of judicial notice that no ecclesiastical judge would 
accept such a plea. Alternatively, (a) he might have failed to surmise dis- 
allowance and hoped that the Court would take it on his word, or go out- 
side the record to verify his word informally, that disallowance had 
actually occurred; or (b) disallowance may have been surmised, but the 
Court suspected, and perhaps counsel admitted upon questioning, that the 
surmise was feigned. The first and best possibility makes sense in this 
case, though it probably does not as a generality. For thought it is unlikely 
that the ecclesiastical court would disallow the plea abstractly stated -- 
"The person suing for tithes is not incumbent, but deprived for simony by 
force of the statute" -- the allegedly simoniacal transaction was compli- 
cated here (as appears from Browlow's report, and as presumably ap- 
peared from the surmise.) (The Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield was 
patron, but the three successive "next avoidances" had been granted to 
three other people. The incumbent was old and sick. Penn made a deal 
13 M. 8 Jac. C.P. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 7; Add. 25,209, f.211b. (The two reports agree 
but complement each other significantly for details. The judges do not speak individually or so 
fully in Brownlow; the MS. does not give the details of the corrupt agreement.) 
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with the Bishop's brother, whereby Penn agreed to lease the tithes to the 
brother if the latter would help him get the benefice when the old incum- 
bent died. The brother agreed to procure the holders of the "next avoid- 
ances" to surrender them back to the Bishop at once, and then when the 
incumbent should die, to procure the Bishop to present Penn. The contract 
was executed on both sides.) There may have been reason for supposing 
that the ecclesiastica1 court would not regard this particular path to a liv- 
ing as simoniacal, but one can hardly blame the judges for being skepti- 
cal, for the transaction smells to heaven. If it is possible that disallowance 
was surmised, but was ascertained to have been feigned: The best way to 
deal with a fictitious or pro forma surmise of disallowance, if it was in- 
formally identified as such, and if the judges thought that actual, trav- 
ersable disallowance was necessary to warrant a Prohibition, would be to 
refuse Prohibition and send the party off to make his plea in earnest -- not 
to close one's eyes to the truth, grant Prohibition, and bring the problems 
of a traverse upon one. 
In substance, the judges rested on the need to make statutory pleas in 
the ecclesiastical court and to seek Prohibitions only on pretense that the 
statute had been misconstrued. " ... In such cases it is their duty to have 
counsel learned in the law," the Court said. (As if to say: "Although there 
is of course a sense in which construction of statutes is primarily common 
law business, and the expertise of common lawyers is likely to be re- 
quired, that is not reason enough to deny ecclesiastical courts the right to 
apply statutes, which are addressed as much to them as to us -- for they 
can and should take advice.") The reasons for insisting on actual disal- 
lowance in this case were especially strong, because apart from the statute 
there would probably have been no basis for common law intervention. 
Simony as such was a purely ecclesiastical offense. Had there been no 
statute affixing consequences to simony, it would probably have been up 
to the ecclesiastical court whether to let a parson's incumbency be chal- 
lenged on the ground that it was acquired by simony. Chief Justice Coke 
proved as much by way of another rule of law: "It has been ruled in this 
Court that if one makes a bond for simony it is not void. The reason is 
that the common law takes no notice or cognizance of simony." (That is, 
a contract which amounts to a simoniacal bargain is a perfectly good con- 
tract at common law, however heinous an ecclesiastical offense. The con- 
tract is not void owing to its immoral purpose, like, say, a gambling 
contract or a bond with an unlawful condition.) The statute alone gave the 
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common law an interest, hence it was especially important that the eccle- 
siastical court be shown to have misapplied the statute. 
I would not, however, expect the common law's non-cognizance of 
simony to prevent a common law court from determining the definition of 
simony once a case was properly before it. If disallowance was alleged 
bona fide in the instant case and Prohibition accordingly granted, and if 
the question turned out to be whether the transaction by which the parson 
gained his benefice was within the legal meaning of simony, I think the 
common law court would decide, though not necessarily without refer- 
ence to ecclesiastical sources and civilian opinion. There are cases in 
which common law courts did just that. In the MS. report of the present 
case, Coke makes a remark about the meaning of simony, and Justice 
Warburton cities the holding on that question in Smith v. Sherborne, a 
case discussed below. Both of those observations go to warn against an 
over-strict definition of simony, specifically against taking mere acquisi- 
tion of advowsons and "next avoidances" as simoniacal, even though 
one's purpose in acquiring them may be to prefer a particular clerk. I 
would take the judges' remarks as incidental -- rather called to mind by 
the transaction in the instant case than intended to hint at a solution. It is 
true that part of the transaction consisted in the Bishop's "merely acquir- 
ing the next avoidances" by way of surrender, but even that part of the 
business involved the further element of "procurement" by the brother for 
a consideration paid by the aspirant. Whether or not the transaction would 
ultimately be held simoniacal, the significance of "mere acquisition" of 
avoidances or advowsons would probably be only a small element in de- 
termining the question. 
Moving on from cases on incumbency or capacity to sue for tithes to 
miscellaneous instances on the surmise of disallowance: One rather cryp- 
tically reported testamentary case 14 seems to fall in that class. An execu- 
tor being sued for a legacy surmised that debts of the estate remained to 
be paid, and that assets in sufficient amount to cover the debts and the 
legacy existed only in the form of unliquidated obligations. The execu- 
tor's claim was not "No assets," but only that the present condition of the 
estate was such that he should not be compelled to pay the legacy at once. 
14 M. 5 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,215, f.38. 
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Whereas a surmise of disallowance was certainly necessary to assert the 
claim of "No assets" at common law, and even then the chance for a Pro- 
hibition was not at all good, the executor here made no surmise of disal- 
lowance. His failure to do so was not flatly disastrous, for the judges 
were ready to presume that the lesser claim -- in effect, that the estate was 
not yet ripe to pay legacies -- would be disallowed. They said that the al- 
legation would not be allowed because priority among the debts was a 
common law question. I.e.: The position apparently imputed to the eccle- 
siastical courts was, "We cannot make a proper assessment of the debts of 
the estate, therefore cannot estimate whether the debts are such as to 
make it unlikely that the estate will eventually be able to bear legacies. 
Since we are not competent to make such an estimate, we will go ahead 
and award recovery of the legacy if nothing is done to stop us. If you 
want to object, get a Prohibition." 
The judges also said that unrecovered obligations are not assets -- as if 
to suggest that the ecclesiastical court would be likely to count them as 
such and award recovery of legacies if, with no more that a casual look at 
the debts, it seemed safe enough by such an accounting. However, having 
spoken in such a way as to suggest that Prohibition should lie without a 
claim of disallowance, the Court then told the executor to "make proof 
and take his Prohibition on that." I can only interpret this as a sign of re- 
luctance to prohibit without a pro forma showing of disallowance. Be- 
lieving that the executor's claim could not be genuinely asserted and 
properly handled in the ecclesiastical court, but also believing that legacy 
suits should probably not be prohibited without disallowance, at least 
when the executor's claim was a near relative of "No assets," the Court 
adopted a device: Go make your plea and proffer evidence, and we will 
grant you a Prohibition on surmise that your proofs were disallowed. 
Disallowance of common law evidence bearing on a common law subject 
was a frequent cause of Prohibition; an attempt to reverse the disallow- 
ance would probably be unsuccessful, since it was notorious that ecclesi- 
astical evidentiary standards were different; it was less notorious, though 
the judges were inclined to suspect it, that an objection to the estate's pre- 
sent liability for legacies in view of unsettled debits and credits would be 
disallowed out of hand. In short, by my reconstruction from a scanty re- 
port, the case is an instance of insistence on the disallowance surmise, but 
only in a pro forma sense. 
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The Caroline case of Watton v. Ball 15 was occasion for an important 
discussion of the need to surmise disallowance. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition 
originally omitted to do so. He was sued for a pew and claimed a pre- 
scriptive right to the seat as an appurtenance of his manor. Justice 
Berkeley took exception to the claim because there was no allegation of 
disallowance. Taylor, of counsel with the plaintiff, argued back by anal- 
ogy with the modus: "On suggestion to have a modus decimandi they will 
grant prohibition in respect of the prescription, which is temporal, and yet 
the original, viz., tithes, belongs [to them], wherefore so here." Berkeley's 
reply is interesting. He starts off explaining the reason for the modus 
case, as if to differentiate it from the present case, but ends by bringing 
them together, if not entirely closing the gap. To sue for tithes in kind 
when there is a modus, Berkeley explains, is as good as demanding tithes 
from a non-tithable product, such as coal (as if, one would suppose, to 
suggest that disallowance of a modus need not be surmised, any more 
than one need take exception to a tithe suite for coal in the ecclesiastical 
court before seeking a Prohibition -- contra in the instant case, where the 
prescription is only a defense or counterclaim to a perfectly valid ecclesi- 
astical suit for the use of a pew.) 
At the end of his speech, however, Berkeley say, "But yet there you 
must plead the modus decimandi in the spiritual court. For regularly they 
have jurisdiction of tithes, and indeed when you prescribe it is made lay 
chattel, but not before." That can only mean, I think, that a pro forma, un- 
traversable surmise of disallowance is required in the modus case. Plead- 
ing the modus in the ecclesiastical court is a necessary ritual to make it 
appear that the tithe suit was bad ab initio, but once that appears it makes 
no difference what the ecclesiastical court does, so no surmise that the 
modus was disallowed should be traversable. In principle, I suppose, a 
surmise ought to say that the modus was pleaded, not pleaded and disal- 
lowed; and the bare fact that it was pleaded ought in principle to be trav- 
ersable. However, I know of no allegations that matter was pleaded 
unaccompanied by the allegation that it was disallowed, and there are cer- 
tainly no reported cases of attempts to dispute factually as to whether a 
15 P. 9 Car. K.B. Harl. 1631, ff. 386b and 404b. (Second entry reports Taylor's second motion for 
Prohibition, with the disallowance surmise.) 
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bare plea had been made. I therefore doubt whether Berkeley's point 
boils down to anything more than common law form: Surmises ought to 
say that modi have been pleaded and disallowed -- subject to absolutely 
no danger that the statement will be falsified. And quaere whether most 
courts would have insisted on it even as a form, in the unlikely event of a 
surmise's or declaration's being challenged for omitting fictitious lan- 
guage. 
What then of the principal case? Berkeley comes back to it in his next 
speech. Meanwhile, Justice Croke had expressed agreement with 
Berkeley and put the case of parish bounds. If bounds come in question, 
Croke says, that is in itself reason for Prohibition, yet the matter must be 
pleaded in the ecclesiastical court. (Pro forma only? Presumably.) Then 
Berkeley speaks to the principal case as follows: "If you plead it there and 
they resolve and allow your plea, there will be no Prohibition, for you are 
not at any prejudice, but the suit is at an end. Otherwise, if they do not al- 
low your plea or will take issue on it, for [it is] a lay thing." (Italics 
mine.) In other words, "allow" is being used to mean "accept as factually 
true and legally sufficient," not "accept as legally sufficient, subject to the 
factual truth's being established if disputed." The prescriptive claim to 
the pew must be pleaded, but because prescriptions intrinsically require 
common law trial, Prohibition will be granted unless the ecclesiastical 
court gives judgment in favor of the party pleading the prescription. Is 
this to reduce the disallowance surmise to as hollow a matter of form in 
the principal case as in the modus case? Almost, I should say, but perhaps 
not quite. The ecclesiastical court is to be given no chance to do the one 
thing it would be likely to do if it regarded the prescription as a legally 
tenable defence or counterclaim -- try it as to fact. 
On the other hand, inasmuch as Berkeley was at pains to show that this 
case differed from the modus case, I am inclined to conjecture that trav- 
ersability would make the difference. The act of pleading the modus, 
though nominally necessary, goes to establish (pending common law fal- 
sification of the modus) the ecclesiastical court's ab initio lack of title to 
hold plea; the act of pleading the "defensive prescription" only goes to 
disqualify the ecclesiastical court from disregarding, interpreting, or try- 
ing the prescription. In the second case, it is perhaps entailed that the ec- 
clesiastical court must actually disregard, misinterpret, or propose to try 
it, and therefore that a statement charging one of those things may be 
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traversed (small though the chance of its being traversed in practice may 
be.) If the conduct of the ecclesiastical court can be put in issue, the party 
must actually make his plea in the ecclesiastical court, not just pretend to 
have done so. Thereby, the ecclesiastical court might gain a little room for 
maneuver. Suppose, for example, it "accepts" the plea in the sense that it 
does not let it be put in issue, but agrees to take it as true if two witnesses 
can be produced to confirm it. If the two witnesses cannot be found, per- 
haps the ecclesiastical court is prohibitable for insisting on an improper 
evidentiary requirement; if they can be, the other party -- who, as ecclesi- 
astical plaintiff, can prohibit his own suit -- may be able to make the same 
complaint and get the prescription tried at common law, should he con- 
sider it worth his while. But then, at least, we would have a new ballgame 
-- a different reason for prohibiting, possibly a more disputable one, than 
the bare fact that a prescriptive title is in question. 
These points are speculative and exiguous. My reason for belaboring 
them is in the end only to say that Berkeley seems to me to have been on 
a profitless course. The reasons for insisting on a disallowance surmise as 
Berkeley developed them are so refined, and so scarcely distinguishable 
from imposing a common law form which itself might as well be dis- 
pensed with, that I can see no advantage in bothering with them. In other 
words, since there was no intention of letting the ecclesiastical court try 
the prescription, it would have been just as well to prohibit on the original 
surmise. Generalizing, parties might as well be given Prohibitions on the 
bare surmise that prescriptive titles, intrinsically appropriate to common 
law trial, had been brought in question in ecclesiastical litigation -- 
whether these prescriptive titles were modi or something else. However, 
Berkeley took the rest of the Court with him (the others as well as Croke, 
who expresses agreement in the report.) Taylor, having been told to go 
plead in the ecclesiastical court, predictably reappeared later in the same 
term with a surmise of disallowance, whereupon he had his Prohibition 
without debate. 
Watton v. Ball admits of being read as a Caroline exercise in scrupu- 
losity toward the rights of the ecclesiastical courts. If it was that, it was a 
cost-free exercise, except for the time and energy of the judges and liti- 
gants. For the judges could unanimously agree to insist on respect for the 
ecclesiastical system -- on pleading there in suits belonging there, on the 
principle that no incident of a proper ecclesiastical suit, even, in a sense, 
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the modus, may be nakedly rapt away for common law determination -- 
with practically no real consequences. Though there can be no certainty 
about such an interpretation, it perhaps makes historical sense that the 
rather "Whiggish" Justice Croke subscribed to the views of the rather 
"Royalist" Justice Berkeley in this case. 
A final case, from 1641, 16 only goes to confirm the rule that pleas 
based on statutes must be offered to the ecclesiastical courts in earnest. A 
man sued for failure to attend church claimed what the report only de- 
scribes as "something by way of excuse." What it was does not matter, 
for clearly he sought his Prohibition on the theory that the adequacy of 
any excuse should be determined at common law. He did not dispute (it 
would have pointless to) that ecclesiastical courts could punish non-atten- 
dance even though that offense was also subject to secular penalties by 
statute. Rather, he took the position that the statute (the Uniformity Act of 
1 Eliz.) "preempted" the field -- i.e., subjected the ecclesiastical courts to 
whatever definition of the extent of the duty to attend church the statute, 
as ultimately interpreted by the common law courts, imposed. The Court 
in this case (contrary to Brown's Case in Section II above) endorsed the 
theory but denied the Prohibition on the ground that the excuse had not 
been pleaded in the ecclesiastical court and must be. The ecclesiastical 
court had jurisdiction; plaintiff-in-Prohibition in effect wanted to say, "By 
the governing statute, correctly interpreted, I am not delinquent in respect 
of my duty to attend church"; several cases on different specific subjects 
held that the ecclesiastical court should have first crack at evaluating such 
a claim, and, if it was accepted as a matter of law, the right to try facts in- 
cidental to it. 
Alongside the miscellaneous cases above on the need to surmise disal- 
lowance, we may consider one line of related cases. These concern agree- 
ments and leases alleged as defenses to tithe suits. My first report in this 
category is a Common Pleas holding in general terms from 1597, 17 as fol- 
lows: If one being sued for tithes pleads matter triable at common law, 
such as a lease or release of the tithes, and the plea is accepted, the eccle- 
siastical court shall try it by witnesses; if the plea is disallowed, Prohibi- 
16 H. 16 Car. C.P. March, 93. 
17 H. 39 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.239b. 
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tion shall be granted and the matter tried by jury. As far as the examples 
used are concerned -- leases and releases -- that is straightforward. Ex- 
tending the rule beyond the examples would be dangerous. Does "matter 
triable at common law" include prescriptions (inclusive or exclusive of 
modi) -- so that a willing ecclesiastical court may try prescriptive titles (if 
not modi, at least "defensive prescriptions," contrary to Watton v. Ball 
above)? Does the rule include contracts as well as leases and releases? 
According to our holding, if the parishioner pleads a lease of the tithes (a 
common law conveyance thereof for a term of years) or a release (a con- 
veyance by deed, working by way of extinguishment, rather than transfer, 
or rights), the suit will be prohibited if and only if the ecclesiastical court 
disallows the plea. Disallowance could take a generic or specific form -- 
either the unlikely judgment "Leases are no defense to tithe claims" or the 
judgment "This lease, owing to internal defects or to insufficient evidence 
proffered to back it up, is not acceptable as a defense" -- but either way 
disallowance is necessary to support a Prohibition. Suppose, however, 
that the parishioner pleads only a considerate agreement on the parson's 
part not to demand tithes. No doubt the ecclesiastical court may try that 
claim as to fact if it is willing. The doubts arise in the other direction: If 
the plea is generically or specifically rejected, will Prohibition lie? For 
reasons that will appear, one should not jump to conclusions in the con- 
tract case on the basis of a holding which uses property transactions -- 
leases and releases -- as examples in an apparent generalization. 
Only a couple of terms later, in the Dean of Gloucester's Case, 18 the 
same court flatly contradicted the above holding, in the direction of mak- 
ing Prohibitions harder to get. The defendant in a tithe suit pleaded a 
lease of the tithes to him and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallow- 
ance. The Common Pleas turned him down, claiming Queen's Bench 
practice as authority for that course. The judges said that the lease was a 
perfectly good defense in ecclesiastical law, and therefore that any impro- 
priety was remediable solely by appeal. They also registered suspicion 
that the disallowance surmise was feigned. ("And therefore [there is] no 
reason why we ought to award Prohibition, where also the surmise per- 
haps is false.") The logical way to implement that suspicion might be to 
hold the disallowance traversable. One can see, however, how a desire to 
18 M. 39/40Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.270b. 
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discourage fictitious surmises and needless Prohibitions might push 
judges to the flat rule of this case -- disallowing a lease is no ground for 
Prohibition -- even if they were not otherwise clearly disposed that way. 
As I argue above, traversing the disallowance would be unlikely to occur 
very often in practice even if it was permitted in law, and trying in-court 
happenings by jury is not the most convenient of proceedings. Judges 
might well be inclined to embrace a twofold scheme and resist the temp- 
tation of a threefold one -- i.e., recognize only those claims which will get 
a Prohibition without any surmise of disallowance, or only a pro forma, 
untraversable one, plus those which will not get Prohibitions, disallow- 
ance or no disallowance; not to recognize the tertium quid, claims which 
will get a Prohibition if and only if they are actually disallowed. It is 
plainly impossible, I think, to exclude the tertium quid entirely -- witness 
statute-based claims and those cases in which the ecclesiastical court has 
applied its own rules in a correct but intolerable way. But to narrow the 
scope of traversable disallowance surmises makes sense, and the decision 
in the Dean of Gloucester's Case would be a reasonable implementation 
of such a policy. I wonder, however, about the extent of the decision. The 
report would suggest that the surmise was strictly generic -- simply, "I 
pleaded that the tithes, were leased to me, which plea was disallowed." 
Suppose the surmise gave some reason to believe that there was a legal 
problem about the meaning or validity of the lease. It could do so with 
varying degrees of specificity -- at one end of the spectrum, a precise 
"laying of error" ("The ecclesiastical court, construing this lease to mean 
X. whereas it means Y., or regarding it as invalid for such-and-such rea- 
sons, has improperly refused to let me use it as a defense"); at the other, 
just enough specific description of the lease to raise the thought that 
maybe the disallowance resulted from a misconstruction or mis-evalu- 
ation of the lease by common law standards (as opposed to defective evi- 
dence or unaccountable error by ecclesiastical standards.) If our case had 
fallen anywhere within that spectrum, would the Prohibition have been 
denied? If granted, would a traverse of the disallowance have been per- 
mitted? 
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In the Jacobean Fowe v. Paule, 19 the parishioner pleaded an agree- 
ment, not a lease. Parson Paule had allegedly agreed to take 10/ per an- 
num in lieu of tithes for the rest of Fowe’s life, and the ecclesiastical court 
had allegedly disallowed that plea. A Prohibition was denied because the 
agreement was not supported by a written deed. That is to say, as far as 
the principal case is concerned, the judges thought the ecclesiastical court 
not only within its rights but right in rejecting the defense. To bar tithes, 
an agreement for life or years should be embodied in a deed; the parish- 
ioner’s only remedy on the oral agreement was an Action on the Case for 
breach of contract in the event that the parson demanded and recovered 
tithes in kind. This decision has no bearing on the need to allege disallow- 
ance: it was alleged, but even so there was no basis for prohibiting. The 
Court added a dictum, however: Prohibition would be granted on an oral 
agreement covering only one year. So, at any rate, a somewhat obscure 
report seems to say. The rule is strange -- in effect that a one-year agree- 
ment must be given specific enforcement as a bar to tithes while a longer- 
term agreement need not be. Nothing specific is said about a disallowance 
surmise in the case of the one-year contract. Quaere whether it would be 
necessary. Generically speaking, a lease was a good ecclesiastical plea in 
bar of tithes. Could the same be said of a parol agreement? Yet it would 
seem odd to hold that an ecclesiastical court may try a lease as to fact if it 
is willing, but not the less solemn one-year, word-of-mouth bargain. 
Among other things, witnesses would be a rational way to try the bargain, 
and insistence on two witnesses would not seem unreasonable, whereas 
trial of a lease by ecclesiastical methods ought perhaps to observe com- 
mon law standards to such intents as not demanding two witnesses to 
authenticate a written deed. (But see the next case.) 
A few years later, in Griffin v. Bulerist, 20 the King’s Bench was ready 
to prohibit in the case of an agreement if and only if disallowance was al- 
leged. The statement of the case is garbled in the report, so that it is im- 
possible to tell the duration of the agreement and whether it was in 
writing. It is clear, however, that an agreement discharging tithes in kind 
was claimed, and that a Prohibition was sought without surmising disal- 
19 P. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.2l3b. 
20 P. 15 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1080, f.30 
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lowance. Chief Justice Montagu (speaking for the Court, so far as ap- 
pears) said that Prohibition would not lie now, but would lie on a surmise 
that the agreement was disallowed, or on surmise that proving it by a sin- 
gle witness was not permitted. Note the second point: If we assume that a 
parol agreement was in question, the ecclesiastical court was not free to 
try even that by its own evidentiary standards. It was, however, to have 
the trial if it was willing to allow the plea in law, and if it observed evi- 
dentiary canons acceptable to the common law. 
Meanwhile, in --- v. Vaughan, 21 the King's Bench had insisted on the 
disallowance surmise in a tithe case where a lease-assignment was in 
question. Since the case is not stated fully, it does not appear what kind 
of a lease-assignment was alleged. Probably the parson sued A, who al- 
leged that the tithes were leased to B. and assigned to him. Alternatively, 
a lease-assignment could come in question with regard to the ecclesiasti- 
cal plaintiff's title to sue: e.g., the tithes were leased to X and assigned to 
Y, but X is suing; or the original lessor; or Y is suing and the parishioner 
claims that the assignment to him was invalid. In any event, a Prohibition 
was sought on the ground that the validity of a lease-assignment was be- 
fore an ecclesiastical court. The king's Bench asked whether the matter 
had been pleaded there and said that if it was disallowed a Prohibition 
would be granted. The question was evidently answered in the affirm- 
ative, for the Prohibition was granted with the cursory remark that eccle- 
siastical courts ought not to meddle with contracts (n.b.) and assignments 
of leases. I assume the question was asked only because the judges did 
not have the surmise before their eyes and wanted to be sure that disal- 
lowance was indeed alleged. It was, so Prohibition lay. Quaere what 
would have happened if an attempt had been made to traverse the disal- 
lowance. "Ought not to meddle" is strong language, suggesting that the 
ecclesiastical court perhaps ought not to try a lease-assignment as to fact 
even if it was willing to, and that the demand for a disallowance surmise 
was pro forma. But the report is too brief for such language to be taken 
very seriously. 
21 P. 9 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 125. 
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A case from Charles I’s reign, 22 confirms the Dean of Gloucester’s 
Case above with respect to leases, contributing a few points of interest by 
the way. The parishioner claimed a lease to him of some of the tithes sued 
for (grain) and a modus covering the rest. He sought a Prohibition without 
alleging disallowance. Justice Jones opposed the Prohibition quoad the 
grain on the ground that the lease was a perfectly good ecclesiastical plea. 
From a subsequent remark by Jones and Justice Berkeley, it is clear that a 
disallowance surmise would not have helped, for they said that the parish- 
ioner’s remedy was by ecclesiastical appeal if he should have any com- 
plaint against his treatment. Both judges agreed that Prohibition lay for 
the tithes covered by the modus. It was of course correct to prohibit 
quoad only part of conglomerate tithe suit when Prohibition was only ap- 
propriate for part. 
That feature of the case is only worth noting as a possible measure of 
the judges’ determination not to prohibit quoad the grain. If they had 
nothing more than qualms about prohibiting for the tithes covered by the 
lease, combined with the feeling that it would be just as well to have all 
disputed questions settled at common law when some would have to be 
anyhow, they might have had some color for prohibiting the conglomer- 
ate suit as a whole, forcing the parson at least to move for a partial Con- 
sultation if he really thought that course more worthwhile than 
controverting the lease at a common law. When Bankes, of counsel for 
the parishioner, was rebuffed by Justice Jones’s first speech, he responded 
with incredulity: “Will the plaintiff there [be allowed] to proceed against 
his own lease?” Both the incredulity and the form of expression are note- 
worthy. Jones may have been on solid ground, but Bankes sounds sur- 
prised, as if his common sense and experience would have led him to 
suppose that Prohibition lay automatically to enforce a common law lease 
in the face of a repugnant tithe claim. As for the formulation, it seems to 
say: “This is not so much a case of the ecclesiastical defendant relying on 
a lease for justification as of the ecclesiastical plaintiff suing when he is 
estopped to do so. Perhaps ecclesiastical courts should not be prohibited 
from entertaining defenses which they in all probability respect as much 
as we do. But ecclesiastical suits which ought never have been brought 
22 P. 9 Car. K.B. Harl. 1631, f.377b. 
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should be prohibited. Where a modus applies, the parson has no business 
claiming tithes in kind; no more has he any business claiming them when 
the very act of doing so contradicts his own deed." However, Jones and 
Berkeley were adamant. "You say that the lease is by indenture," they re- 
plied, "and so what prejudice to you but that you may well have appeal?" 
I take this as equivalent to, "You really can't lose, having a deed to back 
you up." Is that literally true? What would make it so? I would suggest 
the following analysis: A parol discharge of tithes -- a mere contract or 
perhaps a very short-term lease, whatever would be valid in itself to any 
intent -- might be in danger in the ecclesiastical courts. It might be sub- 
jected to ecclesiastical proof requirements which, on consideration, would 
be held unduly stringent. If there is even an appreciable chance of the ec- 
clesiastical courts' going wrong, perhaps stopping the suit here and now 
should be considered. But the deed makes the parishioner's case virtually 
open-and-shut. If one ecclesiastical court gets unaccountably mixed up 
and rules out a lease that so manifestly exists, the chance that the error 
will survive appeal is negligible. If, a little more accountably, one eccle- 
siastical court demands two witnesses to prove that a deed-indented is 
authentic -- well, the chance of that demand's holding up on appeal is not 
very good. In the event of a Prohibition's being sought on the specific 
surmise of inappropriate evidentiary standards, perhaps it should in any 
case be granted. even before appeals, but that is very different from pro- 
hibiting now. At the very worst, the parishioner might reach the end of 
the appeals road still the loser, his lease-by-indenture still unhonored. If 
that were to happen, resort to Prohibition to prevent execution of a plainly 
unlawful sentence would still be open. Seeking a Prohibition now is go- 
ing to the last resort in the first instance, almost surely unnecessarily. 
If that reconstruction of the judges thinking is correct, it adds perspec- 
tive to Justice Jones's final remark in the case. "We ought to allow all that 
belongs to them [the ecclesiastical courts]," Jones said, "for they would 
have more." The pressure on the judges in the Laudian period is revealed in 
the observation, and one judge's response. As it were: These are times to 
be careful about prohibiting too freely. No doubt one should always be 
careful, one should respect ecclesiastical jurisdiction in its place. But 
there is a political reason for caution as well as the normal, fully respect- 
able one. Judges thinking such thoughts might be inclined to refuse Prohi- 
bitions a little against their best judgement, to adopt a 
"When-in-doubt-don't-prohibit" policy. But in the instant case, to put it 
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that way would actually overstate the judges’ tendency. For in fact they 
only refused a gratuitous Prohibition, a Prohibition the parishioner almost 
certainly did not need to protect his interest. They might almost be taken 
as saying to Bankes (who in a few months would become Charles I’s At- 
torney General), “Spare us your theoretical pro’s and cons of this kind of 
case. Let us be tender to ecclesiastical interests when we have so innocu- 
ous an opportunity.” As in Watton v. Ball above, scrupulosity came 
cheap. Only Jones and Berkeley are heard from in the report, probably 
because they were alone in court. 
One further case, from the King’s Bench during Coke’s Chief Justice- 
ship, may be considered alongside those on leases and agreements. In this 
case, Parker v. Kemp, 23 the parishioner’s claim was that a tithe dispute 
had been put to arbitration, and that the arbitrator had made an award that 
so much be paid for the tithes; nevertheless, the parson was suing for the 
full tithe in kind. On the matter of principal concern to us here, the two 
reports of the case conflict. Bulstrode says that disallowance of the plea 
of arbitrament was alleged, and that Prohibition was denied. Rolle agrees 
that Prohibition was denied, but says that there was no disallowance sur- 
mise. At the end of Rolle’s report, the parishioner is expressly advised by 
the Court to move for Prohibition again if the plea of arbitrament should 
be disallowed. The two reports could be reconciled by supposing that on 
the first hearing plaintiff-in-Prohibition was turned down, but advised to 
make a disallowance surmise, and that he then reappeared, claiming disal- 
lowance, only to be turned down again. Telling a man that he would have 
a better chance with a disallowance surmise is not to guarantee that he 
would succeed with one. But perhaps the more likely explanation is sim- 
ply that Rolle is accurate, Bulstrode wrong. (Rather than the other way 
around, for one would be unlikely to record that the judges gave a party 
advice to revise his claim unless one had heard them do so, whereas in 
merely stating a case of this sort one might easily misunderstand, or care- 
lessly assume, that a disallowance surmise was included.) 
23 P. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 227; 1 Rolle, 12. (Only Bulstrode gives the name of the case, but the 
facts and judicial remarks are so similar that there can be no serious doubt that both reports deal 
with the same case. Conflicts in detail are dealt with in the text.) 
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At first sight, the plea of arbitrament seems hardly distinguishable 
from a plea of a contract to take money instead of tithes in kind. The es- 
sence of the parishioner's contention must have been that the parson 
agreed not to press for tithes in kind, but to accept whatever sum of 
money the arbitrator decided was a fair equivalent -- hardly different in 
principle from agreeing to accept a sum-certain arrived at by negotiation. 
The reports give no details, except that the product in question was apples 
(a likely enough subject for a dispute and an arbitration agreement, since 
apples would perhaps not be harvested all at one time, some of the crop 
might be worm-eaten, etc. -- circumstances in which the parson might just 
as soon have the money as the fruit, but in which an argument over what 
the crop was worth might easily blow up.) Conceivably, however, one 
might argue that an arbitration agreement is rather more solemn than an 
ordinary trade -- a matter of two parties' deciding to appoint their own 
judge instead of using the official facilities. Perhaps there is a sense in 
which a parson who agreed to go to arbitration over tithes can be thought 
of as committing himself specifically to stay out of the ecclesiastical tri- 
bunals, to let a "spiritual" matter be decided in a secular way. (Per contra, 
if a parson only agrees to take 10d instead of certain tithes, he has not said 
he will refrain from bringing suit for the tithes -- at least he has not said it 
in quite the same "accent." With, at any rate, a touch of the Bad Man the- 
ory of law, one who agrees to give up something to which he is entitled in 
exchange for something else perhaps does not quite commit himself not 
to sue for the first thing. Perhaps he reserves the privilege of trying to 
"break" the agreement in law if he changes his mind.) 
How these considerations would cut in the inter-jurisdictional context 
seems to me questionable, however. If the parson who sues contrary to 
his arbitration agreement is "worse" than one who sues against his com- 
mutation agreement, then maybe the ecclesiastical court has a stronger 
duty not to permit the former than to prevent the latter. Arguably, an 
agreement to "secularize" a tithe dispute gives the common law a foot- 
hold, as protector of secular interests and supervisor of all private ar- 
rangements for semi-formal conflict-resolution (all of which, one would 
suppose, are inherently temporal, since they originate by contract, not by 
the dispensation of God, the Supreme Head, or the legislature -- whoever 
creates spiritual jurisdiction.) On the other hand, all official courts have 
an interest in what amounts to voluntary substitution of an arbitrator for 
themselves -- whence the extensive common law topic "Arbitrament," 
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comprising the various ways in which the judges oversaw the activities of 
private arbitrators in the sphere of temporal affairs. Do ecclesiastical 
courts not have a comparable interest in supervising arbitration within 
their sphere? If an ecclesiastical court disallows a plea of arbitrament con- 
cerning tithes, might it not be implementing its legitimate supervisory 
authority -- e.g., deciding that the arbitrator went beyond the authority 
which the parties gave him, or made an award predicated on a mistaken 
view of the ecclesiastical law (within which, as to the duty to pay tithes, 
he was presumably commissioned to proceed)? Per contra, an ecclesiastical 
court that disallows a commutation agreement can only be supposed to 
hold that such agreements do not bar suits for tithes in kind (unless the 
disallowance is evidentiary.) Maybe that is an unobjectionable position, 
or at least not controllable by Prohibition, but even if it is objectionable, 
and controllable, arbitration is arguably different. For the disallowance 
does not imply a simple rule, right or wrong, that an arbitration agree- 
ment, or award thereon, will not bar a suit for de jure tithes; it might im- 
ply only legitimate supervision of the arbitration. 
The Court in Parker v. Kemp plainly held that arbitrament is not a 
"common law issue." An agreement to arbitrate an ecclesiastical dispute 
was not taken to cut the ecclesiastical courts off from all further involve- 
ment, leaving the supervision of the arbitration solely to the common law 
courts. Following Rolle, the judges did not concede the ecclesiastical 
court a completely free hand, for they acknowledged that a Prohibition 
would at least be worth considering if it were sought on disallowance sur- 
mise. That might mean that ecclesiastical courts are not free to hold that 
ecclesiastical disputes may not be put to arbitration, or that the duty to 
pay tithes in kind is inviolable qua ecclesiastical duty (any loss to the pa- 
rishioner as a result of his having to pay in kind, instead of carrying out 
the arbitrator's award, being compensable at common law, if secular jus- 
tice so requires.) But need the Court's opinion mean that Prohibition 
would lie on an unexplained surmise of disallowance (as opposed to one 
showing with some specificity why the plea of arbitrament was disal- 
lowed)? On this question, the language of the Court is suggestive. 
Nothing was said about the possible differences between an arbitration 
agreement and a commutation agreement, along the lines of my analysis 
above. On the contrary (following Rolle), Chief Justice Coke started out 
assimilating the two cases, not differentiating them. He could see no ba- 
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sis for prohibiting a tithe suit merely because the parishioner claimed an 
agreement to pay 10/ -- so here. Nor did Coke think there was any differ- 
ence between the present case and two varieties of legacy case -- where 
the executor claims merely of have paid the legacy, or where he claims to 
have an acquittance for it. In those cases, as in the case of an agreement -- 
commutation or arbitration -- ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the "princi- 
pal" carries the "incidents." Coke went on to express his apparently gen- 
eral disapproval of Prohibitions to block enforcement of the two-witness 
rule. (We shall see below that he held consistently to that view.) Justice 
Houghton then intervened with what reads like a corrective note -- lest 
Coke's assertion of the freedom of ecclesiastical courts to handle suits 
properly brought there be overinterpreted. If a legacy suit is brought for a 
lease, Houghton said, it should be prohibited. (I.e.: A testator bequeaths 
an unexpired term of years to A. A. sues for it in the ecclesiastical court -- 
properly in a strict sense, because a term of years in being is a chattel, 
transmittable by will without the statutory power by which alone a man 
could create interests in his freehold by will. Houghton held, however, 
that the ecclesiastical suit was prohibitable ipso facto, upon bare surmise 
that such a suit existed. The rationale for such a holding would seem to 
be that ecclesiastical courts are presumptively unable to handle suits in- 
volving leases of land, which, though personal property, have too much 
"real-estate flavor" for spiritual judges to be trusted with. I should be in- 
clined to deduce from Houghton's position that ecclesiastical suits are 
also prohibitable without disallowance surmise when a lease comes in 
question -- as if, being sued for tithes, the parishioner claims a lease of the 
rectory. Leases, in short, are "common law issues," unlike contracts. 
With respect to contracts, including arbitrament, and the cases of payment 
or acquittance of a legacy put by Coke, Houghton did not disagree.) Coke 
immediately conceded Houghton's position on legacy suits for terms of 
years. He went on to qualify his own former remarks: Although ecclesias- 
tical courts should be free to entertain pleas of arbitrament and legacy-ac- 
quittance, they must handle them by common law standards, under pain 
Prohibition. Justice Dodderidge endorsed that rule, whereupon the Court 
advised plaintiff-in-Prohibition to come back if his plea of arbitrament 
should be disallowed. 
Coke then said that ecclesiastical law conflicted with common law as 
to what constitutes a valid inter vivos gift of personal property, and that 
an ecclesiastical court called to judge such a gift must apply the common 
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law rule or be prohibited. This final remark (in Rolle's report) is signifi- 
cant. The case at hand plainly stimulated Coke's thinking about the prin- 
ciples of "conduct-controlling" Prohibitions. His mentioning an instance 
of clear rule-conflict of no immediate relevance (ecclesiastical law held, 
contrary to common law, that the property in goods cannot pass without 
physical delivery) shows that his thinking turned to "Tanfield's princi- 
ple." Putting his last remark together with his others, Coke's position 
(and, as far as appears, the Court's) would come out as follows: There are 
some issues, such as leases, which ecclesiastical courts should simply be 
prevented from handling if the party complains. However, the list of such 
issues should not be carelessly expanded; in general, the "incident" fol- 
lows the "principal"; as a rule, disallowance surmise is required. In turn, 
intervention upon disallowance surmise should be limited to those cases 
where ecclesiastical rules clearly conflict with the common law--where 
the ecclesiastical court either certainly has applied a conflicting rule, or, 
because of its notoriously different standards, probably has. Ultimately, 
the "common law issue" should be conceived as the limiting case: where 
the likelihood of unacceptable handling is so strong that no disallowance 
surmise, or at most an untraversable one, is required. 
Bulstrode's report (which conflicts only in stating the case) confirms 
this interpretation of Coke's position. In that version, he illustrates the 
rule that the "incidents" follow the "principal" by an inter vivos gift. (A 
legatee sues for a horse devised to him; the executor pleads that the testa- 
tor gave the horse to him in his lifetime. Prohibition does not lie on bare 
surmise of the plea. Incorporating Coke's point at the end of Rolle's re- 
port, it does not lie on bare surmise even though the rules on what consti- 
tutes conveyance of a horse are notoriously not the same in ecclesiastical 
and common law.) Then, in Bulstrode's version, Coke goes on to say that 
"common law matters" arising in ecclesiastical suits must be determined 
by common law standards, citing the same rule-conflict (traditio is neces- 
sary to make gifts and leases good by ecclesiastical law.) In context, 
"common law matters" may be translated as "matters on which the com- 
mon law has specifiable rules capable of conflicting with ecclesiastical 
rules." The point, as above, is clearly that certain or presumptive rule- 
conflict justifies Prohibition on disallowance surmise, not without it, un- 
less in limiting cases (of which the inter vivos gift -- much less a plea of 
arbitrament -- is not an example.) 
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The application of these principles to Parker v. Kemp itself remains 
unclear. Even apart from the conflict between the reports, it seems to me 
worth asking whether disallowance of a plea of arbitrament would by it- 
self point to a rule-conflict and hence justify a Prohibition. If an executor 
was sued for a horse and pleaded a gift of the horse in the testator's life- 
time, I take it he could have a Prohibition by surmising disallowance of 
the plea. For the disallowance would be attributed to the unacceptable 
(because cleanly conflicting) rule that livery is required to convey a 
horse. Is there anything comparable to attribute disallowance of arbitra- 
ment to? Would even the extreme position that tithe disputes are not arbi- 
trable clash with the common law? In Rolle's report, Coke admits that a 
plea of arbitrament could be mishandled by common law standards. But 
would an unexplained act of disallowance signify mishandling? Is it pos- 
sible that Prohibition would lie only upon a showing that, after accepting 
the plea of arbitrament in principle, the ecclesiastical court made a judge- 
ment on the terms of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator's use of 
his authority at odds with what the common law would do with a parallel 
case? (The same kind of question may be put in connection with commu- 
tation agreements: Might the ecclesiastical court be free to disregard such 
agreements altogether, but not free to construe them by its own lights?) If 
Bulstrode is right on the facts -- i.e., if a disallowance surmise was finally 
made and Prohibition nevertheless denied -- Parker v. Kemp holds that an 
unexplained allegation that arbitrament was disallowed will not fetch a 
Prohibition. Rolle is at least not incompatible with that result, for the 
judges in that report do not guarantee that Prohibition would be granted 
on any disallowance surmise. 
Their thinking, as Rolle reports it, leans against easy Prohibitions and 
tends, without coming to roost, to focus on the rule-conflict in compara- 
ble situations as the theoretical basis for "conduct-controlling" Prohibi- 
tions. In any event, both reports affirm that Prohibition will not lie to stop 
a tithe suit on bare surmise of arbitrament. 
D. Disallowance Surmises of Doubtful Necessity 
Summary: For the general character of the cases in this section, see 
immediately below. Because the cases fall into substantive sub-groups, 
they do not admit of summary. The closest approach to a comprehensive 
generalization about these cases would probably be that the presence of 
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the disallowance surmise in situations where one might not expect it is 
usually explicable. "When in doubt surmise disallowance" probably re- 
mains the best rule. Sometimes it might pay even when one could prob- 
ably get by with a bare surmise that a suit or issue beyond a "foreign" 
court's competence was before it. 
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The cases in the last two sub-sections tend to draw firm lines. Those 
in B. say, "Disallowance of Plea X. may not be traversed." It follows 
that anyone wanting to introduce Plea X. may have a Prohibition 
virtually for the asking. That is to make X. a "common law issue," in the 
sense of "an issue which will be determined at common law even though 
the 'foreign' court is willing to accept X. as a generically valid plea, and 
willing to determine its specific validity and factual truth by standards ac- 
ceptable to the common law courts." (It does not follow from holding dis- 
allowance X. untraversable that disallowance need not be surmised pro 
forma, nor that a fictitious disallowance surmise would be absolutely safe 
against informal investigation of its bona fides.) The cases in C. say
"You may not have a Prohibition merely because you want to introduce
Plea Y. into the ecclesiastical suit; but if you were to make Plea Y. in
the ecclesiastical court and it were to be disallowed, then you certainly 
could -- or possibly might -- have a Prohibition." In other words, Y. is not 
a "common law issue" in the above sense. 
In this sub-section, we shall look at cases in which the disallowance  
surmise occurs, but in which it may not have been necessary. Cases of this 
sort tend to blur lines. As "precedents," they count in favor of the disal- 
lowance surmise. If disallowance of Plea Z. is alleged and a Prohibition is 
granted, one has a basis for arguing that Z. in not a "common law issue" - 
- or at least that the surmise of disallowance is necessary as a form when 
Z. is in question. However, that argument does not have much force un- 
less there are many uncontradicted precedents or, better, decisions that 
Prohibition will not lie without disallowance surmise. For there was never 
any harm in surmising disallowance when one was in a position to do so 
truthfully, and even doing so fictitiously carried little risk. Thus, the cases 
in Section II above in which a Prohibition was granted do not establish 
the necessity of the disallowance surmise for any set of circumstances, 
except insofar as their bare precedential value can be supplemented. The 
cases in the present sub-section are those whose precedential value is most 
likely to be discountable. They are cases where Plea Z. is alleged to have 
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been disallowed, but they can be compared with other cases (treated later 
in the study) in which Plea Z. seems to be regarded as a "common law is- 
sue," or basis for Prohibition without disallowance surmise. If you like, 
they are precedents in favor of the disallowance surmise which, indeci- 
sive in themselves, are all the less significant because they are probably 
outvoted by counter-precedents. 
As a rule, however, comparability among cases cannot be so neatly es- 
tablished as to permit simple weighing of precedents. That is, Six Plea-Z. 
cases in which Prohibition was granted without disallowance surmise ver- 
sus one case in which disallowance was alleged would indeed suggest 
that the surmise was superfluous in the anomalous case. But is the odd 
case really comparable to the other six? It may belong to the genus of 
Plea-Z. cases, but perhaps it has some differentiating feature which will 
account for the presence of the disallowance surmise. In that event, the 
relationship of the odd case to the others becomes more complex. The ir- 
regular case cuts less against the generalization "disallowance of Plea Z. 
need not be laid" than it would if it were entirely indistinguishable from 
the six cases. On the other hand, the disallowance surmise in the odd case 
becomes more problematic. Was it necessary, because the special circum- 
stances of the odd case really make prohibiting without a disallowance 
surmise less plausible than in the standard cases? Or is surmising disal- 
lowance only understandable in the exceptional case -- probably not re- 
ally necessary, because at bottom the case is only significant as a member 
of the Plea-Z. genus, but a move which the party might naturally think it 
to his advantage to make? Such problems are intimated in some of the 
cases following. As this topic requires, I shall discuss the cases in sub- 
groups, each one representing a type of claim asserted here by disallow- 
ance surmise, but possibly assertable without it. 
(1) Prescriptive claims in tithe cases 
First of all, one may wonder whether the disallowance surmise was 
ever requisite when prescriptive claims were advanced in response to 
tithe suits. The simplest case is where the ecclesiastical suit is for tithes 
in kind and the parishioner puts forward a modus. From the untrav- 
ersability of allegations that modi had been disallowed, and from the ap- 
parent absence of the disallowance surmise in most modus cases, I infer 
that such a surmise was unnecessary even as a matter of form. The occa- 
sional instances in which disallowance of a modus certainly was alleged 
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are therefore best taken as examples of cautious procedure -- ”playing it 
safe” by laying disallowance, lest the adverse party take it into his head to 
contend that at least a pro forma showing of misconduct on the part of the 
ecclesiastical court is necessary to justify Prohibition. Price v. Mascoll 
(discussed for procedural points in Vol. I) 24 is a good example of the kind 
of case in which the occurrence of a disallowance surmise is not surpris- 
ing. The ecclesiastical action was a conglomerate suit covering several 
products, in response to which the parishioner advanced five separate 
modi, all of which were challenged in law upon demurrer. What we 
know from the report is that plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s declaration laid dis- 
allowance of his modi. Of course nothing was said about the disallowance 
in the discussion of the case, for the demurrer confessed that it had oc- 
curred. The point to be made is that the case probably represented a ma- 
jor showdown over a man’s liability for tithes on a substantial part of his 
product -- a serious litigative investment, no doubt expected to “grow to a 
demurrer.’’ The parishioner was trying to establish a number of legally 
dubious modi, the parson to break them on the law, without running the 
gamut of a jury. It is not surprising to see “cautious procedure’’ on the pa- 
rishioner’s part. He had enough to worry about without inviting his adver- 
sary to object to the absence of any showing of disallowance; the 
adversary was desperate to pick holes in his declaration. In sum, one can 
see a reason for the allegation of disallowance in this case; in more rou- 
tine cases, it may have been alleged pro forma more frequently than 
meets the eye in the reports. 
Less standard forms of prescription are somewhat more problematic. 
Greene v. Hunne, 25 like Price v. Mascoll, was a conglomerate tithe suit 
prohibited on different grounds for different products. The parson took le- 
gal exception to the Prohibition on all counts, but on motion for Consult- 
ation rather than demurrer. With respect to at least one product (wool) 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition surmised disallowance. Being sued for the de jure 
tithe, he claimed a customary right to pay his whole annual tithe at Lam- 
mas, instead of at the several times when it was sheared, and to have set 
out the tithe at Lammas. The parson’s counsel 
claim amounted to a mere plea of payment, as 
(Bacon) argued that this 
such determinable in the 
24 T. M. 12 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 238. 
25 M. 41/42 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.120; Add. 25,200, f.164b. 
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ecclesiastical court. In reply, the Court appears to attach importance to the 
disallowance surmise that accompanied the parishioner's claim: "...It is 
due now by the law, because it is a good prescription to pay it at a certain 
day, and if the spiritual court will not allow it (as it is alleged they will 
not) it is reason to prohibit them." The suggestion there is that the ecclesi- 
astical court must be given a chance to entertain a claim that tithes were 
paid at a time or place defined by special custom; that Prohibition will not 
lie on bare surmise that tithes are demanded de jure, whereas custom de- 
fines a special manner of payment, according to which payment was ren- 
dered. That implies that the ecclesiastical court may try the custom if it is 
controverted, and if the ecclesiastical court is willing -- not only that it 
may try whether performance according to the custom took place. 
Quod nota, for there is the disturbing point in the Court's opinion. It is 
entirely reasonable to say that a plea amounting to "I have done my duty" 
should be tried in the ecclesiastical court in principle, but that the pre- 
scriptive element gives the common law a foothold to intervene if the plea 
is disallowed (contrary to Bacon.) The presumptive reason for the disal- 
lowance would be ecclesiastical unwillingness to let usage vary the de 
jure duty. But is it consistent to insure that any controverted commutation 
may be tried at common law for the asking, while leaving the trial of cus- 
toms going to the time, place, or manner of payment in kind to the eccle- 
siastical court? Are ecclesiastical methods and standards more 
appropriate to the one than the other? Because these questions arise, one 
might be reluctant to push the apparent meaning of the opinion in Greene 
v. Hunne too far. In context, the opinion was addressed to Bacon's argu- 
ment that no control could be exercised over ecclesiastical handling of an 
"I have done my duty" plea. The Court fell back on the disallowance sur- 
mise that was at hand. If there had been no such surmise, I would not be 
confident that the judges would have granted Consultation quoad the 
wool. A Prohibition had been granted; in the event, the judges knocked 
down all of Bacon's objections to it; how ready they would have been to 
listen to a complaint about the absence of a disallowance surmise, if such 
had been possible, seems questionable. The effect of upholding the Prohi- 
bition on motion for Consultation would in all probability be to put the 
whole of a complicated wrangle over custom before a jury. The judges 
might well have preferred to include the custom concerning the wool in 
the common package. If they had no disallowance surmise to justify do- 
ing so, the mere presence of a prescriptive claim might have served. 
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In Fosse v. Parker et al., 26 the disallowance surmise occurs in connec- 
tion with a parishioner's attempt to escape tithes on a by-product via an 
exiguous modus. I doubt whether the surmise helped the parishioner, but 
it may have been used in the deliberate hope of saving a weak cause. The 
ecclesiastical suit was for neck-wool of 800 sheep -- i.e., wool cut from 
around the animal's neck and head, as distinct from the main fleece. The 
parishioner alleged that it was customary to trim this wool from the sheep 
in the autumn to protect them from vermin; that this operation improved 
the quality of the fleeces; that the custom was to pay one fleece out of ten 
at shearing time; that the neck-wool was of "no value" (meaning, presum- 
ably, in strictness, no merchantable value, or so little that one tenth of it 
could not possibly be worth more than what the parson gained in vermin- 
free fleeces.) This matter was allegedly pleaded in the ecclesiastical court 
and disallowed. Nevertheless, the King's Bench refused unanimously to 
prohibit. The judges took the position that cutting off a little too much in 
the name of neck-wool was an all-too easy form of deception. They saw 
no consideration for the exemption of the neck-wool in the improved 
quality of the fleeces and gave no sign of willingness to let the parish- 
ioner off his customary hook by holding that non-fraudulent neck-wool 
was exempt de jure. Obviously the same result would have come about if 
there had been no disallowance surmise. Subsequently, the parishioner 
came back with a good modus -- that the fleeces were wound at shearing- 
time, in consideration of which extra labor the neck-wool was exempt -- 
and got his Prohibition without controversy. If the judges had seen good 
consideration as the custom was originally laid and had not been worried 
about encouraging fraud, they would surely have prohibited without the 
disallowance surmise. 
I would conjecture, however, that the parishioner had a calculated rea- 
son for including it. The parishioner was obviously in the sheep business 
in a pretty big way. Judging by the ease with which he came up with an 
unexceptionable modus in the end, it looks as if he may have decided to 
take a shot at a better thing in the first instance, falling back on the extra- 
work modus if necessary. That is, that it was really customary to wind the 
wool would perhaps not be so easy to prove. Anyhow, it would be nice to 
26 M. 14 Jac. K.B. 3 Bulstrode, 242. 
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escape that extra duty. So why not have a crack at establishing a modus 
involving no extra work, or even, with luck, a de jure exemption for the 
neck-wool? But then the parishioner wonders, correctly enough, whether 
his preferred modus really has much of a chance. Wanting to gamble, one 
might figure that it was at least worth trying in the ecclesiastical court. 
With a bad enough claim, one might as well try to persuade an ecclesiasti- 
cal court first, using the common law as one's fail-safe device and in the 
meanwhile afflicting the other party with protracted litigation. (The report 
tells us that the ecclesiastical court gave sentence for the parson. That 
proves that the disallowance surmise was not fabricated and suggests that 
the parishioner made a serious effort before seeking a Prohibition.) 
Secondly, there was always some chance that the absence of a disal- 
lowance surmise would be held against one, the more so if the judges sus- 
pected one's honesty and motives and needed an excuse for refusing 
Prohibition. Finally, the parishioner in our case did a little more than al- 
lege his purported modus; he alleged that the neck-wool was of "no 
value." That claim was included in what the ecclesiastical court had dis- 
allowed. Might the parishioner not have figured that disallowance of that 
factual claim would provide an outside basis for Prohibition if, as it 
turned out to be, the modus was held bad on its face? I.e.: Might one not 
argue for a Prohibition on the theory that the ecclesiastical court had un- 
reasonably refused one an opportunity to show that the neck-wool, though 
neither generically exempt by law nor sufficiently contributory to the 
value of the main crop to sustain a considerate modus, was, in fact, taken 
in such form and amount as to constitute a waste-product, which a man 
should not have to go to the trouble of setting out for the parson and 
which, even if it should have some sort of incidental use, cannot be con- 
sidered part of the regular profits of agriculture wherein the Church is en- 
titled to share? There is no sign that any such argument was made in the 
face of a thoroughly unreceptive Court, but it could conceivably have fig- 
ured in the original design of the surmise. In sum, thought my points are 
speculative, it seems to me that the disallowance surmise in Fosse v. 
Parker can be sufficiently explained by the peculiarities of the case to de- 
prive it of precedential value. 
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Finally, in the Caroline Halsey v. Halsey, 27 disallowance of a prescrip- 
tive claim was alleged in a suit for obstructing the parson's access to his 
tithes. Such suits were appropriate to ecclesiastical courts by virtue of the 
statute of 2/3 Edw.6, c. 13, sect. ii, and perhaps at common law as well. 
A parson was not confined to protecting his right of way to carry off 
tithes by common law proceedings; he could sue a parishioner in the ec- 
clesiastical court for closing the usual or most convenient access-way, 
even though he had not been absolutely shut out and hence denied the 
tithes themselves. In this case, the parishioner claimed that he had not ob- 
structed the true customary access-way. In other words, by prescription 
Route A was the way to which the parson was entitled, and that route was 
not obstructed; the parson was improperly claiming free passage by Route 
B. The parishioner sought a Prohibition on what looks like a deliberately 
double-barrelled surmise: (a) because the matter above was pleaded in the 
ecclesiastical court and disallowed; (b) because cognizance of a prescrip- 
tive right of way (as opposed to a merely "usual or most convenient" way, 
in the absence of any strictly prescriptive rights) belongs to the common 
law. The Court overruled the Prohibition on demurrer, on the ground that 
cognizance over ways to carry tithes belonged to ecclesiastical courts. 
I.e.: So far as the report indicates, the judges simply took the position that 
the common law had no business interfering in access-way suits, even 
when the conduct of the ecclesiastical court in handling a prescription- 
based defense was complained of. I assume that the ecclesiastical courts' 
statutory authority to entertain such suits was relied on primarily, though 
the report is too brief to show that. 
Obviously, the Prohibition would have been held all the less justifiable 
by this Court if there had been no disallowance surmise. I have consider- 
able doubt whether most earlier courts would have made the same deci- 
sion. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition himself may have thought that his claim 
would be just as good if it had rested solely on the theory that disputes 
about customary rights of way should be determined at common law (for 
judging by the scanty report, it looks as if that theory was emphasized in 
his declaration and the disallowance thrown in.) The case for prohibiting 
on bare surmise that a prescriptive right of way was at issue in an ecclesi- 
27 H. 6 Car. K.B. Jones, 230. 
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astical suit might be especially good because exactly the same facts would 
generate common law rights in the strong sense of "rights assertable in 
common law proceedings." If parson has in fact used Route A (and not 
used Route B) from time immemorial he ought not only to lose his eccle- 
siastical suit for passage via Route B (as a parson who has in fact always 
taken 6d. should lose his suit for tithes in kind); he has a common law ease- 
ment over Route A and lacks one over Route B. On the other hand, the 
statute would be a good reason for insisting on the disallowance surmise 
even if, contrary to the Court in Halsey v. Halsey, one were disposed to 
prohibit. 
(2) De jure exemption from tithes 
I would expect surmises of disallowance to be unnecessary and untrav- 
ersable when plaintiff-in-Prohibition's claim was the de jure exemption 
from tithes of the product sued for. That case seems even stronger than 
the modus case in some ways. The surmise of disallowance makes no ap- 
pearance in the vast majority of cases of this sort. The claim of de jure 
exemption could take two forms: A pure legal claim (the object actually 
named in the libel ought not to pay tithes by the law), and a partially fac- 
tual claim (the libel speaks generically of a product which does owe 
tithes, but the special form of the product which the parishioner has in 
fact belongs to an exempt sub-category.) A case of 1609 28 illustrates the 
second kind: A man was sued for herbage consumed by cattle (generi- 
cally tithable), pleaded that the herbage was entirely consumed by draft 
animals (exempt de jure), and got a Prohibition on surmise that the plea 
was disallowed. A argument could perhaps be made for the necessity of 
putting in a plea and waiting for it to be disallowed because of the factual 
component in the claim. If the ecclesiastical court is perfectly willing to 
respect the legal rule (draft animals exempt), why should it not be left to 
try a simple matter of fact (were all the beasts who ate this grass draft ani- 
mals?) and, if the claim is false, to award recovery of tithes? It is more 
cumbrous to prohibit whatever the ecclesiastical court has done, to try the 
factual issue at common law, and, if the parishioner's claim is falsified, to 
remit the suit by Consultation. Nevertheless, I would guess that a Prohi- 
bition could have been had without surmising disallowance. 
28 M. 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.76b. 
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Pothill v. May 29 was of the same form: Suit for herbage consumed by 
geldings; partially factual response (the geldings were saddle horses used 
purely for pleasure, hence not tithable); Prohibition granted, disallowance 
having been surmised. The only difference between this case and the last 
one is that the legal issue was more debatable. Whereas grass used to sus- 
tain "means of production" was clearly exempt, and grass turned to profit 
-- grazing for sale or hire -- was clearly taxable, the status of grass sup- 
porting means of recreation was rarely discussed. If that rather interesting 
and tricky question had been raised by a surmise making no reference to 
the ecclesiastical court's conduct, would the Court have been tempted to 
put it off on the ground that the ecclesiastical court should have the first 
crack? Quite the contrary, I would expect the judges to take it for their 
duty to settle any genuinely problematic question on tithability however 
the problem presented itself. (Although extensive debate is not reported, 
they did so here by endorsing a profitability theory -- as it were, grass is 
not tithable because the earth yields it, but because it is a source of in- 
come, as opposed to both capital and consumption.) 
A final case 30 presented two legal problems. (i) Does a parishioner 
owe tithes on apples stolen from the trees? May he be held to insure the 
parson against loss of tithes by theft, when the theft occurs before harvest 
and the parishioner never realized his nine-tenths of the product? The 
Court said "No" in the case of a straight theft, but added that the parish- 
ioner is liable for tithes on his apples if he suffers a stranger to pick them 
-- i.e., I take it, gives them away or stands by knowingly while the neigh- 
bor boys take their fill, even though he realizes no profit by harvesting or 
by selling the crop on the trees. Justice Yelverton went a step further: One 
who lets apples hang on the trees past the time when they should be 
picked, thus inviting thieves, is liable for tithes if thieves accept the invi- 
tation. (ii) An involved problem concerning old cows who had gone dry: 
The parishioner was apparently sued generically for herbage consumed 
by cattle. According to him, the cattle in question were all "ancient" milk 
cows, the feeding of which had followed a somewhat complicated course. 
They were pastured with heifers (exempt "replacement stock") for a 
29 T. 9 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 171. 
30 3 - 7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 100. 
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month, then moved to a harvested hay field, then fed on hay in the barn. 
The parishioner presumably wanted to claim that under these circum- 
stances no tithes were due, while the parson wanted to argue that all the 
feed eaten by such "dry cattle" outside the exempt categories of breeding, 
replacement, and draft stock was tithable. The Court held clearly that 
nothing was due on the post-harvest meadow-grass or on the fed-out hay, 
because the first was within the exemption for by-products or secondary 
uses, while the latter had obviously already been tithed. The grass eaten 
by the old cows when they were mixed in with the heifers gave the judges 
pause, but they were inclined to hold it tithable. 
The parishioner in this case said that he had made his plea on both 
points in the ecclesiastical court and had been disallowed. It is easy 
enough to believe that he had actually done so, for he wanted to raise 
rather detailed points of law (rather than general questions on the princi- 
ples of tithability), on which the ecclesiastical court would perhaps have 
been as likely as not to rule in his favor. My guess would be that a bare 
surmise would have sufficed to get the Prohibition considered, but there 
might have been incidental danger in that course. The report does not give 
the disposition of the case. For the cows, a partial Prohibition would seem 
clearly the right solution, give the Judges' inclination on the merits; even 
for the apples, a qualified Prohibition cannot be ruled out -- ita quod they 
were stolen without the parishioner's fault (the ecclesiastical court being 
left to determine the fact.) That result (assuming it to be the one that con- 
forms to the judges' opinion) might conceivably be harder to get to with- 
out the surmise of disallowance. With that surmise, the record showed 
that the ecclesiastical court had rejected the parishioner's justifications al- 
together (i.e., had held by implication, as to the apples, that regardless of 
fault the parson should not bear the loss from theft and, as to the cows, 
that new-growth grass after haying is tithable if grazed.) 
Those were plain errors, correctable by an appropriately tailored Prohi- 
bition. If the parishioner had come with a bare surmise, as to the apples -- 
"I am sued in respect of apples stolen before they were harvested, which 
are not tithable by the law" -- the Prohibition could conceivably fail on 
demurrer, for, construing the claim against the plaintiff, it might be that 
the theft resulted from his negligence, In other words, a bare surmise runs 
some risk unless it states the law as the judges hold it to be with full accu- 
racy; a surmise of disallowance will get a least a partial Prohibition if it 
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shows the ecclesiastical court to have erred in any controllable way. For 
the cows, a bare surmise would have done the job the parishioner was en- 
titled to have done ("I am sued in respect to new-growth and fed-out hay, 
non-tithable products"), but he was probably shooting for total exemption. 
If he was careful to specify the three separate categories of feed as such, 
he could have made his bid and been give the two-thirds of a loaf he de- 
served. But if he was careless about his theory -- saying, perhaps, "I am 
sued in respect of 'ancient' milk cows" -- he might be in trouble, for the 
judges clearly thought that class of cattle tithable as such. The alternative 
theory making for total exemption -- that tithable grass eaten for a short 
time by animals generally nourished on non-tithable feed and repre- 
senting an incalculable fraction of pasture generally exempt because used 
for heifers should not count -- is hard to state crisply. Showing that facts 
in at least some degree favorable to the parishioner had been pleaded, and 
that the ecclesiastical court had improperly refused to consider them justi- 
ficatory in any degree, was the easier way to raise the question of what, in 
somewhat complicated circumstances, the parishioner was entitled to. 
(3) Bounds of parishes 
It was sometimes claimed in response to tithe suits that the produce 
sued for was not grown in the parish of the parson suing. There is plenty 
of authority that a bare surmise -- "I am sued by the Parson of A., 
whereas my land is in B." -- would get a Prohibition in that case, without 
a showing of disallowance. If the Parson of A. wanted to contest the Pro- 
hibition, he should traverse the factual statement, for the bounds of par- 
ishes were triable by jury at common law. That principle also held when, 
less frequently, parish borders came in question in litigation over matters 
other than tithes. 
I have two cases in which disallowance of a plea respecting the bounds 
of parishes was alleged. The first 31 is clearly to be accounted for by its 
early date (1585), for the reports show the judges in doubt as to whether 
Prohibition would lie even with the disallowance. The facts were straight- 
forward: One was sued for tithes purportedly produced in A., pleaded that 
they were actually produced in B., and sought a Prohibition because the 
31 M. 27/28 Eliz. Q.B. Harg. 15, f.145b. 
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plea was disallowed. The Court was reportedly in great doubt, inclining to 
the generalized view that since the tithe suit was properly begun in the ec- 
clesiastical court, there was no common law power to regulate its han- 
dling. (So, tout court, says the report. It is hard to see the disallowance as 
at all reasonable, unless on evidentiary grounds which the ecclesiastical 
court was entitled to. But then, if the decision was utterly unreasonable, it 
might be controllable by appeal. The church could have no conceivable 
interest, across the board, in permitting Parson A. to collect Parson B.'s 
tithes, though in particular situations one can easily imagine ecclesiastical 
courts' preferring that boundaries not be disputed. For example, Parson 
A. is a hardworking clergyman in a none-too rich parish, while Parson B. 
is a wealthy impropriator, or a comfortable non-resident who is unlikely 
to press for the full value of his tithes. In our actual case, it is interesting 
to note, plaintiff-in-Prohibition was farmer of a neighboring parish -- i.e., 
a layman who, as lessee of the tithes in one parish, would probably con- 
tribute not a penny to the Church if the bounds question fell out in his fa- 
vor. The rent paid by such a farmer to his lessor might, depending on 
countless local realities, represent an excellent bargain. Ruling out a 
bounds plea flatly is too overt a means to an administrative end to attrib- 
ute even to a court convinced that the end is just; demanding a proffer of 
strong evidence when a bounds plea is introduced is the obvious way to 
redraw parish lines sub rosa.) 
The Court thus doubting, Tanfield, of counsel for plaintiff-in-Prohibi- 
tion, cited a recent case in his favor -- Briges v. Massye (not inde- 
pendently reported.) Tanfield said that he himself had been a lawyer in 
that case; that a Prohibition had been granted there on the same matter as 
was shown in this case; that the Court in Briges v. Massye had said that 
the bounds of parishes are "merely temporal" and triable at common law; 
and that he personally knew that the bounds question in that case was 
tried by jury at the last Assizes. Confronted with this evidence, the Court 
assigned a day for production of precedents. There is no further report. 
As Tanfield described it, Briges v. Massye appears to have been based 
on reasoning that would make surmising disallowance pointless. If the 
question "Is Blackacre in A or B?" intrinsically demands common law 
trial, an ecclesiastical suit in which it arises should be prohibited, what- 
ever the policy of the ecclesiastical court and whether or not the defen- 
dant there has gone through the motions of pleading his version of the 
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truth. The principal case shows, however, that that point was by no means 
settled in 1585. It is no wonder that plaintiff-in-Prohibition surmised dis-
allowance, and even with that surmise he may not have succeeded. 
The other case in which disallowance of a plea respecting parish 
bounds was certainly alleged 32 did not originate from a tithe suit. Rather, 
a man was prosecuted criminally in an ecclesiastical court for failure to 
attend services at his parish church. He pleaded that the church he was 
accused of not attending was not his parish church, and that he did regu- 
larly attend another church. Then he sought a Prohibition by a twofold 
surmise: (i) that he had not been allowed to plead his justification; (ii) that 
ecclesiastical courts do not have authority to determine the precinct of 
parish churches. In other words, plaintiff-in-Prohibition did not rely on 
disallowance essentially. Because of the second element in the surmise, 
the case counts in favor of the rule that disallowance need not be shown, 
even fictitiously, to prohibit ecclesiastical courts form determining the 
bounds of parishes. (The Court granted the Prohibition unanimously.) 
The occurrence of the disallowance claim is not surprising. Possibly a 
Prohibition could have been obtained on the bare surmise that parish 
bounds were in question, but it is understandable that the accused chose 
to plead and pleaded as he did. He might have hope of defeating the 
charge against him by showing that he frequented some church, even 
waiving his claim about the parish boundaries. (As to whether it would 
have been a justified hope, cf. Browne’s Case in Section II above.) 
Nevertheless, a man might suppose that attendance elsewhere would 
be an excuse. He might also suppose that his chance for a Prohibition 
would be reinforced by the ecclesiastical court’s rejection of “substitute 
performance,” especially in the light of its acceptability for the purposes 
of statutory recusancy. Prohibiting on the bare surmise that bounds were 
in question might conceivably be objected to in this sort of case (as op- 
posed to tithe suits) on the ground that criminal liability for non-atten- 
dance at church would not necessarily depend on the resolution of the 
bounds question. It would not depend thereon if the ecclesiastical court 
were willing to accept habitual attendance at any church, or any reason- 
able church, as an excuse. By pleading and surmising as he did, plaintiff- 
32 T. 9 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 159. 
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in-Prohibition made it appear that the ecclesiastical court did insist on the 
parish church, and therefore that it would have to try the bounds, as it 
ought not. Finally, absence of a disallowance surmise might be objected 
to in more general terms in this sort of case, simply because ecclesiastical 
courts had express authority by the Uniformity Act to punish failure to at- 
tend church. 
(4)Incumbency 
A couple of cases on the ecclesiastical plaintiff's incumbency -- hence 
his title to sue for tithes -- involve possibly superfluous claims of disal- 
lowance. In general, I think it is clear that a parishioner who wanted to 
claim that his adversary was not parson of the parish in question needed 
to make such a plea in the ecclesiastical court. (Cf. Pendleton v. Green, 
above.) But the circumstances of the present cases were special. In 
Glover v. Shedd, 33 the parishioner pleaded that one Morgan, rather than 
his adversary (Glover), was rector. The plea was disallowed and sentence 
given for Glover. A Prohibition was granted, not simply because of the 
disallowance, but because a verdict in a recent common law suit concern- 
ing the living found Morgan the true rector. The disallowance would have 
been enough (following Pendleton v. Green); but so, perhaps, was the 
verdict. It is entirely natural that the parishioner pleaded Glover's non-in- 
cumbency, intending, presumably, to rely on the verdict as evidence. Sup- 
pose, however, that he had relied on the verdict as the sole grounds for 
Prohibition. ("I am sued for tithes by G., who pretends to be parson of X., 
whereas it appears by verdict that M., specifically rather than G., is par- 
son.") I am not sure that Prohibition would lie on that surmise, without 
any showing that an attempt to defeat Glover's incumbency and to use the 
verdict to that end had been made in the ecclesiastical court, but I would 
not be confident the other way either. The discussion of the case does not 
help resolve that question, for as things stood the plea had been pleaded 
and sentence given. The judges (Coke and Dodderidge speak in the re- 
port) needed only to say that the sentence against the verdict was wrong, 
that it resulted from a technicality of the ecclesiastical law on livings that 
conflicted with the common law, and that the common law was fully 
competent to decide the issue of "Parson or not parson?" (The last point, I 
33 T. 13 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 228. 
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think, was by way of saying that "Parson or not parson?" is not primarily 
or essentially an ecclesiastical question, so much so that the ecclesiastical 
court would be free to go its own way even in the face of a verdict. I 
would not take the judges as saying that "Parson or not parson?" was tri- 
able at common law whenever a party wanted it tried there -- like a mo- 
dus or the bounds or parishes -- but that if the issued happened to be tried 
in connection with common actions (normally Quare impedits) the ver- 
dict would conclude ecclesiastical courts, as a verdict on a modus 
would.) 
In Reynolds v. Dr. Lockett, 34 Prohibition was denied because it was 
not sought until after two appeals (see the case in Vol. I.) If plaintiff-in- 
Prohibition had moved sooner, he could clearly have had a writ, possibly 
without the allegation of disallowance which he made. In this case, a pa- 
rishioner sought to defeat a tithe-suit by disputing his opponent's incum- 
bency on two grounds: (i) he had not read the articles as required by 13 
Eliz., c. 12 (wherefore he was ipso facto deprived even if he was other- 
wise lawful parson); (ii) He was instituted and inducted before the living 
was legally vacant (hence was not lawfully instituted and inducted.) The 
parishioner pleaded this matter and was disallowed. (Presumably his ap- 
peals disputed the disallowance, unless he had some further defense.) 
While turning the Prohibition down on procedural grounds, the Common 
Pleas said that in substance the writ lay because both the reading of the 
articles and the induction were temporal matters, triable at common law. 
Putting it that way suggests that the disallowance need not have been al- 
leged (though of course it is not surprising that it was, since the parish- 
ioner had pleaded in the ecclesiastical court, not nominally, but with the 
purpose of litigating there, as the appeals show.) (Ironically, his "purpose 
of litigating there" -- genuine acquiescence -- may have counted against him 
on the procedural point, yet not alleging disallowance might have counted 
even more heavily against him on the same score. For his appeals may, at 
least, have been to contest the disallowance that appeared of record. If he 
had come with a bare surmise -- i.e., showing no attempt to use the failure 
to read the articles, etc., in the ecclesiastical court -- his delay would per- 
haps seem more unaccountable.) 
34 H. 12 Car. C.P. Harg. 23, f.4. 
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The Court's language seems to point to the sufficiency of either of two 
bare surmises: (i) "I am sued for tithes by one who is not parson because 
he has not read the articles." (ii) "I am sued by one who is not parson be- 
cause his purported induction took place before the living was vacant." 
The justification for the first would be that reading the articles is a statu- 
tory duty, the consequences of non-performance being created and de- 
fined solely by statute, therefore within common law jurisdiction by 
virtue of the common law courts' responsibility for the interpretation and 
enforcement of statues. (Serious questions can be raised about this rea- 
soning, as we have seen Should non-common law courts be prohibited 
before they have actually misapplied a statute -- as the ecclesiastical court 
in this case would not appear to have done -- without the allegation of dis- 
allowance? To put it another way, does common law authority to enforce 
statutory rights entail authority to try questions of fact arising in connec- 
tion with such rights? Admitting that the ecclesiastical court in this case 
should be prohibited for a disallowance that seems to imply disrespect 
for, or misunderstanding of, the statute, is it so clear that an ecclesiastical 
court which, so far as appears, perfectly understands and respects the stat- 
ute should be prohibited from trying whether a parson did read the arti- 
cles -- a "simple" fact, hardly requiring communal knowledge beyond the 
information witnesses could supply?) 
As for the second element: it was always recognized that induction 
(though performed by ecclesiastical officers) was the "temporal" part of 
installation in a benefice -- "investiture with the temporalities," as institu- 
tion was "investiture with the spiritualities." In our case, the claim was 
that both the institution and induction were void, but is was no doubt the 
induction that gave the common law its stake. (The ecclesiastical court 
could probably not have been controlled if it chose to hold that the par- 
son's institution was good even though it was premature.) I wonder, how- 
ever, whether the induction gave the common law enough of a stake to 
warrant the rule which the court's language in our case seems to suggest - 
- i.e., that ecclesiastical courts could be prohibited merely in order to in- 
sure that factual and legal questions about an induction (here, whether it 
took place before the living was vacant and whether that mattered legally) 
be determined at common law. If Prohibition should lie on bare surmise 
that there was an issue concerning induction, "Parson or not parson?" in 
effect becomes a "common law issue" in the same sense as a modus or 
bounds of parishes (malgré my remarks at the end of the last case.) For 
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"Parson or not parson?" inevitably involves the question "Was X. duly in- 
ducted into the living" (as it also involves whether the non-temporal acts 
of admission and institution duly occurred.) Dodderidge in Glover v. 
Shedd said in so many words that "Parson or not parson?" includes induc- 
tion (whence, in that case, it followed that there was enough temporal "in- 
terest" in "Parson or not parson?" to justify insisting on the verdict.) As I 
argued, I doubt that any more follows. By the same token, I am skeptical 
about taking Reynolds v. Dr. Lockett as far as the language of the Court 
suggests. I would be inclined to read it as saying that a question about in- 
duction gives the common law enough interest to scrutinize a disallow- 
ance, but probably no more. In other words, though the Court accepted 
the language urged by the plaintiff (" ... because the not-reading of the ar- 
ticles and the induction are both temporal things and ought to be tried by 
the common law"), I would wonder whether that is not shorthand for "ap- 
parent failure to respect the statute, combined with apparent endorsement 
of the strange rule that induction before the living was vacant is good, 
gives quite sufficient grounds for Prohibition, in the light of our guardian- 
ship over statutes and our primary authority to determine questions about 
induction." The disallowance, in short, is more likely than not to have 
been essential, though the opposite possibility exists. 
(5)Parson and vicar 
Several cases concerning the rival claims of parsons and vicars to 
tithes touch on the need to allege disallowance. There is authority that the 
right of tithes as between parson and vicar was a purely ecclesiastical 
question, so strictly so that ecclesiastical courts could not be prohibited 
however they handled it. But some cases dispute that authority. 
In Blinco v. Marston, 35 a vicar sued the parson himself for tithes. 
There is nothing strange about such a suit, for a parson might own land in 
the parish as a private person, from which he would owe the vicar any 
tithes with which the latter was endowed (typically, "small tithes.") In 
this case, the parson pleaded that the land from which tithes were sought 
was his glebe (i.e., land constituting part of living and held by the parson 
in his corporate capacity.) He sued a Prohibition upon surmise that the 
35 T. 38 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 479: Harg. 7, f.200 (MS shows the stages of case, Croke only the 
conclusion, but no conflict.) 
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plea was improperly disallowed. After perhaps a moment's hesitation on 
Justice Fenner's part, he and Justice Gawdy (alone in court) granted the 
Prohibition. It was subsequently confirmed by the Court as a whole. All 
that the judges and counsel talked about was whether glebe owes small 
tithes as a matter of law where the vicar's endowment gives him such 
tithes but does not specify whether the glebe is liable. The Court decided 
that small tithes are not due from the glebe so long as it remains in the 
parson's own hands, contra if he leases it. On the first motion, Fenner 
was inclined to think that prescription would prevail against general rule. 
(If the vicarage went back before the time of memory, and through all 
that time the glebe had paid vicarial tithes, it was liable.) If Fenner had 
any doubt about the Prohibition, it was because of that point -- because 
nothing on the record excluded the possibility that the vicar was suing by 
virtue of a prescriptive title over and above his endowment. That idea 
might relate to the surmise of disallowance. Fenner may have been won- 
dering, "Can we be absolutely sure that the ecclesiastical court did not 
rule out the parson's defense because the vicar's claim was based on pre- 
scription?" 
Otherwise, however, nothing said in the case suggests that the judges 
had any doubt about prohibiting with the surmise of disallowance. One 
may therefore wonder whether they would have had any more hesitation 
without it. Nothing, that is to say, lends countenance to the view that con- 
struction of standard vicarial endowments (for such purposes as whether 
small tithes from glebe land are included within general language refer- 
ring to small tithes) is strictly an ecclesiastical problem. Why it should 
not be is hard to see, in view of the frequently-stated doctrine that parson- 
vicar contentions (normally over the construction of particular endow- 
ments) belonged exclusively to ecclesiastical cognizance. One suspects 
solicitude for typical lay economic interests in the general case: fear lest 
ecclesiastical courts make a general rule that glebe owes vicarial tithes in 
the absence of express provision to the contrary, to the detriment of im- 
propriators and benefit of working clergymen. In any event, if the com- 
mon law had interest enough to insist on its construction of standard 
endowments quoad the liability of glebe, it is perhaps arguable that the 
common law's right to make and enforce the general rule should be as- 
sertable without regard to the ecclesiastical court's conduct. A bare sur- 
mise, in other words -- "I am sued for vicarial tithes in respect of my 
glebe" -- perhaps ought to fetch a Prohibition. There is of course no way 
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to be sure whether it would, and Blinco v. Marston is a precedent for sur- 
mising disallowance. 
In Ryver v. Pell, 36 at least Justices Gawdy and Fenner (who originally 
granted the Prohibition in Blinco v. Marston) held out stubbornly against 
a formidable defense of the ecclesiastical courts' exclusive jurisdiction 
over the tithe-split between parson and vicar. They did so in such a way, 
however, as to suggest that only ecclesiastical misconduct would justify 
common law intervention. In this case, a parson sued for tithes of wood 
and furze. The parishioner pleaded that those tithes belonged to the vicar 
by prescription. A Prohibition was granted on surmise that the plea had 
been disallowed. Consultation was then moved for, on the ground that the 
distribution of tithes between parson and vicar was up to the ecclesiastical 
courts, whether prescription or anything else was claimed as the basis for 
the distribution. On the first bearing, Gawdy and Fenner opposed Con- 
sultation. (They were probably alone in court. At any rate, nothing is re- 
ported from other judges.) The two Justices claimed to have previous 
practice on their side. Fenner said that prescriptions (and compositions to 
boot) ''are more properly triable here than in the spiritual court." He and 
Gawdy did, however, expressly give the disallowance as their reason for 
thinking the Prohibition good -- as if to say, "Even though the issue is 
'more properly triable here,' we could not claim it unless the ecclesiasti- 
cal court had demonstrated unwillingness to try the same." Since it was a 
motion for Consultation that was before them, the two judges would have 
been obliged to deny it if their state of mind had only been one of doubt. 
They told the parson's counsel he could plead to the Prohibition, as it was 
of course his right to do whether he was invited or not. I suppose the 
judges "issued an invitation" in order not to be altogether discouraging 
about a demurrer, but it is not clear from the report that that was their in- 
tention, and they were hardly encouraging. 
Under the circumstances, the parson was well-advised to stick with his 
motion as the means of raising legal objections to the Prohibition. The 
motion for Consultation was introduced again on two subsequent occa- 
sions, and big guns, in the persons of both Coke and Tanfield, were 
36 M. 43/44 - H. 44 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, ff. 396 (first hearing); 413b (second hearing in M. 
43/44); 440 (third hearing, H. 44.) 
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brought on to argue for it. On the first occasion, Coke stated his side's 
analysis of the case in general terms -- that there was nothing at issue ex- 
cept the right of tithes between vicar and parson, and that exclusive eccle- 
siastical jurisdiction over that issue was well-warranted by authority -- 
then cited the case of Hunt v. Bushe as an exact judicial precedent in his 
favor. His success was indifferent, for the Clerk of the Court affirmed 
Hunt v. Bushe but added that "since then it has often been ruled to con- 
trary," and Justice Gawdy (who alone speaks from the Bench) said "we 
want to advise," whereupon the case was adjourned. 
The next term, Tanfield came on with some Year Book citations, and 
again with Hunt v. Bushe (which he said was like the present case in form 
-- similar surmise, motion for Consultation granted after argument.) 
Then, Tanfield made a semi-concession: If a parson sues for tithes and the 
parishioner claims an immemorial practice of paying a commutation to 
the vicar, then "perhaps" Prohibition will lie; contra here, where the pa- 
rishioner admits the duty to pay tithes in kind and seeks to avoid paying 
the parson only by raising the ecclesiastical issue of the parson-vicar split. 
(One wonders whether the precedents contrary to Hunt v. Bushe men- 
tioned by the Clerk on the earlier occasion could be swept away by this 
distinction -- i.e., whether they were all complicated by modi. Tanfield 
did not say so expressly, though that may have been the possibility he 
wanted to suggest.) Coke followed with more citations and the same gen- 
eral arguments. Interestingly, however, he took back what Tanfield had 
conceded. (Counsel on the same side sometimes disagreed with one an- 
other. I think the basic explanation is that they took their role as "officers 
of the Court" and periti seriously, and did not altogether suppress what 
they thought in the interest of concerted strategy. However, intended or 
not, the effect might not be entirely unstrategic: Tanfield concedes a 
point by way of saying that this case should not be confused with the re- 
lated one, where the modus is "perhaps" the heart of the parishioner's de- 
fense. Then Coke says, "No, not even in the modus case does Prohibition 
lie, a fortiori here." In any event, Coke analyzed the modus case the other 
way around: " ... for although a modus decimandi is triable at common 
law, yet it is not material in the said case, nor comes in question. For 
whether the vicar should have tithes in kind or a modus decimandi is not 
material when the suit is between the parson and the parishioner, but the 
debate there is whether the parson or the vicar should have the tithes. 
[Hence the 'debate' is a purely ecclesiastical as in the instant case.]") 
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Justices Gawdy and Fenner were jarred enough to retreat a step in gen- 
eral principle, for they conceded exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
when the "debate" is between two clergyman. But if one party to the "de- 
bate" is an impropriator, they said, things are different. Coke immediately 
corrected them on that, but to no avail. (Indeed, the relevance of the con- 
cession for the case at hand is unclear. Here the "debate," in the sense of 
the litigation, was between parson -- lay or clerical -- and lay parishioner. 
Would the Justices' principle give the common law jurisdiction because 
at least one party to the suit was lay, or would it make the jurisdiction de- 
pend on whether the parson in this case was a clergyman or an impropria- 
tor -- a fact we are not given?) The case was again adjourned, to be heard 
of no more, but the reporter concludes with his impression that the Court 
was still inclined to uphold the Prohibition. (Specific judges other than 
Gawdy and Fenner are not mentioned, but until those two were won over 
the motion for Consultation could not get a majority. The parson would 
be foolish to demur after trying so hard and so unsuccessfully to put his 
motion across. If he still wanted to contend he presumably took issue on 
the prescription, resigning a good case to the limbo of fact.) To the merit 
of the positions in Ryver v. Pell we shall return when we take up other 
cases on the parson-vicar problem. For present purposes, it is enough to 
note that disallowance was surmised, unsurprisingly in the light of the ob- 
vious unsettlement of the substantive question; that Gawdy and Fenner 
gave a hint that surmising disallowance may have been essential to the 
parishioner's case; on the other hand, that at least those judges were 
strong enough for keeping a prescriptive claim against the parson in com- 
mon law hands to permit the speculation that they would have favored the 
Prohibition even without the disallowance. 
One early Jacobean report 37 is both garbled and inconclusive, but it 
provides a further scrap of evidence of the disallowance surmise used to 
37 H. 2 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f.58b. No decision reported. A parson was trying to stop a vicar 
from recovering tithes by showing a composition, while the vicar was relying on prescription. 
Apparently the parson already had a common law judgement (from 42 Eliz.) in his favor when 
the vicar again sued for the same tithes in 2 Jac. Though the report is unclear, it would seem that 
the parson was trying to claim a res judicata, as well as to assert his composition again. It is not 
clear whether he pleaded the judgment as well as the composition in the ecclesiastical court, but 
he did surmise that whatever he pleaded was disallowed. The judgment would tend to strengthen 
his case in substance, and possibly to render the surmise of disallowance superfluous, sed 
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claim common law intervention between parson and vicar. It was used 
again in the somewhat special circumstances of Horne v. Tuke. 38 Tuke 
was vicar, Horne lessee of the rectory. Tuke sued Horne for tithes of a re- 
cently erected cornmill (ten per cent of the "toll" taken for grinding
people's corn.) Horne pleaded a "composition-real" made in 1566, before 
the mill existed, whereby the parson was assigned the standard "great
tithes" (hay and corn) and the vicar the rest. (This species of composi-
tion-real was a permanent settlement of the distribution of tithes be-
tween parson and vicar arrived at by the agreement of those two parties
and the bishop, who made a sealed instrument incorporating the same. 
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It is to be distinguished from a mere bargain between the parson and 
vicar for the time being, and also from the other sort of composition-real, 
whereby clergyman, bishop, and patron assented to a commutation.) 
Horne's position, spelled out in his ecclesiastical plea, was that tithes 
from a corn-mill would go to the parson by the terms of an agreement 
simply assigning him great tithes, and that any ambiguity on that score 
was removed by the fact that the mill was erected after the composition. 
(I.e.: If there could be any doubt as to who got corn-mill tithes in exist- 
ence at the time of the composition by an instrument that made no spe- 
cific reference to them, there could be no doubt with respect to 
intrinsically "great" tithes which the makers of the composition could not 
have contemplated assigning to the vicar.) A Prohibition was granted on 
surmise that this plea was disallowed, and Consultation was subsequently 
moved for. 
On the occasion when the reporter heard discussion of the case, a judi- 
cial division appeared. Justice Tanfield opposed the Consultation on the 
ground that the case depended entirely on the exposition of the composi- 
tion, which belonged, he said, exclusively to the common law. Justice 
Williams differed, but his reasons are not reported. The case was then ad- 
journed. Later, the judges held a conference and decided to grant the 
Consultation. The reporter necessarily had this at second-hand, since 
there was not another discussion in open court. He had heard ("ut 
audivi") that the final decision was based solely on the old statute of Ar- 
quaere. 
38 P.4 Jac. K.B. Harl. 1631, f. 305. 
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ticuli cleri, which had been urged in favor of the Consultation. A clause 
of that statute read, "Prohibition does not lie if anyone erects a new mill 
on his property and afterwards tithes are demanded from the same by his 
rector." It was apparently argued that this provision categorically ex- 
cluded a Prohibition in the specific case of a new mill, and the judges ap- 
parently bought the argument. The reporter was surprised, since he found 
Tanfield's argument against Consultation impressive. 
Surely the surprise was justified. The handling of the case looks sus- 
pect. I would make the following observations: (a) The argument from 
Articuli cleri is shaky. The purpose of the provision is surely to keep pa- 
rishioners from evading all tithes on the produce of new capital invest- 
ment in mills -- not to exclude Prohibitions addressed solely to disputes 
between vicar and parson over new mills. The statute in its very words 
speaks of the rector; here it was used to keep a rector from enjoying the 
tithes, for a vicar's benefit. Relying on the statute, rather unintelligently, 
looks like a way to help the vicar in this case without denying Tanfield's 
point -- i.e., without impugning the common law's title to interpret com- 
positions. The case occurred at a time when the ecclesiastics were aggres- 
sively defending their interests against Prohibitions. The "Church 
interest" was pretty clearly on the vicar's side: The rectory here was actu- 
ally not impropriate, but owned by the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's. 
But Horne was a lay lessee and enough of a capitalist to build a new mill. 
Perhaps he was enough of an "operator" to arrange the lease before open- 
ing the mill for the precise purpose of "writing off" several years' profit 
tithe-free. (The pleadings showed that the rectory was farmed and the 
mill built six years ago.) Political pressure, and plain human charity, may 
well have recommended leaning in the working vicar's favor. Yet con- 
sciousness of political pressure might account for reluctance to concede 
anything "in derogation of the common law." Disposing of the case with- 
out open argument on a dubiously narrow basis points to a desire to avoid 
airing the larger issues of jurisdiction. 
(b) Tanfield's argument does not seem to me entirely persuasive, 
though by deciding the case without contradicting it the Court gave it a 
kind of sanction. In the light of other holdings and the line of reasoning 
represented by Tanfield himself in Ryver v. Pell, it seems to me arguable 
that construction of a composition solely concerned with distributing 
tithes between vicar and parson ought to belong to the ecclesiastical court. 
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A composition-real effecting a commutation of tithes is a different matter 
-- laicized both by the involvement of the patron and by the interest of the 
parishioners. The composition-real in this case, being wholly by and 
among churchmen, would seem as proper to ecclesiastical jurisdiction as 
ancient endowments and tithe-splitting usages. Did Tanfield perhaps 
over-identify the two kinds of composition-real in arguing that the one 
was as much common law business as the other? As the case stands, we 
simply cannot know whether any other judge disagreed with Tanfield on 
the fundamental question, though the bare report that Justice Williams 
spoke "contra" is perhaps more likely than not to mean that his remarks 
were on Tanfield's level, rather than addressed to the bearing of Articuli 
cleri. In any event, Tanfield's emphasis was sufficiently on the common 
law's "mere title" to judge compositions to suggest that for him the sur- 
mise of disallowance was not essential. I.e.: The bare surmise -- "I am 
sued for tithes assigned to me (or the parson, the vicar being my adver- 
sary) by a composition-real" -- might have sufficed. 
(c) The reporter adds one further feature. Several certified opinions of 
civilians were shown to the Court in this case. At least one of them held 
that tithes of a corn-mill were defined as "great tithes" by ecclesiastical 
law. I think the reporter cites that opinion by way of reinforcing his dis- 
satisfaction with the decision, for if the opinion was right the ecclesiasti- 
cal court had probably erred in holding -- by the implication of the 
disallowance -- that the vicar was entitled. (Not necessarily, in that the 
disallowance might reflect only construction of the particular composition 
in question, but probably, since the most obvious line of reasoning would 
have been, "The composition gives only great tithes to the parson, tithes 
from corn-mill are not great tithes, ergo the composition gives these tithes 
to the vicar.") For our purposes, it is worth noting that civilian opinions 
were offered, which shows that counsel, at least, considered them rele- 
vant. In what sense would they have been? If the Court were convinced 
that the ecclesiastical judge had probably erred by his own standards, 
should Prohibition be denied (by what I have called "Tanfield's princi- 
ple")? Or does Justice Tanfield's position on the particular problem of 
this case entail the opposite: Prohibition lies because it appears that the 
ecclesiastical court has erred on a matter (construction of compositions) 
for which the common law courts are primarily responsible, even thought 
the ecclesiastical law is a relevant source of information on such ques- 
tions as the meaning of "great tithes"? (Prohibiting for that reason is dif- 
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ferent from prohibiting without regard to the ecclesiastical court's con- 
duct.) In sum, Horne v. Tuke is an anomalous case, which raises more 
questions than it answers on the possibility of using the disallowance sur- 
mise in parson-vicar cases. 
Three years later, 39 another parson tried to invoke a composition 
against his vicar. It is not clear from the report whether the vicar sued the 
parson himself, or whether he sued a parishioner and the parson "came in 
for interest" (as was permitted) to defend his right to the tithes in ques- 
tion. In any event, the parson pleaded his composition and showed it in 
the ecclesiastical court, then sought a prohibition again showing this 
document, on surmise of disallowance. The King's Bench responded by 
promising a Prohibition if by a certain day the parson would produce an 
affidavit that the composition had in fact been pleaded in the spiritual 
court and disallowed. That is all the report says directly about the case. 
The decision is clear-cut: The common law is entitled to interpret and en- 
force a composition solely concerned with the parson-vicar split; how- 
ever, the common law's title does not accrue, as it were, until the 
ecclesiastical court has failed to respect the composition as the common 
law understands it. By insisting on an affidavit, the Court made sure that 
disallowance had actually taken place, avoiding the trouble that could en- 
sue from not making sure -- the possibility of a traverse to the disallow- 
ance and consequent need to decide whether to admit a fiction; the 
stronger possibility that the vicar would be forced to litigate at common 
law by a feigned surmise when the ecclesiastical court was in fact per- 
fectly willing to do justice to parson. (That was the least, surely, that the 
common law could do for "poor vicars.") 
The reporter expresses surprise at this decision with "Quod nota, al- 
though between vicar and parson, two spiritual men." He proceeds to re- 
count an apparently contrary holding from the same term: A suit between 
vicar and parson for tithes of toll from a mill; Prohibition refused, be- 
cause vicar-parson contentions belong to the spiritual court. While it is 
true that the decision in the principal case clashes with the theory that 
tithe-splits are intrinsically ecclesiastical business (i.e., raises a question 
as to whether that theory is meaningful as a generality if subject to such 
39 T. 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.52. 
171 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
qualification), the second case can be distinguished from the principal one 
in two ways: (a) There is no sign of the disallowance surmise in the sec- 
ond case as stated, whereas that surmise was expressly held essential in 
the principal case. (b) The second case resembles Horne v. Tuke, which 
means that the mill-tithe provision of Articuli cleri may have been rele- 
vant. In general, we have by now seen enough evidence to suggest that 
the theory of exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction over vicar-parson dis- 
putes requires a somewhat indeterminate degree of qualification, short, 
perhaps, of qualification-to-death. 
A few reports involving the disallowance surmise touch on the ques- 
tion over which Coke and Tanfield differed in Ryver v. Pell: If a parish- 
ioner sued by the parson for tithes in kind claims the right to pay a 
customary commutation and to pay it to the vicar, does Prohibition lie? If 
the answer is "Yes" in principle, a further question arises: Does Prohibi- 
tion lie without a disallowance surmise, or only after the ecclesiastical 
court has been given first crack and erred? 
Baker v. Hulett 40 was complicated by a problem concerning prelimi- 
nary proof of the surmise, but for present purposes may be stated as fol- 
lows: Parson sued for wood tithes; parishioner sought a Prohibition on 
surmise that he customarily paid the vicar a sum of money in lieu of those 
tithes; there was no surmise of disallowance. Justices Walmesley and 
Beaumond were ready to prohibit because the wood tithes were surmised 
to belong to the vicar (not because a modus was in question.) They put the 
emphasis that way partly because of the problem upon 2/3 Edw.6: The 
procedural difficulty was that the surmised modus was arguably not ade- 
quately proved; Walmesley and Beaumond proposed not to worry about 
that, on the ground that the vicar's title, with respect to which the surmise 
was adequately proved, was sufficient reason to prohibit the parson's suit, 
so that the modus could be treated as surplusage. Had there been no mo- 
tive to get around the preliminary-proof requirement in an ambiguous 
case, it is possible that the two judges would have been less ready to step 
into a parson-vicar contention. Walmesley and Beaumond having taken a 
position, counsel objected that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had not made the 
30 M. 37/38 Eliz. C.P. Harl. 1631, f.205; Harg. 7, f.147. (For the relationship of the MSS. and other 
details of the case, see Vol. I.) 
172 
Problems of the Disallowance Surmise 
same claim in the ecclesiastical court as the surmise stated, but had stood 
on the modus alone. He had not by-passed the ecclesiastical court alto- 
gether, but he had not invited it to decide the question that was generally 
considered appropriate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction -- the right of tithes as 
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between parson and vicar. Rather, he had invited it to dismiss the suit for tithes 
in kind because a commutation was customary. (Motives for his conduct are 
imaginable. The likely one is that he went through the motions of putting in a 
plea in the ecclesiastical court, just in case failure to do so should be held 
against him, but hoped to get his Prohibition on bare surmise of the modus. 
Having that intention, he would not want to introduce the parson-vicar issue, 
because if that was the issue the ecclesiastical court would have more 
color of jurisdiction, even though the simultaneous presence of the modus 
created an ambiguity. When it came to making his surmise, however, he 
thought he had to tell the full story, lest discrepancies as among his sur- 
mise, a formal pleading, and jury-evidence come out in common law pro- 
ceedings. Alternatively, a man might be ignorant or indifferent as to 
whether the parson or vicar took his money, so long as one or the other 
took that instead of full-value tithes. However, in this snarled-up and 
mishandled case, inadvertence rather than strategy might account for the 
parishioner's steps.) 
When the judges were told that plaintiff-in-Prohibition's ecclesiastical 
plea did not correspond exactly with his surmise, they all agreed that if 
that was so Consultation would lie. (How would they ascertain whether it 
was so? "Informally" is probably the answer.) Walmesley and Beaumond 
were in accord with that conclusion. That means in effect that their ear- 
lier opinion was "in principle": In principle, a parishioner may prohibit 
the parson's suit if the tithes in question belong to the vicar, but he must 
plead that claim in the ecclesiastical court first. In other words, a disal- 
lowance surmise is required. Baker v. Hulett amounts to good authority 
for that proposition. Its bearing on cases involving both a parson-vicar is- 
sue and a modus is more complicated. When the judges agreed that fail- 
ure to plead the vicar's entitlement in the spiritual court was a fatal 
obstacle to Prohibition, they were constrained to pretend that there was no 
modus involved, because it had not been properly proved. Later on (ac- 
cording to Harl. 1631), the defective proof was repaired, and a Prohibi- 
tion was granted. Assuming that the parishioner had done nothing to 
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improve his position on the other front (such as putting in a correct plea in 
the ecclesiastical court and laying disallowance, or convincing the Court 
that he had in fact done so originally), the decision would imply that par- 
son-vicar cases involving modi are prohibitable more or less automat- 
ically. 
I say “more or less” because in this case it was admitted that the parish- 
ioner had pleaded his modus in the ecclesiastical court. Therefore it was 
not the most naked kind of instance -- Prohibition merely because one is 
sued for tithes in kind whereas a commutation is due, without regard to 
whether the ecclesiastical court has been given any chance to accept the 
modus. However, there is no sign of a disallowance surmise. In its final 
shape, the case would seem to boil down to a Prohibition on bare surmise 
that the parson is suing for tithes in kind whereas the vicar is entitled to a 
substitute payment by custom. On this construction, Baker v. Hulett sup- 
ports Tanfield’s position in Ryver v. Pell, rather than Coke’s, with the dif- 
ference that Tanfield did not maintain that the disallowance surmise could 
be dispensed with. But it was a tangled case. If by any chance Coke and 
Tanfield had it in mind, it would be no wonder if their memories clashed 
on its significance. 
Two Jacobean holdings in the King’s Bench on parson-vicar modus 
cases flatly conflict in result, though both testify as precedents to need for 
a disallowance surmise. Both reports simply state the case and give per 
Curiam decisions. In Wintall v. Childe, 41 the vicar sued for tithes in kind 
and the parishioner pleaded a customary right to pay a commutation to 
the parson, which plea was disallowed. The Court granted a Consultation 
(probably on motion, a Prohibition having slipped through.) In Dugdale v. 
Hillary, 42 the parson sued, and the parishioner pleaded a prescriptive title 
to pay the vicar 4d per acre. A prohibition was granted on surmise of dis- 
allowance. Wintall v. Childe falls in Coke’s last term as Chief Justice of 
the King’s Bench (he was dismissed only about ten days before the end of 
the term) and accords with the opinion he expressed from the Bar in Ry- 
ver v. Pell. The reversal of the positions of the vicar and the parson in the 
two cases might not be without effect on the judges’ unconscious mo- 
41 M. 14 Jac. K.B. 3 Bulstrode, 220. 
42 M. 18 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,213, f.254b. 
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tives, though it makes no difference in principle. The common law 
judges, as well as ecclesiastical courts, may have sympathized with the 
plight of impoverished vicars as against lay impropriators. Not to prohibit 
parson-vicar modus cases meant to risk the parishioner’s interest in his 
commutation to the ecclesiastical court; that risk might seem more toler- 
able when the beneficiary of any ecclesiastical bias would be a poor vicar 
than when the likely effect of not prohibiting would be to deliver tithes in 
kind to an impropriator, lay or well-endowed clerical, at the expense of 
both the vicar and the parishioner. Since vicars were ordinarily endowed 
with small tithes, their recovering in kind would not be likely to have a 
ruinous effect on parishioners’ economic expectations (unless the parish- 
ioner had expanded a small-tithe product, such as animal-breeding, into a 
major business, in which case his attempt to make out a nominal modus 
due to the parson might not deserve much sympathy.) 
One further case, Dullingham v. Kyfeley, 43 should be considered 
alongside the parson-vicar modus cases because, though different in 
form, it raises the same kind of problem. Kyfeley, Parson of S., sued a pa- 
rishioner for tithes. Dullingham, Parson of the neighboring parish of H., 
intervened for interest, as ecclesiastical procedure permitted. Dullingham 
claimed that there was a custom in S. whereby certain lands in that parish 
(including this parishioner’s) rendered 13 cheeses in the name of tithes to 
the Parson of H.; in recompense, certain land in H. rendered 13 cheeses to 
the Parson of S. in the name of tithes. The custom was alleged in the ec- 
clesiastical court (necessarily in this case, for unless he came and stated 
his claim, Dullingham could hardly be received as a party-in-interest); 
Dullingham sought a Prohibition on the ground that his claim had been 
disallowed (in effect, that the ecclesiastical court improperly refused to 
receive him as a third party.) 
The great lawyers Coke and Tanfield argued on opposite sides in this 
case. Tanfield, for Kyfeley, opposed Prohibition on two grounds: (a) A 
rejected applicant for reception as a party-in-interest has no standing to 
obtain a Prohibition. I.e.: The nature of Prohibitions is to stop a suit 
against oneself. Here, a stranger to the suit in being sought to prohibit it 
because he was dissatisfied with the ecclesiastical court’s handling of his 
43 M. 33/34 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 251 
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attempt to come in and defend a collaterally threatened interest. He might 
have a rational complaint, but not every rational complaint against eccle- 
siastical courts is a cause of Prohibition ("Tanfield's principle".) (I ex- 
pand a little on the bare words of the report, but I think legitimately. To 
part of what Tanfield did say in so many words -- that it was odd to let a 
person who was not sued prohibit a suit -- one might reply by invoking 
the "public" theory of Prohibition and the cases on self-prohibition in Vol.
I. What does it matter who seeks the Prohibition, so long as it appears to 
the Court that there is reason to prohibit? In this case, however, it seems 
to me that one can come back with a good argument. If all that Tanfield 
said or meant were known, I imagine he might have made it: Granted that 
a non-defendant or even a non-party may bring a Prohibition -- still, the 
purpose of Prohibitions is to stop suits improperly brought in "foreign" 
courts, or else to prevent such courts from deciding issues inappropriate 
to them which arise in their suits, or else to prevent them from deciding 
issues by inappropriate substantive or evidentiary standards. In any event, 
there must be an inappropriate suit, or inappropriate issue, or erroneously 
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handled issue before the "foreign" court. Here, there is nothing before the 
ecclesiastical court (or no prohihendum) except a perfectly appropriate suit 
for tithes. No issues have arisen in that suit within the normal meaning of 
an "issue arising" -- i.e., the parties have not pleaded so as to introduce 
an "incidental" matter in which the common law may take an interest. For 
all the Court knows about the suit in being, Kyfeley has appropriately sued 
one of his parishioners for tithes and the parishioner has as yet said nothing -- 
or has confessed the tithes due, or pleaded payment. What the Court knows 
in addition is not "about the suit in being," but only that a non-party tried to take 
advantage of the ecclesiastical procedures for intervention and for some 
reason failed, leaving the "suit in being" just where it was. What has the com-
mon law got to do with the operation of ecclesiastical procedures for interven- 
tion? If it had no such procedures at all, what business of ours would it 
be? Or if parties seeking intervention were required to prove their factual 
contentions by the testimony of twelve bishops? At most -- even conced- 
ing that the ecclesiastical court mistreated Dullingham in a controllable 
way -- the remedy cannot be to prohibit Kyfeley's suit against X. Con- 
ceivably a Mandamus could be considered, requiring Dullingham to be 
received as a party if the facts he alleges are true. But to prohibit Kyfeley 
v. X., a wholly unobjectionable suit, is surely unreasonable. The crucial 
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point is that the target of the Prohibition is an unobjectionable suit -- not 
that someone other than the defendant has objected to it.) 
(b) Dullingham’s claim goes to the right of tithes as between two par- 
sons, which is a purely ecclesiastical matter (i.e., a matter which not only 
belongs to the ecclesiastical court in the first instance, but which it may 
handle without common law scrutiny.) Although Tanfield does not men- 
tion parson-vicar contentions in his reported words, I think there is no dif- 
ference in principle. His premise is that any issue concerning the 
allocation of tithes as between clergymen (or spiritual corporations, in- 
cluding lay rectors) is outside the common law’s sphere of interest, irre- 
spective of the basis for the allocation (a vicar’s endowment, a 
composition, or a custom.) (Tanfield’s second argument can stand on its 
own feet, independent of the first argument. One can concede Dulling- 
ham’s capacity to prohibit the suit in being for sufficient reason, but con- 
tend that the alleged mishandling of a claim going to the allocation of 
tithes is never reason for prohibiting an ecclesiastical suit. If that conten- 
tion is correct, the parishioner in our case ought not to have a Prohibition 
on the claim that anything he owed he owed to Dullingham--whatever his 
right to a Prohibition on the claim that he owed 13 cheeses instead of 
tithes in kind. However, Tanfield’s two arguments can also be synthe- 
sized. One can concede that the common law might have an interest in 
protecting the parishioner’s right to pay Dullingham instead of Kyfeley 
-- insofar, at any rate, as that right is based on custom -- but argue that it has 
no interest in protecting clergyman against clergyman, hence no title to 
concern itself with whether one clergyman is allowed to intervene to de- 
fend his right to tithes against another clergyman’s right. One can con- 
cede the general appropriateness of stopping X. v. Y. on Z.’s motion 
solely because Z.’s attempt to intervene has been improperly frustrated, 
but maintain that doing so is inappropriate when Z. is a clergyman seek- 
ing to dispute the right to tithes with another clergyman.) 
Coke, for Dullingham, spoke to both points. (a) He took the position 
that the parishioner could have prohibited the suit on the same surmise, 
ergo an interested third party could prohibit it too. (I have said enough by 
way of developing Tanfield’s argument to indicate how this may be an- 
swered. The answer is of course not conclusive, for the public theory of 
Prohibitions is an ample reservoir. It appeared to the Court in this case, 
subject to verification, that a man was in danger of being held liable for 
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tithes in kind in the Parish of S. contrary to immemorial custom: never 
mind how the Court found out, or what kind of interest plaintiff-in-Prohi- 
bition has, or whether the ecclesiastical defendant believes in or wants to 
assert the right which custom is alleged to give him, or what the content 
of the custom is. Alongside this broad justification for prohibiting until 
the reality of the custom is verified at common law, Tanfield's arguments 
may seem insufficient.) 
(b) The premise of (a) is that the parishioner would have cause of Pro- 
hibition if he tried unsuccessfully to plead the custom which Dullingham 
relied on -- in other words, that a man sued by Clergyman A who claims a 
customary right to pay a commutation to Clergyman B may have a Prohi- 
bition if his claim is disallowed. Coke made this point by saying that a 
modus, not the right of tithes, was what was essentially in question. Al- 
though it is true that a mere right-of-tithes question belongs to ecclesiasti- 
cal jurisdiction and may be handled as the ecclesiastical court sees fit (as 
where a parishioner sued by one clergyman claims, for whatever reason, 
that the tithes in kind are due to another clergyman), the presence of a 
modus utterly changes the case. As it were, the modus preempts the field; 
a contest which, from one angle, is over the right of tithes becomes, in the 
only aspect that matters, just like any other modus case -- a contest be- 
tween one person asserting the de jure duty to pay tithes and another per- 
son asserting that immemorial custom has substituted another duty. (Two 
points should be noted. First, Coke's argument for his client here contra- 
dicts his statement in Ryver v. Pell on parson-vicar modus cases and  
what may be his later judicial opinion in Wintall v. Childe. Secondly, it 
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seems questionable whether, by the logic of Coke's argument, the dis- 
allowance surmise should be requisite in standard cases involving both 
the right of tithes and a modus. For the argument tends to equate "A.
sues B. for tithes in kind, and B. says he owes A. 5d. by custom" with 
"A. sues B. for tithes in kind and B. says he owes C. 6d. by custom."
If no disallowance surmise, or at most a pro forma one, is required 
to prohibit the first suit, why should more be required to prohibit the
second? In the principal case, to be sure it is hard to see how the disal- 
lowance surmise could be dispensed with so long as any importance was 
attached to Dullingham's interest in Kyfeley v. X. If one went whole hog 
with the public theory of Prohibitions and regarded Dullingham as a mere 
amicus curiae, then Kyfeley v. X. should perhaps be prohibitable on the 
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bare information that an improper suit for tithes in kind was going on, 
without regard to whether the custom had been pleaded and disallowed. 
But if one sees Dullingham’s right to prohibit as a function of his right to 
be received as a party to the ecclesiastical suit, then he would seem to 
have no title to a Prohibition without showing that he had been denied re- 
ception. However, that is not a logical necessity: it would be possible to 
hold that Clergyman A. may prohibit Clergyman B.’s suit against X. on 
the ground that A. is entitled to a customary payment qua the equivalent 
of the tithes for which B. is suing; that A. need not surmise an attempt to 
intervene in the ecclesiastical suit and disallowance of his claim; and yet 
that a mere stranger, neither a party nor a party-in-interest may not main- 
tain a Prohibition.) 
The implications of Coke’s position for our present concern (the need 
to surmise disallowance) are of only theoretical interest, however, for 
Coke lost in Dullingham v. Kyfeley. At least it is pretty clear that he lost. 
The report ends with an adjournment, but the Court was inclined against 
prohibiting. There is only an outside chance that the judges might have 
changed their minds, if indeed Coke and his client thought another at- 
tempt to persuade them worthwhile. The only judge to appear individu- 
ally in the report is Justice Gawdy, by no means the most rigorous 
supporter of exclusive, uncontrollable ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the 
tithe-split among clergymen. In this case, it is interesting to note, Gawdy 
did not concede such “exclusive, uncontrollable” jurisdiction; he simply 
rejected the vital step in Coke’s reasoning. For Gawdy expressly said that 
the parishioner in the instant case could have a Prohibition by claiming 
the customary right to pay 13 cheeses to Dullingham (whether without 
disallowance surmise does not appear.) He thought, however, that Dull- 
ingham’s attempt to challenge Kyfelye’s title to tithes or the equivalent 
from certain lands was the clearest case of a contest between clergyman 
and clergyman over the allocation of tithe income, hence a purely ecclesi- 
astical matter. If Coke could not make Justice Gawdy accept his inference 
from the parishioner’s right to prohibit to Dullingham’s right, it is un- 
likely that he could have persuaded a majority of the Court upon further 
argument. Gawdy’s acceptance of Coke’s premise, on the other hand (the 
parishioner’s right) furnishes a scrap of further evidence for the proposi- 
tion that Prohibition lies in standard parson-vicar modus cases. It is argu- 
able that the writ should lie without disallowance surmise, but omitting or 
feigning the surmise in such cases would be ill-advised. There was uncer- 
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tainty as to whether Prohibition lay even with disallowance, and the ambi- 
guity of parson-vicar cases is in any event a reason for suspecting that the 
surmise might be demanded. It would soften the blow of prohibiting a suit 
involving the right of tithes between clergyman to give the ecclesiastical 
court first crack -- i.e., to give it a chance to settle the intra-Church con- 
test, so long as the custom and the parishioner’s right to pay a commuta- 
tion were respected. 
(6)Prescriptive claims outside tithe-suits 
In addition to the cases above on defenses to tithe-claims, there are nu- 
merous others in which the surmise of disallowance occurs, but in which 
the necessity of that surmise seems at least open to question. Let us take 
first those in which a prescriptive claim is asserted. One might argue that 
every prescription--not only modi -- is intrinsically suitable to common 
law trial, and therefore that the bare surmise, without an allegation of dis- 
allowance, will suffice. There are scattered cases on various subjects to 
support that argument. Here we shall look at a little evidence going the 
other way. 
In a case of 1610, 44 churchwardens sued certain parishioners for a rate 
assessed to repair the church. The parishioners prescribed to contribute to 
a chapel of ease in lieu of the parish church and sought a Prohibition on 
surmise that their plea was disallowed. The Prohibition was unanimously 
denied, the Court taking the position that it was the ecclesiastical court’s 
business to decide whether such a substitute performance (prescriptive or 
otherwise) should count against a repair-rate assessment. As usual in 
cases where the Prohibition was denied, one can only say that surmising 
disallowance is unlikely to have reduced the chance of success. 
The report of Conduit v. Plumer 45 leaves it nicely ambiguous whether 
the surmise of disallowance was necessary. Conduit was elected parish 
clerk by the parishioners, in the face of the minister’s pretense, by color 
of the 1604 canons, to appoint that officer. When he was unable to make 
Conduit step down, the minister had him cited into the ecclesiastical court 
to the end of formally depriving or disciplining him. Conduit pleaded a 
44 H. 7 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,208, f.93b. 
45 P. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.208b. 
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prescriptive title in the parishioners to elect the clerk. A Prohibition was 
granted on surmise that the plea had been disallowed and sentence of dep- 
rivation given. Chief Justice Coke, explaining the Prohibition, said: "For 
it is a prescription, which is a matter belonging to the common law, which 
they do not allow." By what seems to me the preferable interpretation of 
those words, they would amount to saying that the disallowance was im- 
material. I would "translate" as follows: "There is a prescriptive claim in 
this case, which by its nature demands common law trial, at least when 
the ecclesiastical court notoriously does not recognize the legal validity of 
such a prescriptive claim [ergo, to have a Prohibition Conduit would have 
needed only to say 'An attempt is being made to challenge my exercise of 
the office of clerk, whereas I am entitled to exercise it by prescription']." 
The alternative reading would be: "The presence of a valid prescriptive 
claim, which is suitable for common law trial, gives us grounds for pro- 
hibiting, seeing that the ecclesiastical court is alleged to have disallowed 
the plea." The first reading seems to me preferable partly because Prohi- 
bitions were issued in similar cases without apparent allegation of disal- 
lowance, and partly because the phrase "which they do not allow" ought, 
in the context of the case, to refer to the notorious or regular practice of 
the ecclesiastical courts, not the act of a particular court. For the reason 
why cases like Conduit v. Plumer arose is that ecclesiastical courts 
thought the canons entitled to prevail over other methods of choosing par- 
ish officers, including strictly prescriptive methods. Or, at the very least, I 
think it is clear that the ecclesiastical courts were assumed to take that po- 
sition. (One has to tread a little carefully here, for, as every Prohibition 
issued in such cases says by implication, the position imputed to the  
ecclesiastical courts was patently unlawful insofar as it preferred the 
canons over custom in the strict, immemorial sense. That is true be-
cause new ecclesiastical legislation was required by statute to conform 
with the laws and customs of the realm or fail. Though I have no evi-
dence of it, ecclesiastics might have claimed that they did not dispute 
the power of strict custom to prevail over the canons, but only sought 
to enforce the canons against electoral usages which could not be 
proved immemorial. Nonetheless, my impression is that the "patently un-
lawful" position was attributed to the ecclesiastics by common lawyers.) 
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If we take Coke's admittedly ambiguous statement to work against the 
need to surmise disallowance, we should note the qualification in my 
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"translation" above. I do not take him as saying that every prescriptive 
claim is to be tried at common law, regardless of the ecclesiastical court's 
willingness to try it; only that ecclesiastical suits should be prohibited, 
pending common law trial of prescriptive claims, when there is good rea- 
son (via judicial notice) to suppose that ecclesiastical courts do not recog- 
nize the relevance of prescription and therefore are presumptively 
unwilling to try such claims. 
Our two remaining cases on miscellaneous prescriptions are briefly re- 
ported. In one, 46 the ecclesiastical suit was for disturbing the plaintiff's 
enjoyment of a pew. The defendant pleaded that the pew was his by pre- 
scription and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallowance. The Court 
was in doubt as to whether such a prescription was valid at all -- i.e., 
whether by the common law a man may prescribe to have the exclusive 
use of a pew -- but Justices Foster and Walmesley said that they could see 
nothing invalid about such an easement-like interest, and Foster thought 
there had been a judgment to that effect. No decision is reported. My 
guess would be that the surmise of disallowance may have helped here. 
The courts are unlikely to have much fancied getting involved in petty 
squabbles over pews, most of which were probably for the "seat of honor" 
in local pecking-orders. "We will think about the rights and wrongs of 
these cases only if it is claimed that the ecclesiastical court mishandled 
one by failing to respect prescriptive claims or the like," is perhaps a 
likely thought to put in the heads of judges hesitating in such a case, as 
the Common Pleas judges were here. They were not always so hesitant 
about protecting prescriptive interests in pews, however. 
In our final case, 47 the ecclesiastical suit was for a 6d. Easter offering. 
The defendants pleaded that the local custom required only a 2d offering. 
A Prohibition was granted on surmise of disallowance -- so much and no 
more is reported. On the one hand, it perhaps seems difficult to distin- 
guish a customary sum due for an offering from a modus. If the latter 
should be tried at common law regardless of the ecclesiastical court's 
willingness to try it, should the former not be? On the other hand, there 
are some distinctions. A modus is a considerate exchange, whereas the 
46 Russele v. . T. 8 Jac. C.P. Harg. 15, f.218b. 
47 P. 3 Car. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.120. 
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custom here only went to make 2d due instead of 6d. That is probably 
equivalent to saying that the issue was really custom against custom (Cf. 
Goslin v. Harden, above). There was no de jure duty to pay a particular 
sum for an Easter offering. The clergyman was probably seeking what he 
thought was locally customary, the parishioners disputing his version of 
the custom. (I suppose that where there was no settled custom, or offer- 
ings had been long-neglected, or accepted on a rough "ability to pay" 
basis, the clergyman had a right to sue for a "reasonable" sum, 
or the amount generally given in other communities, so that the case 
would not necessarily be a strict one of custom against custom. Quaere.) 
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Though it could be believed or pretended that ecclesiastical courts 
would not respect modi, could it be supposed with any plausibility that 
they would not respect one custom going to the amount of an offering 
against another, or a custom against the clergyman's claim that there was 
no custom? Finally, important interests were involved with modi -- land- 
values, the value of livings and hence of advowsons, the welfare of the 
Church -- whereas the values in our case were petty. The report says that 
plaintiffs-in-Prohibition were "servants" -- i.e., people of the class that 
would not normally contribute to the Church though tithes. One can 
imagine a certain pity for poor men whom the Church showed signs of 
squeezing, but also a certain reluctance to interfere with the Church's ef- 
forts to get at the non-contributor so long as the ecclesiastical court gave 
no evidence of injustice. Although the distinctions between tithes and of- 
ferings do not resolve the question of principle (should the common law 
intervene merely because a prescriptive claim is on the board?) they prob- 
ably go to suggest that surmising disallowance in the offering case was a 
good idea. The pettiness of the controversy and the likelihood that eccle- 
siastical courts would usually behave reasonably in such cases would ar- 
gue for not encumbering the common law machinery until the 
ecclesiastical failed. 
(7) Parish rates 
The remaining cases on disallowance surmises I shall group according 
to subject matter. Two cases concern parish rates, without involving the 
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element of prescription. Jeffrey's Case 48 raised the important question 
whether a non-resident owning land in a parish may be assessed for a rate 
to repair the church. Upon demurrer, the Queen's Bench said "Yes," inso- 
far as the land is in the owner's hands (i.e., so long as double taxation, of 
both the owner and a tenant, is avoided.) The Prohibition, which grew to 
the demurrer, was granted upon surmise of disallowance. Jeffrey sur- 
mised that he was sued for the rate, being a landowner but not a resident, 
and that he had unsuccessfully pleaded his non-residency in the ecclesias- 
tical court. 
Whether or not other cases on the same subject will support the rule, 
there is positive evidence in Coke's report of this case that the disallow- 
ance was essential. For Chief Justice Wray said that the ecclesiastical 
court had primary jurisdiction over parish rates, and therefore that is was 
necessary to take civilian opinions. Civilians accordingly certified that 
"non-resident landowner" was within the meaning of "parishioner" by ec- 
clesiastical standards. The Consultation by which the case was finally dis- 
posed of expressed the judgment that the disallowance was correct by 
ecclesiastical law, and that that law was relevant. It does not automat- 
ically follow that the opposite datum -- that the ecclesiastical decision 
was wrong, or not clearly right, by ecclesiastical standards -- would have 
led to the opposite conclusion via "Tanfield's principle." Nor, perhaps, 
can we be sure that the Court would have refused to consider the case 
without the surmise of disallowance. It is that note of doubt in my mind 
that leads me to place Jeffrey's Case here, instead of in the section above, 
among cases in which, without a disallowance, a Prohibition would not 
48 M. 31/32 Eliz. Q.B. 5 Coke, 66b; Harl. 1633, f.88; Add. 25,196, f.237b. The MSS., virtually 
identical with each other, are sub. nom. Geffrey v. Churchwardens of Halesham and dated P. 32. 
Both are brief reports of the initial decision to grant Prohibition (despite the later date), not to be 
compared with Coke's full report of the arguments and outcome. The MSS. have a bit of utility 
on one point: They have the judges a little indecisive -- thinking the surmise showed good cause 
of Prohibition, but not resolving anything. I suppose their questions might be: "Even with the 
surmise of disallowance, are church-rates so purely ecclesiastical business that we must stay 
out?" or "Can there really be enough doubt about the correctness of the ecclesiastical decision to 
warrant Prohibition?" The very existence of doubts was sometimes a reason for granting a 
Prohibition, for argument on motions for Consultation and demurrers was as a rule better 
prepared and hence more helpful for resolving the doubts than argument on initial motions for 
Prohibition. My suggestion in the text is that a similar response -- "Yes-no-we'd better prohibit 
in order to make up our minds properly" -- might have been evoked by a surmise laying no 
disallowance. 
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have been colorable. The issue was pretty important -- a landowner 
claiming he was illegally taxed, the Church seeking to impose a form of 
tax-liability which could make a great difference for the resources of 
many parishes and the tax-burden on inhabitants. Could a common law 
court resist the temptation, or evade the responsibility, of settling that is- 
sue, however it was proposed and however relevant ecclesiastical law 
was held to be for its resolution on mature consideration? It is notable that 
the Prohibition was granted, though ultimately reversed, and reversed 
only on demurrer, though there is of course no telling whether a motion for 
Consultation would have had a chance. It is possible that the judges 
wanted a full-dress decision and would have got one even if Jeffrey had 
only said that he was sued for a repair rate in a parish which he did not 
live in. On the whole, I think, the judges wanted to give tax-assessment 
cases of various sorts their own hard look, and would prohibit in order to 
do so, whatever the form of the surmise. 
Jeffrey's Case is early, and on the whole one expects the surmise of 
disallowance in early cases. It appears much later, however, in another 
sort of parish-rate case 49 Here, parishioners claimed that the rate had 
been assessed by an illegal method -- by the churchwardens on their own 
authority, instead of by majority vote of the parish. The Common Pleas 
granted the Prohibition with simply the observation that the assessment 
was illegal. Though the parishioners showed that they had pleaded the 
facts and made their legal point both in the original ecclesiastical court 
and on appeal, I would suppose from other cases on "parish democracy" 
that they could have had their Prohibition on bare surmise that the rate 
had been assessed without consulting the inhabitants. The surmise of dis- 
allowance is of course to be expected when the ecclesiastical defendant 
actually intended to stick with the ecclesiastical courts if possible, as the 
appeal shows the parishioners here wanted to do. Objection to delaying 
until after sentence and appeal (of which there is no sign in this report) 
might be removed by making it appear that one had tried to assert the 
same claim in the ecclesiastical court as one was now driven to assert by 
Prohibition. 
49 Roberts et al. v. . 3 - 7 Car C.P. Hetley, 61. 
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(8)Jurisdiction of the High Commission 
A few cases involve both the surmise of disallowance and the jurisdic- 
tion of the High Commission. One such case, Partlet v. Butler, I have al- 
ready treated in another aspect in Vol. I. The case clearly unfolded as 
follows: A Prohibition was granted, with some discussion, but probably 
without adversary debate. Later in the same term, it was reconsidered, 
probably on a motion for Consultation, with fuller discussion and adver- 
sary debate. On the second occasion, the statement of the case was al- 
tered. It is intelligible what happened: defendant-in-Prohibition showed 
the Court, or persuaded the plaintiff to admit, that the nature of the eccle- 
siastical suit was not exactly as the plaintiff had represented it in his sur- 
mise. On the first occasion, the Court had only the surmise before it. The 
reports treated in Vol. I relate to the second occasion and give the case as 
it then appeared; two other reports 50 relate solely to the first occasion. It 
was only on the first occasion that the matters we are at present concerned 
with -- disallowance and the jurisdiction of the Commission -- had any- 
thing to do with the case. I shall now discuss Partlet v. Butler as it origi- 
nally appeared, virtually as if it were a separate case. 
Partlet was sued in the High Commission for defaming a minister. He 
sought to justify the words he admittedly had spoken -- not as true in a lit- 
eral sense, but as a warranted "value judgment" in the light of facts that 
were alleged to be true. (The words were, "That he was fitter to stand in 
the pillory than preach in the pulpit, and that he had taken two orders al- 
ready, and that he lacked but taking the third, which was to have his ears 
cut off." The justification was that the minister had forged an acquittance, 
in commenting on which the speaker had so expressed himself. The 
speaker pleaded the forgery in detail -- i.e., showed what the forged docu- 
ment related to, when it was forged, etc.). A Prohibition was sought on 
surmise that the High Commission had improperly rejected the plea and 
sentenced the speaker to apologize. The Court granted the Prohibition but 
by-passed the theory on which it was sought. Without going into whether 
ecclesiastical courts were bound to recognize the kind of "circumstantial" 
justification for defamatory words relied on here, the judges simply held 
50 M. 38/39 Eliz. Q.B. Moore, 460 Lansd, 1059, f.256. (Both reports, virtually identical, sub. nom. 
Parlor v. Butler.) 
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that the matter was outside the High Commission's jurisdiction. If the 
words had been spoken during divine service, they said, the High Com- 
mission would have had a basis for proceeding (in consideration of the 
disturbance of order in the church); as it was, there was no basis. It is not 
clear form the reports whether this holding was intended to be specific to 
the High Commission. 
The judges eventually decided in this case that any ecclesiastical court 
would have been prohibitable from proceeding against the speaker, be- 
cause the words were actionable at common law. (They imputed worthi- 
ness of temporal punishment, though not a specific temporal offense. 
Once the justification was put on the board -- that the words were by way 
of accusing the minister of forgery -- the case for prohibiting was very 
strong. It is perhaps worth asking whether the words without that expla- 
nation were sufficiently clear imputation of temporal wrongdoing to war- 
rant a Prohibition.) But in addition, there was probably quite sufficient 
reason to prohibit the High Commission specifically. Standard doctrine 
(though this was a disputed subject) had it that the High Commission was 
confined to ecclesiastical crimes of some magnitude, and that charges of 
ecclesiastical defamation -- which were always considered partly, or in- 
deed primarily, criminal, even when the suit was private in form -- be- 
longed to the regular diocesan courts. I think it is probable that the 
Prohibition in Partlet v. Butler could have been obtained merely by sur- 
mising the nature of the proceeding and arguing that it was beyond the 
High Commission's jurisdiction. In a sense, the case is like those on mis- 
conceived surmises: Although it is possible that the theory implied in the 
surmise was perfectly good -- i.e., that it was not literally misconceived -- 
the Court felt free to dispose of the case on a simpler, more open-and-shut 
theory (whether the Commission's authority or the common law action- 
ability of the words). 
A case of 1600 51 gave the Queen's Bench considerable trouble. A. was 
sued in the Arches. When a pursuivant from that ecclesiastical court came 
to serve process on him, A. beat the pursuivant and said some "opprobri- 
ous" things about the Arches. The High Commission then proceeded 
against A. criminally for the "contempt and disorder" in his treatment of 
51 T. 42 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25203, f.206b. 
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the Arches' process-server. A. pleaded that all he did to the pursuivant 
was in self-defense. The High Commission disallowed the plea and went 
on to sentence A. to pay the pursuivant £10 damages, plus a fine. A Pro- 
hibition was granted on surmise of this material and (the report says) on 
pretense that assault and battery belong to the common law. The report's 
way of putting it suggests that the theory of the surmise was not simply 
that the ecclesiastical court should be prohibited for refusing to admit the 
justification of self-defense in response to its charge of "contempt and 
disorder," but also that the charge was in effect the temporal offense of 
assault and battery, improperly disguised as "contempt of ecclesiastical 
process and officers.'' In other words, the claim to a Prohibition was dou- 
ble-barreled, the surmise of disallowance serving the alternative theory 
that even if contempt in the form of assault and battery was punishable 
qua contempt self-defense ought to have been accepted as a plea. 
The judicial discussion reported was on a motion for Consultation. 
Counsel seeking the Consultation (Warburton) took the broad position 
that contempt proceedings pursuant to proper ecclesiastical suits are be- 
yond control -- whether a given defense to the charge is permitted or not; 
whether or not the contempt takes a form that would also be punishable as 
a temporal misdemeanor or tort; and also whether or not the court pun- 
ishing the contempt (the High Commission here) is the same court that 
suffered it (the Arches.) The court conceded all but the last point, con- 
cerning which it was in doubt. It was in no doubt about one thing: the 
High Commission had no authority to award damages to the pursuivant -- 
call it assault and battery or call it something else (these words are mine, 
but I think the formulation is probably safe), the High Commission, as a 
criminal court, could not give private amends. On the vexed question 
whether the High Commission had authority to fine (as opposed to using 
spiritual sanctions), Chief Justice Popham gave signs of a moment's 
doubt, but he and his brethren were ready after brief reflection to concede 
the Commission's power to fine. They were on the point of granting a 
Consultation for all except the damage-award, had Popham not been dis- 
turbed by the implications of letting the High Commission punish con- 
tempts to other ecclesiastical courts. The report accordingly ends with an 
adjournment. For our present purposes, the case may be taken as holding 
that disallowing a defense to proper ecclesiastical contempt proceedings 
is not controllable. On the other hand, the case illustrates the judges' will- 
ingness to look at all visible aspects of the High Commission's behavior 
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-- whether in contempt proceedings or other matters -- and to prohibit if 
that behavior was ultra vires -- whether or not the surmise was clearly 
predicated on the optimum theory. (The damage-award, the fine, and the 
High Commission's arrogation to itself of power to protect other ecclesi- 
astical courts would have been the components of the "optimum theory" 
here.) 
One Jacobean decision 52 reflects both caution about prohibiting the 
High Commission and an unusual form of insistence on the surmise of 
disallowance. A Prohibition was sought on the bare surmise that the High 
Commission was about to proceed in a matter of incontinency. (The re- 
port is no more specific.) All the King's Bench judges agreed that it had 
no authority to do so. (It was probably sound enough, in the light of other 
cases, to hold that minor ecclesiastical misdemeanors, such as run-of-the- 
mill incontinency, were outside the Commission's jurisdiction, even 
though criminal cases.) However, the Court denied the Prohibition for 
the present, instructing the party to "suggest this matter there unto them." 
If it was not allowed, the judges said, they would then grant a Prohibition. 
In other words, the party was required to "except to the jurisdiction." If 
unsuccessful, he must predicate his Prohibition on the High Commis- 
sion's refusal to rule against its own jurisdiction as a matter of law. There 
were practical advantages in that course. The judges said expressly that 
"they conceived that they would not hold plea in such a case." Why grant 
Prohibitions when there is practically no chance that a "foreign" court 
will actually proceed with an inappropriate suit if the defendant makes 
legal objection? The implications are disturbing, however, for if the prin- 
ciple of the decision were carried to its limits Prohibition would lie only if 
(a) the "foreign" court committed a specifiable and controllable error, by 
improper disallowance of a claim, erroneous sentence, or unlawful type 
of award; or (b) it was notorious or highly predictable that the "foreign" 
court would uphold its own jurisdiction on legal challenge. Prohibitions 
on the bare surmise that a claim or issue outside the "foreign" court's 
scope was before such a court would lose legitimacy. The more outland- 
ishly inappropriate the matter -- say a suit to recover freehold in an Arch- 
deacon's court -- the better reason to withhold Prohibition, pending 
failure of an exception to the jurisdiction in the "foreign" court. 
52 P. 10 Jac. K.B. 1 Bulstrode, 188. 
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Obviously the King's Bench in our case had no such far-reaching im- 
plications in mind. In all probability, the judges had no desire to prohibit 
the touchy and politically potent High Commission gratuitously. Apart 
from the practical situation, it is worth asking whether a special policy for 
the High Commission, or for this kind of case, can be justified in princi- 
ple. The answer, I think, is that it can be. (a) The High Commission was a 
statutory court. For practical purposes, it had such powers as the Elizabe- 
than Supremacy Act directly gave it or authorized the monarch to confer 
on it. Therefore, to prohibit the High Commission was to interpret a stat- 
ute. To prohibit it without evidence that it had misinterpreted the statute 
in its own favor was to imply that a deliberately created and intentionally 
"dignified" court could not be trusted to pursue its authority and was not 
meant by the legislature to be so trusted in any degree. By contrast, most 
ultra vires rules respecting "foreign" courts were "at common law" (i.e., 
non-statutory) and therefore exclusively appropriate to common-law in- 
terpretation and enforcement. To the extent that statutes defined the juris- 
diction and directed the conduct of "foreign" courts other than the High 
Commission, it is arguable (as we have seen in other contexts) that the 
non-common law court ought at least to get first crack at applying the 
statute to itself. But even if that is not conceded as a general principle, 
there are grounds for seeing the High Commission as a special case -- its 
exceptionally high status as an instrument of public policy in the affairs 
of an Erastian Church; the fact that it was created by statute (as opposed 
to regulated by statute) -- i.e., given from the start a delimited authority, 
which it was presumably expected to follow (which contrasts with telling 
an existing court to limit its authority in ways likely to go against its 
"natural" bent.) 
(b) In our case, the jurisdictional issue was intra-ecclesiastical. The 
lower ecclesiastical courts had undoubted jurisdiction to proceed against 
incontinency, while the High Commission did not (except on the theory, 
which the judges in our case would not attribute to the Commissioners, 
that all ecclesiastical causes, or at least all criminal ones, were within 
their authority if they wished to take them.) It is perhaps arguable that no 
ecclesiastical court should be prohibited on the ground that jurisdiction 
belongs to another ecclesiastical court unless it is claimed that the former 
has erroneously ruled in its own favor. In that situation, the jurisdictional 
issue may be regarded as inherently appropriate to the ecclesiastical sys- 
tem -- a matter of "What is the lawful distribution of authority within our 
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sphere?" (Cf. "What is the lawful distribution of revenue between vicar 
and parson?") -- subject to common-law scrutiny for misapplication of 
statutes (or other controllable errors, if any are conceivable -- realisti- 
cally, statutes were involved in nearly all the "distribution" situations that 
came up in Prohibition cases.) Sometimes, of course, whether the High 
Commission had jurisdiction was not a question of the boundary between 
that tribunal and other ecclesiastical courts, but of whether the suit was 
appropriate to any ecclesiastical court. In that event, the rule I state here 
would not apply, though the considerations under (a) above might. I 
doubt that the rule stated here for "intra-ecclesiastical distribution" situ- 
ations was generally recognized, but the instant case lends it countenance. 
In Sutton's Case, 53 our last one involving the High Commission, the 
surmise of disallowance was used with the same kind of ambiguity as we 
saw in the assault and battery case above. Sutton was proceeded against 
in the High Commission to the end of depriving him of the office of 
Chancellor of the Diocese of Gloucester. He was charged with lack of ap- 
propriate training in and knowledge of civil and canon law, the Commis- 
sion relying on canons and recent royal directives for the theory that 
persons unqualified in legal studies could and should be removed from such 
offices. Sutton was also charged with being a clergyman holding a cure 
of souls. (Whether or not that in itself made him ineligible for the Chan- 
cellorship, it was clearly alleged against him as an aggravating circum- 
stance. He was a divine, not a civilian, by profession, whatever pretense 
he could make to de facto competence in law; he was responsible for a 
living, which at least created doubt as to whether his holding both posi- 
tions was tolerable in view of possible neglect of the cure of souls.) Sut- 
ton admitted that he was a beneficed clergyman, but pleaded that the 
Chancellorship had been duly granted to him for life by the Bishop and 
Chapter, wherefore he had a freehold from which he could not be dis- 
lodged. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that this defense was disal- 
lowed. The Court turned him down, essentially because his having a 
freehold was considered irrelevant: He might have one, and if unjustly 
deprived of it he might have common law redress, but the ecclesiastical 
court had every right to examine whether he met the qualifications for the 
spiritual office he held, or failed to in such a way as to be deprivable by 
53 H. 2 Car. C.P. Croke Car.. 65. 
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ecclesiastical law. After all, every holder of a benefice had a freehold, 
yet clergymen holding benefices could be charged with various derelic- 
tions in ecclesiastical courts and deprived -- subject to common law reme- 
dies that would accrue to him and his patron if by color of a wrongful 
deprivation someone interfered with their respective temporal interests in 
the living. 
In one sense, the surmise of disallowance in this case was straightfor- 
ward: Sutton claimed that his duly acquired life-tenure in the office made 
him immune from scrutiny, at least concerning his qualifications and the 
compatibility of the office with his parochial responsibilities (perhaps if 
he had been specifically charged with dereliction of duty or malfeasance 
the case would be different); the High Commission overruled that legal 
contention; the Common Pleas was invited, albeit in vain, to control the 
High Commission's decision. The "matter of freehold," however, may 
change the thrust of the surmise. Suppose Sutton had said merely that the 
High Commission proposed to consider depriving him of an office in 
which he had a freehold without charging specific wrong-doing, and then 
had argued that the common law ought to protect freehold interests in of- 
fices against that kind of ecclesiastical interference. The argument would 
not have succeeded, but it might have been listened to. It is notable, fi- 
nally, that Sutton made no effort, and the Court made no move on its 
own, to dispute the High Commission's jurisdiction specifically. Perhaps 
that would have been unpromising in Charles I's reign. Whether it would 
have been implausible I am not so sure. The High Commission was look- 
ing into the affairs of the Diocese of Gloucester. As an interested party, 
perhaps, the Bishop would have no claim to exclusive authority, but the 
Archbishop might have a persuasive one. The matter was hardly criminal, 
as a charge of specific illegal acts on the part of an ecclesiastical office- 
holder might be considered (with deprivation the sanction.) The proceed- 
ings against Sutton are a good illustration of the High Commission's 
utility as an administrative instrument: Diocesan Chancellors were high 
officers; an incompetent, pluralistic one is likely to have gotten where he 
was by the cozier sort of cathedral politics; a national supervisory body, 
capable of cracking down on the localism that corrupted the Church as it 
frustrated central government, was a useful institution. But is it at all clear 
that the High Commission had the legal power to proceed against Sutton? 
At any rate, its power was not questioned in our case. 
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(9)General pardons 
The surmise of disallowance also comes up in a few cases on general 
pardons. The common law courts frequently prohibited ecclesiastical pro- 
ceedings on the bare surmise that a pardon released the party from liabil- 
ity. Dr. Newman's Case 54 is an express holding that the bare surmise is 
sufficient. Newman was an ecclesiastical judge, who proceeded ex officio 
against a clergyman (for what offense is not reported.) While the suit was 
pending, a general pardon was granted. That it covered the offense in 
question was undisputed. Newman nevertheless proceeded to sentence, 
from which the clergyman appealed. Then he sought a Prohibition, 
merely surmising the pardon -- i.e., without pretense that the pardon had 
been alleged and disregarded, either in Newman's court or at the appel- 
late level. Counsel opposing the Prohibition rested wholly on the argu- 
ment that failure to allege the pardon in the ecclesiastical court was a fault 
-- i.e., that there was no basis for Prohibition without a showing that the 
ecclesiastical courts had improperly disallowed the pardon after having 
been informed of its existence and urged to consider it relevant. The 
Court rejected that contention expressly and granted the Prohibition. 
The report is too brief to give a full impression of the Court's thinking, 
but a couple of formulations are interesting. The judges said that even 
thought the plaintiff had not tried to introduce the pardon in the ecclesias- 
tical court, he could allege it here as amicus curiae. That expression 
evokes the "public" theory of Prohibitions -- as if to say, "Granting that 
qua private party one who raises an issue at a later stage than necessary is 
in a weak position, we are here to prohibit such misconduct as prosecut- 
ing a pardoned man, however we find out abut it." Chief Justice Coke 
said that he doubted whether the general pardon could be waived in a 
criminal case -- by which he presumably meant to suggest, "If there is no 
way for a man to disclaim the benefit of a pardon, failure to allege it at a 
given point is no waiver; unless the plaintiff can in some sense be said to 
have waived the pardon, there is no reason to deny him the advantage of 
it when he brings it up." However the point is put, the Court's ground 
54 H. 8 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,209, f.220. 
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seems solid: Be the law as it might with respect to the need to allege other 
defenses and objections in the ecclesiastical court, a pardon was a public 
act, whereof the ecclesiastical judge should take notice (in at least a moral 
sense, seven if in a narrowly legal one he was not bound, under pain of 
reversal for error, to observe an unalleged pardon.) A pardon was a won- 
derful manifestation of royal mercy, to be appreciated and to be given its 
intended effect, though an ignorant or negligent party failed to claim it, 
though an ecclesiastical judge were excusably or inexcusably uninformed 
of it, or were unwilling to implement it on his own motion. 
In Elizabeth Davis. v. Hawkins, 55 the suit was for defamation. The 
original ecclesiastical court gave sentence for the defendant (speaker.) On 
appeal, the Arches reversed the sentence and gave the plaintiff (defamee) 
12d costs. A general pardon was then granted. (Acts of "spiritual" defa- 
mation, being considered primarily crimes, were consistently held to be 
within the terms of general pardons.) Then the speaker appealed to the 
Delegates, who upheld the Arches' judgement and granted further costs to 
the defamee. Then, after losing again on the merits, the speaker alleged 
the pardon in the Delegates. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that his 
attempt to plead the pardon had been disallowed. The Court's discussion 
of the case is obscurely reported. It is in any event of no importance here, 
for it turns on the problem (common in pardon cases) of how to deal with 
the two cost awards where the substantive offense was pardoned. The 
only point to be noted at present is that disallowance was alleged. Need it 
have been? Would exactly the same discussion have taken place on bare 
surmise that the Delegates had affirmed the "guilty" sentence plus the 
cost award below, and then assessed further costs, after the pardon had 
wiped out the offense? I can only say that in the light of Newman's Case 
and general practice I can see no reason to suppose the disallowance sur- 
mise was essential. One might conceivably argue that a man who takes 
appeals ought to try to use the pardon at some point in the ecclesiastical 
courts. I.e.: It is easy to forgive a man who is pardoned while being tried 
and says nothing about the pardon until, having lost, he seeks a Prohibi- 
tion. For people will understandably want to try for vindication on the 
merits in criminal causes. 
55 H. 22 Jac. C.P. Winch, 125. 
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But when that effort fails once, perhaps the equities are altered. If it is 
no fault to appeal on the merits instead of seeking a Prohibition based on 
the pardon after one loss, and if it is no fault to delay bringing in the par- 
don until the last appeal on the merits is lost, perhaps it should be consid- 
ered a fault even then to keep quiet about the pardon. One who keeps 
quiet all the way through takes advantage of very liberal facilities for vin- 
dication, and then stands back and permits the assessment of costs to get 
more snarled-up than it might if the ecclesiastical court’s notice of the 
pardon were assured by the party best able to call attention to it. How- 
ever, the principle of Newman’s Case is broad, and Davis v. Hawkins is 
hardly distinguishable from that case. (There was an appeal on the merits 
in Newman’s Case, and the pardonee kept quiet even after losing the sec- 
ond time. The only difference is that there could have been another appeal 
in Newman’s Case, whereas the pardonee in Davis v. Hawkins was at the 
end of the road when he brought up the pardon in the ecclesiastical 
courts. He could probably have brought it up for the first time in his Pro- 
hibition without hurting himself.) 
Further cases on pardons merely illustrate the occasional, probably su- 
perfluous, occurrence of the disallowance surmise. Smith v. Sherborne 56 
antedates Newman’s Case. A beneficed clergyman was sued to the end of 
deprivation on the ground that he had acquired his living by simony. He 
pleaded that simony had been forgiven by an appropriately timed general 
pardon and got a Prohibition on surmise that he was improperly denied 
the benefit of the pardon. The reports relate to a motion for Consultation. 
The case presented difficult problems and was argued at length. The Pro- 
hibition was eventually upheld because the judges did not think that the 
transaction involved amounted to simony. With respect to the pardon, 
they did not think it affected the parson’s deprivability for simony. (Par- 
doning the offense meant removing criminal liability, but did not, in the 
case of simony, remove the offender’s disqualification for holding a bene- 
fice.) At least in the retrospective light of Newman’s Case, I can see no 
reason why the Prohibition could not have been obtained merely by sur- 
56 H. -P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Moore, 916; Lansd. 1065, f.4; Harl. 4817, f.180b. (Moore is a bad report, the 
MSS. taken together excellent.) 
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mising that the clergyman was sued contrary to general pardon. The same 
debate and conclusion would have followed. 
The character of the litigation in Dr. Brikenden's Case 57 is not clear to 
me, but it does not matter here. A party tried to take advantage of a par- 
don to escape a costs award. He made an attempt in the ecclesiastical 
court and sought a Prohibition on surmise of disallowance. The Common 
Pleas turned him down on the substance. (a technical question, having to 
do with the timing of the pardon in relation to the judgment for costs and 
the subsequent "taxing," i.e., quantifying, the costs held due in principle.) 
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition had a weak claim, but I see no reason to suppose 
it would not have got a hearing without the disallowance-surmise. 
(10)Testamentary cases 
There are not many testamentary cases in which the surmise of disal- 
lowance is likely to have been superfluous. A couple may be noted. In 
Goram v. Fowks, 58 an administrator sued a man for detaining "jura et 
credita" belonging to the estate and thereby preventing the administrator 
from putting in a true inventory, as he was legally obliged to do. I take 
this suit to be in effect for discovery, like the innumerable equity bills for 
detention of deeds. If the administrator wanted to recover property be- 
longing to his intestate, he could only sue at common law. An ecclesiasti- 
cal suit would have been utterly inappropriate. I think it is plain that the 
administrator was trying to get the other party examined in the ecclesiasti- 
cal court as to whether he held "jura et credita" which the administrator 
suspected him of having, after which there would be enough information 
either to enter those items on the inventory as possibly recoverable assets 
or claims, or else to leave them out. The alleged detainer appeared in the 
ecclesiastical court and claimed property in the goods in question. (What 
kinds of things they were does not appear -- probably bonds, negotiable 
paper, or the like, the ultimate question probably being whether they were 
held as deposits or had been assigned.) A Prohibition was granted on sur- 
mise that the claim was disallowed. 
57 P. 1 Car. C.P. Croke Car., 9. 
58 M. 32 (31/32 or 32/33) Eliz. Q.B. 4 Leonard, 150. 
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The report is too skimpy to permit one to get a hold on this potentially 
interesting case. I would guess that the detainer admitted that he had 
goods of the sort roughly described by the administrator. (In the nature of 
discovery suits, the description would be rough. If the administrator knew 
precisely what was detained and believed it to belong to the estate, he 
should inventory it and sue to recover.) Then, I would suppose, the de- 
tainer said that the goods were his and took the position that the ecclesias- 
tical court had no power to investigate the truth of that claim or otherwise 
to interrogate him further. Perhaps it could make him answer questions to 
the end of discovering whether he had anything of the sort mentioned, but 
once he had admitted that he did, the ecclesiastical court must surcease, 
for the ownership of goods is exclusively common law business. The ec- 
clesiastical judge rejected that legal contention, whereupon a Prohibition 
was sought. If this reconstruction is correct, the occurrence of the disal- 
lowance surmise is unsurprising. The detainer quite naturally went into 
the ecclesiastical court in order to say, "Under the circumstances -- be- 
cause this is really a property-dispute -- I am not examinable here, though 
the suit against me as such -- merely as an effort to get information 
needed by the administrator from someone suspected of having it -- is un- 
objectionable." But it does not follow that the disallowance surmise was 
necessary. Suppose the detainer had said merely, "I am sued for discov- 
ery with respect to goods in which I claim the property." I can only con- 
jecture that the chance for a Prohibition would still have been pretty good. 
The report, indeed, suggests that the surmise here did not rely unambigu- 
ously on the disallowance, but sought also to say that the mere existence 
of a property claim took away ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Confronted with 
an unambiguously "bare" surmise, a common law court would be likely to 
say that ecclesiastical courts must be kept from asking questions that 
might touch on the rights of a property dispute, even if they would not 
necessarily do so. (Not necessarily, because the detainer could be asked 
only for a description of goods which might concern the administrator, 
without being asked in any way to explain or justify his claim to the prop- 
erty. But it is difficult to keep the two apart, and it is in the nature of dis- 
covery proceedings that potential litigants will in some measure be hurt 
by disclosure of even comparatively neutral facts.) 
Insofar as prohibiting at all is not the happiest solution -- well, as much 
harm was done by prohibiting with the surmise of disallowance as would 
have been done by prohibiting without it. The administrator is left in the 
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dark as to what exactly he should inventory as possibly recoverable prop- 
erty, and he may not have sufficient information about the goods to sue 
for them at common law. He should probably be advised to go to a court 
of equity. There, indeed, is where he should perhaps have gone in the first 
place. The decision in Goram v. Fowks does not, however, mean that ec- 
clesiastical suits for discovery are invalid as such. 
A second testamentary case, Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 59 was as follows: 
A man left a £20 legacy to his daughter. The executor entered into a bond 
to pay the legacy (i.e., promised to pay and bound himself to forfeit £40 if 
he failed to.) When subsequently sued for the legacy, the executor ap- 
peared in the ecclesiastical court and pleaded payment "according to the 
bond." He obtained a Prohibition on surmise that the plea was disal- 
lowed. On motion for Consultation, Tanfield, of counsel, argued that the 
executor had merely pleaded that he had paid the legacy. That was an ob- 
viously appropriate ecclesiastical plea to a suit in indisputable ecclesiasti- 
cal cognizance. If it was really disallowed (or disallowed for some 
plausible but insufficient reason, such as defective evidence), the error 
should be corrected by appeal. Justices Gawdy, Fenner, and Yelverton 
(only their opinion is reported, but they make a majority) overruled Tan- 
field's argument. As they put it, the bond "extinguished" the legacy and 
converted the £20 into a common law debt. Taken strictly, that should 
mean (a) that the legacy suit would be prohibitable even though there 
were no claim that the money had been paid; (b) that with or without a 
claim of payment, disallowance need not have been surmised. For if the 
making of the contract utterly "extinguished" the legacy, there was noth- 
ing within ecclesiastical jurisdiction to sue for. Therefore a surmise say- 
ing, "I am sued for a legacy altogether inappropriately, because the 
pretended legacy was converted into a debt" should get a Prohibition. 
It is of course unremarkable that the executor responded to the ecclesi- 
astical suit with his straightforward claim to have satisfied his duty, how- 
ever the duty is to be classified. It seems to me worth noting that there 
would be a good answer to Tanfield's argument without holding the leg- 
acy flatly "extinguished." The executor did not plead payment simpliciter, 
but "according to the bond." He called attention to his contractual duty 
59 M. 1 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 39; Add. 25,205, f.1b. (Virtually identical.) 
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over and above his ecclesiastical duty (note that the contractual duty was 
a heavier onus owing to the penalty in the bond), and professed to have 
paid by way of satisfying the contract -- though that was also to satisfy 
the ecclesiastical duty if the latter could be said (contrary to the Court) to 
retain any life. In rejecting that plea, the ecclesiastical court did not in the 
simplest sense commit the unaccountable (hence appealable) error of dis- 
allowing a plea of payment. It disallowed the plea that another duty had 
been substituted for the legacy by agreement and performed, wherefore 
proceedings to recover the legacy were manifestly unjust; At least in the- 
ory, the ecclesiastical court could have taken the position that the substi- 
tution does not extinguish the legacy, and therefore that the only 
acceptable plea is mere payment. "Payment according to the bond" is 
bad form because it implies the false premise that making the contract 
wipes out the ecclesiastical duty to pay the legacy. That position would 
perhaps not be manifestly erroneous by ecclesiastical standards (though 
pretty silly); common law intervention could be justified as protecting one 
whose performance of a common law duty would not be straightfor- 
wardly accepted as discharging any remaining ecclesiastical duty, con- 
trary to the plain intent of the parties and all justice. If we tacitly assume 
what we must if the ecclesiastical decision is to make any real sense -- 
that the disallowance was evidentiary -- then clearly ecclesiastical stand- 
ards of evidence should not be applied to the claim that a common law 
duty had been satisfied, whereas they would be appropriate (at least argu- 
ably) to a claim of mere payment (=satisfaction of a purely ecclesiastical 
duty.) 
The advantage of this tortuous alternative route to a Prohibition is that 
it avoids the starkest implication of the Court's "extinguishment" theory - 
- that making a contract to pay a legacy ipso facto destroys the ecclesiasti- 
cal right, whether or not the contract is performed. Is that really just? If 
an executor enters a penalty-bond to satisfy a legacy and pays nothing, 
should the legatee be prohibited from suing for the legacy? Must he sue 
on the bond, even though he is willing to give up the penalty and rely on 
the weaker sanctions of ecclesiastical law to get his money? Should one 
not worry about the motives of an executor who seeks to prohibit a suit 
for a legacy he has admittedly not paid, on the ground that an equivalent 
common law action lies against him? If he can avoid being harried by ec- 
clesiastical sanctions for the moment, he will perhaps be hard to find 
when a suit on the bond has ripened to execution. The Court in Goodwyn 
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v. Goodwyn appears to have taken the stronger position, which tends to 
remove the need to surmise disallowance. I argue that it need not have 
taken so strong a position to uphold the Prohibition, and that perhaps it 
should not have. Ultimately, I wonder if it did take that position. Could 
"The bond extinguished the legacy" not be taken as shorthand for "The 
ecclesiastical court had no business treating the right to a legacy as in any 
sense alive when performance of the bond was claimed -- no business do- 
ing anything but letting the executor try to prove satisfaction of the bond 
by common law standards -- no business, if this is what happened, forcing 
the executor to plead payment simpliciter and hence to subject himself to 
ecclesiastical standards of proof"? If such a reading is permissible, the 
behavior of the ecclesiastical court would have been essential to the right 
to a Prohibition. 
(11)Courts of Equity 
The surmise of disallowance almost never occurs in Prohibitions to 
courts of equity. Such Prohibitions were usually based on the theory that 
the suit should never have been brought in equity -- either because a com- 
mon law remedy was available, or because the judges thought that equita- 
ble relief was simply unjustifiable in the circumstances. We may 
conclude this section however, with an exceptional case in which disal- 
lowance was alleged, Moss v. Browne, 60 and a dictum on the disallow- 
ance surmise in relation to courts of equity. B. was badly in debt to M. 
and "decayed in estate." They made a settlement whereby B. paid 25 per 
cent of the debt and M. released the whole. B. then promised to pay the 
rest when "God should please to make him able." Later B. came into a 
large estate. M. sued him in the Court of Requests because he would not 
honor his promise in his changed fortunes. B. first pleaded that he had 
made no promise. When the Requests found against him on that point, he 
pleaded the Statue of Limitations. He sought a Prohibition in part because 
the plea of the Statute was disallowed. (His other claim was that he was in 
effect being sued on a contract, for which an Action on the Case at com- 
mon law was the appropriate remedy.) After argument, the Common 
Pleas refused the Prohibition. (The suit was not on an enforceable con- 
tract, since after the release of the original indebtedness there was no con- 
60 H. 17 Car. C.P. March, 151. 
200 
Problems of the Disallowance Surmise 
sideration to support the promise to pay the forgiven sum if possible. On 
the other hand it was legitimate to take B.'s promissory language as rais- 
ing a trust for M's benefit, and hence to take the suit as an effort to en- 
force a trust, even though it was not expressly cast as such. The Statute of 
Limitations did not apply to a trustee's duties.) 
For our present purposes, I would only suggest that the surmise of dis- 
allowance is unlikely to have been necessary, even if the claim to a Prohi- 
bition had depended wholly on the Statute of Limitations. "I am sued with 
respect to a duty no longer enforceable by reason of the Statute of Limita- 
tions" would probably have led to the same discussion and decision. 
There were problems, as we have seen, about the proposition that com- 
mon law courts were exclusively competent to construe statutes, situ- 
ations in which it was perhaps correct to insist that statute-based claims 
be advanced in the court that had lawful possession of the suit to which 
such claims were alleged to be relevant. I doubt, however, that the Statute 
of Limitations in a Requests suit would have seemed such a situation. Of 
all the prohibited courts, the Requests was probably the least trusted and 
the least regarded as a legitimate member of the system. The judges 
would probably have been ready to assume that minor equity courts (un- 
like the Chancery) were predisposed to mistake the force of statutes in 
general (as distinct from misapplying a particular statute). That is to say, 
they would have been suspected of an inclination to mitigate statutes, 
contrary to the good doctrine (reiterated in Moss v. Brown) that "there is 
no remedy in equity against a statute." (That is, equity relieved uncon- 
scionable abuses of the letter of the common law; it could not prevent 
people from taking unfair advantage of their statutory rights.) The Statute 
of Limitations would probably have seemed especially tempting. People 
like Browne in our case (had the statute applied to him) could maneuver 
themselves behind the protection of the statute in very bad conscience in- 
deed. For these reasons, I suspect that any common law court asked to 
stop a suit in the Requests allegedly barred by the Statute of Limitations 
would immediately take a look for itself, without regard to whether the 
statute had been pleaded and disallowed. 
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In an earlier Requests case, 61 no disallowance surmise was made, nor 
was one needed to justify a Prohibition, but a dictum relating to disallow- 
ance occurs. In this case, Edith More made Trott her executor and made 
the Taylor brothers residuary legatees, each to have half of the residue. 
Trott accounted for the estate in an ecclesiastical court, after which he 
paid what that accounting showed to be the residue to one of the Taylors
-- half in his own right and half as executor to his now-deceased brother, 
the other legatee. Taylor gave Trott two separate acquittances, one for 
each moiety. Trott then died, making X., the present plaintiff-in-Prohibi- 
tion, his executor. Taylor sued X. in the Requests for a new accounting 
(no doubt because he contended that a proper view of More’s estate 
would show a larger residue than appeared by the ecclesiastical account- 
ing.) X. pleaded the above matter (the ecclesiastical accounting plus the 
acquittance) in the Requests; Taylor demurred to his plea there. X. sought 
a Prohibition, through Coke as counsel, simply reciting all this. He did 
not say that the Requests had erroneously ruled against him, but claimed a 
Prohibition on the theory that the Requests ought not to consider giving 
Taylor relief under the circumstances as they were alleged to be. It is no- 
table, however, that X. did plead in the Requests. Quaere whether his 
chance for a Prohibition would be any less if he had not pleaded, or if it 
had not appeared of record that Taylor had demurred (that is to say, if so 
far as appeared questions of mere fact -- whether the prior ecclesiastical 
proceedings had occurred, whether the acquittance were made -- had been 
open in the Requests.) 
The Court granted a Prohibition: “For it was said that an executor’s ex- 
ecutor will not be compelled to account in a Court of Conscience, but the 
executor himself may. And an executor’s executor may be sued in Court 
Christian for a legacy of the first testator. And it was also said that if the 
acquittance will not be allowed there, that is another cause to grant Prohi- 
bition.” It is the last sentence of the Court’s opinion that concerns us here. 
As it stands, it would seem to insist on the disallowance surmise. As the 
case was, the Requests simply had no jurisdiction to call an executor’s ex- 
ecutor to account. (Whence one may infer that the surmise said more than 
it needed to even in reciting the prior ecclesiastical accounting, not to 
61 H. 2 Jac. K.B. Lansd. 1111, f.41. 
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mention the acquittance and the pleading in the Requests. Enough to 
show that the accountant was an executor’s executor. I should suppose 
the reason for his non-accountability in equity was that his conscience 
was not chargeable with anything his testator had done as executor. Sed 
quaere whether cases in which a charge could be put on an executor’s 
conscience are not imaginable, though this would not appear to be one of 
them, for X. would surely be entitled to assume that Trott’s ecclesiastical 
accounting was honest, whether it was or not. Reciting the prior events 
would seem to be helpful for clearing X. of any dereliction in persona.) If, 
however, the first executor had been called to account (or, speculating 
that it might be too flat to say that an executor’s executor can never be li- 
able in equity, if the prior ecclesiastical accounting had not taken place or 
not been alleged) the acquittances themselves would be grounds for Pro- 
hibition, provided they were disallowed. But if they were not disallowed  
-- if X. said nothing more than that he had the acquittances in hand -- 
Prohibition would not lie. So the Court’s opinion, taken literally, implies. 
I wonder whether it ought to be taken that literally. It is perhaps arguable 
in theory that a court of equity ought not to be concluded by the acquit- 
tances -- i.e., ought to be free to investigate whether they were predicated 
on a false accounting which the legatee unwittingly accepted at the time. 
But the King’s Bench in our case does not seem to have taken that po-
sition -- rather, the position that the Requests must not go behind the ac- 
quittances and is not free to try their factual reality. Therefore, should the 
acquittances be barely surmised -- without any allegation of an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to show them in the Requests and persuade that court to 
tell Taylor that he could not have relief in the face of his own releases -- I 
should not be surprised to see a Prohibition granted. This point is specula- 
tive, however. In terms, the opinion goes to show that the disallowance 
surmise was a possibility, and perhaps in some circumstances a require- 
ment, in cases concerning courts of equity. 
ENDNOTES 
FN 6. Lest this situation seem improbable, imagine the following situation: There is little or no sign 
of a custom of commuting tithes -- certainly not enough evidence to sustain a modus at common law. 
However, Parson would prefer money to the trouble of handling tithes in kind. He persuades most of 
the parishioners to agree to a commutation representing more or less fair value. But Parishioner A. 
won’t deal. He thinks the parson’s figure is too high, prefers paying in kind to meeting that price. SO 
Parson sues A. on a feigned, or at least weakly-evidence modus hoping that the ecclesiastical court 
will sympathize with his project, if A’s unwillingness to accept a commutation is strong enough to 
make him contest the suit. (Just bringing a suit is of course one way to make a recalcitrant bargainer 
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think twice.) Perhaps the ecclesiastical judge will see advantage to the Church in a fair-value 
commutation, where most of the parishioners are ready to accept one. Perhaps the judge will at least 
exercise pressure on A. If the judge is not dishonest enough to find the parson's modus good against 
all the evidence, perhaps he will at least be willing to uphold it by combining a little evidence in its 
favor with easy-going ecclesiastical standards of prescription. In these circumstances, A.'s only 
honest response is that there is no such modus, but that tithes in kind are admittedly due. In terms of 
Dodderidge's principles, I find this imaginary case tricky. On the one hand, it would seem that 
common law standards of prescription, rather than ecclesiastical standards, ought to determine 
whether A. has any other duty towards the parson than to pay tithes in kind. The question would 
seem to be whether the governing local law, based on immemorial usage, calls for tithes in kind or a 
substitute performance. 
On the other hand, should it be presumed that an ecclesiastical court would handle a contest between 
a modus and tithes in kind in such a way as to offend common law standards? I have deliberately 
stated a case in which the ecclesiastical court might have a motive to lean in the direction of the 
modus. perhaps using its easier rules on prescription to do so. But basing a presumption of law on an 
imaginable motive is dubious. If one thinks in the somewhat abstract terms perhaps appropriate to 
presumptions of law, it would seem that ecclesiastical law in general has a bias in favor of tithes in 
kind. (Why are ecclesiastical courts not trusted to try modi alleged by parishioners in suits for tithes in 
kind?) Should one not presume that across the board -- including the appellate level, where the judges 
would be remote from any knowledge of local conditions which might make it desirable to uphold the 
parson's modus -- ecclesiastical courts would look hard at any attempt to destroy the right to tithes in 
kind, whoever initiated it? Would they be likely to let such an attempt through unless the prescriptive 
claim was a good candidate by common law standards? 
Secondly, is it self-evident that common law standards should govern a contest between tithes in kind 
and a modus? Is it not arguable that the Church has a right to make people pay a commutation instead 
of tithes in kind if in fact they have done so for long enough to satisfy ecclesiastical standards of 
prescriptions? is doing that not equivalent to holding that usage over a reasonably long time amounts 
to consent, or a kind of "implied composition-real?" Of course such usage should be genuine; 
ecclesiastical courts ought not to do what the parson in our imaginary case hopes for -- cheat a little to 
uphold a weak or feigned modus. But the legal presumption must be that "foreign" jurisdictions will 
apply their own law honestly. 
Finally, there is an incidental reason against prohibiting ipso facto when a parson sues on a modus 
relating to a tithable product. For prohibiting in that case would spare the parishioner admitting 
anything against himself. I.e.: If A can have a Prohibition by surmising that, whereas he is sued for 
10d by virtue of a pretended modus, there is no such custom, he will not have confessed that tithes in 
kind are due. If he wins with a jury and the parson sues him for tithes in kind, he can get a new 
Prohibition by surmising a 6d. modus. If, on the other hand, A must plead in the ecclesiastical court, 
he must either allege his 6d modus now if he is serious about it or admit that tithes in kind are due. The Admission 
migh be advantageous to the parson in various ways, both in ecclesiastical and common law litigation. 
In sum, the case can be argued both ways. Perhaps the very fact that it can be is reason for insisting 
on a disallowance surmise. The last consideration above argues against an ipso facto Prohibition; the 
other considerations at least make difficulty, suggesting that the chance of common law standards' 
being violated in practice may not be so great, and that perhaps those standards are not even relevant. 
Under these circumstances, "wait and see" makes sense -- insist that the ecclesiastical defendant at 
least make a plea in the ecclesiastical court and come with a concrete complaint (e.g., that he offered 
specified evidence that tithes in kind were always paid, or paid up to a time so recent that a modus 
could not possibly be established by common law standards, and that such evidence was disallowed, 
or else that sentence was given without paying proper attention to it.) 
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As for the contest between alternative modi: If all the common law court can see is that such a contest 
is joined, has it the interest in making sure that common law standards are observed to justify 
intervention? Surely it must be assumed that the ecclesiastical court will apply the same standard of 
prescription to both of the rival modi. If it does so, it is at least not presumable that the ultimately 
governing common law standard will be flouted. For even if non-immemorial usage is taken to 
establish rights, it does not follow that the older of the two modi will not be upheld. By the ultimately 
"right" -- common law -- standard, it may be that neither modus ought to prevail over tithes in kind 
(or, in the case of non-tithable products, total exemption), but it would be strange to impose a "better" 
solution on the parties than either seeks. It is possible that application of the ecclesiastical standard of 
prescription could lead to an unacceptable result -- as if Parson's 10d modus were upheld on the basis 
of continuous usage over the last ten years, in the face of at least equally good evidence of 
Parishioner's 6d modus over the ten or more years preceding the last ten. If Parishioner made a 
surmise bringing out such a story, no doubt Prohibition should lie. But a surmise showing only that a 
contest between two modi exists is no basis for presuming that an unacceptable result is at all likely. 
Dodderidge's bringing up the conflicting standards of prescription -- in effect qualifying his earlier 
suggestion that only disallowance of a counter- modus reflecting variant evidentiary standards would 
justify prohibiting suits founded on modi -- only reinforced Justice Houghton's convictions. There is 
so much conflict between common and ecclesiastical law, Houghton said in effect, both on standards 
of evidence and standards of prescription, that a strong common law hand is necessary -- certainly 
automatic intervention when a contest of modi is joined. Presumably he would have argued that the 
likelihood of something's going wrong if ecclesiastical courts were left to try prescriptive 
counterclaims was quite enough to justify "preventive" control. When you have recognized that 
standards of prescription conflict and that the common law standard must prevail, why lean over 
backwards to avoid prohibiting until it is altogether certain that the governing standard will be 
violated? 
Rolle and Harl. 4561 expressly associate Chief Justice Montagu with the final, unanimous decision to 
prohibit, whereas he does not seem to have participated in either of two previous hearings. Bulstrode 
makes it clear that there were two, and that the second ended in a temporary stay. That was an 
appropriate step when the puisne Justices were 2- I for a Prohibition, but the Chief Justice had not had 
a chance to express himself. 
In addition, Bulstrode shows that the judges were confused about exactly what the surmise said and 
what the rival customs were alleged to be. Though the reporting is somewhat obscure, my impression 
is that their difference of opinion was rather in the abstract -- none of them being quite sure what the 
stated case before them was. Perhaps their differences disappeared when they got the case straight 
(e.g., Dodderidge could have become convinced that the disallowance was evidentiary); perhaps 
Dodderidge changed his mind on the principles and decided that counter- modus cases should be 
prohibited ipso facto after all. (The reports of the final outcome emphasize his point about conflicting 
standards of prescription. Perhaps Dodderidge himself came around to the view that, given such 
conflict, it was just as well to prohibit on bare surmise that modi were pitted against each other.) 
Whatever the exact story of one reluctant judge's thinking, it seems safe to suppose that three 
members of the Court favored prohibiting just because rival modi were in question -- in other words, 
that the disallowance surmise in this case was not essential. Goslin v. Harden may be taken as 
authority that alleging an alternative modus when the ecclesiastical suit is based on a modus will fetch 
a Prohibition as reliably as alleging a modus when the ecclesiastical suit is for tithes in kind. If, as in 
Goslin v. Harden itself, plaintiff-in-Prohibition says that his counter- modus was disallowed, the 
disallowance surmise should be untraversable. 
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IV. 
EVIDENTIARY DISALLOWANCE SURMISES: 
THE TWO-WITNESS RULE 
Summary: Judicial opinion on Prohibitions to block enforcement of 
ecclesiastical evidentiary standards was in one respect sharply divided. 
One vein of opinion, represented primarily by Coke, was opposed to such 
Prohibitions, apparently without exception. (Conversely: in favor of al- 
lowing ecclesiastical courts to apply their own standards to the determina- 
tion of facts, once it was conceded that a case or issue was within their 
jurisdiction and that no controllable error of substantive law had been 
committed.) Coke's position on this matter is the clearest instance, though 
not the only one, of his relative restraint in the use of Prohibitions and re- 
gard for the integrity of the ecclesiastical system. Across the board how- 
ever, the Cokean position was the dissenting opinion. Elizabethan 
authority strongly supports evidentiary Prohibitions in general and draws 
no very clear lines between circumstances in which they are and are not 
justifiable. The low point for such Prohibitions was the period of Coke's 
predominance on the Bench. Coke's Common Pleas explicitly adopted 
his position in a couple of strong decisions; his King's Bench appears, so 
far as reported cases show, to have granted no evidentiary Prohibitions; 
nor were they freely granted by the King's Bench under his predecessor 
there, Sir Thomas Fleming. After Coke's fall, both courts were readier to 
grant such Prohibitions, at any rate up to ca. 1630. 
Within the majority vein -- which recognized the general legitimacy of 
evidentiary Prohibitions -- there was considerable difference of opinion 
on a more detailed level. Alongside Coke's pronounced reticence to inter- 
fere with ecclesiastical evidentiary practices, it is possible to make out an- 
other "judicial restraint" position, the latter most clearly associable with 
Chief Justice Popham. This position comes to insisting on rigor in distin- 
guishing matters of essentially ecclesiastical concern -- which ecclesiasti- 
cal courts should be free to try by their own standards -- from matters in 
which the common law had a particular interest and which ought there- 
fore to be tried under rules as little at odds with the common law as possi- 
ble. 
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Most judges would have accepted that distinction in the abstract; their 
differences were over the rigor with which it should be applied -- i.e., the 
way the common law’s “interest” should be defined in various circum- 
stances; the kind and degree of “interest” required to justify Prohibition. 
The clearest intra-court division in those terms appears in the early-Ja- 
cobean King’s Bench. In the main test of strength between Popham’s ad- 
vocacy of restraint and greater willingness to intervene in ecclesiastical 
suits (Brown v. Wentworth), the Chief Justice was narrowly defeated. Po- 
pham’s influence may have joined with Coke’s, however, to keep eviden- 
tiary Prohibitions within somewhat stricter bounds in the 17th century 
than they had been confined to in the 16th. That is a very net sort of gen- 
eralization, however, for the late-Jacobean and early-Caroline courts de- 
parted to a degree from the mood of restraint. No settlement of the scope 
of evidentiary Prohibitions, cutting through the great variety of cases, was 
ever arrived at. 
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In the preceding two sections, we have been concerned with disallow- 
ance surmises which, at least ostensibly, complain of the substantive con- 
duct of ecclesiastical courts. That is to say, plaintiff-in-Prohibition alleges 
an act of disallowance which, he claims, implies an erroneous legal hold- 
ing subject to common law control -- e.g., that a husband’s release does 
not bind his wife. (Such surmises may sometimes be only ostensibly sub- 
stantive, in the sense that the real explanation of the disallowance might 
be evidentiary. E.g.: An executor claims that he was wrongfully pre- 
vented from relying on a husband’s release against the wife’s legacy suit. 
The factual explanation for the ecclesiastical court’s holding might be that 
the release was supported by only one witness. So long, however, as the 
executor does not allege that explanation, his surmise is substantive. If, 
knowing that the release was ruled out for deficiency of supporting evi- 
dence, the executor alleges that it was ruled out tout court, he stakes his 
case on the hope that Prohibition will lie whatever the reason for the dis- 
allowance. He hopes that the common law court will take an erroneous 
and controllable substantive rule as implied in the unexplained disallow- 
ance, or else that it will regard the explanation as immaterial. He hopes, 
should the act of disallowance come to trial and its evidentiary basis come 
to light, that the Prohibition will hold up -- i.e., that the judges will con- 
sider exclusion of the release by virtue of the two-witness rule just as 
wrongful as its exclusion by virtue of its rules on married women’s ca- 
pacity.) 
Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule 
We turn now to evidentiary disallowance surmises -- i.e., cases in 
which plaintiff-in-Prohibition complains expressly and solely that ecclesi- 
astical evidentiary standards have been improperly put in his way. In 
other words, one does not allege that one’s legal contention has been erro- 
neously ruled out, but that one has been prevented from establishing facts 
necessary to sustain one’s admittedly recognized legal contention. In al- 
most every case the culprit was the two-witness rule: people claim that 
they cannot establish Fact X. because the ecclesiastical court insists arbi- 
trarily that two witnesses be produced to affirm it. Once in a while, how- 
ever, other rigidities in ecclesiastical evidentiary standards are 
complained of. Like other disallowance surmises, evidentiary ones should 
not always be taken at face-value as descriptions of reality. The cases pro- 
vide a certain amount of incidental evidence that ecclesiastical courts 
were not altogether rigid in their proof standards. Plaintiffs-in-Prohibition 
who say they have been prevented from establishing Fact X. by a single 
witness may be feigning utterly -- simply figuring that an evidentiary dis- 
allowance surmise is a safer route to a Prohibition that alternative claims, 
and assuming that issue will not be taken on disallowance or the reason 
for it; short of that, plaintiffs may sometimes falsely attribute disallow- 
ances that actually occurred to the two-witness rule because that rule was 
well-known and more objectionable than less unbending standards. (E.g.: 
A man offers one witness to prove Fact X. His proof is rejected, not be- 
cause the ecclesiastical court actually insists on two witnesses, but be- 
cause it regards the proffered witness as incompetent, or because it 
requires documentary or circumstantial evidence to back up the single 
witness. The man may nevertheless say or imply that he is a victim of the 
two-witness rule -- taking that to be the safest way to a Prohibition, hop- 
ing that the reality will not be controverted or, if it is, that the evidentiary 
standards actually applied by the ecclesiastical court will ultimately be 
held objectionable in their own right.) 
For analytical purposes, however, such realities can largely be ig- 
nored: Evidentiary disallowance surmises on their face raise the question 
whether ecclesiastical courts are free to apply their own evidentiary 
standards to matters which are admittedly within their jurisdiction and 
which they give no sign of mishandling from the point of view of sub- 
stantive law. That is the pervasive question of this Section. 
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In the Introduction above, I ask in the abstract whether substantive and 
evidentiary disallowance cases can be distinguished as classes -- whether 
the reasons for prohibiting on the one type of surmise seem notably 
stronger than the reasons for prohibiting on the other. The answer, I think, 
is that arguments can be made in several directions on that question. But 
the difficulty of segregating the two classes of disallowance surmises is 
perhaps what emerges most clearly from the process of working out those 
arguments. In point of form and as a matter of convenience, the two 
classes must be looked at separately; a common set of jurisprudential is- 
sues permeates both categories. Anticipatory discussion of the evidentiary 
cases beyond what I have provided in the Introduction seems to me un- 
necessary. We shall see that in a historical sense the evidentiary cases 
show more coherent patterns that the substantive cases -- if anything, less 
legal certainty or consensus, but more clearcut divisions of opinion and 
more discernible changes of approach from time to time and court to 
court. 
In the early and leading Bagnall v. Stokes (1588), 1 an executor was 
sued for a legacy. He obtained a Prohibition by surmising that the legatee 
had released the legacy and that his offer to plead and prove the release 
had been rejected. Consultation was then moved for on the ground that 
the release was an incident of the properly ecclesiastical suit for the leg- 
acy and in itself a good defense by ecclesiastical standards. Therefore the 
suit was not prohibitable without regard to how it was handled, and the 
handling of the plea was beyond common law control. The executor's 
counsel (Owen) then said that "the truth of the case" was that there was 
only one witness to authenticate the written release, "and for that reason 
he will not have benefit of it in the spiritual court, whereas by the law of 
the land here it ought to serve him although he has only one witness." 
Counsel did not ask the Court to take that as truth merely on his word, but rather
argued that it was implied in the surmise. I.e.: The surmise said "offered to plead 
1 H. 30 Eliz. Q.B. Croke Eliz., 89; Moore, 907; Add. 25,194, f.58; Add. 25,196, f.109B. The 
MSS., very similar to each other, are both much superior to the printed reports. It is of interest to 
note that defendant-in-Prohibition in this case was represented by the "radical" lawyer Fuller (see 
other references.) It is of course a perfectly normal fact of a practitioner's life, but an amusing 
one, that the lawyer whose persecution by the ecclesiastical authorities a decade and a half later 
was a cause celebre on at least one occasion argued in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
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and prove" (with the additional words -- if Owen's speech reflects the surmise 
accurately -- "according to the law of the land".) Owen asked that that 
language, combined with the allegation of disallowance, be read as 
amounting to a claim that the release was ruled out for evidentiary rea- 
sons. In effect, he urged the Court to presume that the release would be 
excluded if it was not supported by two witnesses, and therefore to take a 
somewhat inexplicit surmise as saying that it was excluded for the lack of 
two witnesses. Owen's premise was that the ecclesiastical court's han- 
dling of the case was certainly controllable if inappropriate evidentiary 
standards had been insisted on, assuming that the suit was not prohibi- 
table on any other basis. 
The judges accepted Owen's premise but rejected his construction of 
the surmise. Prohibition would lie, they said, if the truth was as Owen 
said it was, and if the surmise had spelled that "truth" out. They would 
not read the surmise as laying an unexplained disallowance, over and 
above the bare fact that a release was in question. Neither the bare fact 
nor the unexplained disallowance would warrant prohibiting a legacy suit, 
in the Court's opinion. Nor would the judges take it as true, on Owen's 
word or by presumption, that the lack of two witnesses was the reason 
why the plea was ruled out. That must be stated clearly to have been the 
reason, and must actually have been. In other words, the legatee would be 
free to dispute a properly formulated surmise as to fact -- to deny that the 
plea was disallowed for evidentiary reasons and go to trial thereon. (So I 
take the Court's hypothetical language, "if the truth is as alleged." One 
has to be careful on this point, because there were circumstances in which 
the courts would hold that allegations that a plea had been disallowed -- 
or for a particular reason -- could not be traversed. So holding is compat- 
ible with insisting that disallowance, or disallowance for a reason suffi- 
cient to justify a Prohibition, be alleged as a matter of form. The 
possibility that the Court in this case was only concerned with tight pro 
forma pleading cannot be absolutely excluded. That bridge would not 
have to be crossed until, in another case on a correct surmise, the legatee 
tried to take factual issue on the reason why the release was disallowed -- 
an eventuality unlikely to come about.) 
In accord with this opinion, the Court granted a Consultation in Bag- 
nall v. Stokes. For our present purposes, the chief significance of the case 
lies in what was strictly speaking a strong dictum: Insistence on two wit- 
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nesses to prove a written release of a legacy will not be permitted. I say 
"strong dictum," because the Court told Owen clearly that all he need do 
to get a Prohibition was to rewrite his surmise. (Had the judges wanted to 
discourage jumping to conclusions as to what would happen in another 
suit, they could have confined themselves to negating the present sur- 
mise.) He was positively encouraged with respect to one possible misgiv- 
ing, for the judges assured him that an ecclesiastical sentence would not 
bar the Prohibition he claimed to be entitled to in substance. (Another 
possible misgiving was not mentioned: Would 50 Edw. 3 bar a new Prohi- 
bition in the same case after Consultation? Perhaps silence on that score 
was assurance enough.) 
Sir Edward Coke recorded Bagnall v. Stokes in the notebook he kept in 
margins and interleaves of a copy of Littleton. 2 (Anonymously, but the 
date and summarized facts make it clear that the note relates to that case.) 
To his summary, Coke appended a criticism: "Ex hoc nota that by such a 
surmise all matters could be removed out of the Court Christian, although 
the party had many witnesses. For when he surmises that he has but one 
witness, the other cannot say that he has two or more. For then he alleges 
something against himself. And thus it was adjudged M. 4 Jac in C.P., that 
no Prohibition lies on such a surmise." The passage is all in Coke's hand, 
but a slight change in the writing shows that the last sentence was added 
later. In other words, when Coke's Common Pleas, shortly after his ap- 
pointment as Chief Justice, reversed what he regarded as an unfortunate 
holding, he went back and "rounded out" the note he had presumably 
made much earlier. The addition tends to establish that the note was 
meant to be critical. Standing alone, it could be taken as a lawyer's 
memorandum of a handy device -- as it were, "If you want a Prohibition, 
surmise wrongful insistence on the two-witness rule, for the other party 
will hang himself if he tries to contradict you." Coke's taking the trouble 
to complete the note with the citation of a contrary holding by his own 
court confirms the more natural reading of the original words: They say 
in effect, "The holding in Bagnall v. Stokes has alarming implications" -- 
for later Coke remembered that he had once so observed and added, as it 
were, "but now my court has corrected the law." 
2 Harl. 6687, f.739. 
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The exact meaning and justification of Coke's criticism require a little 
reflection. It would seem to say in effect that the surmise of improper in- 
sistence on the two-witness rule is almost bound to be fictionalized and 
abused. That is, A. sues B. in an ecclesiastical court. B. has some sort of 
defense which he prefers to have evaluated and tried at common law, but 
is unsure whether he can get a Prohibition. If, for example, his defense is 
release of a legacy, he certainly cannot get a Prohibition -- going by Bag- 
nall v. Stokes -- on either the ground that releases are intrinsically "com- 
mon law issues" or on the general surmise that the defense was 
disallowed. Therefore B. surmises that he has one witness to prove his de- 
fense, but that the ecclesiastical court improperly insists on two. He 
makes his surmise up out of whole cloth. He may have plenty of wit- 
nesses to satisfy ecclesiastical standards; he may have made no attempt to 
plead his defense or offer evidence of any sort. 
How is A. to respond? According to Coke, he can only plead to the 
merits -- deny, say, that he made the release which B. alleges and let the 
issue be tried at common law. For how can he traverse the disallowance- 
for-evidentiary-reasons, even if he is quite free to in principle? If he trav- 
erses, B. will want to convince the jury that he has only one witness. If he 
in fact could produce a dozen, he will make every effort to repress them. 
A. will have to round them up in order to prevent the jury from conclud- 
ing that B. does in fact have only one witness, and inferring from that that 
B. is telling the truth when he says that he offered his single witness to the 
ecclesiastical court and was turned away. But what will be the effect if A. 
finds several people who will swear, "Yes indeed, A made such a release; 
I saw him write this document out and hand it over to B with my own 
eyes.?" In the first place, will the jury be likely to find for A. if it can 
avoid it? It ought to, perhaps, but it now has overwhelming evidence that 
B.'s defense is true. If it finds for A., it will cause the suit to go back to 
the ecclesiastical court, where the plainly justified B. will have to spend 
his time and money justifying himself all over again. It is hardly a favor 
even to A. to bring further useless litigation upon him -- or at least litiga- 
tion which ought to be useless, if the ecclesiastical court is honest. So the 
temptation to do rough justice by verdict will be considerable. 
But perhaps the jury can be controlled. Can the jury be told to find for 
A. because the evidence shows there are several witnesses, when the is- 
sue is not how many witnesses there are, but whether the ecclesiastical 
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court refused to accept B.’s proffer of proof by one witness? Hardly, for 
what the ecclesiastical court did does not follow from how many wit- 
nesses there are. The number of witnesses there are only goes to verify 
other evidence or permit a constructive picture in the absence of direct 
evidence. If the jury thinks there is only one, it may tend to disbelieve tes- 
timony to the effect that the ecclesiastical court was willing to accept the 
proffered evidence, in the light of other testimony that ecclesiastical 
courts frequently or usually demand two witnesses. Or if there is no di- 
rect testimony on the ecclesiastical court’s actions, the jury may figure 
that B. is probably telling the truth: he would probably have offered his 
single witness, and the ecclesiastical court (given its normal habits) would 
probably have rejected the offer. If, on the other hand the jury thinks there 
are several witnesses, it may be skeptical of B.’s claim (why shouldn’t he 
have offered such formidable evidence in his favor?), or at least inclined 
to punish him for failing to offer it (to the obvious end of having a Prohi- 
bition.) But it cannot be said that the jury must find for A., though it were 
clear that a hundred witnesses could have been produced. 
If we assume a verdict for A., further tangles are imaginable. Will the 
common law necessarily deny a motion in arrest of judgment and grant a 
Consultation, if it is informed that strong, uncontradicted evidence shows 
that B. owes A. nothing? Will A. now be permitted to go into the ecclesi- 
astical court and discredit the witnesses he has used in his behalf at com- 
mon law? At best, assuming he gets a Consultation, A. is not going to be 
in very promising position. He may have helped B. discover evidence, 
and the attempt to impeach his own former witnesses will look exceed- 
ingly odd. Finally, the scenario I imagine will only take place on the as- 
sumption that A. can get to a jury with the issue, “Was the ecclesiastical 
court offered proof by one witness, and did it reject the same?” There 
might be pleading-hurdles in the way of that. If B.’s claim includes the 
statement “there is only one witnesses who can authenticate the defense I 
want to rely on,” can A. traverse B.’s claim as a whole (going to the acts 
of the ecclesiastical court) without being held to have contradicted that 
statement? And does contradicting it entail admitting that there are at 
least two witnesses and that they are credible (can in fact authenticate the 
defense, as alleged)? Maybe not, but perhaps there is at least a problem. If 
A. has admitted on the record that he has no case in substance, should 
there even be a trial on the logically separate question whether the eccle- 
siastical court in fact disallowed the proffered evidence? Should A. be 
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sent back to the ecclesiastical court to deny what he has admitted? That is 
rather worse than sending him back to discredit witnesses whose testi- 
mony adverse to himself he has elicited. 
In sum: Taking issue on a general surmise of disallowance was un- 
promising enough. Taking issue on a surmise of disallowance for eviden- 
tiary reasons would be even less promising. A party must be desperately 
desirous of having his case settled by an ecclesiastical court to risk the 
possibly -- if not certainly -- self-destructive course of trying to prove 
that no disallowance by reason of defective proffered evidence took 
place. Anyone with normal faith in his cause would prefer to go directly 
to trial on the merits (e.g., "Was the legacy released or was it not?"), hop- 
ing for a fair and successful common law determination, followed by a 
Consultation and clear sailing in the ecclesiastical court. Under these cir- 
cumstances, there would be no effective check on feigned surmises, and 
ecclesiastical courts would be unjustly deprived of business which be- 
longed to them and which they may have been willing to handle by evi- 
dentiary standards acceptable to the common law. Coke's reputation as no 
particular friend of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is well-enough deserved, but 
he did not want to see gross infringement of the traditional "diversity of 
courts." Sir Christopher Wray's King's Bench, which decided Bagnall v. 
Stokes in favor of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, probably did not think 
through the implications of the dictum by which it complemented the de- 
cision. 
The implications of Coke's position are fairly radical. The position 
would come to saying, "Forget about two-witness-rule disallowance sur- 
mises." Such surmises being subject to fictionalization and abuse, the 
courts ought to confine themselves to prohibiting (a) when an issue that 
ought to be tried at common law arises in a properly ecclesiastical suit -- 
on bare surmise that the issue has arisen, without disallowance surmise; 
(b) when the ecclesiastical court is alleged to have disallowed a plea and 
the act of disallowing it appears to imply an untenable legal position 
within common law control (plus, of course, the strongest case, (c) when 
the suit ought never to have been brought in an ecclesiastical court.) 
Once a case is excluded from category (a) (i.e., once the issue in question 
is held an "incident" of the ecclesiastical suit, triable by ecclesiastical 
methods) and also excluded from (b) (by "Tanfield's principle" or some 
alternative) the ecclesiastical courts are free to apply their own eviden- 
215 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
tiary standards. This statement of principle of course says nothing about 
the content of (a) -- the list of issues that ought to be tried at common law. 
Presumably releases of legacies would not be on the list, as Bagnall v. 
Stokes decided. Coke might have said, however that it would have been 
better to prohibit in that case on the straightforward ground that ecclesias- 
tical courts ought not to meddle with releases, than to refuse Prohibition 
and then open he door to abusive two-witness-rule surmises. (Taking the 
ecclesiastical decision to imply the untenable legal position that a legacy 
is not releasable would be entirely unconvincing. Contrast the case of a 
husband’s release pleaded in his wife’s suit, where at least it is arguable 
that the ecclesiastical courts would not recognize the binding common 
law conception of the marital relationship.) 
I have independent confirmation of Coke’s statement that the dictum in 
Bagnall v. Stokes was overruled by the Common Pleas in M.4 Jac., in Pep- 
pes’s Case. 3 The decision is strong, for the party seeking a Prohibition 
was probably an honest man with a hardship. An executor being sued for 
a legacy surmised that the legatee had released, and that the release was 
witnessed by three people. In the meantime, however, two of the wit- 
nesses had died, and the ecclesiastical court would not allow the testi- 
mony of the survivor. 
The Common Pleas refused the Prohibition, with the remark "... if 
witnesses die it is the party’s misfortune.” The report also contains one 
further statement by Coke, which is marred by a hiatus in the MS. but ap- 
pears to say in effect that people who take releases ought to have them 
witnessed by a public notary, and that a precedent to encourage that form 
of prudence would be useful. Presumably Coke thought that a notarized 
release would have no trouble gaining acceptance in ecclesiastical courts 
and had no objection to ecclesiastical rules which punished sloppy habits 
3 The name Peppes’s Case comes from the Lansd. 1111 report of Browne v. Wentworth 
(discussed below in this section). A brief report of Peppes, properly dated M. 4 Jac. C.P., is 
appended to Browne v. Wentworth and given as a general holding that Prohibition does not lie 
to block application of the two-witness rule in a legacy-release case. The case is cited as Alcock 
v. Peppes in Devenish v. Downes (below.) The particulars as I give them in the text are reported 
in an anonymous entry under M. 4 Jac. C.P. -- Add. 25,215, f.36b -- surely the same case. Noy, 
12, under Chadron v. Harris, reports the holding briefly sub. nom. Peppes Case, but misassigns 
the case to the King’s Bench. 
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of business. The decision is tough, in that the executor told a likely 
enough story with some particularity (as opposed to speaking so generally 
as to raise suspicion of a feigned surmise). He was the victim of bad luck 
as well as fairly mild imprudence, and of harsher evidentiary rules than he 
would have encountered in a comparable common law suit. 
We shall see below that Coke on the Bench observed the principle of 
his note on Bagnall v. Stokes in other cases than that of the legacy re- 
lease. But before looking at Jacobean cases generally, let us round out the 
Elizabethan picture. Very shortly after Bagnall v. Stokes, another Prohibi- 
tion was granted to prevent enforcement of the two-witness rule in a leg- 
acy suit, thought not with respect to a release.4 Here the executor's 
substantive claim was simply that he had paid the legacy. However, he 
had taken a written acquittance from the legatee and purported to have 
only one witness to authenticate it. As the brief reports state the case, it 
would appear that the executor did not even pretend to have proffered his 
acquittance and single witness, but merely said that the ecclesiastical 
court would not (notoriously) count one witness as better than none. The 
Prohibition was nevertheless granted (apparently regardless of the insis- 
tence in Bagnall v. Stokes on a clear surmise of actual proffer and disal- 
lowance.) In substance, this case is stronger that the dictum on the release 
case in Bagnall v. Stokes. A release, even of a "merely ecclesiastical" 
legacy, should probably be conceived as a common law transaction, a 
conveyance by way of extinguishment of an unrealized right to property. 
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Arguably, at any rate, an ecclesiastical court trying a release ought to 
apply evidentiary standards as close as possible, given the difference of 
methods, to those that would obtain at a common law trial of the same 
transaction or type of transaction. (If, instead of releasing a single legacy, 
one released all claims or suits, including legacies, exactly the same trans- 
action could come in question in separate common-law litigation.) But 
mere payment of a legacy could never be a common law issue. What in- 
terest, however indirect, do common law courts have in the evidence ec- 
clesiastical courts demand to support a claim that a purely ecclesiastical 
duty has been satisfied? If anyone can intervene to prevent unjust double 
payment resulting from rigid or formalistic standards or proof, is it not a 
4 T. 30 Eliz., Court not given. Harl. 1331, f.47b. 
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court of equity? So the reporter of this case thought, for he adds a note 
expressive of surprise at the decision: "... and yet he has no remedy for it 
except in Chancery. Nota." Whether the Chancellor would actually inter- 
vene to protect the executor against the consequences of the ecclesiastical 
two-witness rule I do not know. His doing so would be analogous, how- 
ever, to a common form of equitable intervention: to protect debtors on 
sealed obligations from double payment when they neglected to take a 
sealed acquittance. One might question the common law's standing to ob- 
ject to the evidentiary formalism of the two-witness rule, in view of the 
common law's own insistence on support under seal for the claim that a 
sealed obligation had been paid. 
Over against the last case and Bagnall v. Stokes -- both essentially fa- 
vorable to two-witness-rule Prohibitions -- there is an early Queen's 
Bench decision leaning the other way. This case presents several com- 
plexities, however. The first problem concerns the reports. I have two vir- 
tually identical MSS. 5 sub. nom. Foster (or Footer) v. Whiscarre, dated T. 
32 Eliz. Q.B. In that report, Coke and Tanfield argue on a motion for 
Consultation -- Coke for the motion, Tanfield against it. The other reports 
-- sub. nom. Fuller (or Futter) v. Clemens and Whiskare (or Whiskin) -- 
occur in two printed versions of the Jacobean Robert's Case, 6 where it 
was cited and apparently narrated at length by Coke, then Chief Justice of 
the Common Pleas. These reports, substantially the same, date the case P. 
35 Eliz. That date must be erroneous, however, since Chief Justice Wray, 
who is expressly associated with the decision, died a year earlier. Three 
years between argument on a motion for Consultation and the final dis- 
posal of the case on demurrer which the printed versions report would be 
a long time; that the time was actually shorter reinforces the conclusion 
which the names of the parties and the facts clearly point to -- that we are 
dealing with a single case. Its history can be constructed as follows: A 
Prohibition having been granted, Consultation was sought on motion. The 
motion either failed with a majority of the Court, or else Coke dropped it 
when he saw (as the MS. attests) that at least Justice Fenner could not be 
persuaded. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition proceeded to declare; Coke put in a 
plea; the plaintiff demurred, as Coke probably expected him to. If his rec- 
5 Add. 25,296, f.243b; Harl. 1633, f.98. 
6 12 Coke, 65; Croke Jac., 296. 
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ollection of the outcome can be trusted, he was successful, for the Court 
is said to have decided unanimously against the Prohibition, meaning that 
Fenner was converted after hearing full-scale argument. 
I do not think there is any reason to doubt what Coke says about the 
outcome. His memory, to be sure, could be affected by his pride and pre- 
dilections. The case was among his personal victories at the Bar, and it 
supported views which he held as a judge (whence his use of it in 
Robert’s Case.) There may be an element of interpretation in the gener- 
alizations which Coke attributes to the Court, but he states the facts in de- 
tail (as if he had the record at hand), so I doubt that there can be any 
mistake about the result. The real question of concern to us here is 
whether the case counts for much against two-witness rule Prohibitions. 
Coke may have been too eager to use it that way. 
The facts of Foster v. Whiscarre (as I shall refer to it) were as follows: 
Foster sued Clemens for tithes, pretending to be owner of the rectory. 
Whiscarre intervened for interest, alleging that the rectory was his, not 
F.’s, via a specified chain of conveyances. The ecclesiastical court of first 
instance gave sentence against F., who appealed and set forth a chain of 
title intended to show that the rectory was his. Towards establishing one 
link in the chain, F. offered to prove delivery of deed by one witness. Not 
being allowed to establish that conveyance by the proffered evidence, F. 
lost again in the appellate court, whereupon he obtained a Prohibition. 
The motion for Consultation followed, then the pleading eventuating in 
the demurrer. 
The crucial wrinkle in this case -- and the reason why it does not pre- 
sent a simple two-witness-rule problem -- was that the fact which the sin- 
gle witness was offered to prove was apparently insufficient to support a 
conclusion in F.’s favor. To establish that F. was owner of the rectory, a 
conveyance from X. to Y. had to be established. Towards establishing 
that conveyance, F. offered one witness to prove that X. made and deliv- 
ered a deed to Y., purporting to give him a life-estate in the rectory. But if 
that act (delivery of such a deed) were established -- if, in other words, 
the single witness were accepted -- it would still not be established that X. 
conveyed the rectory to Y. for life. For conveyance of life-estate in a rec- 
tory required livery of seisin. (That is to say, a rectory was a piece of real- 
estate, freehold interests in which could only be transferred by the 
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ceremony of livery or an equivalent solemnity; such interests could not be 
transferred merely by handing over a deed; the role of the deed which 
usually accompanies such transactions was only to furnish evidence of 
and to explain the conveyance actually effected by livery.) In the abstract, 
then, the form of Foster v. Whiscarre would seem to be: An ecclesiastical 
court disallows proof by one witness of a fact which, if true, would not es- 
tablish what the party seeking to take advantage of that fact needs to es- 
tablish to win. Should a Prohibition to block the two-witness rule ever be 
granted in those circumstances, however liberally such Prohibitions 
should be granted in general? 
One consideration, however, might undermine that way of stating the 
problem To maintain his suit against C., F. needed to be owner for the 
time being of the tithes, not necessarily of the rectory as a whole. Tithes 
could be detached from the rest of the rectory, and, as an impalpable spe- 
cies of property, they could be conveyed for life without livery of seisin. 
If, therefore, the conveyance from X. to Y. could be interpreted as a trans- 
fer of the tithes alone, establishing the deed would establish that the tithes 
passed. On this construction, we would have a simple two-witness-rule 
problem: Should ecclesiastical courts be permitted to use that rule to pre- 
vent conveyances of tithes from being established, when properly ecclesi- 
astical litigation over tithes depended thereon? In the event -- upon the 
demurrer -- the Court held that the X.-Y. conveyance should not be taken 
as a transfer of the tithes detached from the rest of the rectory. It was held 
that no such intention appeared -- i.e., that X. meant to convey the whole 
rectory, and so far as the record showed had failed to. In the earlier stages 
of the case, however, the construction of the conveyance may have been 
an open question. Its openness would be a good reason for denying Con- 
sultation on motion. The case was complex; it was hard enough on either 
alternative statement of the problem; a choice between those alternatives 
had to be made before the problem could be defined. Under such circum- 
stances it was clearly good policy to insist on formal pleading. 
The first reported discussion -- on the motion for Consultation -- was 
predicated on my first formulation. Coke, arguing for the motion, said 
that the X.-Y. transaction must be taken as an attempt to convey the 
whole rectory; Tanfield did not contradict him on this occasion. Rather, 
he argued in effect that establishing the deed, while not sufficient to make 
out F.’s title to the rectory, was still highly relevant or perhaps essential. 
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Therefore the ecclesiastical court ought not to use the two-witness rule to 
prevent the deed from being established. ("The seisin alone is not to be 
proved where livery is made secundum formam chartae, but the deed is 
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also to be proved.") In the abstract, Tanfield was taking a loose view of two- 
witness-rule Prohibitions, Coke a tight one. Tanfield was saying that improper
disallowance of a single witness was grounds for Prohibition even though the 
disallowance might not appear in all strictness to be the cause of the 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition's lack of success. The ecclesiastical court ought 
not to rule out evidence acceptable by common law standards when that 
evidence went to establish such "temporal" facts as a deed purporting to 
convey a rectory, or describing the conveyance of one. A litigant seeking 
to establish such a conveyance is entitled to establish the deed and needs 
to in order to make his case complete. The deed, after all, goes to prove 
that the conveyance took place and is necessary to make out the nature of 
the conveyance -- what exactly was comprised, what estate was con- 
veyed, whether any conditions or future interests were attached, etc. Since 
establishing the deed is a vital part of the job, it is beside the point 
whether anything more would have to be established to make out a per- 
fect conveyance and settle the present state of the title. 
Coke's contrary view, though he was arguing for his client, fits his 
personal opinion on two-witness-rule Prohibitions. For it comes to saying 
that if such Prohibitions are ever legitimate they should be approached in 
a "strict constructionist" spirit. If disallowance of evidence in a properly 
ecclesiastical suit is ever grounds for Prohibition, the act of disallowance 
must appear to be the necessary explanation of a unacceptable result. 
Here, so far as appeared, the disallowance only explained F.'s inability to 
establish a deed which, in the strictest sense, he perhaps did not need to 
establish to make out his title, and which would not, if established, suffice 
to make it out. (If F. proved beyond doubt that X. delivered seisin of the 
rectory to Y., it would be at least doubtful whether F. would lose, even 
though the deed were held unproved, and hence as good as nonexistent. 
I say "at least doubtful" because it is probably in some degree unpre- 
dictable what would happen in an ecclesiastical suit where a man claimed 
that seisin was delivered secundum formam chartae -- i.e., with the ex- 
press intent of conveying such an interest as a specified, simultaneously 
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delivered deed described -- and then failed to prove that any deed relating 
to the transaction existed. That man might lose, even thought he proved 
overwhelmingly that the act of livery took place. But surely it is possible 
that he might win. Unexplained livery of seisin conveyed a life-estate. If, 
as in our actual case, only a life-estate needed to be established, the livery 
by itself might be regarded as enough for the ecclesiastical purpose of as- 
certaining whether the person suing for tithes was the person entitled to 
them. If the ecclesiastical court went the other way -- holding against a 
man who claimed livery secundum formam chartae, proved the livery, 
and failed to show that there was any such deed -- then perhaps it ought to 
be prohibited, whether or not the situation resulted from the two-witness 
rule. Whether it should be prohibited in that case would presumably de- 
pend on the niceties of analogy with common law situations. The Prohibi- 
tion, if appropriate, would lie because the ecclesiastical court ignored or 
misunderstood governing common law standards. In the principal case, 
there was nothing to suggest that the one categorically binding common 
law standard -- that conveyance of a freehold requires livery -- had been 
violated. On the contrary, the ecclesiastical court may well have respected 
that rule, for nothing on the record -- at this stage, the surmise -- sug- 
gested that livery was claimed, much less that it had occurred. The eccle- 
siastical court might have refused to accept proffered evidence of the 
deed because no claim of livery was made, nor evidence thereof offered. 
For all the Court could tell, the ecclesiastical judge would have been glad 
to accept proof of the deed by one witness, had there been anything be- 
yond a deed and a single witness to support the claim that an X-Y con- 
veyance took place.) 
Justice Fenner accepted Tanfield's position, but with a twist of his 
own: "Although the deed and livery are at the same time, still there is pri- 
ority in the deed, and he must begin with that, and it must be proved first, 
which he has offered, and the judges of the Court Christian have refused, 
wherefore the Prohibition ... will stand." Two slightly different positions 
in favor of the Prohibition can be stated: (a) The ecclesiastical court ought 
not to have insisted on the two-witness rule for purposes of proving a 
"temporal" deed. That isolated "ought not" is reason enough to prohibit -- 
provided establishing the deed was relevant for the party's purpose, pro- 
vided failure to establish it might have a fatal, or at least adverse, effect 
on the party's cause. It need not appear that the plaintiff-in-Prohibition 
had an airtight case save for the deed. (b) Prohibiting the ecclesiastical 
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court cannot be justified merely because it made an intrinsically improper 
evidentiary ruling with respect to a relevant fact. It must appear that disal- 
lowing the single witness took place at such a time that it was fatal to 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s cause. As it were, the disallowance must have 
obstructed the party’s path so as to insure his downfall. 
To be sure, it need not appear here that the party’s case would turn out 
to be airtight except for the deed. But it must appear that the party was 
blocked while proceeding in the proper order, so that he was prevented 
from establishing any further facts necessary to his cause. Justice Fenner 
plainly adopted the second position and supplied the minor premise -- 
viz., that the party was proceeding in the proper order. He was not only 
entitled -- having pleaded a lease by deed -- to proffer his evidence to 
prove the deed before making any attempt to show that seisin was deliv- 
ered; that was the correct things to do. Therefore, at that moment, the ec- 
clesiastical court had a duty to let the deed be proved by common law 
standards; it had no right, if that was its intention, to rule out the deed un- 
til evidence of livery had been given, or because none had been offered; 
at that moment, the party’s ultimate burden of showing livery was unac- 
crued. 
Tanfield’s position may have been identical but his scantily reported 
words are at least compatible with the looser position (a). Both positions 
contrast with Coke’s view that the evidentiary disallowance, if grounds 
for Prohibition at all, must be the sole possible cause of a man’s inability 
to establish a claimed common law conveyance. It is not clear to me why 
Justice Fenner was so confident of the deed’s “priority.” If one is thinking 
in interjurisdictional terms, it would be more sensible to give the livery 
priority -- i.e., to say that parties seeking to establish freehold convey- 
ances in ecclesiastical suits should first give evidence of the sine qua non, 
livery. If the two-witness rule was used to prevent the livery from being 
proved, the case for Prohibition would be strong; if the livery was suc- 
cessfully established, the problem raised by any subsequent trouble about 
proving the deed would at least be simpler -- i.e., a Court asked to pro- 
hibit would not be, as here, in the dark as to whether there was any livery 
of seisin, hence any conveyance. (The chance that no livery ever took 
place would be quite good in the circumstances of our case. An unadvised 
person intending to convey only a life-estate in a rectory -- the whole real 
value of which might be in the tithes, as to which no livery was required - 
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- might well assume that the property would pass by deed alone.) Per- 
haps Fenner was thinking of some analogy from common law practice. 
Perhaps he was making a rather more confident assertion about "priority" 
than he was strictly entitled to in order to have a plausible reason -- one 
not based on too "loose" a theory of the right to intervene in ecclesiastical 
affairs -- for opposing Consultation on motion. It seems to me that the 
motion clearly ought to have been denied, if only on the procedural 
ground that the case was difficult. Perhaps Coke would have acknow- 
ledged that his motion was a gamble on a shortcut. 
Upon demurrer, the facts in full, as I recite them above, became part of 
the record. (The circumstance that Whiscarre was a third party received 
for interest figured centrally in the formal argument of the case. Although 
the surmise probably showed that fact, no attention was paid to it when 
the motion for Consultation was discussed.) The demurrer was not to the 
Prohibition (plaintiff's declaration), the sort of demurrer that normally 
constituted the formal alternative to motion for Consultation. Rather, the 
demurrer was the plaintiff's move, in response to an absque hoc traverse 
of the declaration. F., that is, pleaded that he had been prevented from 
proving the deed by one witness, and that the ecclesiastical court in con- 
sequence of the wrongful disallowance had given sentence against him. 
W. pleaded that the deed was proved, but that because F. could not prove 
livery of seisin sentence was given against him -- absque hoc that the ec- 
clesiastical court would not let the deed be proved by one witness. There- 
upon, F. demurred. 
Why did the pleading take this form? I suggest he following interpre- 
tation: Having failed or been discouraged on motion for Consultation, 
Coke was reluctant to demur to the Prohibition. For that would mean ad- 
mitting that proof of the deed by one witness had been disallowed and ar- 
guing that the sentence against F. was not necessarily a consequence of 
the disallowance (rather that it should be considered a consequence of 
the absence of any indication on the record that livery had taken place) -- 
the same argument that had not fared so well on motion, at least with Jus- 
tice Fenner. Indeed, the argument might be harder to sustain on demurrer, 
since F. had said that the disallowance was the cause of the sentence 
against him. It might be contended, whether or not successfully, that a 
demurrer amounted to an admission of that causal statement (in addition 
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to the barely factual ones that the deed was disallowed and sentence given 
against F). 
In other words, demurring might arguably be taken to concede that the 
ecclesiastical court had proceeded to sentence immediately after disallow- 
ing the deed, without giving F. a chance to establish livery. (By contrast, 
moving for Consultation involved no admissions -- solely the claim that 
the surmise failed to state a sufficiently tight reason for Prohibition, if 
only because it neglected to cover plausible "might have beens" which 
would undermine the grounds for a writ.) Therefore, Coke decided to 
deny the disallowance of the deed in such form as to drive the plaintiff to- 
wards an admission that livery of seisin could not be established. He did 
not simply deny the disallowance of proof by one witness. To have done 
that would have been to expose himself to a two-sided danger: If the other 
party was content to go to trial on the fact, who would want to predict that 
a jury would find that the proof had not been disallowed? Even if it had 
not been, the most honest jury would be profoundly confused by such a 
case; in fact, the proof probably had been ruled out in some sense, 
thought perhaps for the excellent reason that no evidence of livery had 
been proffered. On the other hand, straight traverses of disallowance sur- 
mises were legally questionable, at least. Therefore, Coke took the narrow 
way between a plea and a traverse--introducing new material, in the form 
of a statement that livery could not be proved (plus the causal assertion 
that the sentence resulted from that fact), but casting the same as a nega- 
tion of the plaintiff's central claim that proof of the deed had been disal- 
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lowed. If, instead of demurring, the plaintiff had been content to go to trial,
the question for the jury would be focused on whether livery had taken place. 
("Would be focused": I do not mean that would be the strict question, for 
the jury would be free to find that the deed had been disallowed. But hav- 
ing been required by the pleading to find whether livery could be proved, 
the jury would in practice be unlikely to look into the murky questions of 
what had happened in the ecclesiastical court and why. I would expect the 
practical upshot to be a special verdict finding that livery had or had not 
taken place in reality. Legal argument upon such a special verdict would 
be based upon one rock or the other: certainty that no conveyance took 
place, owing to want of livery, or else certainty that livery could be 
proved by common law standards.) 
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The demurrer set the case upon a rock without the fuss of a trial. The 
plaintiff presumably had no practical hope of proving that seisin was ever 
delivered; therefore he admitted it had not been and staked his case on the 
legal argument that Prohibition nevertheless lay. His serious goal, let us 
recall at this point, was to stop his own ecclesiastical suit in order to pre- 
vent sentence upholding W.’s title to the rectory from being given. One 
can only imagine why, if his own title was disastrously weak owing to the 
want of livery, that objective seemed worth considerable trouble. “Fairly 
rational litigative warfare” would be my guess. If F. now got a Prohibition 
upon demurrer, he could demand tithes of the parishioners with a good 
deal of confidence. Most parishioners would not care which impropriator 
or impropriator’s lessee -- for the rectory in question was impropriate -- 
they paid their tithes to. 
One parishioner, Clemens, held out against Foster, either for reasons 
of his own or because he agreed with Whiscarre to force a suit and give 
the latter a chance to defend his interest. Having had that chance, and 
having failed after protracted and expensive litigation in both ecclesiasti- 
cal and common law courts, how likely would he be to try again? On the 
assumption that Foster’s title was disastrously weak, I think there can be 
no doubt that Whiscarre could establish his own by one form or another 
of litigation, The Prohibition might be thrown in his face, but I do not 
think it would stop him. But between the legal possibility and the real will 
to litigate after a costly defeat moves a considerable shadow. A victory, 
however technical, might put Foster in a favorable position to collect sev- 
eral years’ worth of tithes to which he had no title. He had only an estate 
pur auter vie in any case, an interest whose value, apart from any specula- 
tive investment in a lump fine, comes to annual value -- income minus 
rent. A life-tenant who stays in possession on a weak title for a year or 
two is so much closer to realizing what he could expect from the lease. A 
Consultation in the instant case would “dispossess” Foster at once -- and 
worse, for the ecclesiastical courts had already taxed about £22 of costs 
against Foster, part to Clemens, part to Whiscarre. These equities should 
be considered as possible reinforcing motives for the Court’s decision 
against Foster. To decide in his favor would be to deprive the probably- 
entitled Whiscarre of his cost-award, as well as the immediate enjoyment 
of that which he was entitled to. 
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Coke's account of Foster v. Whiscarre gives four arguments on the los- 
ing (pro-Prohibition) side upon the demurrer, but the first three together 
come to the following: Whiscarre's standing as a third party received for 
interest was urged against him. As I understand the argument, it was con- 
tended that his role undercut an intrinsically dubious right to have a property
controversy settled in an ecclesiastical court. " ... This is the birth right
of the subject to have his inheritance and freehold tried and determined 
by common law; for the civil law differs much in deciding of inheritance." 
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counsel said. But that remark stands in the context of insistence on the 
special weakness of Whiscarre's position as third party. Counsel were not 
maintaining that the mere existence of a question about "inheritance and 
freehold" in an ecclesiastical suit would justify Prohibition in the far-gone 
circumstances of this case as it stood -- where one party to the property 
controversy had admitted that he had no title to the property! Letting a 
property question be settled by an ecclesiastical court is "intrinsically du- 
bious," but perhaps there is no helping it when one party has made admis- 
sions on the face of the record which in effect settle the controversy -- as 
a rule. Thus, if Clemens, the original ecclesiastical defendant, had chal- 
lenged Foster's title to the rectory and Foster admitted in pleading pursu- 
ant to a Prohibition that he had no title, the ecclesiastical court would 
perhaps not be prevented from giving judgment for Clemens, even though 
in a rarefied technical sense a Consultation would imply leaving a ques- 
tion of freehold to ecclesiastical determination. But the present case is 
special. Clemens might have a kind of "natural right" to be dismissed 
from liability for tithes by the ecclesiastical court, if he was manifestly 
entitled to be and the ecclesiastical court was manifestly ready to dismiss 
him. But Whiscarre has no such claim. For look what he has done: He has 
taken advantage of a facility which ecclesiastical law happens to provide - 
- third-party intervention -- to put a property dispute in the ecclesiastical 
court. Nothing on the record suggests that Clemens wanted to raise a ques- 
tion about title to the rectory. Whiscarre wanted to, and he saw his chance 
to litigate about that question in an ecclesiastical court when Foster sued 
Clemens. Whereas Clemens is only a man seeking to defend himself 
against tithe liability, on whatever good or bad grounds he may have, 
Whiscarre is up to something objectionable. He could have brought a 
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common law action to try the title to the rectory; he ought to have. In- 
stead, he insinuated his case into the ecclesiastical court by way of inter- 
vention procedure. That procedure is legitimate enough, if ecclesiastical 
courts want to provide it for purposes plainly within their jurisdiction 
(e.g., if a parson sues for tithes and a vicar comes in for interest in order 
to dispute the terms of a vicarial endowment.) But the procedure deserves 
no respect if it is made a means of bringing common law questions before
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an improper tribunal. There is perhaps a sense in which ecclesiastical courts 
have a right to suits which the law recognizes as valid suits proper to those 
courts -- a right that is only defeasible if the case is mishandled in certain ways 
and so as to cause results which the common law cannot accept; there is no 
sense in which ecclesiastical courts have a right to handle issues intrinsi- 
cally inappropriate to them via the intervention procedure they provide 
for their own business. Therefore, the ecclesiastical court should be pro- 
hibited in the instant case even though plaintiff-in-Prohibition has made 
admissions fatal to him in substance, even though it appears that Whis- 
carre would be sure to win in the proper tribunal. If you like, the Prohibi- 
tion should be upheld on public grounds -- to dissuade people from doing 
what Whiscarre has done. (And note: prohibiting will only help the "inno- 
cent bystander," Clemens. By Foster's admission, he has no business 
claiming tithes -- prohibit and Clemens will not have to pay him.) 
By the time the case had "grown to demurrer," I think plaintiff-in-Pro- 
hibition's counsel had put their trust largely in the above argument. I say 
that partly because three of the arguments Coke states as separate ones 
come to different aspects of it, partly because it seems to me quite persua- 
sive. Confidence in that argument helps explain the demurrer itself. In 
one way, Coke left his opponents with no choice except to demur, assum- 
ing they had no serious hope of proving the livery of seisin. But it would 
be better to try to prove it against all odds than to "give away the ball- 
game" by admitting everything, had hope not been placed in an argument 
that despite fatal admissions in substance Prohibition should still lie. It is 
notable that as far as the reports show there was no attempt to make a 
pure pleading argument against Coke's absque hoc traverse, though such 
pleas were rather open to cavil. I infer that Foster's counsel thought, quite 
reasonably, that they had a strong case in substance. 
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Their last argument, as Coke reports it, is a generalized objection to the 
two-witness rule. Since it was apparently admitted that the rule had not 
been insisted on, perhaps the point of objecting to it was only to suggest 
the notorious incompetence of ecclesiastical courts to try property ques- 
tions, As it were: Ecclesiastical evidentiary formalism, whereby a fact is 
treated as unproved and unprovable unless it is supported by two wit- 
nesses, is so at odds with the common law that ecclesiastical courts 
should simply be prevented from handling matters in which the common 
law has as interest, as it undoubtedly has in whether a conveyance of a 
rectory took place. That is true whether or not a particular ecclesiastical 
court actually insisted on the two-witness rule. It is especially true when 
the matter in question has not come before the ecclesiastical court in the 
normal course of its business, but by way of interventionary procedure for
which a straightforward common law action to try the title to the rectory
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could and should be substituted. So stated, the last argument for Foster re- 
inforces the others. Standing by itself (as if it had been made against Clemens
rather than Whiscarre), it would come to an argument for the legal untravers-
ability of some evidentiary disallowance surmises: If a plea of sufficient interest
to the common law -- e.g., a conveyance of freehold -- is introduced into 
an ecclesiastical suit the suit should, in effect, be prohibited on re-
quest; the reason it should be prohibited, however, is that ecclesiastical 
evidentiary canons are inappropriate to such "common law matters"; 
therefore, disallowance owing to the two-witness rule should be alleged
pro forma, but only pro forma. If untraversability were conceded, then
the demurrer in our case would come to saying, "The defendant-in-
Prohibition may not deny that the plaintiff was prevented from proving 
the deed. His plea is not good insofar as it seeks to deny that, if in-
deed the attempt to traverse an untraversable claim does not vitiate it 
altogether. The absque hoc clause of the plea must be disregarded, at
any rate. Disregarding it,  the plea would amount to an admission that 
the deed was improperly ruled out, offset by a claim that livery of seisin
did not take place. But then -- along the lines of the plaintiff's argument
on the motion for Consultation -- a Prohibition on disallowance surmise 
is not ill-granted just because the plaintiff may lack an airtight case. The 
only issue upon a formally pleaded Prohibition is whether the writ ought
to have been granted -- the same issue as upon motion for Consultation 
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Whether plaintiff-in-Prohibition ought to win on the underlying matter
cannot be raised unless, in effect, plaintiff consents to have it raised --
here, by traversing the claim that there was no livery of seisin. The
plaintiff has a right to do what he has done here by demurring -- stand
on his contention that the Prohibition was properly granted in the first
instance." In short, by this putative theory, ecclesiastical suits in which
such issues as property transactions arise should be prohibited; the truth
about the property transaction as a whole -- as opposed to the immediate 
matter (here, the deed) to which a fictitious evidentiary disallowance 
surmise relates -- may not be tried pursuant to the Prohibition -- with the 
probable result that Whiscarre would "land on his feet" (and collect his 
ecclesiastical costs in the end.) Perhaps he ought to be driven to the sepa- 
rate common law remedy which he should have resorted to originally. 
In the event, however, nothing that was urged in Foster's behalf 
availed. Coke reports four resolutions on the Court's part. (a) The Court 
affirmed the rule that an ecclesiastical court with jurisdiction over the 
"principal" may also determine the "incidents." I.e.: The judges would not 
hold that the mere existence of a dispute over a conveyance was reason to 
prohibit. (b) Accordingly, the ecclesiastical court is prohibitable only if it 
makes an error with respect to a matter governed by common law rules. 
In this case, the ecclesiastical court handled the common law matter cor- 
rectly -- by holding that the conveyance in question extended to the whole 
rectory, that therefore livery of seisin was required, and therefore that no 
conveyance took place, owing to the want of livery established as a fact 
by the pleading. (c) It is improper for the common law courts to question 
ecclesiastical interventionary procedure as such. I.e.: Ecclesiastical law 
does permit, and is entitled to permit, one in Whiscarre's position to come 
in for interest; in the absence of any mishandling of matters governed by 
the common law, the operation of the interventionary system is control- 
lable only by ecclesiastical appeal, not by Prohibition (In effect: Foster v. 
Clemens and Whiscarre is no different that Foster v. Clemens. Whiscarre 
is as much entitled as Clemens to have the suit determined by the ecclesi- 
astical court, so long as that court does nothing wrong.) (d) Surmising 
that only one witness is available to prove a fact which the ecclesiastical 
court is entitled to determine does not state a cause of Prohibition. Such 
surmises cannot be effectively denied by the other party and would there- 
fore, if admitted, be the means to deprive ecclesiastical courts of their ju- 
risdiction indiscriminately, 
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The first two holdings take care of the case as pleaded, unless the in- 
volvement of interventionary procedure is a basis for making an excep- 
tion from general principles. The third holding is a clear refusal to make 
such an exception. The first two holdings are strong authority against rec- 
ognizing the category of ''common law issues" -- or, converseIy, for in- 
sisting on bona fide disallowance surmises except, perhaps, in the special 
case of modi. The fourth holding -- the one that is relevant for our imme- 
diate concern -- is problematic. It appears to be a general repudiation of 
two-witness-rule Prohibitions -- i.e., a holding that ecclesiastical courts, 
which must err before they are prohibited, cannot err by insisting on their 
evidentiary canons for the establishment of facts within their jurisdiction, 
even when those facts are "incidents" which must be substantively han- 
dled by common law standards. We have seen that Coke apparently sub- 
scribed to such a "general repudiation." 
One is, I think, entitled to suspect Coke of sometimes reading his own 
views into the courts' holdings by the subtle process on interpretation and 
stress, but there is no basis for supposing he did so in this case, since 
there are no other reports to check against his version. Therefore we are 
confined to asking whether the fourth holding in Foster v. Whiscarre 
should be regarded as a dictum. Assuming the Court did repudiate two- 
witness rule Prohibitions generally, did it need to in order to fill out its 
disposition of the case? I think it is justifiable to say "No" almost flatly, 
for on the pleading it was admitted that the two-witness rule had not been 
insisted on. 
However, as I speculate above, it may have been argued (a) that eccle- 
siastical courts are not entitled to their evidentiary standards for the pur- 
pose of trying "common law incidents" and (b) that ecclesiastical courts 
so notoriously have discrepant standards that it makes no difference 
whether a particular court actually insists on two witnesses (and likewise 
no difference whether accepting one witness would insure plaintiff-in- 
Prohibition's victory.) This argument can be rebutted by rejecting propo- 
sition (a) as well as by rejecting the rest. To that extent, it was relevant to 
hold generally that ecclesiastical courts are entitled to their evidentiary 
standards. In sum, Foster v. Whiscarre is legitimate authority for the 
Cokean view of two-witness rule Prohibitions, but the case is too special 
to count strongly against contrary precedents. 
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In a case of 1595, 7 the Queen’s Bench refused a Prohibition based on 
the two-witness rule, but laid down a dictum for a related situation up- 
holding such Prohibitions. An administrator was sued by the intestate’s 
child for the share of the estate he was entitled to by law. The administra- 
tor pleaded that the father had made a nuncupative (oral) will, in which no 
executors were appointed; that by that will he had devised a term of years 
to the administrator, by reason of which he had taken administration (pre- 
sumably the term was the greater part of the estate); and that he had only 
one witness to prove the nuncupative will. As in some other cases, it is 
not clear from the report whether the surmise said that the ecclesiastical 
court actually had disallowed, or surely would disallow, the proof by one 
witness. In any event, Chief Justice Popham and Justices Clench and Fen- 
ner opposed a Prohibition. Their reason was that the common law took no 
notice of wills without executors. 
In other words (I take it): As far as the common law is concerned, this 
case present a mere intestate estate, committed to an administrator and 
subject to such claims as the child’s portion sued for here. Whether the 
ecclesiastical court is free to take account of a nuncupative will without 
executors is a question that does not arise. It is certainly free to impose its 
own evidentiary requirements on such a will -- i.e., not to take account of 
the will unless it is supported by at least two witnesses. (I put it this way 
because there might be a question as to the ecclesiastical court’s liberty to 
prefer a nuncupative devise over a child’s portion, if it had proposed to do 
so and if the child had objected. It did not propose to do so here, because 
the administrator failed to clear the hurdle of the two-witness rule.) 
The decision makes such overwhelming sense that it cannot be said to 
go against the grain of the contemporary cases favoring two-witness-rule 
Prohibitions. Even if a nuncupative devise ought in principle to be pre- 
ferred over ordinary claims to an intestate’s estate, the two-witness rule 
would be highly defensible as a protection against fraud. What more 
likely that someone will appear claiming that an apparent intestate made 
an oral will on his deathbed, seeking thereby to defeat the interests of 
those entitled to de jure shares of the estate? Surely it is wise to insist 
7 H. 37 Eliz. Q.B. Lansd. 1073, f.153b; add. 25,200, f.l16. 
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that he have two witnesses to back him up before his claim is taken seri- 
ously. A single confederate is too easy to find. By dictum, however, the 
judges reindorsed their general proclivity to block enforcement of the 
two-witness rule: If a man makes a will and appoints executors, and the 
estate is subsequently committed to an administrator because the execu- 
tors refuse to serve, Prohibition lies if the two-witnesses rule is used to 
prevent payment of legacies. If A. sues for a legacy allegedly given him 
by the will and cannot prove the will by two witnesses, A. may (appar- 
ently) use the Prohibition to force acceptance of the single witness, even 
though he would be prohibiting his own suit. (A strong rule, not because 
of the element of self-prohibition, but because it would seem to entail that 
two witnesses cannot be insisted on for ordinary purposes of probate by 
an executor. For if an administrator appointed because the executors re- 
fuse must pay legacies on a one-witness will, surely an executor ought to 
pay legacies on such a will. Quaere.) 
The reports end with a puzzling remark by Justice Fenner, which ap- 
parently contradicts the position he had just concurred in. Fenner says 
that a common law suit Pro rationabile parte bonorum could be brought 
for the child's portion, and therefore that Prohibition lies. Whether his 
premise is right I cannot judge (the writ Pro rationabile parte lay against 
administrators in some circumstances, not universally.) I can only take 
his reasoning to be that the child could protect himself at common law 
and therefore did not need to be protected in the ecclesiastical court 
(which was the effect of denying the Prohibition.) The reports say ex- 
pressly that no one answered Fenner. If he was serious about his point, he 
must have had second thoughts. Their tendency would be to extend the 
scope of Prohibitions to block the two-witness rule. 
Save for one unlabelled report, all the Elizabethan cases considered so 
far are from the Queen's Bench. The two-witness rule also came in ques- 
tion in three Common Pleas cases, with mixed results. In the first case, 8 
plaintiff-in-Prohibition neglected to allege disallowance. Being sued for 
tithes, he surmised simply that the tithes had been leased to him for term 
of years. The Court refused to grant a Prohibition merely because a "com- 
mon law transaction'' was in question. If the ecclesiastical court will al- 
8 H. 39 El iz .  C . P .  Add. 25 ,199 ,  f .28 .  
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low the plea, it may try it, the judges said, but Prohibition lies if the plea 
is disallowed. Justice Owen (perhaps remembering what the had learned 
as a lawyer in Bagnall v. Stokes) added that Prohibition would lie if the 
ecclesiastical court insisted on two witnesses to prove the lease. No one 
contradicted him. (The Court as a whole spoke in general terms -- as if to 
say, "If the ecclesiastical judge will accept the plea as a matter of law, he 
may try it as to truth." I take it that Owen spoke up to correct the possible 
misunderstanding -- as if to say, "Yes, the ecclesiastical judge may try it 
as to truth, provided he accepts proof by one witness." There is no guar- 
antee that the other judges agreed with the proviso, but no reason to think 
they disagreed.) 
In Mallary v. Marriot 9 a parishioner being sued for tithes of pigeons 
pleaded mere payment. He sought a Prohibition on surmise that the eccle- 
siastical court insisted on two witnesses. The Common Pleas granted the 
writ, "for it would be greater [sic] inconvenience to bring two witnesses 
to prove payment of every sort of tithes" (Croke). The common sense of 
that statement is obviously strong. It is rational to demand two witnesses 
to authenticate transactions of some value and deliberateness -- wills, re- 
leases, and the like. It is abusive to impose a formal, archaic witnessing 
requirement on trivial and routine acts. A man raises enough pigeons to
owe two or three to the parson; he gives them to him, or at least does some-
thing intended as an act of donation, such as telling his servant to leave
them off at the kitchen door of the parsonage; something goes wrong -- the
parson doesn't think he has received as many pigeons as he ought to, or they
are left at the kitchen door in a defective coop and escape -- hence litigation:
Whoever may be in the right in such situations, it is burdensome to hold
the parishioner liable for the tiniest payment unless he goes to the trouble of
finding two transaction-witnesses to accompany him every time he renders
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a tithe. The parties should be allowed to fight out such petty disputes 
with whatever evidence they can produce. On the other hand, as I argue in 
the case of "mere payment" of a legacy above, it stretches the two-witness- 
rule Prohibition farther to use it in this type of case than where the 
authentication of "common law transactions" is in question. Foolish rule 
9 P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz., 667; Moore, 909. 
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it may be, but why should the ecclesiastical courts not be free to make a 
rule whose practical effect is to require a degree of formality and public- 
ity in paying tithes, the parishioner bearing the risk if he fails to observe 
that standard of care? It is easier to say why ecclesiastical courts should 
not be free to impose super-standards of formality and caution on men 
who make leases and releases, for they have a right to base their expecta- 
tions on common law standards. In one way, it is unnatural to demand 
two witnesses to petty tithe payments; it is perhaps unnatural in a still 
more serious way to ask a man to remember that he must get two wit- 
nesses today, when he releases a legacy, whereas yesterday, when he re- 
leased an obligation worth twice as much, no such caution was necessary. 
The third Common Pleas report, Blackwel's Case, 10 turns the other 
way. Here, a parson claimed that a parishioner denied him access to 
tithes. A number of cases involve this substantive point. The parishioner's 
duty was basically to cut and set out tithes in the field; it was the parson's 
responsibility to come and get them. But the parishioner also had the ob- 
vious ancillary duty not to deny the parson reasonable access to the field. 
In the instant case, the parson did not claim that the parishioner had failed 
to "sever and expose" the tithes, but maintained that he had locked the 
gate so as to make them unreachable and thereby had in effect failed to 
render the tithe. The parishioner sought a Prohibition on the theory that 
set-out tithes are turned into chattels and therefore removed from ecclesi- 
astical jurisdiction. In other words, having admitted that the tithes were 
set out, the parson's only complaint, on the score of the locked gate, was 
wrongful detention of his goods, for which he must sue at common law. 
The Common Pleas denied the Prohibition (in accord with the best opin- 
ion on this sort of case.) Though the premise (that severing tithes converts 
them into the parson's secular property) was indisputable, the Court held 
that an ecclesiastical suit for non-payment could still be brought. This 
conclusion was based on the statute of 2/3 Edw. 6, c. 13, section ii, which 
affirmed the parson's right to demand tithes as unpaid when the parishioner
had "paid" in a nominal way and then made it impossible to get physical 
possession. 
10 T. 43 Eliz. C.P. Croke Eliz. 844. 
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Having lost on the theory he elected, the parishioner told the Court that 
his proofs had been disallowed. The surmise said nothing about that. 
Counsel perhaps hoped that the Court would go outside the record to as- 
certain whether any disallowance of evidence had occurred, or would pre- 
sume that it had; perhaps counsel only wanted an indication as to how a 
two-witness-rule surmise might fare. The Court was in any event dis- 
couraging. If the proofs were disallowed, the judges said, the remedy 
would be by appeal. Not too much can be made of this dictum, for the judges 
were not facing the hard fact of alleged. insistence on the two-witnesses 
rule. In all probability, they did not believe for a moment that two wit- 
nesses would be demanded in this case. The parishioner's defense would 
presumably be that the gate was never locked, or not locked for a reason- 
able time after the tithes were set out, or not so locked as to constitute a 
real obstruction (locked only at night or at other times when there was 
reason not to expect the parson, the parson could have had the key if he 
had only asked, etc.) Would the ecclesiastical courts insist on two wit- 
nesses to back up every statement the parishioner made about the condi- 
tion of the gate over a stretch of time? It seems unlikely. In most 
situations where the two-witness rule came in question, it had a clear fla- 
vor of "transaction formalism": ecclesiastical courts "arbitrarily" refused 
to consider that certain transactions had occurred, or that certain docu- 
ments were authentic, unless care were taken to have the transaction or 
documents witnessed by at least two people. It is quite conceivable that 
ecclesiastical courts would have actually done what one was accused of doing
in Mallary v. Marriot above: extend the scope of "transaction formalism"
to such transactions as tithe payment, in furtherance of typical ecclesiastical
interests. Blackwel's Case presents the kind of situation in which it is
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meaningless to speak of a "transaction." It is burdensome, but rational, to
warn parishioners to take witnesses along when they pay tithes; a man cannot 
possibly be expected to provide witnesses to the unlocked condition of his gate 
over several days. An ecclesiastical court that actually insisted on the two-
witness rule in the circumstances of Blackwel's Case might indeed by correctable 
by appeal. In strictness, however, Mallary v. Marriot and Worth's Case go in 
different directions: the former to say that the two-witness rule may not be 
applied to a plea of payment of tithes; the latter to suggest that its application
to such a plea is not controllable by Prohibition -- for the parishioner's claim 
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not to have denied access was a version of the claim to have "paid," or 
satisfied his legal duty as a tithe-payer. 
A further Elizabethan case, this one from the Queen's Bench again, 
sheds an oblique light on the two-witness rule. Bray v. Partridge 11 is not a 
Prohibition case, but a common law tort suit (Action on the Case.) A pa- 
rishioner claimed to have paid his tithes in the presence of two witnesses. 
After one of the witnesses died, the parson brought a suit for the tithes, in- 
tending to take advantage of the two-witness rule. Whether he had actu- 
ally succeeded in recovering when the parishioner brought his Action on 
the Case is not clear. (Noy says the Parson had recovered; the other re- 
ports do not say so expressly.) The theory of the Action of the Case, in 
any event, was that the vexation of bringing an ecclesiastical suit for duly 
paid tithes was an actionable wrong. The parties went to trial on the gen- 
eral issue, and the jury returned a special verdict: The parishioner had 
paid the tithes, but he had not paid them in the presence of the two wit- 
nesses named in his declaration, because one of those men had died be- 
fore the tithes were paid. 
Happily, perhaps, for them (if a little unfortunately for the curious), 
the judges could avoid debate as to which of the parties the verdict fa- 
vored. For counsel were allowed to move that the action was ill-founded 
to start with (i.e., to do by way of motion after verdict what probably 
could have been done be demurrer.) One qualification must be put on 
that, however. The truth as established by verdict was that the parson had 
sued for tithes after receiving payment. The issue, accordingly, was 
whether bringing the ecclesiastical suit after payment was a tort. It was 
not the truth that the parson sued with the specific intent of taking crafty 
advantage of one witness's death. A court could conceivably hold that it 
is not a tort to sue after payment (with the vague hope of recovery and 
double payment), but that it is a tort to sue because one sees a specific 
opening for a fraudulent trick. 
I doubt, however, that the judges in our case would have made such a 
distinction. Their decision was cast in general terms: It is no tort to sue in 
the proper court without cause, and that is all that happened here. (That 
11 T. 43 Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.341; Noy, 38; Croke Eliz. 836, sub. nom. Bray v. Patrid. 
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does not quite say it is no tort to sue without cause and with a specific 
fraudulent scheme in mind, but the Court's thinking was probably general 
enough to cover that variant. The line between vague and specific fraudu- 
lent intent is a shaky one, certainly in morality -- e.g., between suing a 
man who has paid his tithes because you know he brought no witnesses 
along and suing him because you know his witnesses just died.) The 
judges conceded that there might be circumstances in which bringing an 
ecclesiastical suit would be tortious. Chief Justice Popham thought it 
might be actionable to bring an utterly inappropriate ecclesiastical suit 
(precisely what the tithe suit here was not, however unjust it was.) Jus- 
tices Gawdy and Fenner cited a Year Book case (8 Edw.4, pl. 13) in 
which it was claimed (though not held) that a tithe suit was tortious be- 
cause it was brought in the face of a composition discharging certain land 
from tithes in exchange for the settling of other land upon a parson. The 
judges thought that case distinguishable (presumably by the theory that a 
suit for tithes from land discharged by a formal composition is bad ab ini- 
tio, hence no different from Popham's case of a utterly inappropriate suit 
for a "temporal matter".) In the principal case, the Court had no real 
trouble reaching the conclusion that there was no cause of action -- surely 
a benign conclusion, for the spectacle of common law courts awarding 
damages for causeless ecclesiastical suits, as if the ecclesiastical courts 
could not do justice, would be unbecoming in a mixed legal system. 
What does Bray v. Partridge tell us about the law of Prohibitions? It 
raises the question why the parishioner did not simply seek to prohibit the 
ecclesiastical suit, instead of embarking on a novel, high-risk tort action. 
There might be an incidental explanation (e.g., the parishioner was angry 
enough or greedy enough to "have a go" at sticking the parson for dam- 
ages), but the most likely one is that the chance of getting a Prohibition 
looked gloomy to a lawyer. And so it might have. Generally speaking, the 
Queen's Bench was pretty ready to block enforcement of the two-witness 
rule. But our only instance of such intervention in a case of mere payment 
of tithes was from the Common Pleas. A lawyer may have been aware of 
such misgivings as Coke had about two-witness-rule Prohibitions. Know- 
ing of such misgivings, on the one hand, and perceiving the obvious po- 
tentialities for abuse in the two-witness rule, he may have calculated that 
the moment was ripe for the "new approach" of a tort action. Might it not 
be promising to say to the judges, "Look, there are admittedly drawbacks 
to prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from applying their own evidentiary 
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rules in their own cases, most of all when there are 'common law issues' 
involved. Prohibition to that intent is questionable in principle, not to 
mention the danger of uncontrollable fictitious surmises. So let us grant that
Prohibition will not lie to block the two-witness rule, at least where mere
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tithe payment is in question. But then, what becomes of people who are 
actually victimized by the two-witness rule? Would allowing a tort action 
not be clean solution? Such actions would be directed at the party, not the 
ecclesiastical court -- at 'bad men' who sue when they have already been paid, 
not at ecclesiastical courts. Ecclesiastical courts have every right to their two-
witness rule; as an inducement to care and publicity in transactions, including 
tithe payment, the rule is socially useful. But surely there must be a remedy 
against those who take dishonest advantage of useful formalism. (Cf. the 
exactly parallel argument that courts of equity act only against the corrupt 
conscience of the party and respect the general utility of the common law 
rules whose strict application they frustrate.)"? Well, if such was the 
thinking, it was unpromising in the event. Bray v. Partridge stands as in- 
direct evidence that two-witness Prohibitions in tithe payment cases were 
unlikely to be granted. (Note that the Common Pleas turned one down in 
Blackwel's Case the same term.) 
My last Elizabethan case bearing on the two-witness rule is Agarde v. 
Porter.12 We have already discussed this case in connection with 
substantive disallowance surmises, because it was the occasion for 
Tanfield's important argument that misapplication of ecclesiastical law, 
or "injustice" by universal standards, can never be the basis for Pro-
hibition. Actually, the surmise in Agarde v. Porter was evidentiary, though
in a special sense. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition, an executor being sued for
a legacy, claimed that the estate was insufficient to support legacies. 
He did not surmise simply that the plea of "No assets" had been dis-
allowed, nor did he allege that he had been prevented from estab-
lishing specified facts about the estate for want of two witnesses. Rather,
he said that he had pleaded the condition of the estate -- showing its
insufficiency to bear legacies -- and offered to prove what he asserted
12 P. 44. Eliz. Q.B. Add. 25,203, f.467 (good report); Add. 25,213, f.31 (brief.) 
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by "reasonable testimony," which had been rejected. The Prohibition 
having been granted, Tanfield moved for Consultation. For one thing,
he said, the ecclesiastical court had not refused to allow "reasonable 
testimony" to prove what plaintiff-in-Prohibition claimed. For the rest,
he relied on the theory that disallowing a plea of "No assets" is an error 
by ecclesiastical standards, and hence not controllable by Prohibition. 
What concerns us here is how Tanfield extended that theory to eviden- 
tiary cases. He conceded the general legitimacy of two-witness-rule Pro- 
hibitions. He did not argue that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards 
(unlike substantive rules) can never conflict with the common law, being 
functions of a incomparable system of fact-finding: quite the contrary. He 
conceded that any instance of insistence on two witnesses to establish a 
fact which could be established without two witnesses at common law 
represents a conflict, and hence a cause of Prohibition. ("And therefore if 
the defendant pleads a thing which by their law must be proved by two 
witnesses and the party offers to prove it by one witness or by other proof 
allowable in the common law, which they of the Court Christian refuse, a 
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Prohibition lies." In the instant case, however, Tanfield maintained simply 
that ecclesiastical evidentiary standards did not conflict with the common
law. The surmise did not say that two witnesses had been insisted on to prove 
any particular fact, only that "unreasonable" evidentiary demands had been 
made; Tanfield maintained that the ecclesiastical rules applicable to the 
case at hand were perfectly compatible with the common law. If they had 
somehow been unreasonably applied, the remedy was by ecclesiastical 
appeal. Specifically, in this case all the executor wanted to prove was that 
the estate owed certain debts which, added up, rendered it insufficient to 
pay legacies. According to Tanfield, ecclesiastical courts would let debts 
under 40/ be proved by the executor's own oath; for debts over that 
amount, they would accept one witness plus the executor's oath. "And 
that" said Tanfield, "is reasonable proof as the common law would allow." 
(N.b. There is no exact way of comparing rules suited to the jury system 
with rules suited to the witness system. It cannot be said that the com-
mon law required one witness plus the oath of the party to prove that A. owed
B. £10. A strict statement of Tanfield's position would be: "Ecclesiastical 
courts may not erect serious formalistic barriers to establishing facts,
but that does not mean they may not have any 'minimum evidence' re-
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quirements. A common-sense test should be applied to ecclesiastical re-
quirements. If it is pretty unlikely that less evidence than the ecclesiastical 
courts will accept would convince an honest jury without knowledge of its 
own, then ecclesiastical standards should be considered sufficiently accordant 
with the common law. A jury would be more than justified if, say, it refused 
to believe that A. owed B. £10 when only one man so testified and the party 
claiming that the debt existed was known to be unwilling to verify his 
claim under oath. Therefore the ecclesiastical requirement of one witness 
plus the oath of the party is fair enough. In the case of a very petty debt, 
of the sort people are likely to contract without bothering to have wit- 
nesses present, a jury might justifiably have lower expectations -- enough, 
as it were, that the party claiming that the debt exists has an honest face or 
reputation. Ecclesiastical insistence on the bare check of an oath obvi- 
ously does not interpose an added formalistic hurdle -- if you like, it only 
scratches the surface of a specious face or inflated reputation.") 
To substantiate his version of the ecclesiastical law, Tanfield produced 
a signed certificate of the ecclesiastical judges (probably the Delegates, to 
whom plaintiff-in-Prohibition had already unsuccessfully appealed) testi- 
fying to its accuracy. The certificate also said that the rules described by 
Tanfield had been applied in this case. Therefore, if the Court was will- 
ing to take the certificate as conclusively true, it could see that the two- 
witness rule had not been applied. Tanfield clearly hoped that the Court 
would step outside the record to the extent of accepting the certificate as a 
definitive account of what had happened in the ecclesiastical court, not 
only as a authoritative statement of the law. He clearly hoped that knowl- 
edge that the two-witness rule had not been applied would be enough to con- 
vince the judges that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had no serious case, that the 
vague claim that "reasonable testimony" had been offered and rejected 
was a cover for vexations intentions -- for the certificate went to show 
that the standards by which any proffered evidence had been disallowed, 
if it had been, were perfectly "reasonable." But the stratagem did not 
work. The judges did not disbelieve Tanfield's certified statement of the 
ecclesiastical law, but they still refused a Consultation on motion: "For 
though their law be such as has been said, yet they have so many excep- 
tions to witnesses for blood, alliance, and other presumption of favor that 
it is a very difficult thing to prove anything by witnesses of which they will 
allow. And therefore the Court ordered Tanfield to plead something of re- 
cord to have a Consultation." 
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Two observations should be made on this decision. (a) In one sense, it 
stretches the disallowed-evidence Prohibition beyond its usual limits. Pro- 
hibitions were frequently granted because two witnesses were demanded; 
the Cokean vein of opinion questioned whether Prohibitions should be 
granted solely for that reason, once a matter was admitted to be within ec- 
clesiastical jurisdiction and no error of substance was laid to the ecclesiasti- 
cal court. In Agarde v. Porter, the Court was far from doubting 
two-witness-rule Prohibitions; it embraced a looser form of disallowed- 
evidence Prohibition. Strictly on the record, the Court was willing to pro- 
hibit upon a generalized complaint that "unreasonable" evidentiary 
obstacles had been put in a litigant's way. The judges were ready to pre- 
sume until the contrary was established that ecclesiastical requirements 
were "unreasonable" one way or another -- if not because of the formal- 
ism of the two-witness rule, then because of over-strict rules on the com- 
petence of witnesses. The implication is that ecclesiastical courts have no 
more right to their own position on such questions as the competence of a 
party's kinsmen to serve as his witnesses than to the two-witness rule. If 
we take into account the matter beyond the record introduced by Tanfield, 
we may say that the Court was willing to prohibit on a generalized evi- 
dentiary disallowance-surmise even though the surmise clearly did not re- 
fer to insistence on the two-witness rule, and even though there was no 
positive reason to suspect that evidence was excluded by questionable 
standards. I.e.: There was no reason to suppose that it was excluded be- 
cause of rigid rules on the competence of witnesses. The certificate sug- 
gested, though it probably did not establish definitively (even on the 
assumption of its truth), that any exclusions that occurred were based on 
the single-witness- cum -oath standard. The judges at least gave no sign of 
disputing the propriety of that standard. 
(b) On the other hand, all the Court decided was to deny Consultation 
on motion. Tanfield was encouraged to plead formally. (When the report 
says he was "ordered" to, I suppose it means he was told "If you want a 
Consultation, you must plead." The word "ordered" perhaps suggests that 
he was not so told in a hostile tone, as if to say "We do not see any likeli- 
hood of defeating this Prohibition unless by trial of the real dispute -- i.e., 
by proving at common law that the condition of the estate is such that it 
can bear legacies -- but of course we cannot stop you from trying to de- 
feat it otherwise by way of formal pleading." However, the "tone" in 
which motions for Consultation were turned down is sometimes hard to 
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detect.) Tanfield would presumably have several options other than tak- 
ing issue on the underlying dispute. (i) Traverse the disallowance. Sig- 
nificantly, the report ends with a remark by Justice Yelverton: "In some 
cases, the refusal of the plea or proof by the judges of the ecclesiastical 
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court is issuable." That is indefinite enough, but it suggests that Yelverton was 
reflecting as to whether the effect of denying the motion would be to cut 
off any real chance of returning the suit to the ecclesiastical court before trial 
on the merits. I wonder whether he was not asking that question and answer- 
ing it with the thought, "Well, defendant-in-Prohibition might deny that 
plaintiff's evidence was in fact ruled out -- though disallowance surmises 
have sometimes been held untraversable, it is not at all clear that they can 
never be contradicted." (ii) Demur. This would probably be the least 
promising course in view of the failure of the motion, but perhaps the 
Court would listen to a full-dress contention that disallowance of "reason- 
able" proof was too vague a complaint, assuming the declaration showed 
no more specifically than the surmise what evidence was offered. If it was 
more specific, the Court might hold on demurrer that there was nothing 
unreasonable about the standards implied by rejection of the evidence al- 
legedly offered. (iii) Plead essentially what Tanfield's certificate showed 
-- that the single-witness- cum -oath standard had been applied and no evi- 
dence excluded by any other standard -- absque hoc that reasonable proof 
had been disallowed. Such a plea might draw a demurrer, whereon the 
reasonableness or conformity to common law of the ecclesiastical rules 
admittedly applied could be adjudged. Otherwise, plaintiff-in-Prohibition 
would have to deny that only the single-witness- cum -oath standard had 
been applied. From such a factual dispute it would emerge whether the 
two-witness rule had been enforced and whether any rules on the compe- 
tence of witnesses figured in the exclusion of evidence. If competence 
rules were found to have figured, perhaps their reasonableness -- or the 
ecclesiastical courts' right to their own standards in that regard -- could 
be brought in question by motion in arrest of judgment. 
Since there are no further reports, there is no way of telling whether 
Tanfield adopted any of those courses or stopped trying to block the Pro- 
hibition after the failure of his motion. The very possibility that the case 
might assume various shapes upon pleading would be a good reason for 
denying Consultation on motion. It was in any event in the Court's discre- 
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tion to turn down such motions, and wise to do so if there was any serious 
doubt about the law or the facts. In short, denying the motion is perfectly 
compatible with the belief that the defendant (Tanfield’s client) probably 
had a winning case in substance. If, however, the Court’s view of eviden- 
tiary disallowance surmises had been generally dim, a Consultation on 
motion could have been justified. Denying the motion indicates receptiv- 
ity to such surmises even when they were not specifically directed at the 
two-witness rule -- a fortiori when they were so directed. 
We may now turn to the Jacobean cases on two-witness-rule Prohibi- 
tions. I propose to look at the King’s Bench and Common Pleas lines 
separately, taking the King’s Bench first. Two important testamentary 
cases arose in the King’s Bench while Lord Popham was still Chief Jus- 
tice. In the first, Harris v. Chadborne, 13 a man made a nuncupative will 
by which he left goods to Harris. Administration was originally granted 
to Harris with the will annexed to the letters of administration. (Standard 
procedure in cases where there was a will of some sort, but an administra- 
tor instead of an executor. Nuncupative wills were ordinarily reduced to 
writing after being made orally. They remained nuncupative if they were 
not written out by or for the testator and signed or sealed by him.) Sub- 
sequently, administration was transferred to Chadborne. (Why does not 
appear, probably because a nearer kinsman turned up. Such cancellations 
and regrants of administration were common, though constrained by stat- 
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ute.) Chadborne then sued Harris for the goods which he retained in the 
name of his legacy by the nuncupative will. The new administrator 
sought to get possession of all the goods of the estate which the old ad- 
ministrator had; the old administrator claimed that he was not liable to 
hand over such of the goods as represented his legacy. Harris sought to 
prohibit Chadborne’s suit largely on the ground that the ecclesiastical 
court would not recognize the nuncupative will because it was supported 
only by one witness. (“Largely”: Harris also raised a technical objection 
13 T. 3 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,209, f.49; Add. 25,205, f.15b; Lansd. 1111, f.92; Noy, 12. The first two 
MSS. are full reports, the slight differences between which are treated in the text. The other two 
reports. (sub. nom. Chaldron or Chadron v. Harris) are two nearly identical versions of a note on 
the case, giving nothing like a picture of its unfolding. 
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to the grant of administration to Chadborne. The Court thought the objec- 
tion without merit, however, so that the only serious question was 
whether the ecclesiastical court was at liberty to disregard the will for 
lack of sufficient witnesses.) 
When the Court first discussed the case, the judges disagreed. Justice 
Gawdy favored a Prohibition, but in somewhat hesitant term. He began 
by enunciating the general principle that ecclesiastical courts are entitled 
to their two-witness rule in testamentary matters, though it differ from the 
common law. But then he thought the instant case an exception, "because 
he [Harris] has no other means than to pay himself by way of retainer." 
What Gawdy meant by that is explained by Popham's rebuttal. Ordinar- 
ily, Popham explained, a new administrator is bound by the old adminis- 
trator's "untrue" (wrongful) payments. Clearly, Gawdy used that rule to 
reach his conclusion, as follows: If by color of the nuncupative will, Har- 
ris had paid a legacy to X., Chadborne would be bound -- i.e., would not 
be able to get the goods back form X. But here Harris had no way of pay- 
ing his own legacy to himself except by retaining the goods. Therefore 
Chadborne should no more be able to recover those goods from Harris 
than to recover the goods conveyed to X. in the other case, however 
wrongful the self-payment by way of retainer was (i.e., however unjusti- 
fied, owing to the insufficiency of the one-witness will.) 
Popham disagreed with Gawdy expressly, and opposed Prohibition. He 
first stated the general rule that an "untrue" payment binds the second ad- 
ministrator, then proceeded as follows: "But here it is not so, because 
there is no sufficient proof for the legacy. Ergo it does not bind the sec- 
ond administrator." I find Popham's thinking harder to get at then 
Gawdy's. My best guess would be this: The will must be treated as if it 
did not exist, since by standards which the ecclesiastical court is entitled 
to apply it is incapable of being given any effect. Harris's only pretense to 
keep the goods is that they were paid to himself as his legacy. But how 
can he so pretend when there is "no such thing" as a will? Since Harris is 
utterly unable to prove that there is any will leaving him a legacy, he must 
be supposed to hold the goods merely in the capacity of first administra- 
tor, in which capacity he has no longer any right to them. (I am confident 
enough that is Popham's meaning. The only disturbing note is the gen-
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erality of the statement "it does not bind the second administrator." Does that 
mean the second administrator could recover goods paid in the name of legacy
to a stranger, X., by the first administrator? My guess would be "No," except
in a very theoretical sense. X., like Harris, could not rely on the "nonexistent"
nuncupative will, but he could probably defeat Chadborne's attempt to regain
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the goods by showing generally that Harris paid them to him in his capacity 
as first administrator, whether or not he had color to do so. In the instant 
case, Harris could not begin to justify his retention of the goods without 
relying on the "nonexistent" will. Quaere tamen. Popham concludes his 
remarks with an incidental observation: "and if one writes a will with his 
own hand and has one witness to it, that is sufficient because there is in 
effect (come) a double proof by the spiritual law." Add. 25,205 adds the 
further phrase "and this the spiritual law allows." Presumably Popham 
said this way of contrast with the principal case: A nuncupative will re- 
duced to writing and supported by one witness is no good; a will written 
by the testator and supported by one witness is good. What he would have 
concluded if the contrasting situation came in question is a matter of some 
interest, though undeterminable. The further phrase in Add. 25,205 gives 
the remark the force, "Ecclesiastical rules on the witnessing of wills are 
not unreasonably rigid. Our intervening in this case would be easier to 
justify if they were, for then we would perhaps have no better course than 
to fall back on common law standards -- to say that obstacles which we 
would not put in the way of establishing acts ought not to be interposed by
ecclesiastical courts either. But in reality the ecclesiastical rules make perfectly 
good sense. They demand two witnesses in the case of a nuncupative will, 
where there is obvious danger of fraud, but are satisfied with one for the 
purpose of establishing that a will was actually written by the testator. The 
mere fact that the rule on nuncupative wills is formalistic or cautionary in a 
sense for which there is no precise common law analogy is no basis for 
complaint on our part." Thinking this way, what would Popham do if it were 
alleged that an ecclesiastical court had disallowed a will written by the 
testator and supported by one witness? Would he say that if any such dis- 
allowance had actually occurred it was a violation of ecclesiastical stand- 
ards, remediable by appeal? Or prohibit on the ground that the 
ecclesiastical court had displayed the kind of rigidity on whose absence 
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its right to handle testamentary cases by its own standards depended? 
Those must remain questions. 
Justice Fenner's remarks seem to respond to the last of Popham's 
points as I construct them above. Fenner did not say positively that he fa- 
vored a Prohibition, but he asked a fundamental question about the eccle- 
siastical courts' right to their own standards in testamentary cases (in 
contrast to Gawdy, who conceded that right while favoring a Prohibition 
in the instant case.) Fenner invoked the commonplace historical view that 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over wills was not an ancient or inherent facet 
of spiritual authority (a view supported by the fact that testamentary juris- 
diction was temporal in other countries.) If, Fenner asked, the ecclesiasti- 
cal courts' jurisdiction is a latter-day delegation of authority originally in 
the common law, why should common law standards of evidence not be 
binding on ecclesiastical courts? ("The King's courts now of late time re- 
mit the probate of wills to the spiritual court, and at common law one wit- 
ness suffices. Why not in the spiritual court, which has its authority from 
us?") Taken as a specific response to Popham's views as stated above, 
this would say, "Quite regardless of whether ecclesiastical standards for 
proving will are reasonable, or unduly rigid, or in flagrant conflict with 
the 'spirit' of the common law, have they any right to vary from the com- 
mon law at all? In other fields -- tithes, perhaps -- ecclesiastical rules 
may have what amounts to a prescriptive right to vary (subject, like other 
prescriptive rights, to control if the variance is excessive, or utterly unrea- 
sonable, or deleterious to men's common law interests and expectations.) 
But is that the case in the testamentary field?" 
The three judges whose opinions are reported being thus divided, the 
case was adjourned. Later, with Justice Gawdy absent, the Court denied 
the Prohibition. Fenner need not have been converted to Popham's opin- 
ion, for the two judges who are not heard from individually, Yelverton 
and Williams, could have concurred with the Chief Justice to make a ma- 
jority. The case is strong authority for ecclesiastical courts' right to de- 
mand two witnesses to prove a nuncupative will (and note that Gawdy did 
not dispute that, whether or not he would have held out for his dissent if 
he had participated in the final decision.) 
The Add. 25,205 report of Harris v. Chadborne, after giving the 
judges' initial opinions, goes on with (a) a summary of a later case (Hill v. 
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Browne, H. 3 Jac.); (b) a speech labeled "Tanfield"' (c) brief notes of re- 
lated recent Common Pleas opinions. Though it is impossible to be sure, I 
take it that the remark by Tanfield was in Hill v. Browne, in which event 
he spoke as a judge, having just been appointed to the Bench. 
In Hill v. Browne, a man wrote his will with his own hand, but named 
no executors. Administration was accordingly granted with the will an- 
nexed. A legatee sued the administrator. A Prohibition was granted on 
surmise that the ecclesiastical court would not allow the legacy because 
there were not two witnesses to support the will. Assuming this to be a 
definitive and unanimous decision, it bears strongly on the question raised 
by Popham's opinion in Harris v. Chadborne: If an ecclesiastical court 
will not allow a will written by the testator and supported by one witness, 
should it be prohibited.? Hill v. Browne seems to say "Yes" -- i.e., 
that such a disallowance is not an error remediable only by appeal. There
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is a difference to worry about, however. We encountered the view
above that a will without executors is no will, so far as the common law
is concerned. Noy's brief report of Harris v. Chadborne says that the 
Court agreed on that proposition, with the qualification that legatees may 
recover if the executorless will is annexed to the letters of administration. 
Strictly speaking, Hill v. Browne would only decide that, having annexed 
the executorless will, the ecclesiastical court was not free to block lega- 
cies by evidentiary rules stricter than (by Popham's presumption) it 
would apply to the same will with executors. In other words, once an ex- 
ecutorless will is attached to the letters of administration it is to be treated 
as a proper will to all intents and purposes (hence provable by one wit- 
ness if written by the testator); it must not be subjected to the proof re- 
quirements appropriate to nuncupative wills. Prohibiting to enforce that 
point would not in strictness amount to interfering with ecclesiastical can- 
ons of proof. It would be interfering with ecclesiastical autonomy in the 
testamentary field, but rather to a substantive end than an evidentiary one. 
The decision would not say, "You must let wills written by the testator be 
proved by one witness or risk Prohibition"; but, "You must not treat ex- 
ecutorless wills as nuncupative once you have annexed them." It does not, 
of course, follow that the Court in Hill v. Browne actually made this dis- 
tinction. It may have intended to insist by way of Prohibition on the rule 
that Popham laid down in Harris v. Chadborne (and expected that ecclesi- 
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astical courts would not question): The testator's writing plus one witness 
suffices. 
Tanfield's remark in Add. 25,205 consists only of a citation of Bagnall 
v. Stokes (for its dictum, its significant point). Taking Tanfield as a judge 
speaking in Hill v. Browne: His merely citing a case says nothing abut his 
opinion, but relying on Bagnall v. Stokes suggests that the problem was 
seen as evidentiary. Bagnall v. Stokes could only be loosely relevant, as 
general authority for intervention to block application of the two-witness 
rule. Intervention to block its application to a release of a legacy, argu- 
ably a "common law transaction" (Bagnall v. Stokes), does not necessar- 
ily entail intervention to prevent its being applied to the authentication of 
a will of personal estate, arguably a "merely spiritual" transaction. To the 
Common Pleas opinion noted in Add. 25,205 we shall return when we 
take up that court. 
The King's Bench was divided in Harris v. Chadborne, but the split 
was not altogether stark, since Justice Gawdy did not dissent on the two- 
witness rule as such, and there is no certainty that Justice Fenner dis- 
sented in the end. In the very well-reported Armiger Brown v. 
Wentworth, 14 the Court was cleanly split. In the latter case, a Prohibition 
14 T. 4 Jac. K.B. Yelverton, 92; Lansd. 1111, f.241b; Harl. 1631, f.329b; Add. 25,205, f.46b. All 
four reports are good, and there are no conflicts of substance among them. Yelverton and Add. 
25,205, however, essentially synthesize the majority and minority positions, whereas Lansd. 
1111 and Harl. 1631 go judge-by-judge and occasion-by-occasion. My exposition is accordingly 
based on the latter two MSS. Those MSS. do not give exactly the same picture of the stages of 
the discussion. My account combines them into what seems a probable narrative of the case's 
unfolding. Nothing in substance depends on the details of the narrative. The two reports compare 
as follows: 
(1) Lansd. 1111 starts by stating the case. Then it gives speeches by Popham, Fenner, and 
Tanfield, in that order. Then comes the notation "another day," after which Yelverton speaks in 
favor of the Prohibition (majority position), followed in order by Tanfield, Fenner, Williams, and 
Popham. Then, with the notation "afterwards" the reporter gives the outcome -- viz., denial of the 
motion for Consultation and demurrer by the defendant-in-Prohibition. The report ends with a 
summary of Peppes's Case (cf. Note 3 above). 
(2) Harl. 1631 does not state the case, but says it was moved "as before." The MS. does not 
contain an earlier entry on the case, but it is clear that it was brought up on a previous occasion. I 
take the first exchange in Lansd. 1111 (Popham, Fenner, Tanfield) to relate to that previous 
occasion. and Harl. 1631 to represent the second discussion. Harl. 1631 runs Popham, Williams 
(inconclusively), Fenner, Tanfield, Popham (disputing Tanfield's interpretation of Lloyd's Case), 
Yelverton leaning Popham's way, Popham again. Then comes the specific note that three days 
later Yelverton changed his mind and made his argument on the Fenner-Tanfield side (in favor 
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to block application of the two-witness rule was upheld, 3-2, on motion 
for Consultation. Although the issues in the two cases were not the same, 
they meet sufficiently at a certain level of abstraction to permit the fol- 
lowing formulation: In Brown v. Wentworth, Justice Fenner, who in Har- 
ris v. Chadborne expressed principled objection to the two-witness rule in 
all testamentary cases, carried Tanfield (Gawdy's replacement) with him 
and won over a somewhat wavering Yelverton; Popham, who opposed in- 
terfering with ecclesiastical evidentiary canons in both cases, carried 
Williams with him into vigorous dissent. However, no two of the judges 
saw Brown v. Wentworth in exactly the same way, and that case can be 
compared with Harris v. Chadborne only "at certain level of abstraction." 
The facts of Brown v. Wentworth were as follows: "An esquire of Suf- 
folk who was killed by his servant" made a will with executors. Then he 
made a second will without executors, revoking the first, after which he 
was killed. Administration was committed to Brown with the second will 
annexed. Wentworth sued Brown for a legacy left to him by the first will. 
Brown pleaded that the first will was revoked, then got his Prohibition on 
surmise that he was not allowed to prove it by one witness -- i.e., was not 
allowed to prove the revocation by producing the second will in the testa- 
tor's handwriting, plus one witness and (which he also offered) "compari- 
son of hands and such like" (i.e., physical evidence tending to verify that 
the document was actually written by the testator.) As the case was dis- 
cussed, the issue was: Should the ecclesiastical court be prevented from 
insisting on two witnesses to prove revocation of a will? In other words, 
nothing was made of the peculiar features of the case -- the fact that the 
act of revocation was comprised in an executorless will, and that that will 
was annexed to the letters of administration. Fitting the MS. reports to- 
gether to give an exact picture of the progress of the discussion presents a 
few problems. I shall tell the story in what seems the probable order. 
Whether it is precisely correct does not affect the content of the judges' 
views. 
of the Prohibition.) Then, with the notation "another day," come speeches by Tanfield. Fenner, 
Williams (decisively on Popham's side), and Popham. No result is reported. I take it that Lansd. 
1111 telescopes the later discussions while Harl. 1631 spells them out stage by stage. 
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When the motion for Consultation was first discussed, Chief Justice 
Popham stated his basic opinion firmly: Proving revocation of a will is no 
different in principle from proving a will. Both are properly ecclesiastical 
matters. The ecclesiastical court having exclusive jurisdiction over both 
questions -- "Did A. make this will?" and "Did A. revoke this will?" -- it 
is "against reason" to prevent the ecclesiastical court from applying its 
own evidentiary standards in deciding them. On this rock, Popham edi- 
fied a few explanations and qualifications. (a) Lest it be said that the two 
questions are not on the same level: Revocation is, as it were, implicit in 
probate. It makes no sense to hold that two witnesses may be demanded 
for probate, but not for a question which may expressly arise in probate 
proceedings (if someone comes forward to contest probate by attempting 
to show revocation), and which otherwise is implied in the probate ques- 
tion ("Is this actually A.'s last -- i.e., unrevoked -- will?"). And surely two 
witnesses may be required for probate. (" ... for it is a necessary matter in 
the probate of a will to prove whether it is revoked or not, and probate ... 
will be by two witness, and no Prohibition lies.") 
(b) Lest it be doubted that insistence on two witnesses for probate 
should be permitted: Objection to permitting it is likely to arise from con- 
cern about common law interests. In practice, the ecclesiastical courts did 
not throw out uncontested wills for lack of two witnesses. They provided 
a form for a kind of prima facie probate, whereby an executor without 
two witnesses could establish the will and enter on his office. Such an ex- 
ecutor could, however, be challenged to prove the will per testes, and 
then he must produce two. If he failed, the estate would be committed to 
an administrator, as if the decedent had died intestate. It is at this point 
that doubt about the desirability of allowing enforcement of the two-wit- 
ness rule may arise. For suppose the executor who loses his office by vir- 
tue of the rule has already dealt with the property of the estate, as by 
selling goods or releasing debts. Will the vendee or releasee be hurt? "No," 
Popham replies. For if the administrator sues at common law for the debt  
released or goods sold, the releasee or vendee need only plead the will. If 
he can prove it by common law standards, he will win. Therefore no one 
will be hurt at common law as a result of enforcement of the two-witness 
rule for ecclesiastical purposes. Therefore the common law has no inter- 
est in blocking the rule. 
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(c) Lest it be objected that ecclesiastical courts are simply not always 
permitted to enforce the two-witness rule in cases properly brought there, 
as Popham's general language might suggest they should be: Here Po- 
pham made a tentative concession. "It may be" ( only "may be") that when 
such things as contracts or land transactions come in question in ecclesi- 
astical suites "collaterally" they must be tried by common law standards, 
under pain of Prohibition. In other word, the two-witness rule is objec- 
tionable, if at all, only when it is applied to a "common law issue." Revo- 
cation of a will, like the truth of a will in probate proceedings, is in no 
sense a "common law issue." Making a will and revoking one are "noth- 
ing more than the testator's disposition as to who will have his goods af- 
ter his death," and of such dispositions the common law takes no direct 
notice. Testamentary matters become of interest to the common law -- 
hence on a level with conveyances, contracts, and the like -- only when 
executors and administrators start to deal with the estate, when "disposi- 
tion" gives way to "execution." It simply does not follow that because 
Prohibitions are sometimes properly used to block the two-witness rule, 
they may always be so used. 
(d) Lest the problem of the mixed will be introduced as an objection: 
Here Popham made a large concession to the common law's power to 
protect its interests. If probate of a will comprising both land and goods is 
refused, or if a claim that such a will was revoked is disallowed, Prohibi- 
tion lies for all (not, as the competing theory held, only quoad terram.) 
Ecclesiastical courts should not (I take it from Popham's formulation) be 
prohibited from so much as touching such a will, but they should be pro- 
hibited from making any negative judgment on it (judging it revoked or 
no will) to the possible prejudice of common law proceedings on the 
same will. Whether such a negative judgment resulted from the two-wit- 
ness rule or something else would (I take it) make no difference. But 
nothing follows as to this case from the mixed-will case. Ecclesiastical 
courts cannot be given a free rein with mixed wills precisely because 
common law interests should not be exposed to the harm which applica- 
tion of ecclesiastical standards might indirectly do them; no common law 
interest depends on the bare question whether or not a will of personal es- 
tate was revoked. 
Fenner, the senior puisne Justice, spoke after Popham, directly to the 
contrary. In his first speech, Fenner took issue solely and flatly on Po- 
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pham's argument that probate and revocation are indistinguishable: " ... al- 
though the probate ... belongs to ecclesiastical courts, yet the revocation 
does not, for that is to prove that there is not any testament. And if one 
devises diverse legacies, and afterwards he says that his will is that J.S. 
shall not have his legacy, it seems to me that this revocation will be tried 
according to the course of the common law." In other words, "This will 
was revoked" means "There is no will for the ecclesiastical court to pro- 
bate -- no basis for any ecclesiastical proceedings having to do with this 
document, even its bare authentication." Therefore, whether "This will 
was revoked" is a true statement is in no proper sense an ecclesiastical 
question, suitable for trial by ecclesiastical standards. It is rather a ques- 
tion as to whether there is any ecclesiastical question. ("No proper sense": 
Does Fenner mean that Prohibition lies on the bare surmise that an al- 
leged will was revoked, or that the ecclesiastical court may try the revoca- 
tion provided it does not insist on the two-witness rule? If the latter, there 
is obviously a sense in which "Was this will revoked?" is an ecclesiasti- 
cal questions -- i.e., a question which an ecclesiastical court may deter- 
mine even though one party objects. It is not, however, an ecclesiastical 
question in the strict or proper sense that how it is determined is of no 
concern outside the ecclesiastical system. In connection with Fenner's 
thinking, cf. the modus: Does claiming a modus amount to claiming that 
the tithe suite was void ab initio, in which case there is no sense in which 
"Does this modus exist?" is an ecclesiastical question. Or does claiming a 
Prohibition on the basis of a modus only amount to claiming that the ec- 
clesiastical court is incompetent, or notoriously unwilling, to try one sort 
of question within its jurisdiction?) 
Justice Tanfield spoke next, making an argument in support of Fen- 
ner's position. Tanfield took the rule in Bagnall v. Stokes as his premise 
(without citing the case specifically though he did so as a later point in the 
discussion): Two witnesses may not be insisted on to prove a release of a 
legacy. Is a revocation not like a release, Tanfield asked.(" ... and as a re- 
lease is a discharge of the legacy, so is a revocation an annulling of the 
will.") I.e.: Both a legatee's release and a testator's revocation are "nega- 
tive" acts -- acts which, if they actually took place, go to destroy ecclesi- 
astical claims or remove the need for ecclesiastical proceedings. 
Therefore whether they took place is not properly an ecclesiastical ques- 
tion, not a question arising out of claims or proceedings that can be said 
to be before the ecclesiastical court -- in accord with Fenner's opinion. 
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At the least, it would be anomalous to treat releases and revocations dif- 
ferently. (If they should be treated the same way, note the implication 
that the ecclesiastical court should try the revocation provided it waives 
the two-witness rule. For no one pretended that releases were not triable 
in ecclesiastical courts on that condition, and Bagnall v. Stokes held ex- 
pressly that the ecclesiastical court should be prohibited only on a clear 
surmise that it had insisted on the two-witness rule.) Yelverton and Wil- 
liams are reported the have doubted what Tanfield said -- in just what re- 
spect does not appear. 
On what I take to have been the second discussion of the case, Popham 
repeated his basic point. Williams spoke to two incidental points, without 
showing his hand on the principal case. On the question of mixed wills, 
Williams said that ecclesiastical courts should be prohibited only quoad 
terram if there is only one witness to prove the will (contrary to what Po- 
pham said on the first hearing.) Secondly, Williams affirmed the rule of 
Bagnall v. Stokes on legacy releases, which Popham and Yelverton are 
reported to have conceded. Popham did not dispute the premise of Tan- 
field's argument from the release to the revocation, though he rejected 
the argument itself. 
Justice Fenner spoke again, this time switching from his narrow logical 
distinction between probate and revocation to the broad historical argu- 
ment he had used in Harris v. Chadborne: "[Disallowing the revocation 
for lack of a second witness] is contrary to the law of England, from 
which they have their power to probate testaments, which at the begin- 
ning did not belong to them, wherefore they ought to pursue the form of 
our law, and so it is for the revocation." Two points should be observed 
here: (a) Whatever independent validity the distinction between probate 
and revocation may have, Fenner's historical argument removes the dif- 
ference. He all but explicitly says what the argument implies: Because 
testamentary jurisdiction originally belonged to the common law the two- 
witness rule has no place in any testamentary proceedings, probate or 
revocation. (b) If the common law delegated testamentary jurisdiction to 
the ecclesiastical system, it presumably delegated authority to decide 
claims of revocation as well as probate power, both with the proviso that 
common law evidentiary standards be observed. At least there would 
seem to be no reason for assuming the contrary. Therefore, Prohibition 
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should lie in a revocation case only on surmise that the evidentiary pro- 
viso had been broken. 
Tanfield spoke next. Relying on a Lloyde's Case, he distinguished pro- 
bate and revocation as follows: Probate is an inherently "spiritual" func- 
tion, revocation a temporal act, properly speaking within common law 
jurisdiction (hence, for the purposes of the principal case, to be deter- 
mined by common law evidentiary standards even though literally tried in 
the ecclesiastical court.) For ecclesiastical courts should be prohibited in 
toto from determining a claim that a mixed will was revoked, whereas 
they should only be prohibited quoad terram from probating a mixed will 
-- so held in Lloyde's Case. 
Popham then intervened, once again to accept Tanfield's premise and 
dispute his conclusions: Admittedly the ecclesiastical court was prohib- 
ited in in toto in Lloyde's Case, where revocation rather than probate was 
involved. But no radical distinction between probate and revocation fol- 
lows from that. The reason why the Prohibition was total in that case was 
simply that an ecclesiastical trial quoad bona might prejudice subsequent 
common law litigation about the land. We have seen an indication that 
Popham favored total Prohibitions in mixed-will cases when only probate 
was in question. If (in accord with Williams's opinion above and prevail- 
ing authority) Popham would not have insisted on the latter point, he 
would still have a perfectly good explanation of Lloyde's Case. For it is 
quite arguable that an ecclesiastical trial on the specific, indivisible, and 
controverted claim that a document was revoked would be more likely to 
prejudice common law litigation than mere probate proceedings, ostensi- 
bly going only to as much of the will as concerned goods. In other words, 
one can reasonably say that there is a practical distinction between pro- 
bate and revocation, in the context of deciding whether total Prohibition 
is necessary to avoid prejudice, while still maintaining that there is no es- 
sential distinction. 
Save for one further remark by Popham (repeating, with an unspecific 
citation, his earlier point that application of the two-witness rule to pro- 
bate will not hurt people who have had dealings with a temporarily in- 
stalled, later ousted executor), the only other speech on the present 
occasion was by Yelverton. He said briefly and generally that he could 
see no difference between probate and revocation -- if wills are "spiri- 
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tual," so are revocations of wills -- clearly implying agreement with Po- 
pham. Three days later, however, (Harl. 163 l specifies the three days), 
Yelverton changed his mind. He now announced his opinion that revoca- 
tion of a will in an inherently temporal act. It may be tried by ecclesiasti- 
cal courts if it comes up obiter in ecclesiastical litigation -- like leases, 
contracts, etc. -- but then common law evidentiary standards must be ob- 
served. Beyond that basic point, Yelverton contributed a slant of his own 
on the case: "...in all cases where the temporal court could have jurisdic- 
tion and the ecclesiastical also, the temporal will be preferred, as it ap- 
pears in all our books that when trials are to be by both laws, that only 
will be put in issue which is triable by the common law, as induction will 
be put in issue and not institution." Harl. 1631 says that Yelverton "put 
several cases" to sustain this point, unfortunately without telling what 
they were. 
Yelverton's thinking is of interest for the frame of the case. Holding 
the "swing" vote, he shows symptoms of a troubled judge -- searching his 
books, looking for an approach to the case that would be a little more sat- 
isfying than anything he had heard. What he found seems to me a some- 
what softened version of the Fenner-Tanfield position. Yelverton did not 
quite want to say that revocation and probate are miles apart (logical po- 
lar opposites, as it were) or that ecclesiastical authority in testamentary 
cases is by the gift and at the sufferance of the common law. He preferred 
to think in terms of priorities in the event that jurisdictions with conflict- 
ing rules overlap. Yelverton did not want to say that ecclesiastical courts 
have, in strictness, no business deciding claims of revocation, or that a 
claim of revocation goes to deny that there is any testamentary matter for 
the ecclesiastical court to take up. He preferred to see the revocation 
claim as an "incident," like any other, of an ecclesiastical cause -- a mat- 
ter arising, something that must be decided by someone before the suit 
can be disposed of. Once it is seen that way, the question arises whether 
the "incident" should be tried by common law or ecclesiastical standards. 
The question is a real one (as Popham admitted in the discussion of this 
case), for it was plainly not the law that ecclesiastical courts are always 
free to try "incidents" of their own suits by their own rules. How does one 
decide? It seems to me that the thrust of Yelverton's remarks is to pro- 
pose a rule of thumb close to "When in doubt prefer the common law." 
The nicer formulation would be: "In cases of ambiguity -- where there is 
a legitimate sense in which an issue may be seen as concerning, or appro- 
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priate to, the common law -- take it as a 'common law issue' for the pur- 
pose of evidentiary standards; blot out the sense, though that may be le- 
gitimate too, in which it may be seen as an ecclesiastical issue." (With 
such a formulation in mind, Yelverton's analogy with benefice-law 
makes a kind of sense. In many cases, whether a clergyman was installed 
in a benefice was both a matter of whether he was instituted -- a "spiri- 
tual" act -- and of whether he was inducted -- a "temporal" one. Common 
law policy was to resolve the problem whether such cases were primarily 
about induction or about institution by "blotting out" the latter and forcing 
common law litigants to take issue on the former.) 
Whether revocation of a will ought to pass Yelverton's test is question- 
able. Popham would certainly say it does not, without necessarily disput- 
ing the test as such. For Popham saw no ambiguity, no legitimate sense in 
which revocation of a will of personalty touched the common law. It 
seems to me that an argument can be made, however, though no one in 
the reports makes it in these terms. It is, after all, true that whether a will 
was revoked could affect people's interests -- most notably those entitled 
to intestate succession. Often, surely, the motive for revoking a will is to 
restore to grace the near relatives who would take an intestate estate, or at 
least to withdraw benefactions which the decedent once wanted to bestow 
at the expense of his wife and nearest kin. The rights of intestate succes- 
sors were ecclesiastical, in the sense that suits to obtain administration 
and recover shares of the estate must be brought in ecclesiastical courts. 
However, the freedom of ecclesiastical courts to deal with intestate es- 
tates was severely hedged in by statute. The common law frequently in- 
tervened to see that the statutes were observed, and that the interests of 
wives and children, which the statutes protected, did not suffer. There is 
a sense in which the common law had a kind of tutelary interest in the in- 
testate successors. Applied to probate, the effect of the two-witness rule 
was to make wills harder to establish, to insure that intestate successors 
were not deprived of their due by false or dubious wills. Applied to revo- 
cation, the effect would be to make wills harder to break. Perhaps the 
common law's "tutelary interest" is strong enough to justify insisting that 
an issue of revocation is a common law issue. That may be an interest at 
least equal to the interest in protecting executors who say that legacies 
have been released but cannot produce two witnesses. It is probably true 
that intestate successors were a good deal safer with ecclesiastical courts 
257 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
than executors trying to defeat legacies. One should not assume too much 
about reality on the basis of the lawyerly arguments in Brown v. 
Wentworth. Granting a Consultation in that case would not necessarily 
lead to recovery of the legacy. Indeed, the legatee would seem to have a 
shaky case, for he was suing an administrator for a legacy bequeathed by 
a will other than the one attached to his letters of administration. The ef- 
fect of a Consultation would only be to leave the ecclesiastical court free 
to struggle with a complicated case as it saw fit, and free to prevent the 
administrator from pleading revocation of the first will -- whatever other 
defenses he might have. 
The same point can be made for more normal circumstances. To hold 
that ecclesiastical courts may insist that claims of revocation be supported 
by two witnesses does not necessarily mean that intestate successors and 
beneficiaries of wills made after revocation of a former will would suffer 
in practice. It does not mean that the first executor who could find two 
people to swear to his will would be absolutely safe against claims of 
revocation unsupported by an equal number of oath-helpers. How the ec- 
clesiastical courts actually handled complex testamentary situations when 
left to themselves is an obscure question. However, the "tutelary interest" 
runs a certain risk if the ecclesiastical courts are left to themselves. That 
may be reason enough to prohibit, or as good a reason as was ever avail- 
able in two-witness-rule Prohibition cases. The arguments above were not 
to all appearances made in Brown v. Wentworth. I am not sure the values 
they touch on can be left out of account as sub-surface influences. Anxi- 
ety lest the shades of gentlemen who thought better of their benefactions 
be offended, and the kinsmen likely to gain from revocations be harmed, 
may have tipped the balance in a tight case. Justice Yelverton, who did 
the tipping, at least provided the framework in which those motives can 
be given explicit recognition. 
At the final discussion of Brown v. Wentworth, Tanfield and Fenner 
restated their position without significant additions. Justice Williams now 
declared himself on Popham's side. Williams, like Yelverton, shows 
signs of perplexity and research. He cited some Year Book authority for 
the generalities of the Popham position (that ecclesiastical courts may try 
the issues that arise in their cases -- as much as the old books would 
show, but bringing them in perhaps lent some extra conviction to the ap- 
plication of those generalities which Popham worked out for the present 
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case and Williams concurred in.) He faced Fenner's historical argument, 
answering it as if he took it seriously. It is true, Williams conceded, that 
ecclesiastical testamentary jurisdiction was not ancient, that before the 
Fourth Lateran Council it belonged to the temporal courts. But Williams 
would not draw Fenner's conclusion from that premise. Sine the common 
law had delegated testaments to the Church courts, Williams said in ef- 
fect, the right to try testamentary matters by ecclesiastical standards must 
be taken as included in the gift. ("But now that it belongs to them to prove 
testaments, the law must also allow them a means of trial, and other trial 
they cannot have than by their own law.") Finally, Williams challenged 
the use that had been made of Bagnall v. Stokes. Having apparently done 
some research into the record, he was able to expose Tanfield's inaccu- 
racy. Tanfield had cited the case as a decision that the two-witness rule 
may not be applied to a release of a legacy. As shorthand, that was fair 
enough, for the Court plainly meant so to hold. But, as Williams discov- 
ered, it was not strictly correct. The Prohibition in Bagnall v. Stokes had 
been granted because the executor was suing against his own release, 
wholly without reference to the two-witness rule; all the Court decided 
was that the Prohibition should not have been granted on that ground, 
wherefore Consultation was awarded. Thus, Williams concluded, "to say 
that if they had refused the trial by one witness that the Prohibition would 
stand is imagination out the case." If Williams had a report of Bagnall v. 
Stokes, instead of the official record, it would not have seemed so imagi- 
nary. Nevertheless, even with full information, Williams would have been 
perfectly entitled to say that the rule on releases was only a dictum, and, 
as such, not an authority which one need be reluctant to dispute. 
The Chief Justice, who spoke last, would not accept the help that Wil- 
liams's research provided. Popham's parting argument conceded the leg- 
acy-release case and went on to distinguish it. A legacy release, he held, is 
one of those "collateral" issues which ecclesiastical courts may try if and 
only if they are willing to waive the two-witness rule; revocation of a tes- 
tament is not such an issue. Whereas Tanfield thought a release and a 
revocation essentially similar -- both "negations" of ecclesiastical claims - 
- Popham took the exactly opposite position. As he had argued before, 
"the revocation is a necessary dependent upon the testament, and it is all 
one to try whether the testator made a will or not, or whether he revoked 
his will after making it, and both are acts done by the testator." Similarly, 
Popham now added, an executor's claim that he paid a legacy is triable by 
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ecclesiastical standards, for that too is "dependent" on the ecclesiastical 
claim. A release, on the other hand, is "collateral," and therefore as much 
to be tried by common law standards as the obvious sorts of "common 
law issues" that may arise in ecclesiastical cases (issues such as "Who has 
the property in these goods?", which, unlike a bare release of a legacy, 
could actually come in question in common law litigation.) 
The dependent-collateral distinction may be expounded as follows: 
this A.'s last will?" relates to "was this will revoked by A. (so that it is not 
his last will)?" as "The executor owes me a legacy" relates to "I, the ex- 
ecutor, have paid the legacy claimed (so that the executor does not owe 
the claimant a legacy)." In both instances, the second group of words -- 
whether question or statement -- "depends" on the first in the sense that 
answering one question answers the other, and verifying one statement 
disverifies the other. "The executor owes me a legacy" relates differently 
to "The claimant released the legacy," even though it be made to look like 
the second term in the sets above by adding a negative phrase, "(so that 
the executor does not owe the claimant a legacy)." For the negation here 
is really an "artificial conclusion of the law," rather than a logical transla- 
tion. It follows because the law recognized a power in legatees to wipe 
out their rights to recover legacies; "The claimant released the legacy" 
does not mean "The executor does not owe a legacy." 
If one asks which law recognized the legatee's power to release, the 
answer must ultimately be the common law, though the ecclesiastical law 
may also recognize it as a matter of contingent fact. For suppose ecclesi- 
astical law did not recognize the power to release ecclesiastical duties: It 
is unimaginable, surely, that so fundamental a conflict with the common 
law would have been tolerated for a moment -- as unimaginable as toler- 
ating an ecclesiastical rule which said, e.g., that tithes cannot be conveyed 
by lease. Per contra, where a legatee says that the legacy is unpaid and 
the executor says it is paid, the executor's response in no way derives its 
defensive validity from the common law, for by "mere reason," or the 
necessary rules of any legal system, to say that a duty is discharged an- 
swers the claim that it is undischarged. Where a claim in the last analysis 
derives its defensive validity from the common law, it makes sense to say 
that common law evidentiary standards must be applied, for to permit 
their non-application is to let ecclesiastical canons of proof deprive peo- 
ple of rights which the common law gives and hence is responsible for 
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defining. A right is defined in part by what is required to establish it. Con- 
tra, where a right does not have its source in the common law, so that the 
common law is not responsible for articulating its meaning. Since the 
mere plea that a legacy or tithes have been paid does not have a common 
law source, ecclesiastical courts are free to say, if you like, that "paid" 
means "paid in the presence of two witnesses," or that what counts as dis- 
charging ecclesiastical duties is what can be proved to have been done ac- 
cording to a certain method, however, rigid or unfair the proof-procedure 
may be. (With respect to legacies and other testamentary matters, inciden- 
tally, this logical argument holds up even though one concedes Fenner's 
historical argument, as Williams did. Historically it might be true that 
legacies originally belonged to the common law, that therefore that pay- 
ment of legacies may have been handed over to the ecclesiastical system 
at a specifiable point in time. In that sense, legacy law would be "derived" 
from the common law, as the power to release may be said to be" de- 
rived" from it. However, the validity of a plea of mere payment would 
still not be derived from the common law. The crucial test is whether the 
ecclesiastical rule could possibly not exist -- whether the validity of the 
defense is ultimately forced on the ecclesiastical law. The historical 
transaction Fenner posited would not involve telling the ecclesiastical 
courts they must allow payment as a defense to legacy claims; by giving 
them legacy claims, it would merely enable them to apply their existing, 
because necessary, rule to a new situation.) 
Chief Justice Popham argued redoubtably in Brown v. Wentworth. It 
was one of his last great cases, for he was about seventy-five years old 
and died roughly a year later. Though unsuccessful, he may not have ar- 
gued altogether in vain, for after the motion for Consultation was denied, 
the defendant demurred to the Prohibition. With the Court so closely di- 
vided and the difficulty of the case so fully exposed, the demurrer was 
well-advised. One change of opinion, comparable to Yelverton's about- 
face on the motion, would have done the trick. However, no further 
events in the case are reported. The chances are that the demurrer was 
dropped, the defendant finally deciding that the likelihood of converting 
anyone after such profound discussion was slight. It is ironic that one 
term later Coke's Common Pleas overturned the dictum in Bagnall v. 
Stokes, on which all the King's Bench judges (with the possible excep- 
tion of Williams) agreed. Coke was soon to strike a fundamental blow at 
two-witness-rule Prohibitions; the King's Bench in Brown v. Wentworth 
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extended the scope of such Prohibitions in the face of strong resistance by 
two judges. At least by Popham’s reasoning, it would have been hard to 
extend it much further, for if one witness must be accepted for revocation 
of a will, must one witness not be accepted for payment of a legacy, or 
payment of tithes? The one place left for the two-witness rule would seem 
to be bare probate of wills of personalty, or quatenus they concerned per- 
sonalty. 
The remaining cases from the Jacobean King’s Bench are not very nu- 
merous or very strong. They do not all go the same way, but if anything 
they suggest greater caution about two-witness-rule Prohibitions than had 
characterized the King’s Bench up to the climactic Brown v. Wentworth. 
Coke, and posthumously Popham, may have exercised a cautionary influ- 
ence. From Sir Thomas Fleming’s Chief Justiceship (1607-13), I have 
only three exiguous reports. One says merely that an executor who 
claimed to have paid a legacy and had only one witness first obtained a 
Prohibition and then lost it by consultation. 15 
The second report, of Parson Close’s Case, 16 is dated H. 5 Jac. K.B., 
but the case was an earlier one in another court, which Chief Justice 
Fleming happened to recount in that term (in what context does not ap- 
pear). In Close’s Case, a tithe-payer wanted to claim that the parson was 
deprived because he had obtained his living by simony. A Prohibition 
was granted by the Exchequer, a most unusual place to seek the writ, to 
judge by the evidence of law reports. (Fleming knew about the case be- 
cause he had formerly been Chief Baron of the Exchequer.) The ground 
of the Prohibition was that three witnesses had been rejected, two for 
competence (because they had been somehow involved in the simoniacal 
transaction) and the third because he was a single witness, whereas at 
least two were required. Six years later (quod nota) the Prohibition was 
reversed by Consultation on the ground that tithes belong to the ecclesias- 
tical system, and therefore that anything erroneous or unreasonable that 
the particular ecclesiastical court did was remediable only by appeal. 
15 T. 5 Jac. K.B. Add 25,213, f.82b, reported briefly under the heading of another totally unrelated 
16  Harl .  3209,  f .6l .
Prohibition case, Freeman v. Nascall. 
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That is as much as the report tells. I would take the case as making 
two points: (a) If a parishioner in a tithe suit disputes the parson's in- 
cumbency by reason of simony, the ecclesiastical court is entitled to insist 
on two witnesses to prove the simoniacal transaction. This holding is sur- 
prising in one way, because automatic deprivation for simony was statu- 
tory. It would seem arguable that an ecclesiastical defendant who relies 
on a statute to defeat his liability should be allowed to establish the facts 
to which the statute gives significance by common law standards. How- 
ever, that may not be so clear. If a statute creates an ecclesiastical offense 
or increases the sanction for one and says nothing to the contrary, perhaps 
it should be taken to mean that the ecclesiastical courts are perfectly free 
to apply their own evidentiary canons to relevant facts, so long as they do 
not disregard or misinterpret the legal rule which the statute enacts. (b) 
Where the ecclesiastical courts are free to apply the two-witness rule 
straightforwardly (where there is no suggestion that more than one wit- 
ness could be produced), they are free to apply it in the somewhat more 
complicated circumstances of this case. I.e.: They are free to say that "two 
witnesses" means "two competent witnesses," and therefore to rule out a 
single witness who survives after other proferred witnesses have been 
ruled incompetent. If the rulings on competence are erroneous or unrea- 
sonable, or if it is excessive to apply the two-witness rule when a party 
has done his best to find multiple witnesses but turns out to have only one 
who can qualify, the remedy is by appeal. Close's Case enters into the 
King's Bench tradition only on the assumption that Fleming, who told the 
story, subscribed to its moral. 
In Mallins's Case, 17 toward the end of Fleming's tenure, it was held 
that the two-witness rule may not be applied to a commutation agreement 
for tithes. I.e.: The parishioner says the parson agreed to take money instead 
of tithes (not by composition-real, but by ordinary bargain); the suit will 
be prohibited if the parishioner is not allowed to prove the agreement by 
one witness. Subject to the element of doubt that existed as to whether 
ecclesiastical courts were bound to recognize such bargains at all, the de- 
cision is not surprising, for a contract is an obvious candidate for the class 
17 T. 10 Jac. K.B. Harg. 15, f.278. 
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of matters of such interest to the common law that they should be tried by 
common law standards. 
There are no two-witness-rule cases from Coke's period as Chief Jus- 
tice of the King's Bench (1613-16). From the post-Cokean years I have 
three reports. In Barnewell v. Tracy 18 a parishioner pleaded a relatively 
formal contractual commutation of tithes: The parson covenanted that 
certain land be discharged of tithes, rendering rent (i.e., the land to be en- 
cumbered with a rent-charge in lieu of tithes); the covenant was condi- 
tioned to be void if the rent was not paid. The parson did not deny the 
covenant, but claimed that the rent was not paid on the day specified, 
wherefore the covenant was void for breach of condition and tithes were 
due. The parishioner sought a Prohibition because the issue was whether 
or not a "real contract" (comprised in a deed and affecting land) had been 
broken and forfeited, and because the ecclesiastical court would not allow 
proof by a single witness. From the judges' remarks, it would appear that 
disallowance of evidence as to whether the rent was paid on time was not 
concretely alleged. Rather, the surmise pointed to ecclesiastical eviden- 
tiary standards in general terms, as "notoriously" inappropriate to this 
case. For Justice Houghton said, with Justices Dodderidge and Croke 
concurring, that Prohibition would lie if the ecclesiastical court would not 
264 
accept one witness to prove payment of the rent. As the case stood, in their 
opinion, Prohibition would not lie, for the ecclesiastical court was perfectly 
able to try whether the rent was paid. That breach and forfeiture of a "real contract" 
were at stake was not sufficient reason for Prohibition, and disallowance of 
evidence was not adequately surmised. Chief Justice Montagu may have thought 
that prohibition would not lie even with a surmise that proof by one witness 
had been disallowed, though this is not clear. He took the position that the 
ecclesiastical court should be prohibited, irrespective of the evidence it al- 
lowed, if issue had been taken on the truth of the "real contract." But the 
parson had admitted the contract, and the parties were at issue on the pay- 
ment of the rent. That issue, Montagu said, was an "accessory" of the ec- 
clesiastical suit. He may have meant that the ecclesiastical court was free 
to try that issue by its evidentiary standards. Houghton spoke after Mon- 
18 T. 16 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 42. 
Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule 
tagu, agreeing but adding the proviso that common law evidentiary stand- 
ards must be applied. Croke and Dodderidge are reported as agreeing 
with Houghton, but nothing is said about the Chief Justice. That is slight 
evidence that he doubted the proviso. 
In Wood v. Churley, 19 a man devised a legacy conditionally: A. was 
bound in an obligation to B., and C. was A.'s surety. C. left a legacy to 
A., on condition that A. provide security to save C.'s executor harmless if 
he should become liable to pay B. on the bond. A. sued for the legacy; the 
executor said the condition had not been performed; A. replied that he 
had tendered security, but that the executor had refused. The ecclesiasti- 
cal court proceeded to try the question thus raised, deciding that A.'s ten- 
der was sufficient and that the legacy should be paid. The executor 
obtained Prohibition by surmising these facts -- i.e., on the ground that 
the reality of the tender and its sufficiency to satisfy the condition were 
intrinsically common law questions. The report relates to a motion for 
Consultation. Counsel argued that the tender was an incident of ecclesias- 
tical litigation, hence determinable by the ecclesiastical court. In support 
of this point, Bagnall v. Stokes was cited -- correctly for a change, for the 
decision rather than the dictum was relied on. Chief Justice Ley supplied 
the dictum, however. The intent of his speech was to favor the Consult- 
ation in this case, but he added that common law issues triable in ecclesi- 
astical courts must be tried by common law standards. Justice Dodderidge 
agreed, the only other member of the Court to speak. Note that Bagnall v. 
Stokes (decision and dictum) was still alive as a King's Bench precedent, 
notwithstanding Coke's repudiation of the dictum in the Common Pleas. 
Another point of interest in Wood v. Churley arises from a phrase in 
Ley's speech and one in Dodderidge's. Ley explained what he meant by 
ecclesiastical trial using common law standards: " ... though it is not by 
jury, yet by such proofs as would be allowed before a jury here." Dod- 
deridge explained why ecclesiastical courts may not insist on two wit- 
nesses when trying common laws issues: " ... in our law proof by one 
witness is good, for the jurors are to give their verdict from their own 
knowledge although no evidence is given." What these explanations sug- 
gest to me is a touch of intellectual discomfort about the meaningfulness 
19 T. 21 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle. 439. 
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of "ecclesiastical trial by common law standards." It is as if someone had 
said, "You keep talking about a class of common law matters, which may 
be tried as 'incidents' of ecclesiastical suits so long as they are given 
common law trial. You will not take the clean, dichotomous way -- pro- 
hibit when there is an issue which you really think should have common 
law trial, so that it gets such trial; otherwise, let the ecclesiastical courts 
proceed with their own methods and rules. But perhaps such a hard-edged 
choice ought to be made in every case. For does it make sense to speak of 
common law trial in an ecclesiastical court? Common law trial means 
trial by jury, not trial by testimony, with or without a two-witness rule. 
You talk as if trial by one witness were the common law method, trial by two
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witnesses the ecclesiastical. But that is misleading both ways. At common 
law, juries decide with the help of such evidence as is presented to them, 
if any is, and if they credit any of it. There is no such thing as a 'one-witness 
rule', any more that there is a 'six-witness rule'. If you like, the common law 
operates with a 'twelve-witness rule!' On the other hand, it is misleading to 
describe ecclesiastical trial as trial by two witnesses. The essential point is 
that it is trial by witnesses alone, without the jury of twelve to fall back 
on. The two-witness rule is a natural, rational function of that system. Not 
having 'twelve witnesses,' it makes sense, for the sake of reliability, to in- 
sist on at least two, to restrain a solo judge from deciding a given way if 
he believes a single witness. Perhaps the ecclesiastical method is a bad 
method; perhaps the element of formalism that the testimony-system en- 
tails is a reason for not having such a system, or for limiting its scope as 
much as possible. But then the thing to do is to take issues in which the 
common law has a defensible interest out of the ecclesiastical system al- 
together -- let them be tried the better way, the real common law way. 
The alternative course is to turn such issues over to an inferior version of 
the ecclesiastical system -- trial by testimony without the insurance of re- 
liability which, given the system, such institutions as the two-witness rule 
clumsily provide." 
Though there are no signs that such a argument was spelled out in 
Wood v. Churley, the phrases used by Ley and Dodderidge seem to be di- 
rected against aspects of it. Ley's says, as it were, "Of course when we 
speak of common law trial in ecclesiastical courts we are not talking liter- 
ally, but there is a legitimate sense in which merely waiving the two-wit- 
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ness rule brings an ecclesiastical trial closer to the common law model. 
Substitute the ecclesiastical judge for the jury, and think of the one wit- 
ness as 'minimum evidence,' and you are not too far off the mark. For 
common law trial consists in a fact-decider -- twelve men as it happens, 
but make it one -- free to decide from 'minimum evidence,' and given the 
ecclesiastical system 'minimum evidence' can only mean one witness." 
Dodderidge's language says, "Literally speaking, there is of course no 
such common law institution as proof by one witness. But an ecclesiasti- 
cal judge who is constrained to decide even though all the evidence he 
has to go on is the testimony of one witness approximates significantly to 
the common law system, where juries decide even though no evidence is 
presented." Neither remark seriously rebuts the argument above. The 
judges did not sit down to rebut it. What they did perhaps do, merely by 
dropping phrases, was to parry it, as if it were in their minds or in the air. 
The argument is obvious enough, but I have found no traces of it in ear- 
lier cases on the two-witness rule. Historically, it may represent a rela- 
tively sophisticated doubt. There was considerable practice behind the 
idea that common-law 'incidents' should be tried by ecclesiastical courts, 
but without the two-witness rule. It was perhaps taken for granted that to 
ban the two-witness rule was to guarantee a close enough imitation of 
common law trial to satisfy the common law's interest -- until it occurred 
to someone to doubt. Ley and Dodderidge were defending the conven- 
tional wisdom. 
In a case of 1623, 20 a Prohibition to stop a legacy suit was sought on 
two grounds. The MS. report states the two grounds with perfect clarity, 
but how they fit together into one case is not so clear. The first ground 
was that the ecclesiastical court had refused to accept an acquittance writ- 
ten and sealed by the legatee, acknowledging receipt of the legacy, be- 
cause it was unsupported by witnesses. (According to the executor, the 
witnesses were all dead.) The second ground was that the ecclesiastical 
court had misconstrued or refused to recognize a "shifting" legacy. (A. 
devised 10£ to B., to be paid when B. reached twenty-one, and if B. 
should die before reaching twenty-one, C. to have the £10. According to the 
surmise, B. died before twenty-one but his executor was nevertheless try- 
20 M.21 Jac. K.B. 2 Rolle, 414; Harg. 30, f.169. 
267 
The Writ of Prohibition: 
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law 
ing to recover the £10 from A.’s executor. The ecclesiastical court had al- 
legedly give sentence for B.’s executor.) 
Combining the two grounds, I should suppose the case to be as fol- 
lows: The disallowed acquittance went to show that A.’s executor had 
paid C. The-relevance of establishing that in order to defeat B.’s executor 
is not evident, for the obvious argument against him is that B.’s death be- 
fore twenty-one broke the condition and simply disentitled B.’s estate. 
Perhaps it is arguable, however, that the ecclesiastical court ought to have 
allowed A.’s executor to prove payment to C. by way of establishing his 
“clean hands.” Conceivably, the ecclesiastical court could have taken the 
position that A.’s executor was under the circumstances estopped to dis- 
pute his duty to pay B. or his estate unless he could claim to have paid C. 
In property-law terms, that is a funny position (the devise ought either to 
impose a valid condition on B.’s legacy or not, so that B.’s executor was 
either entitled to £10 or not, that being the sole question), but perhaps a 
case can be made for it in legacy law. A testamentary court, seeking to 
effect the testator’s intentions, might reasonably take the conditionality of 
B.’s legacy as less than absolute, thus: A.’s first choice was to benefit B. 
if he survived to adulthood. His second choice, should B. die in his non- 
age, was to employ the £10 to benefit C. But what was his third choice? 
What would he have chosen if, say, C. disappeared from the country, 
never claiming, the £10 (a small sum, after all) and not being reachable 
by the executor? It is not so clear that he would have wanted the £10 to go 
to the residuary legatee, in preference to B.’s estate (via which those 
would probably benefit who would have benefited if B. had received his 
legacy and died at twenty-two.) Perhaps a testamentary court which was 
allowed the flexibility to do so could reasonably look into whether C. had 
been paid, and whether, in view of the lapse of time and other circum- 
stances, there was any likelihood of his ever claiming the legacy. If C. 
had not been paid and could not be reached, and A.’s estate was overdue 
for final settlement, the ecclesiastical court might reasonably prefer B.’s 
estate to the residuary legatee (typically the executor himself,) 
The alternative to this reconstruction is to suppose that two distinct 
claims were joined in one legacy suit, and that the two grounds of the sur- 
mise go to different matters. The court’s handling of the case, however, 
encourages the reconstruction I have given. The judges were divided on 
the merits as they appeared, but agreed that no action should be taken un- 
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til the ecclesiastical sentence was shown (produced so that the Court 
could inspect its details, as opposed to pleaded in general terms.) The 
judges' insistence on knowing exactly what the ecclesiastical court had 
done suggests that they were a little confused by the double surmise, a lit- 
tle uncertain whether the disallowed evidence was relevant in the ecclesi- 
astical court's own eyes, whatever difference that might make. I infer that 
the goings-on in the ecclesiastical court were somewhat complex and un- 
usual, as they must have been if both elements in the surmise relate to a 
single claim. 
On the apparent merits, Justice Houghton took the position that there 
was no basis for Prohibition. He expressed himself in the most general 
vocabulary -- simply that the ecclesiastical court had cognizance of the 
principal matter and was therefore free to handle matters arising as it 
chose. Perhaps his spelled-out position would not be that legacy suits are 
never prohibitable, but rather that in this case (a) ecclesiastical courts may 
apply their own evidentiary requirements to a mere plea of payment (per- 
haps not, e.g., to a release); (b) ecclesiastical courts may construe legacies 
as they see fit, subject only to appeal -- e.g., whether a legacy is condi- 
tional, and whether conditionality has the same meaning in legacy law as 
in the common law of property. Justices Dodderidge and Chamberlain 
thought that both parts of the surmise stated grounds for Prohibition. 
They expressly disputed the generality that cognizance of the "principal" 
carries cognizance of the "incidents." That is not true, they said, when 
departure from common law standards will affect a third party (C. in the 
scheme above) or will deprive the executor of what belongs to him. They 
described the disallowance of the acquittance as a "strange conceit." Wit- 
nesses, they said, "cannot be kept in life, and ytt is the hande of God." 
(This need not imply that the two-witness rule could never be enforced 
with respect to payment of a legacy. There might be room for saying that 
the two-witness rule is enforceable as "transaction formalism," but that 
when the party took pains to obtain a witnessed acquittance in writing he 
must not be required to produce live testimony when it is impossible or 
unreasonably difficult.) On the substantive matter, Dodderidge and 
Chamberlain held in effect that the devise must be construed by common 
law standards: As it stood, B's death before twenty-one simply extin- 
guished his right; contra if there had been no expressly conditional lan- 
guage (if he dies before twenty-one, then to C.) (I.e.: If the devise were 
simply £10 to B., to be paid when he reaches twenty-one", B.'s executor 
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would be entitled to the £10 when B. would have been twenty-one even 
though B. died earlier.) 
Turning now to the Jacobean Common Pleas: We have already noted 
the reversal of the dictum in Bagnall v. Stokes, which took place in M. 4 
Jac. in Peppes's Case. Before that, I have one faint contrary indication: A 
note in one report of Harris v. Chadborne, above, that in M.3 Jac. Justice 
Daniel of the Common Pleas expressed agreement with the rule of Bag- 
nall v. Stokes on releases. The same report also notes another Common 
Pleas Case: In M. 2 Jac. a Prohibition was granted to prevent application 
of the two-witness rule to probate, but later (H. 4, after Peppes) a Con- 
sultation was granted. The reporter notes that "it does not appear whether 
the will was written by the devisor or not" (If it was not, the Consultation 
was unsurprising; if it was, the Consultation expressed relatively strong 
willingness to let the ecclesiastical courts set their own standards in testa- 
mentary matters.) 
In Roberts's Case, 21 Coke's Common Pleas extended the principle of 
Peppes's Case to a lease of tithes, using language strong and general 
enough to rule out two-witness-rule Prohibitions altogether. The Court 
invoked the usual generality that "incidents" of ecclesiastical causes 
should be left to ecclesiastical determination by ecclesiastical standards, 
but also relied on Coke's argument that fictitious surmises were a virtu- 
ally unlimited danger. Counsel made one specific objection to the hold- 
ing, to which the Court made a clear and broad response. Suppose, it was 
objected, that A. sues for tithes, claiming to be lessee of the rectory; sup- 
pose the parishioner pleads that the rectory was leased to B. by an earlier 
lease, so that B. rather A. is entitled to the tithes. If the parishioner is not 
allowed to prove the lease to B. by one witness, he will be condemned to 
pay A. For the internal purposes of the ecclesiastical system, that is not a 
particularly evil result, because the parishioner will no doubt be protected 
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against B. But suppose B. brings a common law action for the value of the 
tithes plus punitive damages (as in some circumstances he was entitle to do 
by 2/3 Edw.6, c 13.) If B.'s lease is actually senior, he will have no trouble 
21 M.8 Jac. C.P. 12 Coke, 65; Croke Jac., 629 (dated H. 8 and mislabelled K.B.) 
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proving it by one witness at common law and will recover, the parish- 
ioner paying twice. To this point specifically, the Court replied that the 
parishioner has no complaint, because he would not have been caught in 
double liability if he had done his duty in the first place. The parish- 
ioner’s duty is to set out his tithes; once he has done so, he has dis- 
charged his obligation to the person entitled to the tithes, whoever that 
may be; if the tithes belong to B. but A. gets there first, B. has no claim 
against the parishioner; if B. sues, either in an ecclesiastical court or at 
common law, all the parishioner need do is plead the setting-out. (Note 
that this reasoning is fairly tough on tithe-payers. Imagine a parishioner 
who knows there is a dispute going on about whom the tithes are leased 
to. He has pretty good reason to think that B. is really entitled, but also 
reason to suppose that if the tithes are set out A. will make off with them. 
So with the intention of doing right and protecting B. he carries the tithes 
off to his own barn -- perfectly willing to satisfy B. when he gets a chance 
to make demand, perfectly willing to deal with A. if he will demand the 
tithes and show convincing evidence of his title, willing to litigate with 
him if necessary, unwilling simply to have his tithes disappear into a du- 
bious claimant’s hands, with possible recriminations from Neighbor B. 
The court spared no pity for a parishioner who got into trouble from such 
good intentions.) 
Going on in more general terms, the Court expressed doubt that eccle- 
siastical courts would in fact insist rigidly on the two-witness rule in such 
cases as the present one. In reality, the judges thought, one witness plus 
some such “vehement presumption” as possession would satisfy the ec- 
clesiastical law. (I.e., in the instant case: Direct proof by one witness that 
the tithes were leased to A., supported by evidence that B. had collected 
tithes from this or other parishioners, would do. To doubt that ecclesiasti- 
cal courts actually had a universal two-witness rule is not, of course, to 
doubt that they applied such a rule rigidly in some instances -- notably, to 
transactions, such as releases and tithe payment, of whose occurrence cor- 
roborative circumstantial evidence was unlikely to exist. Coke and his 
brethren thought its rigid application to such transactions -- including 
documents purporting to comprise them -- entirely reasonable.) Then the 
Court took exception to speaking of a “one-witness-rule” as if the com- 
mon law recognized such an animal. (Cf. my discussion of Wood v. 
Churley above.) Nothing is established at common law, the judges 
pointed out, because one witness swears to it; facts are established be- 
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cause the jury is persuaded in its “conscience” that they are true. There- 
fore there is no easily intelligible sense in which a two-witness rule in a 
jurisdiction that does not use the jury system conflicts with the common 
law. Conflict (this comes to saying) implies meeting, responding differ- 
ently in comparable contexts; the two-witness rule does not conflict with 
the common law because the common law has no contexts in which it has 
to choose between a two-witness rule and alternatives. But Prohibitions -- 
the Court went on to say almost expressly -- are warranted only when 
there is conflict (save for those designed to prevent “foreign“ courts from 
entertaining suits to which they have absolutely no title.) Prohibitions 
controlling the interlocutory behavior of ecclesiastical courts are justified 
when it is shown that a statute has been ignored or misconstrued, or when 
it is otherwise made to appear that a legal question governed by the com- 
mon law has been, or is likely to be, mishandled. Prohibition never lies -- 
I think it was the Court’s clear intent to say -- on surmise that an ecclesi- 
astical court proposed to determine matter of fact by standards of its own 
choosing. In the discussion of Roberts’s Case, Coke recounted Foster v. 
Whiscarre (above), among whose holdings he numbered a general con- 
demnation of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. 
Peppes’s Case and Roberts’s departed flatly from the King’s Bench 
tradition. Whether or not Coke’s influence made the King’s Bench more 
restrained, that court continued to grant two-witness-rule Prohibitions. 
Did the Common Pleas persist in disapproval of them? There are three 
cases in point from Lord Hobart’s Chief Justiceship (1613-23), and most 
of the Caroline cases come from that court. All three cases from the Ho- 
bart court go against the Cokean doctrine. 
In Chibborne v. , 22 the Court did not have to decide whether 
to block enforcement of the two-witness rule, but it said unmistakably 
that it would do so in a legacy-release case if called to. In the instant case, 
a release was proved by only one witness, but the ecclesiastical plaintiff 
(administrator of the legatee) did not dispute that the release was made. 
Rather, he maintained that the releasor was an idiot. The Court held that 
his mental capacity was triable in the ecclesiastical court and denied a 
Prohibition. By way of dictum, the Chief Justice, apparently speaking for 
22 M. 15 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f.42b (anonymous); Hobart, 188 (named but undated.) 
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the Court, said that insistence on two witnesses to prove a legacy release 
could not be suffered when comparable evidence was not required to es- 
tablish discharges of common law duties more solemn than legacies (re- 
cognizances, judgement debts, and the like.) On the other hand, Hobart 
said, the common law should not interfere with ecclesiastical decisions 
concerning the competence of witnesses. Two judges disagreed on an- 
other case which Justice Hutton put by the way: A legatee releases at the 
age of seventeen; when he later sued for his legacy, the executor pleads 
the release. In Hutton’s opinion, Prohibition would not lie; Justice Winch 
disagreed. Although the report does not say so, I assume Hutton meant 
that Prohibition would not lie on surmise that the release was disallowed. 
(I.e., even if the ecclesiastical court took the legal position that a minor is 
bound by his legacy release, at least a minor old enough to have some 
sort of putative responsibility for this acts.) Assuming his concurrence 
with the dictum on the two-witness rule, Hutton’s opinion in the nonage 
case adds an accent to it: Ecclesiastical courts are free to follow their own 
standards, at least within reason, with respect to the age of responsibility, 
but not with respect to evidence. Winch’s contrary opinion is more pre- 
dictable: Although, as in the principal case, there is no reason to prevent 
the ecclesiastical court from trying such a fact as idiocy, when there is no 
sign that its standards differ from the common law’s, once there is any 
sign of deviance, substantive or evidentiary, Prohibition lies. 
In Conisby v. Watts,23 a Prohibition was granted essentially to block 
application of ecclesiastical evidentiary rules, but there was a reinforcing 
factor. A. devised £100 to Elizabeth, his granddaughter, who married 
Watts. A.’s executor, B., paid the legacy in 3 Jac. and took an acquittance 
under Watts’s hand and seal; the acquittance was witnessed by two peo- 
ple. Watts later sued C., B.’s executor, for the £100. C. surmised that the 
two witnesses were dead and the ecclesiastical court would not accept the 
acquittance without their testimony. It was further surmised that live testi- 
mony to verify the original witnesses’ signatures on the acquittance 
was rejected, as well as other evidence (writings plus live witnesses to 
prove that the acquittance was in Watts’s hand, and further testimony by 
persons who had heard Watts confess making the acquittance.) Finally,
23 M. 16 Jac. C.P. Hobart, 247; Hutton, 22; Helty; 132 (misdated H. 4 Car.): Harl. 4813, f.16b; 
Harl. 5149, f.245. 
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the ecclesiastical court was alleged to be unwilling to accept a husband's
release of his wife’s legacy when she was not party to the suit. In the
nature of the case, the last claim was bound to be speculative -- a mat-
ter of saying that ecclesiastical courts (notoriously) would not consis- 
tently uphold the husband’s power to bind the wife (cf. the case in Sec- 
tion II above on this point.) For if the acquittance was excluded on 
evidentiary grounds, plaintiff-in-Prohibition could hardly say that it was 
in fact excluded on substantive grounds -- or excluded for what, so far as 
appears, must be improper legal reasons. Prohibition would probably lie 
on surmise that a husband’s release had been disallowed, but not on mere 
suggestion that it might be. In this case, if the judges suspected that the 
ecclesiastical court might not respect the husband’s release, the obvious 
way to cut it off was to prohibit on evidentiary grounds. A court strongly 
opposed to interfering with ecclesiastical canons of proof might grant 
Consultation on condition that the husband’s, acquittance not be excluded 
as a matter of law -- thereby permitting the ecclesiastical court to exclude 
it in practice by insisting on evidentiary rules with the kind of unreason- 
able rigidity displayed in this case. The Common Pleas in Conisby v. 
Watts simply granted general Prohibition. 
Justice Hutton cited a Hawkins v. Stockdale, in which a Prohibition 
was granted because an ecclesiastical court would not accept one witness 
plus circumstantial evidence to prove a modus. Note the affinity of that 
precedent to the principal case: The parishioner in Hawkins v. Stockdale 
presumably chose to stick with the ecclesiastical court instead of seeking 
the Prohibition he could have had on bare surmise of the modus. When he 
came to seek a Prohibition, he put his surmise on an evidentiary basis, for 
whatever reason. (I cannot suppose he needed to, sed quaere. Could it 
ever be argued that the conduct of ecclesiastical courts undercut the pre- 
sumption that modi were not respected there? Suppose a man pleads his 
modus, has his evidence disallowed, takes two ecclesiastical appeals 
solely on the ground that the disallowance of evidence was improper, 
loses, then seeks a Prohibition on bare surmise of his modus. Is there any 
way for the parson to establish the events in the ecclesiastical system as 
facts, and then at least to argue that the evidentiary decision by the eccle- 
siastical court was uncontrollable, or that the parishioner had delayed too 
274 
Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule 
long?) In any event, the effect of not prohibiting to block enforcement of the 
two-witness rule would be to let the ecclesiastical court get away with 
awarding tithes in kind where there was enough evidence to make it quite 
likely that the modus could be established at common law. So in Conisby 
v. Watts: the effect of not prohibiting on evidentiary grounds would be to 
let the ecclesiastical court enforce indirectly the "unlawful" view of marital 
relations it could reasonably be suspected of entertaining. There is a spe- 
cial sense in which awarding tithes in kind where there is probably a mo- 
dus and qualifying the husband's power to bind his wife are both 
"anti-common law" acts. The sense is not strictly logical, but "moral" -- 
reverence for custom and the conception of husband and wife as one per- 
son were very important values embodied in the common law. 
Owing to the lurking matter of the husband's power, and also to the ex- 
treme rigidity with which the two-witness rule was insisted on, Conisby 
v. Watts can be played down as a precedent for two-witness-rule Prohibi- 
tions in general. One might say (in a Cokean spirit) that such Prohibitions 
ought to be eschewed, but that the courts must retain a certain discretion 
to prevent the two-witness rule from being the means to such substan- 
tively unacceptable ends as depriving a husband of power to bind his 
wife. Perhaps "discretion" should be emphasized: The judges may look at 
the circumstances in order to discern whether evidentiary requirements 
really are being used to subvert the common law. In Conisby v. Watts, 
there was excellent reason for so concluding, for strong substitute proofs 
had been rejected when witnesses in the unpredictable course of nature 
had died. An executor who pleaded a husband's release of his wife's leg- 
acy and did not pretend to have had the transaction witnessed by more 
than one person perhaps ought not have a Prohibition -- no more than if 
the man had released his own legacy. An ecclesiastical court insisting on 
a reasonable sort of "transaction formalism" would not appear to be aim- 
ing at an unacceptable substantive goal; contra if the transaction was sur- 
rounded with due precautions and the ecclesiastical court seemed to be 
trying to make proof impossibly difficult. So with Hawkins v. Stockdale: 
Granted that two-witness-rule Prohibitions should be avoided in general, 
in the unlikely event that the rule is used to stop a man from establishing 
a probable modus the attempt should be blocked -- for the ecclesiastical 
courts' respect for modi is doubtful, a man's right to the benefit of custom 
is especially important, and a surmise of disallowed evidence in a modus 
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case is probably misconceived anyhow. However, although Conisby v. Watts 
and Hawkins v. Stockdale can be mitigated as general-purpose precedents, it 
does not follow that the Common Pleas judges in 1618 would have regarded 
them as discretionary exceptions, for those judges may not have shared the dis-
approbation of two-witness-rule Prohibitions characteristic of Coke's court. 
That they did not share it comes out clear1y in the last case from Ho- 
bart's Chief Justiceship, Devenish v. Downes24 The Court's thinking was 
not unanimous or uncomplicated, however. Good MS. reports enable us 
to follow it. Devenish v. Downes was a simple tithe suite, in which the 
parishioner claimed simply that he had paid. He sought a Prohibition on 
the ground that his proof of payment by one witness had been disallowed, 
that witness being his servant. Note the last point: The parishioner himself 
did not claim that the two-witness rule had been enforced against him al- 
together flatly; he admitted that the proof had been disallowed in part be- 
cause of the identity of his witness, a servant whose objectivity could be 
questioned; he was in effect asking not only that the two-witness rule be 
blocked, but also that the ecclesiastical court be prevented from excluding 
proof solely by a servant as ipso facto incredible. 
When the case was first discussed, both sides were represented by 
leading counsel (Serjeant Harris for the parishioner, Serjeant Davies for 
the parson.) On that Occasion, Davies made the basic Cokean argument: 
Prohibitions of this sort could be the means of depriving ecclesiastical 
courts of jurisdiction almost without limit. Justice Winch spoke first from 
the Bench, in favor of prohibiting. He expressly used Conisby v. Watts 
as authority (" ... I was of this opinion in the case of Lady Conisby v. 
Watts as well ..." i.e., Winch apparently saw no basis for distinguishing.) 
Winch also argued from the well-known rule that setting out tithes con- 
verts them into the parson's chattels, so that the parson can maintain an 
action of trespass against a stranger who makes off with the tithes, while 
the parishioner cannot. In the report, he only states that rule. I take his 
meaning to be: The common law has a particular interest in a transaction - 
- setting out of tithes -- which constitutes a transfer of secular property in 
goods as well as satisfaction of an ecclesiastical duty. Even if ecclesiasti- 
24 M.-H. 17 Jac. C.P. Harl. 4813, f.29; Harl. 5149, f.347b; Harg. 30, f.64. 
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cal courts cannot be prevented from applying their evidentiary standards 
to purely ecclesiastical transactions, they should not be free to apply them 
when the common law is also interested in whether the transaction took 
place. 
Justice Warburton (the senior puisne Justice, who became a member of 
the Court six years before Coke’s appointment as Chief Justice, in con- 
trast with Winch, who served under Coke for about two years at the end 
of his tenure) disagreed. Warburton repeated the Cokean argument and 
relied expressly on the decisive Alcock v. Peppes. That case having been 
cited, a curious sequel took place, beautifully illustrative of the unreliable 
use of authority in 17th-century jurisprudence. The record of Alcock v. 
Peppes was brought into court (plainly, the judges were interested, and 
perhaps disturbed, by Warburton’s claim that there was a unanimous anti- 
Prohibition precedent bearing Coke’s imprimatur.) On inspection, the 
roll of Alcock v. Peppes showed no Consultation! The case appeared on 
the record as a Prohibition granted to block the two-witness rule in a leg- 
acy-release case and never reversed by Consultation, contrary to Warbur- 
ton’s memory. Ample law-report evidence demonstrates that the record 
was either simply wrong (a clerk failed to get around to recording the 
Consultation) or misleading owing to accident (no Consultation was actu- 
ally issued because the executor saw that the Court was against him and 
settled with the legatee without further ecclesiastical litigation.) The dis- 
covery must have taken the wind out of Warburton’s sails; it may even 
have convinced him that his memory was wrong, for he seems in the end 
to have changed his mid and agreed to a Prohibition in Devenish v. 
Downes. Several other record-precedents (none of them cases of which I 
have reports) were meanwhile cited in support of evidentiary Prohibi- 
tions. 25 Even if Warburton stuck to his memory of Alcock v. Peppes, he 
was outnumbered. 
25 (1) Audley v. Leather, H. 36 Eliz. C. P.: The question was whether tithes had been set out. 
Prohibition granted on surmise that proof by two witnesses was disallowed, both witnesses being 
the tithe-payer’s servants. (According to Harl. 5149, Harl. 4813 represents this case as involving 
disallowance of proof by one witness.) 
(2) Reynard v. Gole, M. 39/40 Eliz. C.P.: Payment of a legacy provable only by one witness; 
Prohibition granted. 
(3) Clark v. Wall, H. 14 Jac. C.P.: Payment of tithes provable only by one witness: Prohibition. 
N.b: Two Elizabethan precedents and one from the Hobart Court itself. 
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When the case was taken up again, Serjeant Harris, for the parishioner, 
argued from custom in the looser sense (not usage of the sort that estab- 
lished prescriptive titles, but those "ways people ordinarily do things" of 
which the law may sometimes take account.) Men do not usually bring 
in outside witnesses to watch them set out tithes; the ordinary witnesses 
of that transaction are only those who happen to be working in the fields, 
very possibly a single workman employed by the tithe-payer, as in this 
case. Ecclesiastical courts should not, by Harris's theory, be permitted to 
demand a standard of care and formality higher than common practice 
and assumptions endorse. (Harris may have meant to imply what this ar- 
gument points to: "Common practice and assumptions" do recommend 
having transactions comprised in documents witnessed -- leases, releases, 
and the like. That being so, perhaps the law's title to step in with specifi- 
cations -- e.g., that there must be two witnesses to a release -- is compara- 
tively strong. In contexts hardly thought of as "business," where 
traditions of informality prevail, ecclesiastical law has less right to intrude 
with requirements that will inconvenience people and make them change 
their ways.) 
Chief Justice Hobart then gave his somewhat hesitant opinion. In the 
abstract, he was clear for Prohibition: Two witnesses ought not to be de- 
manded to prove payment of tithes; moreover, a witness ought not to be 
excluded merely because he is the tithe-payer's servant. Hobart was not 
sure, however, that this case could be decided by applying those abstract 
truths. The surmise admitted that the ecclesiastical court had given sen- 
tence against the parishioner and attributed the sentence to the erroneous 
exclusion of this evidence. This is what bothered Hobart: "...if it could be 
made apparent to us that sentence was given there against the defendant 
for defect of number in the witnesses, I would grant Prohibition, But if 
his credit is impeached there, though he have several witnesses, if they 
for any exception to their credit give sentence against the defendant, yet it 
is no cause of Prohibition. And it is hard to make it appear to this court 
that the reason for their sentence in the ecclesiastical court was solely for 
the defect of number in the witnesses, for that is never mentioned in their 
sentence. And if it does not appear of us, then on such suggestion they 
could be prohibited where they ought not." I take it that the Chief Justice 
would have had no qualms if the complaint of disallowed evidence had 
been made before sentence, that he was in effect specifying one situation 
where Prohibition must be sought before sentence. 
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In one way, I find Hobart's reasoning strange. If all the facts stated by 
the surmise are assumed to be true (tithes were claimed -- the sole evi- 
dence that they were paid was ruled out -- parishioner was condemned to 
pay the tithes as if they had not been paid), how can the sentence not fol- 
low from the exclusion? How could any other sentence be given, once the 
error of excluding the evidence was committed? It seems to me, however, 
that there are two answers to this objection: (a) Be it noted to start with 
that Hobart was talking about any possible surmise -- whether the de- 
pendence of a sentence on an evidentiary exclusion could ever be made to 
appear in an airtight manner -- not about any contingent defects in the 
surmise in this case. Hobart was inclined to think that such dependence 
could never be made to appear, and we have asked directly whether that 
is true. It is true, but only if "make it appear" is given a particular inter- 
pretation. Obviously I can "make it appear" (subject to ascertainment that 
I am telling the truth) that X. is the cause of Y. if I say so. Hobart's posi- 
tion implies that any explicit causal language in a surmise should be over- 
looked. The solid legal reason for so holding is that the cause of a judicial 
act is a poor jury issue. How is a jury (especially on the ancient theory 
that jurors draw on their own knowledge) supposed to know whether an 
ecclesiastical judge reached conclusion-X "because" he made evidentiary- 
ruling-Y and for no other reason? Yet claims to Prohibitions in such 
cases as this must be issuable; otherwise any tithe-payer could try his luck 
in the ecclesiastical court, wait until sentence turned out to be unfavor- 
able, then have a Prohibition on a feigned surmise that the sentence was 
give "because" certain evidence was excluded--say documentary evidence 
in support of oral testimony. Conceivably the fact of exclusion could be 
treated as issuable even if the causal connection were not.) Then, if ex- 
plicit causal language is disregarded, all plaintiff-in-Prohibition can 
"make appear" is that X. happened and later Y. happened. Can the Court - 
- assuming the question to be appropriate for the Court, not for a jury -- 
ever infer a causal connection without committing the post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy? If it ever can (as my questions above say), it ought 
to be able to in a case like the present one, where sentence is known to 
have been given against A. and all evidence in support of a defense suffi- 
cient to discharge A. from liability is known to have been excluded. Nev- 
ertheless, in strictly logical terms, a showing of sequentiality does not 
"make it appear" that a causal connection exists between the events in the 
sequence. 
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(b) There is some legal point in insisting on logic for general purposes, 
even though the point in this case is exiguous. For other cases can be 
imagined in which it would be genuinely difficult to decide whether a 
sentence really depended on an exclusion of evidence. (For example, in 
Conisby v. Watts, if there had been a sentence in that case. The ecclesias- 
tical court there could have admitted proof of the release and still given 
sentence against the executor, on the theory that a husband may not re- 
lease his wife's legacy. Application of that particular theory would prob- 
ably have been stopped by Prohibition, but that is not entirely certain, and 
other theories on which ecclesiastical courts might act were clearly not 
controllable.) It is arguable that the best rule is for the judges to use com- 
mon sense -- prohibit when a sentence in all probability does depend on 
an improper exclusion, do not prohibit when there is a reasonable chance 
(or some appreciable chance, or a strong chance) that it does not. But it 
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is also arguable, in Hobart's support, that the courts are better off avoid-
ing the question of an ecclesiastical sentence's ''cause" so far as pos- 
sible (hence avoiding such problems as whether there must be a "reason- 
able," "appreciable," or "strong" chance of non-dependence.) The 
simplest means to that end would be a flat rule that Prohibitions on sur- 
mise of improper exclusion of evidence must be sought before sentence. 
Such a rule would have something to recommend it as a compromise in 
the troubled area of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. In Devenish v. 
Downs, Serjeant Davies, Justice Warburton, and Hobart all touched on 
the danger of fictionalization and abuse. Coke's general condemnation of 
two-witness-rule Prohibitions was obviously too strong for most judges to 
swallow. To adopt a "before-sentence-or-not-at-ail" rule would have cut 
off some of the opportunity for abuse and made a troubling form of Pro- 
hibition harder to get, without doing away with a type of Prohibition on 
whose necessity most judges agreed. 
Justice Hutton, who spoke after Hobart, went for the heart of the Chief 
Justice's argument. "If such a suggestion is made as is supposed, it is is- 
suable," Hutton said, "scil. whether that is the cause of their sentence or 
not." In other words, an express surmise that a sentence depends on an 
evidentiary exclusion can go to a jury on the point of causality; the objec- 
tions above are no objections; if the jury thinks the exclusion explains the 
sentence, the Prohibition stands (assuming the verdict is otherwise favor- 
able to the parishioner, if other facts could be put in issue at the same 
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time -- quaere de hoc ); if the jury thinks the ecclesiastical judge reached 
his sentence by an independent path, the Prohibition falls. In the instant 
case, Hutton thought the surmise made it appear clearly enough that the 
sentence depended on the exclusion, as by common sense it obviously 
did, for he joined Winch in support of a Prohibition. Brownlow, the 
Court's learned Prothonotary, came to the aid of Winch and Hutton, say- 
ing that there were precedents of Prohibitions in "such case." I assume he 
meant in cases where the Prohibition was sought after sentence and there 
could be a question of the sentence's dependence on the exclusion, not 
simply two-witness-rule Prohibitions in general. 
Hobart was not converted, but he was perhaps moved by the two 
judges and Prothonotary against him. For he now said that if a Prohibition 
should be granted, it should be qualified -- "if that be the cause of their 
sentence." The ecclesiastical court, that is, should be permitted to exe- 
cute the sentence "at its peril," if it was honestly convinced that it would 
have given the same sentence even if the evidence had been admitted. 
The report then says (whether the reporter's observation or Hobart's 
skeptical comment on his own proposal), "and yet, as I conceive, it is du- 
bious whether that would be available [= of any avail] to the party." In the 
instant case, the qualified Prohibition almost certainly would not help the 
parson, since the sentence almost certainly did depend on the exclusion. 
Even in less clear cases, I too should wonder whether ecclesiastical courts 
and plaintiffs would often dare to proceed. Would they not risk attach- 
ment for actually disobeying the Prohibition, and upon such attachment 
could jury trial on the point of causality (the very thing Hobart was doubt- 
ful about) be avoided? If, on the other hand, such a qualified Prohibition 
were taken to imply willingness to trust the ecclesiastical court, it would 
be of little use to the other party (plaintiff-in-Prohibition.) 
With the Court thus divided, the case was again adjourned. It was 
probably argued again. Harl. 5149 says there was "much debate in several 
terms at the Bar and Bench." That is probably an exaggeration, since the 
other reports indicate that the case was begun in Michaelmas and finished 
in Hilary, 17 Jac. In any event, on some occasion Serjeant Davies tried 
another interesting argument against prohibiting: He invoked the prelimi- 
nary proof requirement of 2/3 Edw. 6 as (presumably) a sign of the rea- 
sonableness, or acceptability in common law contexts, of two-witness 
rules. On the same occasion, Davies tried to shift the emphasis away from 
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the two-witness rule as such, to the competence of the single witness pro- 
vided in this case, as if to say, "Even if ecclesiastical courts are not free to 
insist on two witnesses in some cases, including this one, they should be 
free to insist on at least one competent witness. And their standards of 
competence -- at any rate the one applied here, that a servant of the tithe- 
payer unsupported by other evidence is not competent -- are not within 
common law control." However, Davies's further efforts did not help. 
Eventually, the Court agreed that a straightforward Prohibition would lie. 
Harl. 4813 says expressly "per totam Curiam," so it would seem that Ho- 
bart and Warburton were converted at last. Even so, the decision was 
slightly qualified. Justice Hutton, the author of Harl. 4813, reports "and 
yet it was referred to be ordered by me at Assizes." Though the less 
authoritative Harl. 5149 says Prohibition was granted, I think there is 
every reason to follow Hutton's account. He does not say a Prohibition 
was granted, only, in effect, that the Court agreed that one should be, or if 
necessary would be, "and yet" (the point would seem to be) one or two of 
the judges did not quite like the conclusion the arguments and precedents 
drove them to. They did not quite like setting another precedent. So they 
put off formal action, trusting Hutton to treat with the parties at Assizes 
and bring them to a settlement in the light of the Court's opinion. Ho- 
bart's Common Pleas never broke quite cleanly with Coke's position on 
two-witness-rule Prohibitions, though it tended away from it. 
Caroline cases from the Common Pleas show somewhat mixed results, 
certainly no return to Coke's view. In a case of 1627, 26 an executor 
sought a Prohibition because a bishop's chancellor would not let him 
prove a will by one witness. (It is probably significant that a diocesan 
court was involved, rather than the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, the 
"big-time," experienced testamentary court, which would not have in- 
sisted on two witnesses for unchallenged, prima facie probate). Justices 
Hutton and Croke were puzzled as to how a Prohibition could be framed 
in this case (they sound as if they would gladly prohibit if they could 
overcome their puzzlement.) As they put it, the executor was trying to 
prohibit his own suit, but their meaning was clearly not that self-prohibi- 
tion is objectionable in itself. The executor was not seeking to prohibit a 
26 H. 2 Car. C.P. Littleton, 20; Harl. 5148 f.114. 
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suit in which he was plaintiff on the ground that the defendant had intro- 
duced a claim determinable at common law, as in the usual self-prohibi- 
tion case. He was seeking the prohibit a suit in which there was no 
defendant, a suit which existed only in the form of his own ex parte app-
lication for probate, which the ecclesiastical court would not entertain. In
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other words, he was asking the Court to "prohibit" the chancellor from
doing what the Chancellor did not propose to do unless another witness 
was produced. In effect, he needed a Mandamus and was trying to make
a Prohibition do the job. Justice Yelverton was more optimistic. "We
may prohibit him from condemning the will because there is only one
witness," Yelverton suggested. I suppose that means, "We cannot order
him to accept one-witness proof by the 'Thou shalt not' language a Pro-
hibition necessarily uses, but we can achieve the same effect by say- 
ing, 'Thou shalt not condemn the will by virtue of the two-witness rule.'" 
Exactly what an ecclesiastical judge forbidden to condemn a will for a 
particular reason would and would not be free to do might make a ques- 
tion, but he would certainly be put in a touchy position. For example, 
could he refuse to entertain a legacy suit founded on the will without risk- 
ing attachment for "condemning" the will in violation of the Prohibition 
and having, at best, to argue his way out of the charge? The judges put 
off disposing of this odd case until precedents were searched; nothing 
more is reported of it. In support of two-witness-rule Prohibitions in gen- 
eral, Hutton and Croke said that Prohibition is "always" granted if proof 
of payment of tithes by one witness is not accepted. Always? 
In Eaton and Morrice's Case, 27 an unusual two-witness rule Prohibi- 
tion was denied. The ecclesiastical suit was for defamation -- imputing 
adultery to a married woman -- but the circumstances were out of the or- 
dinary. Eaton and Morrice were "reputed" churchwardens, but had not 
taken the required oath and therefore were not properly installed in the of- 
fice. Undertaking to act as churchwardens, they presented the woman for 
adultery "on common fame" (i.e., as someone generally reputed or re- 
ported to be an adulteress -- a proper-enough presentment for proper 
churchwardens.) The woman and her husband sued for defamation. 
They were on the point of having sentence given in their favor when the 
27 P. 3 Car. C.P. Harl. 5148, f.133b. 
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churchwardens appealed. A prohibition to the appellate court was sought 
"because this presentment cannot be proved except by one witness, [and 
therefore] they sentence the husband and wife." Such are the words of the
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report. I assume they mean that the appellate court (unlike the court of first 
instance) refused to conclude that the defamatory act (presentment) ever 
took place unless at least two witnesses would swear that it had, and 
therefore that a sentence against the husband and wife (charging them 
with costs) was given, wherefore they sought to prohibit the suit in which 
they were plaintiffs. But the report is obscure. The alterative meaning 
would be that the churchwardens were seeking the Prohibition, sentence 
having been given for the husband and wife, on the ground that they were 
improperly prevented from proving that the alleged defamatory act was a 
presentment and immune as such. (Cf. Phillips v. Piper, in Section II 
above, as to whether defamation liability could be attached to an untrue 
ecclesiastical presentment. Quaere whether that problem should be 
resolved the same way for true and "reputed" churchwardens.) In any
event, the Court denied the Prohibition -- as the report says, "for
they were presented first, and also it is a cause in which this court has no
cognizance." I do not know what the first clause means, but the sec- 
ond is clear. It would be surprising to find the two-witness rule blocked 
when its effect was to make it harder to establish an act of defamation. It 
would be almost equally surprising for the common law to prevent eccle- 
siastical courts from using their own standards of evidence for the pur- 
pose of unravelling the kind of problem presented by Eaton and Morrice 
-- whether an official ecclesiastical act performed by persons pretending 
and supposed to be ecclesiastic officers, but not lawfully such, constituted 
an act of ecclesiastical defamation. 
Denn's Case 28 only touches on conflicting evidentiary standards as a 
cause of Prohibition. Deferring the details: the upshot of this case was 
that a suit to revoke a mixed will was prohibited in toto, not because evi- 
dence had been disallowed, but because the judges thought that the eccle- 
siastical court simply ought not to handle such a suit, to the possible 
28 T. 4 Car. C.P. Croke Car., 115. 
Evidentiary Disallowance Surmise: The Two-Witness Rule 
detriment of common law interests in the land. It was said at the Bar, 
however, that the ecclesiastical court would insist on unacceptable stand- 
ards of evidence if it were left to determine the claim of revocation. In 
this instance, it was not the two-witness rule that counsel pointed to, but 
over strict and rigid exclusionary rules -- the unwillingness of ecclesiasti- 
cal courts to accept the evidence of servants, kinsmen, and legatees whose 
testimony could be presented to a common law jury. The Court may have 
been moved to prohibit in part because it shared counsel’s opinion that 
improper evidentiary standards would be insisted on, possibly necessitat- 
ing a Prohibition later on if one were denied, or granted only quoad ter- 
ram, at this point. (As to the possibility of a partial Prohibition, which 
was discussed: The judges would probably have been more willing to 
consider that solution if their faith in the ecclesiastical court’s evidentiary 
standards had been greater. To permit an ecclesiastical trial quoad bona 
and a common law trial quoad terram is not so bad if the chance of the 
two trials’ coming to different conclusions is relatively slight. Rigid evi- 
dentiary requirements -- whereby every piece of evidence going to show 
that the will was revoked might be ruled out in the ecclesiastical proceed- 
ings -- would magnify the chance of conflicting results.) 
In a case of 1630, 29 the Common Pleas refused to speculate as to 
whether proof by one witness would be ruled out, insisting that actual and 
issuable disallowance of evidence be surmised before an evidentiary Pro- 
hibition would be considered. Whether a Prohibition would be have been 
granted on a firm surmise in the circumstances of this case is a question 
of some interest, to which a confident answer is impossible. All one can 
say is that the Court did not rule out the possibility. A parishioner being 
sued for tithes claimed a written, but unsealed, agreement to take 18/ in 
lieu of tithes for seven years. He sought a Prohibition primarily on the 
theory that the contract was intrinsically determinable at common law 
(i.e., did not say that the agreement had been disallowed, just that it ex- 
isted.) The Court refused to prohibit on that basis. The parishioner also 
said that he could prove payment of the 18/ for two of the seven years, 
but that his proof was by one witness, which the ecclesiastical court 
would not accept. The alternative theory of the surmise was that, if left to 
the ecclesiastical court, he would not be given as much opportunity as he 
29 M. 6 Car. C.P. Harl. 4813. f88b. 
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deserved to prove that the contract existed. He had his piece of paper, but 
the lack of a seal reduced its value; whether he had any witnesses to the 
making of the contract does not appear; he had evidence that the contract 
had been performed for two years -- i.e., that 18/ had been paid to the par- 
son, whence, combined with evidence that tithes in kind had not been 
paid, it might be inferred that the agreement comprised in the writing was 
actually entered into; the last item of evidence, he claimed, would be ren- 
dered valueless by improper ecclesiastical insistence on two witnesses. 
The Court refused to consider the alternative theory because it was not 
claimed that proof of the payments by a single witnesses had actually 
been offered. If that hurdle were overcome, the question would be: May 
ecclesiastical courts insist on two witnesses to prove a fact which is not it- 
self in issue, but which, if established, would provide a good basis for in- 
ference as to the matter at issue? Previous cases provide no ready clues. 
One might argue that the two-witness rule may not be applied to the di- 
rect proof of transactions or documents, but that it may be applied to facts 
whose value as a basis for inference may be variously judged. Per contra, 
one might argue that the two-witness rule is a reasonable formalistic re- 
quirement for transactions and documents, but that is has no place once 
inferential proof of such transactions is admitted in principle, as a substi- 
tute for, or supplement to, direct proof. A further question implicit in our 
case would be whether the ecclesiastical court is obliged to admit inferen- 
tial proof of a contract at all -- instead of direct proof; to supplement di- 
rect proof by one witness; or merely to add weight to direct proof which, 
if credited, is perfectly adequate by ecclesiastical standards. (The argu- 
ments might vary, depending on which of those three functions the infer- 
ential evidence was assumed to have.) 
The last of our Common Pleas cases, Warner v. Barret, 30 is badly re- 
ported, but through the obscurity one catches glimpses of the judges' con- 
tinuing bafflement by two-witness-rule Prohibitions. In the principal 
case, Warner sued for a legacy and the executor pleaded "Plene adminis- 
travit." He sought a Prohibition on the ground that he was not allowed to 
sustain his plea by a single witness. The report gives no conclusion. We 
have seen that ecclesiastical handling of pleas of "No assets" or "Plene 
30 3-7 Car. C.P. Hetley, 87. 
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administravit" in legacy suits was not usually interfered with. One might 
therefore expect ecclesiastical courts to be left free to use their own evi- 
dentiary standards -- as they were allowed to use their judgment about the 
general condition of the estate -- in determining whether an executor was 
in a position to meet unpaid legacies. 
Some of the judges in Warner v. Barret may have been inclined to that 
position, but it is hard to tell. For the rest, the report shows them ruminat- 
ing inconclusively on evidentiary Prohibitions in general. Chief Justice 
Richardson asserted their legitimacy and said that refusal to accept one 
witness to payment of tithes is cause of Prohibition. He seems hard put at 
first to distinguish the present case. Justice Croke grasped at the respect- 
able theory that ecclesiastical courts may not be prevented from applying 
their standards of proof to pleas that only say an ecclesiastical duty has 
been discharged. Richardson seems to latch onto that point and conclude 
that the "Plene administravit" in the present case was such a plea-in-dis- 
charge. What Justice Hutton was trying to say is hopelessly lost in the re- 
port, except that he cited a Hawkin's case to prove that refusal to allow 
one witness for payment of tithes (the paradigm, one would think, of a plea 
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-in-discharge) is grounds for Prohibitions. From Justice Yelverton's speech, one
distinction emerges coherently: If an executor pleads simply that he paid a pec-
uniary legacy, the ecclesiastical court is free to insist on two witnesses; but if
the legacy was twenty oxen and the executor claims that he paid a sum of
money which was accepted in lieu of the oxen, then common law, or one-witness,  
proof must be accepted under pain of Prohibition. The distinction is along 
the lines of pleas-in-discharge ("I owed £5 as a legacy and I paid £5") versus 
"collateral" defenses (in effect "I owed twenty oxen as a legacy, but a 
contract to substitute £5 for the oxen was made and executed".) In the 
principal case, Yelverton seems inclined to say that "Plene administravit" 
should be tried by one witness because the common law and ecclesiastical 
definitions of assets sometimes differed. (As if to say, "Because the com- 
mon law could insist that its legal definition of assets be accepted by ec- 
clesiastical courts, it may also insist that the question of whether the 
estate has assets to satisfy legacies be tried by common law evidentiary 
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standards.") Finally, Yelverton cited the dictum in Bagnall v. Stokes, with 
apparent approval. Croke speaks again at the end of the report to agree 
that one witness to payment of tithes must be accepted, without showing 
how that claim is anything but a plea-in-discharge. I repeat, the report of 
Warner v. Barret is execrable, not a fair indication of the judges' thinking. 
I have taken notice of it because for all its obscurity it is of some value as 
evidence that after many years and many cases the principles of two-wit- 
ness-rule Prohibition were still up in the air. 
In Dickes et uxor v. Brown, 31 the Caroline King's Bench laid down a 
clear distinction between substantive and evidentiary disallowance sur- 
mises in "No assets" cases, but only by way of dictum. I have discussed 
this case in Vol. I for its primarily procedural interest. In substance, a Pro- 
hibition had been granted either on the bare surmise that the adequacy of 
an estate to support legacies was in question or on the surmise that "No 
assets" had been disallowed. (The reports are confusing and conflicting. 
Benloe and Noy represent the case a straightforward "No assets" problem: 
Legatee sues, executor pleads "Plene administravit" or "No assets" and 
surmises disallowance of the plea. Bulstrode, much the best report of the 
case's unfolding, says that the executor won in the ecclesiastical court on 
the plea of "No assets," whereupon the legatee first appealed, then de- 
serted the appeal and sought a Prohibition. If that is what happened, disal- 
lowance of "No assets" could obviously not be the ground of the surmise. 
A remark by counsel in Bulstrode suggests that there was no disallow- 
ance-surmise, but a bare allegation that the condition of the estate was in 
question, which is compatible with the legatee's being plaintiff-in Prohi- 
bition -- viz. accuses the plaintiff of using the Prohibition vexatiously, 
having deserted his appeal, to make the other party spend more on litiga- 
tion to recover his legacy than it is worth. I therefore conclude that Bul- 
strode's initial statement of the case is garbled -- that the executor lost in 
the original court, appealed, then switched to Prohibition. I so state the 
case in discussing its procedural aspects. As to whether the Prohibition 
was obtained on bare surmise or substantive disallowance surmise: Dod- 
deridge in Bulstrode says the parties were "at issue ... in the Court Chris- 
31 3 Bulstrode 314 (dated M. 1 Car.): Benloe, 139 (dated H. 1 sub. nom. Brown v. Dixe) and 170 
(dated P. 2); Noy, 77 (sub. nom. Dixye v. Brown, undated.) 
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tian touching fully administered." That means the plea of "No assets" 
could not have been disallowed, as Noy and Benloe say. Either the com- 
plaint was barely that the sufficiency of the estate was in question, or else 
there was a patently false disallowance surmise.) 
In any event -- abstracting from the procedural complications -- the is- 
sue was whether the Prohibition ought to have been granted, hence 
whether it should be undone by Consultation on motion. The judges 
thought the Prohibition plainly bad. Though they were probably faced 
with a bare surmise, their language at least suggests that they would also 
have disapproved of prohibition on a substantive disallowance surmise. 
They sound affirmative toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction over claims of 
"No Assets" as common "incidents" of legacy suits and seem to take it for 
granted that no ecclesiastical court -- unless one patently in error by its 
own standards and hence correctable by appeal -- would disallow that 
plea as such. More to the point, Justice Dodderidge and then the whole 
Court (Bulstrode) are explicit in saying that disallowance of proof which 
is acceptable by common law standards is grounds for Prohibition in "No 
assets" cases. It is probably fair to infer that only disallowance of evi- 
dence -- insistence that executors meet a too high or rigid standard, or a 
standard too different from what they would encounter in seeking to es- 
tablish that an estate was inadequate to satisfy a common law claim 
against it--would justify Prohibition in this Court's opinion. Though it 
only expressed itself by way of dictum, the Court had no doubt that a 
two-witness-rule surmise would be good -- no qualms about denying the 
ecclesiastical courts their evidentiary standards after conceding their com- 
petence to decide whether estates were sufficient to bear legacies. 
A second report from the Caroline King's Bench, Nicholls v. 
Knowles, 32 is too brief to be meaningful. It says only that a two-witness- 
rule Prohibition was granted in a tithe suit, but gives no information as to 
the kind of issue -- bare payment, lease, contract, etc. -- the rejected evi- 
dence related to. Two further King's Bench cases are more substantial. In 
one, Bellamy v. Alden, 33 an administrator was accounting for his estate in 
an ecclesiastical court, in the process of which he said he had paid a cer- 
32 H. 4 Car. K.B. Harg. 39, f.12. 
33 Early Car. K.B. Latch, 117; Noy, 78 
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tain sum to a creditor. The creditor intervened to challenge the account, 
claiming that the administrator had paid him a smaller sum than the later 
claimed. The administrator verified his account on that item by one wit- 
ness, but the ecclesiastical court considered that proof insufficient and ex- 
communicated the administrator. Justices Dodderidge and Jones, alone in 
court, granted a Prohibition on those facts. As they understood the case, 
however, what they granted was not a two-witness rule Prohibition. For 
Dodderidge and Jones thought that the ecclesiastical court had no busi- 
ness trying the truth of the account, by one witness or a hundred. The ac- 
count should be accepted as offered; if the creditor thought he had more 
coming to him, he should sue at common law, where of course one wit- 
ness would suffice for the administrator. Upon a further hearing, from 
which Dodderidge was absent, some difference of opinion among the 
judges came out, for Chief Justice Crewe thought that the ecclesiastical 
court was entitled to inquire into the truth of the account. Jones then fell 
back on the rejecting of proof by one witness, and on that basis the other 
judges (Crewe and Whitelocke) agreed to the Prohibition. Whitelocke 
was clearly on Crewe's side on the other matter, for he emphasized that 
"the jurisdiction of their court is not taken away, but their proceedings." A 
two-witness-rule Prohibition was granted in Bellamy v. Alden because it 
was the common denominator of a divided Court. 
The last King's Bench case 34 is straight and classical; the Court was 
not unanimous. An executor simply pleaded that he had paid a legacy and 
offered unsuccessfully to prove it by one witness. Three member of the 
Court--Jones, Whitelock and Chief Justice Hyde -- held that Prohibition 
would not lie. Jones, speaking for the majority, said that jurisdiction over 
legacies carries with it the right to try whether a legacy has been paid or 
released by ecclesiastical standards. Jones did, however, make an impor- 
tant distinction, never before clearly stated: If a legatee makes a release of 
several things, including his legacy, and some of the things released are 
common law claims, trial by one witness must be accepted. Justice Croke 
dissented (the same Sir George Croke who appears in the Common Pleas 
cases above -- translated to the King's Bench in October, 1628.) Croke 
rested firmly on the analogy of tithe-payment cases, in which he said that 
34 T. 5 Car. K.B. Harg. 39, f.35b. 
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Prohibition was "usually granted" if two witnesses were insisted on. 
("Usually" probably has its common 17th-century force of "customarily" 
or "regularly," as opposed to the modern ''most of the time.") A touch
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of emotion comes through Croke's concluding words: "... to have 
a prohibition in such case is the privilege of the subject, and I am of 
opinion that there are some precedents in this court of Prohibitions 
granted on this very surmise." There is vehemence in Jones's reply, too: 
"Perhaps some Prohibitions have been granted, but I was never nor will 
be of the same opinion without better reason given than I have heard 
yet." Croke then ordered counsel to search the precedents. With that the 
report ends. Presumably the other judges were willing to defer to Croke's 
strong doubts by delaying denial of the Prohibition pending research. 
Nothing more is heard of this case, and throughout the 1630's there are 
no signs of two-witness-rule Prohibitions. Is that a pure accident, or were 
lawyers pessimistic about obtaining them in the heyday of ecclesiastical 
influence? 

